diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'package/network/services/hostapd/patches/005-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | package/network/services/hostapd/patches/005-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch | 154 |
1 files changed, 154 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/005-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/005-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2136bb9d47 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/005-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake + +Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame +processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids +issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing +same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and +also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed +frames on RX side. + +This issue was introduced by the commit +0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in +authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple +times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is +needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt +failed. + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +--- + +--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c ++++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c +@@ -2154,6 +2154,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hos + { + struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap; + struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap; ++ int set = 1; + + /* + * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and +@@ -2161,9 +2162,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hos + * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but + * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that + * does not support full AP client state. ++ * ++ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the ++ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for ++ * the same key. + */ +- if (!sta->added_unassoc) ++ if (!sta->added_unassoc && ++ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) || ++ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) { + hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); ++ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED); ++ set = 0; ++ } + + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N + if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT) +@@ -2186,11 +2196,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hos + sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL, + sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo, + sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0, +- sta->added_unassoc)) { ++ set)) { + hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, + HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE, + "Could not %s STA to kernel driver", +- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add"); ++ set ? "set" : "add"); + + if (sta->added_unassoc) { + hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +@@ -1751,6 +1751,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_m + #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */ + break; + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */ ++ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED: ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; ++ return 0; + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP +@@ -3725,6 +3728,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_ + } + + ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) ++{ ++ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) ++ return 0; ++ return sm->tk_already_set; ++} ++ ++ + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry) + { +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c +@@ -794,6 +794,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state + return; + } + ++ if (sm->tk_already_set) { ++ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX ++ * PN in the driver */ ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); ++ return; ++ } ++ + /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail + * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only + * after association has been completed. This function will be called +@@ -806,6 +814,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state + + /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */ + sm->pairwise_set = TRUE; ++ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE; + } + + +@@ -1002,6 +1011,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struc + + sm->pairwise = pairwise; + sm->PTK_valid = TRUE; ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; + wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm); + + buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h +@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticato + u8 *data, size_t data_len); + enum wpa_event { + WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH, +- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT ++ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED + }; + void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event); +@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_sta + int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry); + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry * +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h +@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine { + struct wpa_ptk PTK; + Boolean PTK_valid; + Boolean pairwise_set; ++ Boolean tk_already_set; + int keycount; + Boolean Pair; + struct wpa_key_replay_counter { |