packages: sort network related packages into package/network/

SVN-Revision: 33688

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 338 deletions

diff --git a/package/ead/src/tinysrp/t_misc.c b/package/ead/src/tinysrp/t_misc.c
deleted file mode 100644
index a23986f90f..0000000000
--- a/package/ead/src/tinysrp/t_misc.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,338 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1997-1999  The Stanford SRP Authentication Project
- * All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
- * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
- * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
- * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
- * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
- * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
- * the following conditions:
- *
- * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
- * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS-IS" AND WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
- * EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR OTHERWISE, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY
- * WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
- *
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL STANFORD BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL,
- * INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OF ANY KIND, OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER
- * RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER OR NOT ADVISED OF
- * THE POSSIBILITY OF DAMAGE, AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, ARISING OUT
- * OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- *
- * In addition, the following conditions apply:
- *
- * 1. Any software that incorporates the SRP authentication technology
- *    must display the following acknowlegment:
- *    "This product uses the 'Secure Remote Password' cryptographic
- *     authentication system developed by Tom Wu (tjw@CS.Stanford.EDU)."
- *
- * 2. Any software that incorporates all or part of the SRP distribution
- *    itself must also display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by Tom Wu and Eugene
- *     Jhong for the SRP Distribution (http://srp.stanford.edu/srp/)."
- *
- * 3. Redistributions in source or binary form must retain an intact copy
- *    of this copyright notice and list of conditions.
- */
-
-#include "t_defines.h"
-
-#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
-#include <unistd.h>
-#endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-
-#include "t_sha.h"
-
-#ifndef NULL
-#define NULL 0
-#endif
-
-static unsigned char randpool[SHA_DIGESTSIZE], randout[SHA_DIGESTSIZE];
-static unsigned long randcnt = 0;
-static unsigned int outpos = 0;
-SHA1_CTX randctxt;
-
-/*
- * t_envhash - Generate a 160-bit SHA hash of the environment
- *
- * This routine performs an SHA hash of all the "name=value" pairs
- * in the environment concatenated together and dumps them in the
- * output.  While it is true that anyone on the system can see
- * your environment, someone not on the system will have a very
- * difficult time guessing it, especially since some systems play
- * tricks with variable ordering and sometimes define quirky
- * environment variables like $WINDOWID or $_.
- */
-extern char ** environ;
-
-static void
-t_envhash(out)
-     unsigned char * out;
-{
-  char ** ptr;
-  char ebuf[256];
-  SHA1_CTX ctxt;
-
-  SHA1Init(&ctxt);
-  for(ptr = environ; *ptr; ++ptr) {
-    strncpy(ebuf, *ptr, 255);
-    ebuf[255] = '\0';
-    SHA1Update(&ctxt, ebuf, strlen(ebuf));
-  }
-  SHA1Final(out, &ctxt);
-}
-
-/*
- * t_fshash - Generate a 160-bit SHA hash from the file system
- *
- * This routine climbs up the directory tree from the current
- * directory, running stat() on each directory until it hits the
- * root directory.  This information is sensitive to the last
- * access/modification times of all the directories above you,
- * so someone who lists one of those directories injects some
- * entropy into the system.  Obviously, this hash is very sensitive
- * to your current directory when the program is run.
- *
- * For good measure, it also performs an fstat on the standard input,
- * usually your tty, throws that into the buffer, creates a file in
- * /tmp (the inode is unpredictable on a busy system), and runs stat()
- * on that before deleting it.
- *
- * The entire buffer is run once through SHA to obtain the final result.
- */
-static void
-t_fshash(out)
-     unsigned char * out;
-{
-  char dotpath[128];
-  struct stat st;
-  SHA1_CTX ctxt;
-  int i, pinode;
-  dev_t pdev;
-
-  SHA1Init(&ctxt);
-  if(stat(".", &st) >= 0) {
-    SHA1Update(&ctxt, (unsigned char *) &st, sizeof(st));
-    pinode = st.st_ino;
-    pdev = st.st_dev;
-    strcpy(dotpath, "..");
-    for(i = 0; i < 40; ++i) {
-      if(stat(dotpath, &st) < 0)
-	break;
-      if(st.st_ino == pinode && st.st_dev == pdev)
-	break;
-      SHA1Update(&ctxt, (unsigned char *) &st, sizeof(st));
-      pinode = st.st_ino;
-      pdev = st.st_dev;
-      strcat(dotpath, "/..");
-    }
-  }
-
-  if(fstat(0, &st) >= 0)
