aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* kernel: usb: add FSL EHCI packageDavid Bauer2019-04-131-2/+21
| | | | | | | Add kernel module package for the Freescale USB2 EHCI used on the mpc85xx platform. Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
* ath79: remove unnecessary packages from I-O DATA ETG3-RINAGAKI Hiroshi2019-04-131-0/+1
| | | | | | | | I-O DATA ETG3-R is a wired router. So wireless-related packages are unnecessary and remove those packages from default configuration to reduce flash usage. Signed-off-by: INAGAKI Hiroshi <musashino.open@gmail.com>
* ath79: add TP-Link WR842N v3Sven Roederer2019-04-134-1/+181
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This adds support for the TP-Link WR842N v3 which is already supported on ar71xx target (0b45bec22c59cc6e6b2fa71dc9a88386c5587132). Specification: * SoC: QCA9533 ver 2 rev 0 * 16 MB Flash (gd25q128) * 64 MB RAM * 1 WAN 10/100 MBit/s (blue connector) * 4 LAN 10/100 MBit/s (AR8229; 4 ports; yellow connectors) * Atheros AR9531 (2,4GHz, two fixed antennas) * USB * Reset / WPS button * WiFi button (rf kill) * 8 green leds; 1 red/green led * serial console (115200 8N1, according to the OpenWrt-wiki some soldering is needed) Installation: * flash via vendor WebUI (the filename must not exceed certain length) * sysupgrade from installed OpenWrt (also ar71xx) Thanks to Holger Drefs for providing the hardware Tested-by: @kofec (github) Signed-off-by: Sven Roederer <devel-sven@geroedel.de>
* mac80211: rt2x00: replace patch with upstream versionDaniel Golle2019-04-123-57/+96
| | | | | | | | Replace the patch introduced by commit d0b969eee8 ("mac80211: rt2x00: do not increment sequence number while re-transmitting") was merged into wireless-drivers.git. Replace our version with the merged version. Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
* ramips: fix pinctrl to allow hardware i2c on WRTNODE2RDaniel Golle2019-04-111-1/+11
| | | | | | | | Instead of assigning I2C pins as GPIOs by default, leave it up to the user whether to install kmod-i2c-mt7621 and use them for hardware I2C instead. Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
* kernel: move and replace accepted patchDaniel Golle2019-04-111-12/+11
| | | | Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
* uboot-envtools: fix fw_env.config for ox820/stg-212Daniel Golle2019-04-111-1/+3
| | | | Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
* build: switch default target from ar71xx to ath79Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant2019-04-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | ar71xx is in the process of being deprecated as a target accepting new devices. The replacement target for the same hardware is DTS based ath79. Switch the default build target selection from ar71xx to ath79. This is intended to encourage DTS takeup & support for ath79 and longer term will also aid kernel upstream support. Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ldir@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
* hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9497, CVE-2019-9498, CVE-2019-9499Stefan Lippers-Hollmann2019-04-115-1/+467
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | EAP-pwd missing commit validation Published: April 10, 2019 Identifiers: - CVE-2019-9497 (EAP-pwd server not checking for reflection attack) - CVE-2019-9498 (EAP-pwd server missing commit validation for scalar/element) - CVE-2019-9499 (EAP-pwd peer missing commit validation for scalar/element) Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/ Vulnerability EAP-pwd implementation in hostapd (EAP server) and wpa_supplicant (EAP peer) was discovered not to validate the received scalar and element values in EAP-pwd-Commit messages properly. This could result in attacks that would be able to complete EAP-pwd authentication exchange without the attacker having to know the used password. A reflection attack is possible against the EAP-pwd server since the hostapd EAP server did not verify that the EAP-pwd-Commit contains scalar/element values that differ from the ones the server sent out itself. This allows the attacker to complete EAP-pwd authentication without knowing the password, but this does not result in the attacker being able to derive the session key (MSK), i.e., the attacker would not be able to complete the following key exchange (e.g., 4-way handshake in RSN/WPA). An attack using invalid scalar/element values is possible against both the EAP-pwd server and peer since hostapd and wpa_supplicant did not validate these values in the received EAP-pwd-Commit messages. If the used crypto library does not implement additional checks for the element (EC point), this could result in attacks where the attacker could use a specially crafted commit message values to manipulate the exchange to result in deriving a session key value from a very small set of possible values. This could further be used to attack the EAP-pwd server in a practical manner. An attack