xsm: Expand I/O resource hooks

The XSM hooks inside rangeset are not useful in capturing the PIRQ
mappings in HVM domains. They can also be called from softirq context
where current->domain is invalid, causing spurious AVC denials from
unrelated domains on such calls.

Within FLASK code, the rangeset hooks were already divided between
IRQs, I/O memory, and x86 IO ports; propagate this division back
through the XSM hooks and call the XSM functions directly when needed.

This removes XSM checks for the initial rangeset population for dom0
and the removal checks on domain destruction; denying either of these
actions does not make sense.

Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>

1 files changed, 20 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
index 330b395110..4e258f39ce 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
         struct domain *d;
         unsigned int fp = domctl->u.ioport_permission.first_port;
         unsigned int np = domctl->u.ioport_permission.nr_ports;
+        int allow = domctl->u.ioport_permission.allow_access;
 
         ret = -EINVAL;
         if ( (fp + np) > 65536 )
@@ -87,7 +88,9 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
 
         if ( np == 0 )
             ret = 0;
-        else if ( domctl->u.ioport_permission.allow_access )
+        else if ( xsm_ioport_permission(d, fp, fp + np - 1, allow) )
+            ret = -EPERM;
+        else if ( allow )
             ret = ioports_permit_access(d, fp, fp + np - 1);
         else
             ret = ioports_deny_access(d, fp, fp + np - 1);
@@ -822,6 +825,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
         unsigned long gfn = domctl->u.memory_mapping.first_gfn;
         unsigned long mfn = domctl->u.memory_mapping.first_mfn;
         unsigned long nr_mfns = domctl->u.memory_mapping.nr_mfns;
+        int add = domctl->u.memory_mapping.add_mapping;
         int i;
 
         ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -837,8 +841,13 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
         if ( unlikely((d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(domctl->domain)) == NULL) )
             break;
 
-        ret=0;
-        if ( domctl->u.memory_mapping.add_mapping )
+        ret = xsm_iomem_permission(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1, add);
+        if ( ret ) {
+            rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if ( add )
         {
             gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO,
                 "memory_map:add: gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr_mfns=%lx\n",
@@ -871,6 +880,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
         unsigned int fgp = domctl->u.ioport_mapping.first_gport;
         unsigned int fmp = domctl->u.ioport_mapping.first_mport;
         unsigned int np = domctl->u.ioport_mapping.nr_ports;
+        unsigned int add = domctl->u.ioport_mapping.add_mapping;
         struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport;
         int found = 0;
 
@@ -893,8 +903,14 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
         if ( unlikely((d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(domctl->domain)) == NULL) )
             break;
 
+        ret = xsm_ioport_permission(d, fmp, fmp + np - 1, add);
+        if ( ret ) {
+            rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+            break;
+        }
+
         hd = domain_hvm_iommu(d);
-        if ( domctl->u.ioport_mapping.add_mapping )
+        if ( add )
         {
             gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO,
                 "ioport_map:add f_gport=%x f_mport=%x np=%x\n",