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authorJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>2013-09-30 14:17:46 +0200
committerJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>2013-09-30 14:17:46 +0200
commit6bb838e7375f5b031e9ac346b353775c90de45dc (patch)
tree9a3a447fa05f3e3462b8c1cbc279aa7229a4ca98 /xen/arch/x86/hvm/intercept.c
parent0a6b415d5212af68249ddf41a20dfc3998c8d670 (diff)
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x86: properly handle hvm_copy_from_guest_{phys,virt}() errors
Ignoring them generally implies using uninitialized data and, in all but two of the cases dealt with here, potentially leaking hypervisor stack contents to guests. This is CVE-2013-4355 / XSA-63. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'xen/arch/x86/hvm/intercept.c')
-rw-r--r--xen/arch/x86/hvm/intercept.c49
1 files changed, 40 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/intercept.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/intercept.c
index 85caa0cf10..5bb1c17190 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/intercept.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/intercept.c
@@ -87,17 +87,28 @@ static int hvm_mmio_access(struct vcpu *v,
{
for ( i = 0; i < p->count; i++ )
{
- int ret;
-
- ret = hvm_copy_from_guest_phys(&data,
- p->data + (sign * i * p->size),
- p->size);
- if ( (ret == HVMCOPY_gfn_paged_out) ||
- (ret == HVMCOPY_gfn_shared) )
+ switch ( hvm_copy_from_guest_phys(&data,
+ p->data + sign * i * p->size,
+ p->size) )
{
+ case HVMCOPY_okay:
+ break;
+ case HVMCOPY_gfn_paged_out:
+ case HVMCOPY_gfn_shared:
rc = X86EMUL_RETRY;
break;
+ case HVMCOPY_bad_gfn_to_mfn:
+ data = ~0;
+ break;
+ case HVMCOPY_bad_gva_to_gfn:
+ ASSERT(0);
+ /* fall through */
+ default:
+ rc = X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+ break;
}
+ if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
+ break;
rc = write_handler(v, p->addr + (sign * i * p->size), p->size,
data);
if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
@@ -165,8 +176,28 @@ static int process_portio_intercept(portio_action_t action, ioreq_t *p)
for ( i = 0; i < p->count; i++ )
{
data = 0;
- (void)hvm_copy_from_guest_phys(&data, p->data + sign*i*p->size,
- p->size);
+ switch ( hvm_copy_from_guest_phys(&data,
+ p->data + sign * i * p->size,
+ p->size) )
+ {
+ case HVMCOPY_okay:
+ break;
+ case HVMCOPY_gfn_paged_out:
+ case HVMCOPY_gfn_shared:
+ rc = X86EMUL_RETRY;
+ break;
+ case HVMCOPY_bad_gfn_to_mfn:
+ data = ~0;
+ break;
+ case HVMCOPY_bad_gva_to_gfn:
+ ASSERT(0);
+ /* fall through */
+ default:
+ rc = X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
+ break;
rc = action(IOREQ_WRITE, p->addr, p->size, &data);
if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
break;