against the EAP-pwd peer is slightly more complex, but still consider practical. These invalid scalar/element attacks could result in the attacker being able to complete authentication and learn the session key and MSK to allow the key exchange to be completed as well, i.e., the attacker gaining access to the network in case of the attack against the EAP server or the attacker being able to operate a rogue AP in case of the attack against the EAP peer. While similar attacks might be applicable against SAE, it should be noted that the SAE implementation in hostapd and wpa_supplicant does have the validation steps that were missing from the EAP-pwd implementation and as such, these attacks do not apply to the current SAE implementation. Old versions of wpa_supplicant/hostapd did not include the reflection attack check in the SAE implementation, though, since that was added in June 2015 for v2.5 (commit 6a58444d27fd 'SAE: Verify that own/peer commit-scalar and COMMIT-ELEMENT are different'). Vulnerable versions/configurations All hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support (CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled in the runtime configuration) are vulnerable against the reflection attack. All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support (CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled in the runtime configuration) are vulnerable against the invalid scalar/element attack when built against a crypto library that does not have an explicit validation step on imported EC points. The following list indicates which cases are vulnerable/not vulnerable: - OpenSSL v1.0.2 or older: vulnerable - OpenSSL v1.1.0 or newer: not vulnerable - BoringSSL with commit 38feb990a183 ('Require that EC points are on the curve.') from September 2015: not vulnerable - BoringSSL without commit 38feb990a183: vulnerable - LibreSSL: vulnerable - wolfssl: vulnerable Acknowledgments Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi) for discovering and reporting the issues and for proposing changes to address them in the implementation. Possible mitigation steps - Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild: CVE-2019-9497: EAP-pwd server: Detect reflection attacks CVE-2019-9498: EAP-pwd server: Verify received scalar and element EAP-pwd: Check element x,y coordinates explicitly CVE-2019-9499: EAP-pwd client: Verify received scalar and element EAP-pwd: Check element x,y coordinates explicitly These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/ - Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> [bump PKG_RELEASE] Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9496Stefan Lippers-Hollmann2019-04-112-1/+53
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | hostapd: fix SAE confirm missing state validation Published: April 10, 2019 Identifiers: - CVE-2019-9496 (SAE confirm missing state validation in hostapd/AP) Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-3/ Vulnerability When hostapd is used to operate an access point with SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals; also known as WPA3-Personal), an invalid authentication sequence could result in the hostapd process terminating due to a NULL pointer dereference when processing SAE confirm message. This was caused by missing state validation steps when processing the SAE confirm message in hostapd/AP mode. Similar cases against the wpa_supplicant SAE station implementation had already been tested by the hwsim test cases, but those sequences did not trigger this specific code path in AP mode which is why the issue was not discovered earlier. An attacker in radio range of an access point using hostapd in SAE configuration could use this issue to perform a denial of service attack by forcing the hostapd process to terminate. Vulnerable versions/configurations All hostapd versions with SAE support (CONFIG_SAE=y in the build configuration and SAE being enabled in the runtime configuration). Possible mitigation steps - Merge the following commit to hostapd and rebuild: SAE: Fix confirm message validation in error cases These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-3/ - Update to hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> [bump PKG_RELEASE] Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9495Stefan Lippers-Hollmann2019-04-112-1/+320
