diff options
author | Paul Kehrer <paul.l.kehrer@gmail.com> | 2016-01-10 00:25:35 -0600 |
---|---|---|
committer | Paul Kehrer <paul.l.kehrer@gmail.com> | 2016-01-10 12:38:25 -0600 |
commit | 3057f91ea9a05fb593825006d87a391286a4d828 (patch) | |
tree | dbf471f137e6adf9485462202636f4075c49281f /src/cryptography/hazmat/backends/openssl/decode_asn1.py | |
parent | 3f6f8f593e0bd9910d406ec56bfeceba5a2badbf (diff) | |
download | cryptography-3057f91ea9a05fb593825006d87a391286a4d828.tar.gz cryptography-3057f91ea9a05fb593825006d87a391286a4d828.tar.bz2 cryptography-3057f91ea9a05fb593825006d87a391286a4d828.zip |
move openssl asn1 decode functions to a new module
Diffstat (limited to 'src/cryptography/hazmat/backends/openssl/decode_asn1.py')
-rw-r--r-- | src/cryptography/hazmat/backends/openssl/decode_asn1.py | 717 |
1 files changed, 717 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/cryptography/hazmat/backends/openssl/decode_asn1.py b/src/cryptography/hazmat/backends/openssl/decode_asn1.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c0cc01a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/cryptography/hazmat/backends/openssl/decode_asn1.py @@ -0,0 +1,717 @@ +# This file is dual licensed under the terms of the Apache License, Version +# 2.0, and the BSD License. See the LICENSE file in the root of this repository +# for complete details. + +from __future__ import absolute_import, division, print_function + +import ipaddress + +from email.utils import parseaddr + +import idna + +import six + +from six.moves import urllib_parse + +from cryptography import x509 +from cryptography.x509.oid import ( + CRLEntryExtensionOID, CertificatePoliciesOID, ExtensionOID +) + + +def _obj2txt(backend, obj): + # Set to 80 on the recommendation of + # https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/OBJ_nid2ln.html#return_values + buf_len = 80 + buf = backend._ffi.new("char[]", buf_len) + res = backend._lib.OBJ_obj2txt(buf, buf_len, obj, 1) + backend.openssl_assert(res > 0) + return backend._ffi.buffer(buf, res)[:].decode() + + +def _decode_x509_name_entry(backend, x509_name_entry): + obj = backend._lib.X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(x509_name_entry) + backend.openssl_assert(obj != backend._ffi.NULL) + data = backend._lib.X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(x509_name_entry) + backend.openssl_assert(data != backend._ffi.NULL) + value = backend._asn1_string_to_utf8(data) + oid = _obj2txt(backend, obj) + + return x509.NameAttribute(x509.ObjectIdentifier(oid), value) + + +def _decode_x509_name(backend, x509_name): + count = backend._lib.X509_NAME_entry_count(x509_name) + attributes = [] + for x in range(count): + entry = backend._lib.X509_NAME_get_entry(x509_name, x) + attributes.append(_decode_x509_name_entry(backend, entry)) + + return x509.Name(attributes) + + +def _decode_general_names(backend, gns): + num = backend._lib.sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gns) + names = [] + for i in range(num): + gn = backend._lib.sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gns, i) + backend.openssl_assert(gn != backend._ffi.NULL) + names.append(_decode_general_name(backend, gn)) + + return names + + +def _decode_general_name(backend, gn): + if gn.type == backend._lib.GEN_DNS: + data = backend._asn1_string_to_bytes(gn.d.dNSName) + if not data: + decoded = u"" + elif data.startswith(b"*."): + # This is a wildcard name. We need to remove the leading wildcard, + # IDNA decode, then re-add the wildcard. Wildcard characters should + # always be left-most (RFC 2595 section 2.4). + decoded = u"*." + idna.decode(data[2:]) + else: + # Not a wildcard, decode away. If the string has a * in it anywhere + # invalid this will raise an InvalidCodePoint + decoded = idna.decode(data) + if data.startswith(b"."): + # idna strips leading periods. Name constraints can have that + # so we need to re-add it. Sigh. + decoded = u"." + decoded + + return x509.DNSName(decoded) + elif gn.type == backend._lib.GEN_URI: + data = backend._asn1_string_to_ascii(gn.d.uniformResourceIdentifier) + parsed = urllib_parse.urlparse(data) + if