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authorJo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>2016-08-18 16:02:57 +0200
committerZoltan HERPAI <wigyori@uid0.hu>2016-08-18 16:02:57 +0200
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dropbear: security update to 2016.74
- Security: Message printout was vulnerable to format string injection. If specific usernames including "%" symbols can be created on a system (validated by getpwnam()) then an attacker could run arbitrary code as root when connecting to Dropbear server. A dbclient user who can control username or host arguments could potentially run arbitrary code as the dbclient user. This could be a problem if scripts or webpages pass untrusted input to the dbclient program. - Security: dropbearconvert import of OpenSSH keys could run arbitrary code as the local dropbearconvert user when parsing malicious key files - Security: dbclient could run arbitrary code as the local dbclient user if particular -m or -c arguments are provided. This could be an issue where dbclient is used in scripts. - Security: dbclient or dropbear server could expose process memory to the running user if compiled with DEBUG_TRACE and running with -v The security issues were reported by an anonymous researcher working with Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure www.beyondsecurity.com/ssd.html Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
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