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | EAP-pwd side-channel attack Published: April 10, 2019 Identifiers: - CVE-2019-9495 (cache attack against EAP-pwd) Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/ Vulnerability Number of potential side channel attacks were recently discovered in the SAE implementations used by both hostapd and wpa_supplicant (see security advisory 2019-1 and VU#871675). EAP-pwd uses a similar design for deriving PWE from the password and while a specific attack against EAP-pwd is not yet known to be tested, there is no reason to believe that the EAP-pwd implementation would be immune against the type of cache attack that was identified for the SAE implementation. Since the EAP-pwd implementation in hostapd (EAP server) and wpa_supplicant (EAP peer) does not support MODP groups, the timing attack described against SAE is not applicable for the EAP-pwd implementation. A novel cache-based attack against SAE handshake would likely be applicable against the EAP-pwd implementation. Even though the wpa_supplicant/hostapd PWE derivation iteration for EAP-pwd has protections against timing attacks, this new cache-based attack might enable an attacker to determine which code branch is taken in the iteration if the attacker is able to run unprivileged code on the victim machine (e.g., an app installed on a smart phone or potentially a JavaScript code on a web site loaded by a web browser). This depends on the used CPU not providing sufficient protection to prevent unprivileged applications from observing memory access patterns through the shared cache (which is the most likely case with today's designs). The attacker could use information about the selected branch to learn information about the password and combine this information from number of handshake instances with an offline dictionary attack. With sufficient number of handshakes and sufficiently weak password, this might result in full recovery of the used password if that password is not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks. This attack requires the attacker to be able to run a program on the target device. This is not commonly the case on an authentication server (EAP server), so the most likely target for this would be a client device using EAP-pwd. The commits listed in the end of this advisory change the EAP-pwd implementation shared by hostapd and wpa_supplicant to perform the PWE derivation loop using operations that use constant time and memory access pattern to minimize the externally observable differences from operations that depend on the password even for the case where the attacker might be able to run unprivileged code on the same device. Vulnerable versions/configurations All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support (CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled in the runtime configuration). It should also be noted that older versions of wpa_supplicant/hostapd prior to v2.7 did not include additional protection against certain timing differences. The definition of the EAP-pwd (RFC 5931) does not describe such protection, but the same issue that was addressed in SAE earlier can be applicable against EAP-pwd as well and as such, that implementation specific extra protection (commit 22ac3dfebf7b, "EAP-pwd: Mask timing of PWE derivation") is needed to avoid showing externally visible timing differences that could leak information about the password. Any uses of older wpa_supplicant/hostapd versions with EAP-pwd are recommended to update to v2.7 or newer in addition to the mitigation steps listed below for the more recently discovered issue. Possible mitigation steps - Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild: OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums Add helper functions for constant time operations OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for crypto_bignum_legendre() EAP-pwd: Use constant time and memory access for finding the PWE These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/ - Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available - Use strong passwords to prevent dictionary attacks Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> [bump PKG_RELEASE] Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9494Stefan Lippers-Hollmann2019-04-119-1/+1083
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SAE side-channel attacks Published: April 10, 2019 Identifiers: - VU#871675 - CVE-2019-9494 (cache attack against SAE) Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/ Vulnerability Number of potential side channel attacks were discovered in the SAE implementations used by both hostapd (AP) and wpa_supplicant (infrastructure BSS station/mesh station). SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals) is also known as WPA3-Personal. The discovered side channel attacks may be able to leak information about the used password based on observable timing differences and cache access patterns. This might result in full password recovery when combined with an offline dictionary attack and if the password is not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks. Cache attack A novel cache-based attack against SAE handshake was discovered. This attack targets SAE with ECC groups. ECC group 19 being the mandatory group to support and the most likely used group for SAE today, so this attack applies to the most common SAE use case. Even though the PWE derivation iteration in SAE has protections against timing attacks, this new cache-based attack enables an attacker to determine which code branch is taken in the iteration if the attacker is able to run