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author | Maximilian Hils <git@maximilianhils.com> | 2016-02-15 14:58:46 +0100 |
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committer | Maximilian Hils <git@maximilianhils.com> | 2016-02-15 14:58:46 +0100 |
commit | 33fa49277a821b9d38e8c9bf0bcf2adcfa2f6f04 (patch) | |
tree | 31914a601302579ff817504019296fd7e9e46765 /docs/howmitmproxy.rst | |
parent | 36f34f701991b5d474c005ec45e3b66e20f326a8 (diff) | |
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diff --git a/docs/howmitmproxy.rst b/docs/howmitmproxy.rst deleted file mode 100644 index 7dcb4c30..00000000 --- a/docs/howmitmproxy.rst +++ /dev/null @@ -1,239 +0,0 @@ -How mitmproxy works -=================== - -Mitmproxy is an enormously flexible tool. Knowing exactly how the proxying -process works will help you deploy it creatively, and take into account its -fundamental assumptions and how to work around them. This document explains -mitmproxy's proxy mechanism in detail, starting with the simplest unencrypted -explicit proxying, and working up to the most complicated interaction - -transparent proxying of SSL-protected traffic [#ssl]_ in the presence of `Server Name Indication`_. - -Explicit HTTP -------------- - -Configuring the client to use mitmproxy as an explicit proxy is the simplest -and most reliable way to intercept traffic. The proxy protocol is codified in the -`HTTP RFC`_, so the behaviour of both -the client and the server is well defined, and usually reliable. In the -simplest possible interaction with mitmproxy, a client connects directly to the -proxy, and makes a request that looks like this: - -.. code-block:: http - - GET http://example.com/index.html HTTP/1.1 - -This is a proxy GET request - an extended form of the vanilla HTTP GET request -that includes a schema and host specification, and it includes all the -information mitmproxy needs to proceed. - -.. image:: schematics/how-mitmproxy-works-explicit.png - :align: center - -1. The client connects to the proxy and makes a request. -2. Mitmproxy connects to the upstream server and simply forwards the request on. - - -Explicit HTTPS --------------- - -The process for an explicitly proxied HTTPS connection is quite different. The -client connects to the proxy and makes a request that looks like this: - -.. code-block:: http - - CONNECT example.com:443 HTTP/1.1 - -A conventional proxy can neither view nor manipulate an SSL-encrypted data -stream, so a CONNECT request simply asks the proxy to open a pipe between the -client and server. The proxy here is just a facilitator - it blindly forwards -data in both directions without knowing anything about the contents. The -negotiation of the SSL connection happens over this pipe, and the subsequent -flow of requests and responses are completely opaque to the proxy. - -The MITM in mitmproxy -^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ - -This is where mitmproxy's fundamental trick comes into play. The MITM in its -name stands for Man-In-The-Middle - a reference to the process we use to -intercept and interfere with these theoretically opaque data streams. The basic -idea is to pretend to be the server to the client, and pretend to be the client -to the server, while we sit in the middle decoding traffic from both sides. The -tricky part is that the `Certificate Authority`_ system is -designed to prevent exactly this attack, by allowing a trusted third-party to -cryptographically sign a server's SSL certificates to verify that they are -legit. If this signature doesn't match or is from a non-trusted party, a secure -client will simply drop the connection and refuse to proceed. Despite the many -shortcomings of the CA system as it exists today, this is usually fatal to -attempts to MITM an SSL connection for analysis. Our answer to this conundrum -is to become a trusted Certificate Authority ourselves. Mitmproxy includes a -full CA implementation that generates interception certificates on the fly. To -get the client to trust these certificates, we :ref:`register mitmproxy as a trusted -CA with the device manually <certinstall>`. - -Complication 1: What's the remote hostname? -^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ - -To proceed with this plan, we need to know the domain name to use in the -interception certificate - the client will verify that the certificate is for -the domain it's connecting to, and abort if this is not the case. At first -blush, it seems that the CONNECT request above gives us all we need - in this -example, both of these values are "example.com". But what if the client had -initiated the connection as follows: - -.. code-block:: http - - CONNECT 10.1.1.1:443 HTTP/1.1 - -Using the IP address is perfectly legitimate because it gives us enough -information to initiate the pipe, even though it doesn't reveal the remote -hostname. - -Mitmproxy has a cunning mechanism that smooths this over - :ref:`upstream -certificate sniffing <upstreamcerts>`. As soon as we -see the CONNECT request, we pause the client part of the conversation, and -initiate a simultaneous connection to the server. We complete the SSL handshake -with the server, and inspect the certificates it used. Now, we use the Common -Name in the upstream SSL certificates to generate the dummy certificate for the -client. Voila, we have the correct hostname to present to the client, even if -it was never specified. - - -Complication 2: Subject Alternative Name -^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ - -Enter the next complication. Sometimes, the certificate Common Name is not, in -fact, the hostname that the client is connecting to. This is because of the -optional `Subject Alternative Name`_ field in the SSL certificate -that allows an arbitrary number of alternative domains to be specified. If the -expected domain matches any of these, the client will proceed, even though the -domain doesn't match the certificate Common Name. The answer here is simple: -when we extract the CN from the upstream cert, we also extract the SANs, and -add them to the generated dummy certificate. - - -Complication 3: Server Name Indication -^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ - -One of the big limitations of vanilla SSL is that each certificate requires its -own IP address. This means that you couldn't do virtual hosting where multiple -domains with independent certificates share the same IP address. In a world -with a rapidly shrinking IPv4 address pool this is a problem, and we have a -solution in the form of the `Server Name Indication`_ extension to -the SSL and TLS protocols. This lets the client specify the remote server name -at the start of the SSL handshake, which then lets the server select the right -certificate to complete the process. - -SNI breaks our upstream certificate sniffing process, because when we connect -without using SNI, we get served a default certificate that may have nothing to -do with the certificate expected by the client. The solution is another tricky -complication to the client connection process. After the client connects, we -allow the SSL handshake to continue until just _after_ the SNI value has been -passed to us. Now we can pause the conversation, and initiate an upstream -connection using the correct SNI value, which then serves us the correct -upstream certificate, from which we can extract the expected CN and SANs. - -Putting it all together -^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ - -Lets put all of this together into the complete explicitly proxied HTTPS flow. - -.. image:: schematics/how-mitmproxy-works-explicit-https.png - :align: center - -1. The client makes a connection to mitmproxy, and issues an HTTP CONNECT request. -2. Mitmproxy responds with a ``200 Connection Established``, as if it has set up the CONNECT pipe. -3. The client believes it's talking to the remote server, and initiates the SSL connection. - It uses SNI to indicate the hostname it is connecting to. -4. Mitmproxy connects to the server, and establishes an SSL connection using the SNI hostname - indicated by the client. -5. The server responds with the matching SSL certificate, which contains the CN and SAN values - needed to generate the interception certificate. -6. Mitmproxy generates the interception cert, and continues the - client SSL handshake paused in step 3. -7. The client sends the request over the established SSL connection. -8. Mitmproxy passes the request on to the server over the SSL connection initiated in step 4. - -Transparent HTTP ----------------- - -When a transparent proxy is used, the HTTP/S connection is redirected into a -proxy at the network layer, without any client configuration being required. -This makes transparent proxying ideal for those situations where you can't -change client behaviour - proxy-oblivious Android applications being a common -example. - -To achieve this, we need to introduce two extra components. The first is a -redirection mechanism that transparently reroutes a TCP connection destined for -a server on the Internet to a listening proxy server. This usually takes the -form of a firewall on the same host as the proxy server - `iptables`_ on Linux or -pf_ on OSX. Once the client has initiated the connection, it makes a vanilla HTTP request, -which might look something like this: - -.. code-block:: http - - GET /index.html HTTP/1.1 - -Note that this request differs from the explicit proxy variation, in that it -omits the scheme and hostname. How, then, do we know which upstream host to -forward the request to? The routing mechanism that has performed the -redirection keeps track of the original destination for us. Each routing -mechanism has a different way of exposing this data, so this introduces the -second component required for working transparent proxying: a host module that -knows how to retrieve the original destination address from the router. In -mitmproxy, this takes the form of a built-in set of -modules_ that know how to talk to each platform's redirection mechanism. -Once we have this information, the process is fairly straight-forward. - -.. image:: schematics/how-mitmproxy-works-transparent.png - :align: center - -1. The client makes a connection to the server. -2. The router redirects the connection to mitmproxy, which is typically listening on a local port - of the same host. Mitmproxy then consults the routing mechanism to establish what the original - destination was. -3. Now, we simply read the client's request... -4. ... and forward it upstream. - -Transparent HTTPS ------------------ - -The first step is to determine whether we should treat an incoming connection -as HTTPS. The mechanism for doing this is simple - we use the routing mechanism -to find out what the original destination port is. By default, we treat all -traffic destined for ports 443 and 8443 as SSL. - -From here, the process is a merger of the methods we've described for -transparently proxying HTTP, and explicitly proxying HTTPS. We use the routing -mechanism to establish the upstream server address, and then proceed as for -explicit HTTPS connections to establish the CN and SANs, and cope with SNI. - -.. image:: schematics/how-mitmproxy-works-transparent-https.png - :align: center - -1. The client makes a connection to the server. -2. The router redirects the connection to mitmproxy, which is typically listening on a local port - of the same host. Mitmproxy then consults the routing mechanism to establish what the original - destination was. -3. The client believes it's talking to the remote server, and initiates the SSL connection. - It uses SNI to indicate the hostname it is connecting to. -4. Mitmproxy connects to the server, and establishes an SSL connection using the SNI hostname - indicated by the client. -5. The server responds with the matching SSL certificate, which contains the CN and SAN values - needed to generate the interception certificate. -6. Mitmproxy generates the interception cert, and continues the client SSL handshake paused in - step 3. -7. The client sends the request over the established SSL connection. -8. Mitmproxy passes the request on to the server over the SSL connection initiated in step 4. - -.. rubric:: Footnotes - -.. [#ssl] I use "SSL" to refer to both SSL and TLS in the generic sense, unless otherwise - specified. - -.. _Server Name Indication: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication -.. _HTTP RFC: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230 -.. _Certificate Authority: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority -.. _Subject Alternative Name: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SubjectAltName -.. _iptables: http://www.netfilter.org/ -.. _pf: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PF_\(firewall\) -.. _modules: https://github.com/mitmproxy/mitmproxy/tree/master/libmproxy/platform |