-    SHA1Update(&ctxt, (unsigned char *) &st, sizeof(st));
-
-  sprintf(dotpath, "/tmp/rnd.%d", getpid());
-  if(creat(dotpath, 0600) >= 0 && stat(dotpath, &st) >= 0)
-    SHA1Update(&ctxt, (unsigned char *) &st, sizeof(st));
-  unlink(dotpath);
-
-  SHA1Final(out, &ctxt);
-}
-
-/*
- * Generate a high-entropy seed for the strong random number generator.
- * This uses a wide variety of quickly gathered and somewhat unpredictable
- * system information.  The 'preseed' structure is assembled from:
- *
- *   The system time in seconds
- *   The system time in microseconds
- *   The current process ID
- *   The parent process ID
- *   A hash of the user's environment
- *   A hash gathered from the file system
- *   Input from a random device, if available
- *   Timings of system interrupts
- *
- * The entire structure (60 bytes on most systems) is fed to SHA to produce
- * a 160-bit seed for the strong random number generator.  It is believed
- * that in the worst case (on a quiet system with no random device versus
- * an attacker who has access to the system already), the seed contains at
- * least about 80 bits of entropy.  Versus an attacker who does not have
- * access to the system, the entropy should be slightly over 128 bits.
- */
-static char initialized = 0;
-
-static struct {
-  unsigned int trand1;
-  time_t sec;
-  time_t usec;
-  short pid;
-  short ppid;
-  unsigned char envh[SHA_DIGESTSIZE];
-  unsigned char fsh[SHA_DIGESTSIZE];
-  unsigned char devrand[20];
-  unsigned int trand2;
-} preseed;
-
-unsigned long raw_truerand();
-
-void
-t_initrand()
-{
-  SHA1_CTX ctxt;
-#ifdef USE_FTIME
-  struct timeb t;
-#else
-  struct timeval t;
-#endif
-  int i, r=0;
-
-  if(initialized)
-    return;
-
-  initialized = 1;
-
-  i = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
-  if(i > 0) {
-    r += read(i, preseed.devrand, sizeof(preseed.devrand));
-    close(i);
-  }
-
-  /* Resort to truerand only if desperate for some Real entropy */
-  if(r == 0)
-    preseed.trand1 = raw_truerand();
-
-#ifdef USE_FTIME
-  ftime(&t);
-#else
-  gettimeofday(&t, NULL);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef USE_FTIME
-  preseed.sec = t.time;
-  preseed.usec = t.millitm;
-#else
-  preseed.sec = t.tv_sec;
-  preseed.usec = t.tv_usec;
-#endif
-  preseed.pid = getpid();
-  preseed.ppid = getppid();
-  t_envhash(preseed.envh);
-  t_fshash(preseed.fsh);
-
-  if(r == 0)
-    preseed.trand2 = raw_truerand();
-
-  SHA1Init(&ctxt);
-  SHA1Update(&ctxt, (unsigned char *) &preseed, sizeof(preseed));
-  SHA1Final(randpool, &ctxt);
-  outpos = 0;
-  memset((unsigned char *) &preseed, 0, sizeof(preseed));
-  memset((unsigned char *) &ctxt, 0, sizeof(ctxt));
-}
-
-#define NUM_RANDOMS 12
-
-/*
- * The strong random number generator.  This uses a 160-bit seed
- * and uses SHA-1 in a feedback configuration to generate successive
- * outputs.  If S[0] is set to the initial seed, then:
- *
- *         S[i+1] = SHA-1(i || S[i])
- *         A[i] = SHA-1(S[i])
- *
- * where the A[i] are the output blocks starting with i=0.
- * Each cycle generates 20 bytes of new output.
- */
-_TYPE( void )
-t_random(data, size)
-     unsigned char * data;
-     unsigned size;
-{
-  if(!initialized)
-    t_initrand();
-
-  if(size <= 0)         /* t_random(NULL, 0) forces seed initialization */
-    return;
-
-  while(size > outpos) {
-    if(outpos > 0) {
-      memcpy(data, randout + (sizeof(randout) - outpos), outpos);
-      data += outpos;
-      size -= outpos;
-    }
-
-    /* Recycle */
-    SHA1Init(&randctxt);
-    SHA1Update(&randctxt, randpool, sizeof(randpool));
-    SHA1Final(randout, &randctxt);
-    SHA1Init(&randctxt);
-    SHA1Update(&randctxt, (unsigned char *) &randcnt, sizeof(randcnt));
-    SHA1Update(&randctxt, randpool, sizeof(randpool));
-    SHA1Final(randpool, &randctxt);
-    ++randcnt;
-    outpos = sizeof(randout);
-  }
-
-  if(size > 0) {
-    memcpy(data, randout + (sizeof(randout) - outpos), size);
-    outpos -= size;
-  }
-}
-
-/*
- * The interleaved session-key hash.  This separates the even and the odd
- * bytes of the input (ignoring the first byte if the input length is odd),
- * hashes them separately, and re-interleaves the two outputs to form a
- * single 320-bit value.
- */
-_TYPE( unsigned char * )
-t_sessionkey(key, sk, sklen)
-     unsigned char * key;
-     unsigned char * sk;
-     unsigned sklen;
-{
-  unsigned i, klen;
-  unsigned char * hbuf;
-  unsigned char hout[SHA_DIGESTSIZE];
-  SHA1_CTX ctxt;
-
-  while(sklen > 0 && *sk == 0) {        /* Skip leading 0's */
-    --sklen;
-    ++sk;
-  }
-
-  klen = sklen / 2;
-  if((hbuf = malloc(klen * sizeof(char))) == 0)
-    return 0;
-
-  for(i = 0; i < klen; ++i)
-    hbuf[i] = sk[sklen - 2 * i - 1];
-  SHA1Init(&ctxt);
-  SHA1Update(&ctxt, hbuf, klen);
-  SHA1Final(hout, &ctxt);
-  for(i = 0; i < sizeof(hout); ++i)
-    key[2 * i] = hout[i];
-
-  for(i = 0; i < klen; ++i)
-    hbuf[i] = sk[sklen - 2 * i - 2];
-  SHA1Init(&ctxt);
-  SHA1Update(&ctxt, hbuf, klen);
-  SHA1Final(hout, &ctxt);
-  for(i = 0; i < sizeof(hout); ++i)
-    key[2 * i + 1] = hout[i];
-
-  memset(hout, 0, sizeof(hout));
-  memset(hbuf, 0, klen);
-  free(hbuf);
-  return key;
-}