mac80211: backport upstream fixes for FragAttacks

From the patch series description:

Several security issues in the 802.11 implementations were found by
Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi), who has published all
the details at

	https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/usenix2021.pdf

Specifically, the following CVEs were assigned:

 * CVE-2020-24586 - Fragmentation cache not cleared on reconnection
 * CVE-2020-24587 - Reassembling fragments encrypted under different
                    keys
 * CVE-2020-24588 - Accepting non-SPP A-MSDU frames, which leads to
                    payload being parsed as an L2 frame under an
                    A-MSDU bit toggling attack
 * CVE-2020-26139 - Forwarding EAPOL from unauthenticated sender
 * CVE-2020-26140 - Accepting plaintext data frames in protected
                    networks
 * CVE-2020-26141 - Not verifying TKIP MIC of fragmented frames
 * CVE-2020-26142 - Processing fragmented frames as full frames
 * CVE-2020-26143 - Accepting fragmented plaintext frames in
                    protected networks
 * CVE-2020-26144 - Always accepting unencrypted A-MSDU frames that
                    start with RFC1042 header with EAPOL ethertype
 * CVE-2020-26145 - Accepting plaintext broadcast fragments as full
                    frames
 * CVE-2020-26146 - Reassembling encrypted fragments with non-consecutive
                    packet numbers
 * CVE-2020-26147 - Reassembling mixed encrypted/plaintext fragments

In general, the scope of these attacks is that they may allow an
attacker to
 * inject L2 frames that they can more or less control (depending on the
   vulnerability and attack method) into an otherwise protected network;
 * exfiltrate (some) network data under certain conditions, this is
   specific to the fragmentation issues.

A subset of these issues is known to apply to the Linux IEEE 802.11
implementation (mac80211). Where it is affected, the attached patches
fix the issues, even if not all of them reference the exact CVE IDs.

In addition, driver and/or firmware updates may be necessary, as well
as potentially more fixes to mac80211, depending on how drivers are
using it.

Specifically, for Intel devices, firmware needs to be updated to the
most recently released versions (which was done without any reference
to the security issues) to address some of the vulnerabilities.

To have a single set of patches, I'm also including patches for the
ath10k and ath11k drivers here.

We currently don't have information about how other drivers are, if
at all, affected.

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>

1 files changed, 94 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/388-mac80211-do-not-accept-forward-invalid-EAPOL-frames.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/388-mac80211-do-not-accept-forward-invalid-EAPOL-frames.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9a0b78def1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/388-mac80211-do-not-accept-forward-invalid-EAPOL-frames.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:50 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: do not accept/forward invalid EAPOL frames
+
+EAPOL frames are used for authentication and key management between the
+AP and each individual STA associated in the BSS. Those frames are not
+supposed to be sent by one associated STA to another associated STA
+(either unicast for broadcast/multicast).
+
+Similarly, in 802.11 they're supposed to be sent to the authenticator
+(AP) address.
+
+Since it is possible for unexpected EAPOL frames to result in misbehavior
+in supplicant implementations, it is better for the AP to not allow such
+cases to be forwarded to other clients either directly, or indirectly if
+the AP interface is part of a bridge.
+
+Accept EAPOL (control port) frames only if they're transmitted to the
+own address, or, due to interoperability concerns, to the PAE group
+address.
+
+Disable forwarding of EAPOL (or well, the configured control port
+protocol) frames back to wireless medium in all cases. Previously, these
+frames were accepted from fully authenticated and authorized stations
+and also from unauthenticated stations for one of the cases.
+
+Additionally, to avoid forwarding by the bridge, rewrite the PAE group
+address case to the local MAC address.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Co-developed-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+---
+
+--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
+@@ -2541,13 +2541,13 @@ static bool ieee80211_frame_allowed(stru
+ 	struct ethhdr *ehdr = (struct ethhdr *) rx->skb->data;
+ 
+ 	/*
+-	 * Allow EAPOL frames to us/the PAE group address regardless
+-	 * of whether the frame was encrypted or not.
++	 * Allow EAPOL frames to us/the PAE group address regardless of
++	 * whether the frame was encrypted or not, and always disallow
++	 * all other destination addresses for them.
+ 	 */
+-	if (ehdr->h_proto == rx->sdata->control_port_protocol &&
+-	    (ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, rx->sdata->vif.addr) ||
+-	     ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, pae_group_addr)))
+-		return true;
++	if (unlikely(ehdr->h_proto == rx->sdata->control_port_protocol))
++		return ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, rx->sdata->vif.addr) ||
++		       ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, pae_group_addr);
+ 
+ 	if (ieee80211_802_1x_port_control(rx) ||
+ 	    ieee80211_drop_unencrypted(rx, fc))
+@@ -2572,8 +2572,28 @@ static void ieee80211_deliver_skb_to_loc
+ 		cfg80211_rx_control_port(dev, skb, noencrypt);
+ 		dev_kfree_skb(skb);
+ 	} else {
++		struct ethhdr *ehdr = (void *)skb_mac_header(skb);
++
+ 		memset(skb->cb, 0, sizeof(skb->cb));
+ 
++		/*
++		 * 802.1X over 802.11 requires that the authenticator address
++		 * be used for EAPOL frames. However, 802.1X allows the use of
++		 * the PAE group address instead. If the interface is part of
++		 * a bridge and we pass the frame with the PAE group address,
++		 * then the bridge will forward it to the network (even if the
++		 * client was not associated yet), which isn't supposed to
++		 * happen.
++		 * To avoid that, rewrite the destination address to our own
++		 * address, so that the authenticator (e.g. hostapd) will see
++		 * the frame, but bridge won't forward it anywhere else. Note
++		 * that due to earlier filtering, the only other address can
++		 * be the PAE group address.
++		 */
++		if (unlikely(skb->protocol == sdata->control_port_protocol &&
++			     !ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, sdata->vif.addr)))
++			ether_addr_copy(ehdr->h_dest, sdata->vif.addr);
++
+ 		/* deliver to local stack */
+ 		if (rx->list)
+ #if LINUX_VERSION_IS_GEQ(4,19,0)
+@@ -2617,6 +2637,7 @@ ieee80211_deliver_skb(struct ieee80211_r
+ 	if ((sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP ||
+ 	     sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) &&
+ 	    !(sdata->flags & IEEE80211_SDATA_DONT_BRIDGE_PACKETS) &&
++	    ehdr->h_proto != rx->sdata->control_port_protocol &&
+ 	    (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN || !sdata->u.vlan.sta)) {
+ 		if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ehdr->h_dest) &&
+ 		    ieee80211_vif_get_num_mcast_if(sdata) != 0) {