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| author | Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> | 2013-04-18 17:01:45 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> | 2013-04-18 17:01:45 +0200 |
| commit | 764012376a096a45bced88ee2ec1a6c17c6c22c7 (patch) | |
| tree | 2881ecaf60a14d78fa122aaa697dec29060888de /xen/arch/x86/domctl.c | |
| parent | d8b5421f45c2b528bab1c8695271f99743b708fa (diff) | |
| download | xen-764012376a096a45bced88ee2ec1a6c17c6c22c7.tar.gz xen-764012376a096a45bced88ee2ec1a6c17c6c22c7.tar.bz2 xen-764012376a096a45bced88ee2ec1a6c17c6c22c7.zip | |
x86: remove IS_PRIV access check bypasses
Several domctl functions dealing with rangesets contain a short-circuit
bypass if the domain is privileged. Since the construction of domain 0
permits access to all I/O ranges, the call to irq_access_permitted will
normally return true even without the IS_PRIV check, and the presence of
the IS_PRIV check prevents the creation of a privileged domain without
access to specific devices or IO memory ranges.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Diffstat (limited to 'xen/arch/x86/domctl.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | xen/arch/x86/domctl.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c index 8fb4fa98a5..9580390594 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c @@ -645,8 +645,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl( break; ret = -EPERM; - if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) && - !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1) ) + if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1) ) break; ret = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1, add); @@ -723,8 +722,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl( } ret = -EPERM; - if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) && - !ioports_access_permitted(current->domain, fmp, fmp + np - 1) ) + if ( !ioports_access_permitted(current->domain, fmp, fmp + np - 1) ) break; ret = xsm_ioport_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, fmp, fmp + np - 1, add); |