unprivileged code on the victim machine (e.g., an app installed on a smart phone or potentially a JavaScript code on a web site loaded by a web browser). This depends on the used CPU not providing sufficient protection to prevent unprivileged applications from observing memory access patterns through the shared cache (which is the most likely case with today's designs). The attacker can use information about the selected branch to learn information about the password and combine this information from number of handshake instances with an offline dictionary attack. With sufficient number of handshakes and sufficiently weak password, this might result in full discovery of the used password. This attack requires the attacker to be able to run a program on the target device. This is not commonly the case on access points, so the most likely target for this would be a client device using SAE in an infrastructure BSS or mesh BSS. The commits listed in the end of this advisory change the SAE implementation shared by hostapd and wpa_supplicant to perform the PWE derivation loop using operations that use constant time and memory access pattern to minimize the externally observable differences from operations that depend on the password even for the case where the attacker might be able to run unprivileged code on the same device. Timing attack The timing attack applies to the MODP groups 22, 23, and 24 where the PWE generation algorithm defined for SAE can have sufficient timing differences for an attacker to be able to determine how many rounds were needed to find the PWE based on the used password and MAC addresses. When the attack is repeated with multiple times, the attacker may be able to gather enough information about the password to be able to recover it fully using an offline dictionary attack if the password is not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks. This attack could be performed by an attacker in radio range of an access point or a station enabling the specific MODP groups. This timing attack requires the applicable MODP groups to be enabled explicitly in hostapd/wpa_supplicant configuration (sae_groups parameter). All versions of hostapd/wpa_supplicant have disabled these groups by default. While this security advisory lists couple of commits introducing additional protection for MODP groups in SAE, it should be noted that the groups 22, 23, and 24 are not considered strong enough to meet the current expectation for a secure system. As such, their use is discouraged even if the additional protection mechanisms in the implementation are included. Vulnerable versions/configurations All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with SAE support (CONFIG_SAE=y in the build configuration and SAE being enabled in the runtime configuration). Acknowledgments Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi) and Eyal Ronen (Tel Aviv University) for discovering the issues and for discussions on how to address them. Possible mitigation steps - Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild: OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums Add helper functions for constant time operations OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for crypto_bignum_legendre() SAE: Minimize timing differences in PWE derivation SAE: Avoid branches in is_quadratic_residue_blind() SAE: Mask timing of MODP groups 22, 23, 24 SAE: Use const_time selection for PWE in FFC SAE: Use constant time operations in sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc() These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/ - Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available - In addition to either of the above alternatives, disable MODP groups 1, 2, 5, 22, 23, and 24 by removing them from hostapd/wpa_supplicant sae_groups runtime configuration parameter, if they were explicitly enabled since those groups are not considered strong enough to meet current security expectations. The groups 22, 23, and 24 are related to the discovered side channel (timing) attack. The other groups in the list are consider too weak to provide sufficient security. Note that all these groups have been disabled by default in all hostapd/wpa_supplicant versions and these would be used only if explicitly enabled in the configuration. - Use strong passwords to prevent dictionary attacks Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> [bump PKG_RELEASE] Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* procd: update to latest git HEADHans Dedecker2019-04-101-3/+3
| | | | | | baaf38c procd: instance: Support deleting stopped instances Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* wireguard: remove obvious commentsFlorian Eckert2019-04-091-9/+0
| | | | | | Remove obvious comments to save disk space. Signed-off-by: Florian Eckert <fe@dev.tdt.de>
* wireguard: converted whitespaces from space to tabFlorian Eckert2019-04-091-176/+169