parsed.hostname: + hostname = idna.decode(parsed.hostname) + else: + hostname = "" + if parsed.port: + netloc = hostname + u":" + six.text_type(parsed.port) + else: + netloc = hostname + + # Note that building a URL in this fashion means it should be + # semantically indistinguishable from the original but is not + # guaranteed to be exactly the same. + uri = urllib_parse.urlunparse(( + parsed.scheme, + netloc, + parsed.path, + parsed.params, + parsed.query, + parsed.fragment + )) + return x509.UniformResourceIdentifier(uri) + elif gn.type == backend._lib.GEN_RID: + oid = _obj2txt(backend, gn.d.registeredID) + return x509.RegisteredID(x509.ObjectIdentifier(oid)) + elif gn.type == backend._lib.GEN_IPADD: + data = backend._asn1_string_to_bytes(gn.d.iPAddress) + data_len = len(data) + if data_len == 8 or data_len == 32: + # This is an IPv4 or IPv6 Network and not a single IP. This + # type of data appears in Name Constraints. Unfortunately, + # ipaddress doesn't support packed bytes + netmask. Additionally, + # IPv6Network can only handle CIDR rather than the full 16 byte + # netmask. To handle this we convert the netmask to integer, then + # find the first 0 bit, which will be the prefix. If another 1 + # bit is present after that the netmask is invalid. + base = ipaddress.ip_address(data[:data_len // 2]) + netmask = ipaddress.ip_address(data[data_len // 2:]) + bits = bin(int(netmask))[2:] + prefix = bits.find('0') + # If no 0 bits are found it is a /32 or /128 + if prefix == -1: + prefix = len(bits) + + if "1" in bits[prefix:]: + raise ValueError("Invalid netmask") + + ip = ipaddress.ip_network(base.exploded + u"/{0}".format(prefix)) + else: + ip = ipaddress.ip_address(data) + + return x509.IPAddress(ip) + elif gn.type == backend._lib.GEN_DIRNAME: + return x509.DirectoryName( + _decode_x509_name(backend, gn.d.directoryName) + ) + elif gn.type == backend._lib.GEN_EMAIL: + data = backend._asn1_string_to_ascii(gn.d.rfc822Name) + name, address = parseaddr(data) + parts = address.split(u"@") + if name or not address: + # parseaddr has found a name (e.g. Name <email>) or the entire + # value is an empty string. + raise ValueError("Invalid rfc822name value") + elif len(parts) == 1: + # Single label email name. This is valid for local delivery. No + # IDNA decoding can be done since there is no domain component. + return x509.RFC822Name(address) + else: + # A normal email of the form user@domain.com. Let's attempt to + # decode the domain component and return the entire address. + return x509.RFC822Name( + parts[0] + u"@" + idna.decode(parts[1]) + ) + elif gn.type == backend._lib.GEN_OTHERNAME: + type_id = _obj2txt(backend, gn.d.otherName.type_id) + value = backend._asn1_to_der(gn.d.otherName.value) + return x509.OtherName(x509.ObjectIdentifier(type_id), value) + else: + # x400Address or ediPartyName + raise x509.UnsupportedGeneralNameType( + "{0} is not a supported type".format( + x509._GENERAL_NAMES.get(gn.type, gn.type) + ), + gn.type + ) + + +def _decode_ocsp_no_check(backend, ext): + return x509.OCSPNoCheck() + + +def _decode_crl_number(backend, ext): + asn1_int = backend._ffi.cast("ASN1_INTEGER *", ext) + asn1_int = backend._ffi.gc(asn1_int, backend._lib.ASN1_INTEGER_free) + return x509.CRLNumber(backend._asn1_integer_to_int(asn1_int)) + + +class _X509ExtensionParser(object): + def __init__(self, ext_count, get_ext, handlers, unsupported_exts=None): + self.ext_count = ext_count + self.get_ext = get_ext + self.handlers = handlers + self.unsupported_exts = unsupported_exts + + def parse(self, backend, x509_obj): + extensions = [] + seen_oids = set() + for i in range(self.ext_count(backend, x509_obj)): + ext = self.get_ext(backend, x509_obj, i) + backend.openssl_assert(ext != backend._ffi.NULL) + crit = backend._lib.X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext) + critical = crit == 1 + oid = x509.ObjectIdentifier(_obj2txt(backend, ext.object)) + if oid in seen_oids: + raise x509.DuplicateExtension( + "Duplicate {0} extension found".format(oid), oid + ) + try: + handler = self.handlers[oid] + except KeyError: + if critical: + raise x509.UnsupportedExtension( + "Critical