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authorKeir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>2010-01-26 07:51:20 +0000
committerKeir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>2010-01-26 07:51:20 +0000
commitf30a5d2eceb2fa3d6145e7527cae7ff34cb70e49 (patch)
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VT-d: add "iommu=workaround_bios_bug" option
Add this option to workaround BIOS bugs. Currently it ignores DRHD if "all" devices under its scope are not pci discoverable. This workarounds a BIOS bug in some platforms to make VT-d work. But note that this option doesn't guarantee security, because it might ignore DRHD. So there are 3 options which handle BIOS bugs differently: iommu=1 (default): If detect non-existent device under a DRHD's scope, or find incorrect RMRR setting (base_address > end_address), disable VT-d completely in Xen with warning messages. This guarantees security when VT-d enabled, or just disable VT-d to let Xen work without VT-d. iommu=force: it enforces to enable VT-d in Xen. If VT-d cannot be enabled, it will crashes Xen. This is mainly for users who must need VT-d. iommu=workaround_bogus_bios: it workarounds some BIOS bugs to make VT-d still work. This might be insecure because there might be a device not protected by any DRHD if the device is re-enabled by malicious s/w. This is for users who want to use VT-d regardless of security. Signed-off-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@intel.com>
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