| | | | | | | | | With this change, the file is reduced from 5186 bytes to 4649 bytes that its approximately 10.5 percent less memory consumption. For small devices, sometimes every byte counts. Also, all other protocol handler use tabs instead of spaces. Signed-off-by: Florian Eckert <fe@dev.tdt.de>
* ethtool: bump to 5.0Hans Dedecker2019-04-091-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 170d821 Release version 5.0. 909f8c0 Revert "ethtool: change to new sane powerpc64 kernel headers" a484274 ethtool: dsa: mv88e6xxx: add pretty dump for others 034a17b ethtool: dsa: mv88e6xxx: add pretty dump for 88E6390 7f1cc44 ethtool: dsa: mv88e6xxx: add pretty dump for 88E6352 a13a053 ethtool: dsa: mv88e6xxx: add pretty dump for 88E6161 4e98029 ethtool: dsa: mv88e6xxx: add pretty dump for 88E6185 ff99e46 ethtool: dsa: mv88e6xxx: add pretty dump cb8e980 ethtool: dsa: add pretty dump 4df55c8 ethtool: change to new sane powerpc64 kernel headers 0cb963e ethtool: zero initialize coalesce struct 8f05538 ethtool: don't report UFO on kernels v4.14 and above Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* imx6: bump sdma firmware to 3.4Koen Vandeputte2019-04-091-0/+0
| | | | Signed-off-by: Koen Vandeputte <koen.vandeputte@ncentric.com>
* ath79: add support for Netgear EX6400 and EX7300Daniel Gimpelevich2019-04-098-0/+282
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is sold as a dual-band 802.11ac range extender. It has a sliding switch for Extender mode or Access Point mode, a WPS button, a recessed Reset button, a hard-power button, and a multitude of LED's, some multiplexed via an NXP 74AHC164D chip. The internal serial header pinout is Vcc, Tx, Rx, GND, with GND closest to the corner of the board. You may connect at 115200 bps, 8 data bits, no parity, 1 stop bit. Specification: - System-On-Chip: QCA9558 - CPU/Speed: 720 MHz - Flash-Chip: Winbond 25Q128FVSG - Flash size: 16 MiB - RAM: 128 MiB - Wireless No1: QCA9558 on-chip 2.4GHz 802.11bgn, 3x3 - Wireless No2: QCA99x0 chip 5GHz 802.11an+ac, 4x4 - PHY: Atheros AR8035-A Installation: If you can get to the stock firmware's firmware upgrade option, just feed it the factory.img and boot as usual. As an alternative, TFTP the factory.img to the bootloader. Signed-off-by: Daniel Gimpelevich <daniel@gimpelevich.san-francisco.ca.us> [whitespace fix in DTS and reorder of make variables] Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* ath79: remove more duplicate image build variablesDaniel Gimpelevich2019-04-093-22/+18
| | | | | | | | | Remove Netgear-specific image build variables which are set to the same value. Signed-off-by: Daniel Gimpelevich <daniel@gimpelevich.san-francisco.ca.us> [reordering of variables, removed stray newline] Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* sunxi: Remove already applied patchHauke Mehrtens2019-04-081-214/+0
| | | | | | | This patch is already included in kernel v4.19.31. Fixes: 8df12d76c642 ("kernel: bump 4.19 to 4.19.34") Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
* scripts/qemustart: Allow specifying custom rootfs for maltaPetr Štetiar2019-04-081-0/+11
| | | | | | | | Currently it's not possible to test boot squashfs root images, so this patch now allows this use case as well. Cc: Yousong Zhou <yszhou4tech@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* scripts/qemustart: Allow specifying custom kernel for x86Petr Štetiar2019-04-081-1/+9
| | | | | | | | Currently it's not possible to test boot squashfs root images, so this patch now allows this use case as well. Cc: Yousong Zhou <yszhou4tech@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* scripts/qemustart: Allow usage without networkingPetr Štetiar2019-04-081-10/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | For basic tests it's not necessary to have the networking setup and this allows testing as a normal user as well, without root privileges. So this patch adds `--no-network` long option or `-n` short option, which allows starting QEMU without network. Cc: Yousong Zhou <yszhou4tech@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* ar71xx: Correct MAC address for WAN interface of Archer C7 v5Adrian Schmutzler2019-04-081-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | This device shares the network config with v4, thus the WAN MAC also needs to be fixed the same way. However, the partition where the MAC address resides has been changed. Based on: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/1726 Tested-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de> Signed-off-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de>
* ar71xx: Add "info" partition for TP-Link Archer C7 v5Adrian Schmutzler2019-04-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This adds the "info" MTD partition, as it is specified in the ath79 DTS: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/blob/master/target/linux/ath79/dts/qca9563_tplink_archer-c7-v5.dts#L35 This is required to set the WAN MAC address, as it is build based on the LAN MAC address, which in turn has to be read from the "info" partition: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/blob/master/target/linux/ath79/dts/qca9563_tplink_archer-c7-v5.dts#L35 Tested-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de> Signed-off-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de>
