curl: Fix multiple security problems

This fixes the following security problems:
* CVE-2018-14618: NTLM password overflow via integer overflow
* CVE-2018-16839: SASL password overflow via integer overflow
* CVE-2018-16840: use-after-free in handle close
* CVE-2018-16842: warning message out-of-buffer read
* CVE-2019-3823:  SMTP end-of-response out-of-bounds read
* CVE-2019-3822:  NTLMv2 type-3 header stack buffer overflow
* CVE-2018-16890: NTLM type-2 out-of-bounds buffer read

Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>

1 files changed, 42 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/package/network/utils/curl/patches/405-CVE-2019-3823.patch b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/405-CVE-2019-3823.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..58b0e1b599
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/405-CVE-2019-3823.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From 39df4073e5413fcdbb5a38da0c1ce6f1c0ceb484 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
+Date: Sat, 19 Jan 2019 00:42:47 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] smtp: avoid risk of buffer overflow in strtol
+
+If the incoming len 5, but the buffer does not have a termination
+after 5 bytes, the strtol() call may keep reading through the line
+buffer until is exceeds its boundary. Fix by ensuring that we are
+using a bounded read with a temporary buffer on the stack.
+
+Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-3823.html
+Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
+CVE-2019-3823
+---
+ lib/smtp.c | 8 ++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/smtp.c
++++ b/lib/smtp.c
+@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
+  *                            | (__| |_| |  _ <| |___
+  *                             \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+  *
+- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2018, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
++ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2019, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+  *
+  * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+  * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+@@ -207,8 +207,12 @@ static bool smtp_endofresp(struct connec
+      Section 4. Examples of RFC-4954 but some e-mail servers ignore this and
+      only send the response code instead as per Section 4.2. */
+   if(line[3] == ' ' || len == 5) {
++    char tmpline[6];
++
+     result = TRUE;
+-    *resp = curlx_sltosi(strtol(line, NULL, 10));
++    memset(tmpline, '\0', sizeof(tmpline));
++    memcpy(tmpline, line, (len == 5 ? 5 : 3));
++    *resp = curlx_sltosi(strtol(tmpline, NULL, 10));
+ 
+     /* Make sure real server never sends internal value */
+     if(*resp == 1)