diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'package/network/utils/curl/patches/406-CVE-2019-3822.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | package/network/utils/curl/patches/406-CVE-2019-3822.patch | 33 |
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/network/utils/curl/patches/406-CVE-2019-3822.patch b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/406-CVE-2019-3822.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bb8bb6cb3f --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/406-CVE-2019-3822.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From 50c9484278c63b958655a717844f0721263939cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> +Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 12:59:28 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] ntlm: fix *_type3_message size check to avoid buffer overflow + +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-3822.html +Reported-by: Wenxiang Qian +CVE-2019-3822 +--- + lib/vauth/ntlm.c | 11 +++++++---- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +--- a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c ++++ b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c +@@ -776,11 +776,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_ntlm_type3_mes + }); + + #ifdef USE_NTRESPONSES +- if(size < (NTLM_BUFSIZE - ntresplen)) { +- DEBUGASSERT(size == (size_t)ntrespoff); +- memcpy(&ntlmbuf[size], ptr_ntresp, ntresplen); +- size += ntresplen; ++ /* ntresplen + size should not be risking an integer overflow here */ ++ if(ntresplen + size > sizeof(ntlmbuf)) { ++ failf(data, "incoming NTLM message too big"); ++ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } ++ DEBUGASSERT(size == (size_t)ntrespoff); ++ memcpy(&ntlmbuf[size], ptr_ntresp, ntresplen); ++ size += ntresplen; + + DEBUG_OUT({ + fprintf(stderr, "\n ntresp="); |