* ath79: Add WPS button to TP-Link Archer C7v5Petr Štetiar2019-04-081-0/+7
| | | | | | | This patch adds currently missing support for the WPS button on TP-Link Archer C7v5. Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* ath79: Correct MAC address for WAN interface of Archer A7/C7 v5Adrian Schmutzler2019-04-081-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | These devices share the network config with C7v4, thus the WAN MAC also needs to be fixed the same way. However, the partition where the MAC address resides has been changed. Based on: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/1726 Tested-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de> Signed-off-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de>
* ath79: Fix GPIO reset button on TP-Link Archer C7v5Adrian Schmutzler2019-04-083-7/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The GPIO for the reset button for the Archer C7v5 changed from ar71xx to ath79. An investigation based on tests revealed that the A7v5 responds on "11", while the C7v5 responds on "5" as set for ar71xx. Thus, we just define this in the DTS files instead of in the common DTSI. Tested-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de> Signed-off-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de>
* ath79: Utilize new LED modes from diag.sh for Archer A7/C7 v5Adrian Schmutzler2019-04-081-1/+4
| | | | | Tested-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de> Signed-off-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de>
* ath79: Consolidate LEDs in Archer A7/C7 v5 DTSIAdrian Schmutzler2019-04-081-48/+46
| | | | | | | | Definition is split here without obvious reason. Just merge it (and align order to that from C7 v4). Tested-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de> Signed-off-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de>
* ath79: add support for Ubiquiti airCube ISPChristian Mauderer2019-04-084-0/+115
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The Ubiquiti Network airCube ISP is a cube shaped 2.4 GHz with internal 2x2 MIMO antennas. It can be supplied via a USB connector or via PoE. There are for 10/100 Mbps ports (1 * WAN + 3 * LAN). There is an optional PoE passthrough from the first LAN port to the WAN port. SoC: Qualcomm / Atheros QCA9533-BL3A RAM: 64 MB DDR2 Flash: 16 MB SPI NOR Ethernet: 4x 10/100 Mbps (1 WAN + 3 LAN) LEDS: 1x via a SPI controller (not yet supported) Buttons: 1x Reset Serial: 1x (only RX and TX); 115200 baud, 8N1 Missing points: - LED not yet supported - Factory upgrade via web IF or TFTP recovery not yet supported (Needs RSA signed images, for details see PR#1958) The serial port is on a four pin connextor labeled J1 and located between Ethernet and USB connector. The pinout is: 1. 3V3 (out) 2. Rx (in) 3. Tx (out) 4. GND Upgrading via serial port / U-Boot: - Connect the serial port via a level converter - Power the system and stop U-Boot with pressing any key when `Hit any key to stop autoboot` is displayed. Note: Pressing space multiple times untill U-Boot reaches that location works well. - Connect a PC with the IP 192.168.1.100 (or some other in that net) running a TFTP-Server to one of the LAN ports. Copy the sysupgrade image to the server. - Set the U-Boot server IP with setenv serverip 192.168.1.100 - Load the flash image to RAM with tftpboot 0x81000000 sysupgrade.bin - Erase the flash with erase 0x9f050000 0x9ffaffff - Write the new flash content with cp 0x81000000 0x9f050000 ${filesize} - Reset the device with reset Signed-off-by: Christian Mauderer <oss@c-mauderer.de> [removed full stop in subject and added lockdown note to commit message] Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* ath79: add support for OCEDO UrsusMarkus Scheck2019-04-084-2/+160
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SOC: Qualcomm Atheros QCA9558 RAM: 128MB FLASH: 16MB (Macronix MX25L12845EMI-10G) WLAN1: QCA9558 2.4GHz 802.11bgn 3SS WLAN2: QCA9880 5GHz 802.11ac 3SS LED: Power, LAN1, LAN2, 2.4GHz, 5GHz Serial:Next to SPI Flash, Pinout is 3V3 - GND - TX - RX (Square Pin is 3V3) The Serial setting is 115200-8-N-1 INSTALLATION: 1. Serve an OpenWrt ramdisk image named "ursus.bin". Set your IP-address to 192.168.100.8/24. 2. Connect to the serial. Power up the device and interrupt the boot process. 