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author | Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io> | 2016-08-18 16:02:57 +0200 |
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committer | Zoltan HERPAI <wigyori@uid0.hu> | 2016-08-18 16:02:57 +0200 |
commit | 39386db0f4f5bb8d2cb524981d889832b0f0dc62 (patch) | |
tree | 8601a3c04437dc424dbc49f7909d9c71a68fb083 /tools/flex | |
parent | 427c57cc606dfc47f54419a672d89d96d2f08b5e (diff) | |
download | master-187ad058-39386db0f4f5bb8d2cb524981d889832b0f0dc62.tar.gz master-187ad058-39386db0f4f5bb8d2cb524981d889832b0f0dc62.tar.bz2 master-187ad058-39386db0f4f5bb8d2cb524981d889832b0f0dc62.zip |
dropbear: security update to 2016.74
- Security: Message printout was vulnerable to format string injection.
If specific usernames including "%" symbols can be created on a system
(validated by getpwnam()) then an attacker could run arbitrary code as root
when connecting to Dropbear server.
A dbclient user who can control username or host arguments could potentially
run arbitrary code as the dbclient user. This could be a problem if scripts
or webpages pass untrusted input to the dbclient program.
- Security: dropbearconvert import of OpenSSH keys could run arbitrary code as
the local dropbearconvert user when parsing malicious key files
- Security: dbclient could run arbitrary code as the local dbclient user if
particular -m or -c arguments are provided. This could be an issue where
dbclient is used in scripts.
- Security: dbclient or dropbear server could expose process memory to the
running user if compiled with DEBUG_TRACE and running with -v
The security issues were reported by an anonymous researcher working with
Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure www.beyondsecurity.com/ssd.html
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/flex')
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