kernel-5.4: bump to 5.4.102 and refresh patches

5.4.102 backported a lot of stuff that our WireGuard backport already
did, in addition to other patches we had, so those patches were
removed from that part of the series. In the process other patches were
refreshed or reworked to account for upstream changes.

This commit involved `update_kernel.sh -v -u 5.4`.

Cc: John Audia <graysky@archlinux.us>
Cc: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Cc: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

1 files changed, 100 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0091-wireguard-queueing-account-for-skb-protocol-0.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0091-wireguard-queueing-account-for-skb-protocol-0.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a9ca655e74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0091-wireguard-queueing-account-for-skb-protocol-0.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 18:30:45 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: queueing: account for skb->protocol==0
+
+commit a5588604af448664e796daf3c1d5a4523c60667b upstream.
+
+We carry out checks to the effect of:
+
+  if (skb->protocol != wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb))
+    goto err;
+
+By having wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr return 0 on failure, this
+means that the check above still passes in the case where skb->protocol
+is zero, which is possible to hit with AF_PACKET:
+
+  struct sockaddr_pkt saddr = { .spkt_device = "wg0" };
+  unsigned char buffer[5] = { 0 };
+  sendto(socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_PACKET, /* skb->protocol = */ 0),
+         buffer, sizeof(buffer), 0, (const struct sockaddr *)&saddr, sizeof(saddr));
+
+Additional checks mean that this isn't actually a problem in the code
+base, but I could imagine it becoming a problem later if the function is
+used more liberally.
+
+I would prefer to fix this by having wg_examine_packet_protocol return a
+32-bit ~0 value on failure, which will never match any value of
+skb->protocol, which would simply change the generated code from a mov
+to a movzx. However, sparse complains, and adding __force casts doesn't
+seem like a good idea, so instead we just add a simple helper function
+to check for the zero return value. Since wg_examine_packet_protocol
+itself gets inlined, this winds up not adding an additional branch to
+the generated code, since the 0 return value already happens in a
+mergable branch.
+
+Reported-by: Fabian Freyer <fabianfreyer@radicallyopensecurity.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+---
+ drivers/net/wireguard/device.c   | 2 +-
+ drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h | 8 +++++++-
+ drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c  | 4 ++--
+ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c
+@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t wg_xmit(struct sk_buf
+ 	u32 mtu;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if (unlikely(wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb) != skb->protocol)) {
++	if (unlikely(!wg_check_packet_protocol(skb))) {
+ 		ret = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
+ 		net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Invalid IP packet\n", dev->name);
+ 		goto err;
+--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h
++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h
+@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ struct packet_cb {
+ #define PACKET_PEER(skb) (PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair->entry.peer)
+ 
+ /* Returns either the correct skb->protocol value, or 0 if invalid. */
+-static inline __be16 wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb)
++static inline __be16 wg_examine_packet_protocol(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+ 	if (skb_network_header(skb) >= skb->head &&
+ 	    (skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(struct iphdr)) <=
+@@ -81,6 +81,12 @@ static inline __be16 wg_skb_examine_untr
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++static inline bool wg_check_packet_protocol(struct sk_buff *skb)
++{
++	__be16 real_protocol = wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb);
++	return real_protocol && skb->protocol == real_protocol;
++}
++
+ static inline void wg_reset_packet(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+ 	skb_scrub_packet(skb, true);
+--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c
+@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static int prepare_skb_header(struct sk_
+ 	size_t data_offset, data_len, header_len;
+ 	struct udphdr *udp;
+ 
+-	if (unlikely(wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb) != skb->protocol ||
++	if (unlikely(!wg_check_packet_protocol(skb) ||
+ 		     skb_transport_header(skb) < skb->head ||
+ 		     (skb_transport_header(skb) + sizeof(struct udphdr)) >
+ 			     skb_tail_pointer(skb)))
+@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ static void wg_packet_consume_data_done(
+ 	 */
+ 	skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
+ 	skb->csum_level = ~0; /* All levels */
+-	skb->protocol = wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb);
++	skb->protocol = wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb);
+ 	if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
+ 		len = ntohs(ip_hdr(skb)->tot_len);
+ 		if (unlikely(len < sizeof(struct iphdr)))