3. Set the correct bootcmd with > setenv bootcmd run bootcmd_1 > saveenv 4. Run > tftpboot 0x81000000 ursus.bin > bootm 0x81000000 5. Wait for OpenWrt to boot up. 6. Transfer OpenWrt sysupdate image and flash via sysupgrade. Signed-off-by: Markus Scheck <markus.scheck1@gmail.com> Tested-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net> [whitespace fix, renamed LED labels and SoC type fix] Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* ath79: ag71xx: Enable tx hang workaround for the rest of ar724x SoCsPetr Štetiar2019-04-081-1/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | In ar71xx we check for stuck DMA on devices which fall in the is_ar724x SoC group (ar724x, ar933x, ar934x, qca9533, tp9343, qca955x, qca956x). In ath79 we're currently performing this check only for devices with ar7240 SoC, so this patch tries to sync the dma stuck checking behavior with what is being done in ar71xx. Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* ar71xx: ag71xx: Fix broken networking on some devices (FS#2177)Petr Štetiar2019-04-081-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | It was reported, that latest ar71xx builds have broken networking on TP-Link TL-WPA8630 and Nanostation M5 XW devices and that by reverting the offending commit, everything is back to normal. Fixes: d3506d1 ("ar71xx: ag71xx: fix compile error when enabling debug") Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* ar71xx: Add support for Ubiquity Bullet M (XW)Petr Štetiar2019-04-088-0/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CPU: AR9342 SoC RAM: 64 MB DDR2 Flash: 8 MB NOR SPI Ports: 100 MBit (24V PoE in) WLAN: 2.4/5 GHz UART: 1 UART on PCB marked as J1 with 115200 8N1 config LEDs: Power, Ethernet, 4x RSSI LEDs (orange, red, 2x green) Buttons: Reset UART connection details .---------------------------------. | | [ETH] J1 [ANT] | o VCC o RX o TX o GND | `---------------------------------' Flashing instructions using recovery method over TFTP 1. Unplug the ethernet cable from the router. 2. Using paper clip press and hold the router's reset button. Make sure you can feel it depressed by the paper clip. Do not release the button until step 4. 3. While keeping the reset button pressed in, plug the ethernet cable back into the AP. Keep the reset button depressed until you see the device's LEDs flashing in upgrade mode (alternating LED1/LED3 and LED2/LED4), this may take up to 25 seconds. 4. You may release the reset button, now the device should be in TFTP transfer mode. 5. Set a static IP on your Computer's NIC. A static IP of 192.168.1.25/24 should work. 6. Plug the PoE injector's LAN cable directly to your computer. 7. Start tftp client and issue following commands: tftp> binary tftp> connect 192.168.1.20 tftp> put openwrt-ar71xx-generic-ubnt-bullet-m-xw-squashfs-factory.bin Tested only on Bullet M2HP. Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* ar71xx: ubnt-m-xw: Fix factory image flashing using TFTP recoveryPetr Štetiar2019-04-081-2/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is backport of the same functionality in ath79, from commit d42a7c469 ("ath79: ubnt-m-xw: Fix factory image flashing using TFTP recovery method") Ubiquity allows flashing of unsigned factory images via TFTP recovery method[1]. They claim in airOS v6.0.7 release changelog[2] following: All future airOS versions will be signed in this way and not allow unsigned firmware to be loaded except via TFTP. U-boot bootloader on M-XW devices expects factory image revision version in specific format. On airOS v6.1.7 with `U-Boot 1.1.4-s1039 (May 24 2017 - 15:58:18)` bootloader checks if the revision major(?) number is actually a number, but in currently generated images there's OpenWrt text and so the check fails: Hit any key to stop autoboot: 0 Setting default IP 192.168.1.20 Starting TFTP server... Receiving file from 192.168.1.25:38438 Received 4981148 bytes Firmware check failed! (1) By placing arbitrary correct number first in major version, we make the bootloader happy and we can flash factory images over TFTP again: Received 3801500 bytes Firmware Version: XW.ar934x.v6.0.4-42.OpenWrt-r9766+2-be42e44 Setting U-Boot environment variables Un-Protected 1 sectors Erasing Flash.... done Patch provided by AREDN[3] project, tested on Bullet M2 XW. 1. https://help.ubnt.com/hc/en-us/articles/204910124-UniFi-TFTP-Recovery-for-Bricked-Access-Points 2. https://dl.ubnt.com/firmwares/XW-fw/v6.0.7/changelog.txt 3. https://github.com/aredn Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* imx6: Add support for Toradex Apalis family of CoMsPetr Štetiar2019-04-0811-1/+495
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds support for the following computer on modules (CoM) from Toradex[A]: Apalis iMX6 Quad 2GB IT - i.MX 6Quad 800MHz, 2GB DDR3, 4GB eMMC -40° to +85° C Temp Apalis iMX6 Quad 1GB - i.MX 6Quad 1GHz, 1GB DDR3, 4GB eMMC 0° to +70° C Temp Apalis iMX6 Dual 1GB IT - i.MX 6Dual 800MHz, 1GB DDR3, 4GB eMMC -40° to +85° C Temp Apalis iMX6 Dual 512MB - i.MX 6Dual 1GHz, 512MB DDR3, 4GB eMMC 0° to +70° C Temp I've developed and tested it on Quad 2GB IT v1.1A and Dual 512MB v1.1A CoMs, using Ixora[B] carrier board v1.0A, but it should hopefuly work on Eval[C] board as well. A. https://www.toradex.com/computer-on-modules/apalis-arm-family/nxp-freescale-imx-6 B. https://www.toradex.com/products/carrier-board/ixora-carrier-board C. https://www.toradex.com/products/carrier-board/apalis-evaluation-board Flashing/recovery instructions: 1. Download and compile imx_loader for OpenWrt from https://github.com/ynezz/imx_loader 2. Enter recovery mode as desribed in https://developer.toradex.com/knowledge-base/imx-recovery-mode 3. Connect board via USB to the host computer, check that it's connected by lsusb: 15a2:0054 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. i.MX 6Dual/6Quad SystemOnChip in RecoveryMode 4. Copy following OpenWrt images to imx_loader directory: SPL u-boot.img u-boot-with-spl.imx openwrt-imx6-apalis-recovery.scr openwrt-imx6-apalis-squashfs.combined.bin 5. Run imx_usb in imx_loader directory Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* imx6: image: Split imx6-sdcard image for reusabilityPetr Štetiar2019-04-081-3/+16
| | | | | | | I'm going to reuse the imx6-sdcard image commands for building of Apalis eMMC images. Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* uboot-envtools: imx6: Add support for Toradex Apalis board familyPetr Štetiar2019-04-081-0/+4
| | | | | | | This patch is needed in order to be able to use fw_{set,print}env commands. Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* uboot-imx6: Add support for Toradex Apalis board familyPetr Štetiar2019-04-082-0/+134
| | | | | | This patch is needed in order to properly boot OpenWrt bootscript. Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* glibc: update to latest 2.27 commit [BZ #22964]Hans Dedecker2019-04-081-2/+2
| | | | | | de9d4aa353 ja_JP locale: Add entry for the new Japanese era [BZ #22964] Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* kernel: bump 4.19 to 4.19.34Koen Vandeputte2019-04-0839-213/+102
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Refreshed all patches. Removed: - 030-PCI-dwc-skip-MSI-init-if-MSIs-have-been-explicitly-d.patch Altered: - 366-netfilter-nf_flow_table-clean-up-and-fix-dst-handlin.patch - 650-netfilter-add-xt_OFFLOAD-target.patch - 662-remove_pfifo_fast.patch - 332-arc-add-OWRTDTB-section.patch - 100-clocksource-drivers-arch_timer-Workaround-for-Allwin.patch - 702-phy_add_aneg_done_function.patch New symbols: - ARC_IRQ_NO_AUTOSAVE - SUN50I_ERRATUM_UNKNOWN1 Compile-tested: cns3xxx, imx6, sunxi Runtime-tested: cns3xxx, imx6 Signed-off-by: Koen Vandeputte <koen.vandeputte@ncentric.com>
* kernel: bump 4.14 to 4.14.111Koen Vandeputte2019-04-0811-20/+20
| | | | | | | | | Refreshed all patches. Compile-tested on: ar71xx, cns3xxx, imx6, x86_64 Runtime-tested on: ar71xx, cns3xxx, imx6 Signed-off-by: Koen Vandeputte <koen.vandeputte@ncentric.com>
* kernel: bump 4.9 to 4.9.168Koen Vandeputte2019-04-082-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | Refreshed all patches. Compile-tested on: ar7 Runtime-tested on: none Signed-off-by: Koen Vandeputte <koen.vandeputte@ncentric.com>
* kernel: bump 4.14 to 4.14.110Koen Vandeputte2019-04-084-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | Refreshed all patches. Compile-tested on: ar71xx, cns3xxx, imx6, x86_64 Runtime-tested on: ar71xx, cns3xxx, imx6 Signed-off-by: Koen Vandeputte <koen.vandeputte@ncentric.com>
* kernel: bump 4.9 to 4.9.167Koen Vandeputte2019-04-081-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | Refreshed all patches. Compile-tested on: ar7 Runtime-tested on: none Signed-off-by: Koen Vandeputte <koen.vandeputte@ncentric.com>
* dropbear: bump to 2019.78Hans Dedecker2019-04-072-48/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Fix dbclient regression in 2019.77. After exiting the terminal would be left in a bad state. Reported by Ryan Woodsmall drop patch applied upstream: 010-tty-modes-werent-reset-for-client.patch Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* ubox: bump to git HEADStijn Tintel2019-04-071-3/+3
| | | | | | 5130fa4 kmodloader: fix and optimize loading of failed modules Signed-off-by: Stijn Tintel <stijn@linux-ipv6.be>
* tools: cbootimage: depend on automakeTomasz Maciej Nowak2019-04-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | Fix missing aclocal reported by buildbot. Fixes: 8595bb0 ("tools: add cbootimage for tegra") Signed-off-by: Tomasz Maciej Nowak <tomek_n@o2.pl>
* firmware-utils: fix nec-enc build on older architecturesChristian Lamparter2019-04-061-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch enable gnu99 mode for the nec-enc utility which fixes the following build-breaking errors on some older architectures. nec-enc.c: In function ‘xor_data’: nec-enc.c:34:2: error: ‘for’ loop initial declarations are only allowed in C99 or C11 mode for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) { ^~~ nec-enc.c:34:2: note: use option -std=c99, -std=gnu99, -std=c11 or -std=gnu11 to compile your code nec-enc.c: In function ‘main’: nec-enc.c:101:3: error: ‘for’ loop initial declarations are only allowed in C99 or C11 mode for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) { ^~~ Spotted-By: Buildbot Fixes: fac27643f057 ("firmware-utils: add nec-enc") Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-07-06 21:54:01 +0000