extension {0} is not currently supported" + .format(oid), oid + ) + else: + # Dump the DER payload into an UnrecognizedExtension object + data = backend._lib.X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ext) + backend.openssl_assert(data != backend._ffi.NULL) + der = backend._ffi.buffer(data.data, data.length)[:] + unrecognized = x509.UnrecognizedExtension(oid, der) + extensions.append( + x509.Extension(oid, critical, unrecognized) + ) + else: + # For extensions which are not supported by OpenSSL we pass the + # extension object directly to the parsing routine so it can + # be decoded manually. + if self.unsupported_exts and oid in self.unsupported_exts: + ext_data = ext + else: + ext_data = backend._lib.X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext) + if ext_data == backend._ffi.NULL: + backend._consume_errors() + raise ValueError( + "The {0} extension is invalid and can't be " + "parsed".format(oid) + ) + + value = handler(backend, ext_data) + extensions.append(x509.Extension(oid, critical, value)) + + seen_oids.add(oid) + + return x509.Extensions(extensions) + + +def _decode_certificate_policies(backend, cp): + cp = backend._ffi.cast("Cryptography_STACK_OF_POLICYINFO *", cp) + cp = backend._ffi.gc(cp, backend._lib.sk_POLICYINFO_free) + num = backend._lib.sk_POLICYINFO_num(cp) + certificate_policies = [] + for i in range(num): + qualifiers = None + pi = backend._lib.sk_POLICYINFO_value(cp, i) + oid = x509.ObjectIdentifier(_obj2txt(backend, pi.policyid)) + if pi.qualifiers != backend._ffi.NULL: + qnum = backend._lib.sk_POLICYQUALINFO_num(pi.qualifiers) + qualifiers = [] + for j in range(qnum): + pqi = backend._lib.sk_POLICYQUALINFO_value( + pi.qualifiers, j + ) + pqualid = x509.ObjectIdentifier( + _obj2txt(backend, pqi.pqualid) + ) + if pqualid == CertificatePoliciesOID.CPS_QUALIFIER: + cpsuri = backend._ffi.buffer( + pqi.d.cpsuri.data, pqi.d.cpsuri.length + )[:].decode('ascii') + qualifiers.append(cpsuri) + else: + assert pqualid == CertificatePoliciesOID.CPS_USER_NOTICE + user_notice = _decode_user_notice( + backend, pqi.d.usernotice + ) + qualifiers.append(user_notice) + + certificate_policies.append( + x509.PolicyInformation(oid, qualifiers) + ) + + return x509.CertificatePolicies(certificate_policies) + + +def _decode_user_notice(backend, un): + explicit_text = None + notice_reference = None + + if un.exptext != backend._ffi.NULL: + explicit_text = backend._asn1_string_to_utf8(un.exptext) + + if un.noticeref != backend._ffi.NULL: + organization = backend._asn1_string_to_utf8(un.noticeref.organization) + + num = backend._lib.sk_ASN1_INTEGER_num( + un.noticeref.noticenos + ) + notice_numbers = [] + for i in range(num): + asn1_int = backend._lib.sk_ASN1_INTEGER_value( + un.noticeref.noticenos, i + ) + notice_num = backend._asn1_integer_to_int(asn1_int) + notice_numbers.append(notice_num) + + notice_reference = x509.NoticeReference( + organization, notice_numbers + ) + + return x509.UserNotice(notice_reference, explicit_text) + + +def _decode_basic_constraints(backend, bc_st): + basic_constraints = backend._ffi.cast("BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *", bc_st) + basic_constraints = backend._ffi.gc( + basic_constraints, backend._lib.BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free + ) + # The byte representation of an ASN.1 boolean true is \xff. OpenSSL + # chooses to just map this to its ordinal value, so true is 255 and + # false is 0. + ca = basic_constraints.ca == 255 + if basic_constraints.pathlen == backend._ffi.NULL: + path_length = None + else: + path_length = backend._asn1_integer_to_int(basic_constraints.pathlen) + + return x509.BasicConstraints(ca, path_length) + + +def _decode_subject_key_identifier(backend, asn1_string): + asn1_string = backend._ffi.cast("ASN1_OCTET_STRING *", asn1_string) + asn1_string = backend._ffi.gc( + asn1_string, backend._lib.ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free + ) + return x509.SubjectKeyIdentifier( + backend._ffi.buffer(asn1_string.data, asn1_string.length)[:] + ) + + +def _decode_authority_key_identifier(backend, akid): + akid = backend._ffi.cast("AUTHORITY_KEYID *", akid) + akid = backend._ffi.gc(akid, backend._lib.AUTHORITY_KEYID_free) + key_identifier = None + authority_cert_issuer = None + authority_cert_serial_number = None + + if akid.keyid != backend._ffi.NULL: + key_identifier = backend._ffi.buffer( + akid.keyid.data, akid.keyid.length + )[:] + + if akid.issuer != backend._ffi.NULL: + authority_cert_issuer = _decode_general_names( + backend, akid.issuer + ) + + if akid.serial != backend._ffi.NULL: + authority_cert_serial_number = backend._asn1_integer_to_int( + akid.serial + ) + + return x509.AuthorityKeyIdentifier( + key_identifier, authority_cert_issuer, authority_cert_serial_number + ) + + +def _decode_authority_information_access(backend, aia): + aia = backend._ffi.cast("Cryptography_STACK_OF_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *", aia) + aia = backend._ffi.gc(aia, backend._lib.sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free) + num = backend._lib.sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(aia) + access_descriptions = [] + for i in range(num): + ad = backend._lib.sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(aia, i) + backend.openssl_assert(ad.method != backend._ffi.NULL) + oid = x509.ObjectIdentifier(_obj2txt(backend, ad.method)) + backend.openssl_assert(ad.location != backend._ffi.NULL) + gn = _decode_general_name(backend, ad.location) + access_descriptions.append(x509.AccessDescription(oid, gn)) + + return x509.AuthorityInformationAccess(access_descriptions) + + +def _decode_key_usage(backend, bit_string): + bit_string = backend._ffi.cast("ASN1_BIT_STRING *", bit_string) + bit_string = backend._ffi.gc(bit_string, backend._lib.ASN1_BIT_STRING_free) + get_bit = backend._lib.ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit + digital_signature = get_bit(bit_string, 0) == 1 + content_commitment = get_bit(bit_string, 1) == 1 + key_encipherment = get_bit(bit_string, 2) == 1 + data_encipherment = get_bit(bit_string, 3) == 1 + key_agreement = get_bit(bit_string, 4) == 1 + key_cert_sign = get_bit(bit_string, 5) == 1 + crl_sign = get_bit(bit_string, 6) == 1 + encipher_only = get_bit(bit_string, 7) == 1 + decipher_only = get_bit(bit_string, 8) == 1 + return x509.KeyUsage( + digital_signature, + content_commitment, + key_encipherment, + data_encipherment, + key_agreement, + key_cert_sign, + crl_sign, + encipher_only, + decipher_only + ) + + +def _decode_general_names_extension(backend, gns): + gns = backend._ffi.cast("GENERAL_NAMES *", gns) + gns = backend._ffi.gc(gns, backend._lib.GENERAL_NAMES_free) + general_names = _decode_general_names(backend, gns) + return general_names + + +def _decode_subject_alt_name(backend, ext): + return x509.SubjectAlternativeName( + _decode_general_names_extension(backend, ext) + ) + + +def _decode_issuer_alt_name(backend, ext): + return x509.IssuerAlternativeName( + _decode_general_names_extension(backend, ext) + ) + + +def _decode_name_constraints(backend, nc): + nc = backend._ffi.cast("NAME_CONSTRAINTS *", nc) + nc = backend._ffi.gc(nc, backend._lib.NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free) + permitted = _decode_general_subtrees(backend, nc.permittedSubtrees) + excluded = _decode_general_subtrees(backend, nc.excludedSubtrees) + return x509.NameConstraints( + permitted_subtrees=permitted, excluded_subtrees=excluded + ) + + +def _decode_general_subtrees(backend, stack_subtrees): + if stack_subtrees == backend._ffi.NULL: + return None + + num = backend._lib.sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(stack_subtrees) + subtrees = [] + + for i in range(num): + obj = backend._lib.sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(stack_subtrees, i) + backend.openssl_assert(obj != backend._ffi.NULL) + name = _decode_general_name(backend, obj.base) + subtrees.append(name) + + return subtrees + + +def _decode_extended_key_usage(backend, sk): + sk = backend._ffi.cast("Cryptography_STACK_OF_ASN1_OBJECT *", sk) + sk = backend._ffi.gc(sk, backend._lib.sk_ASN1_OBJECT_free) + num = backend._lib.sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(sk) + ekus = [] + + for i in range(num): + obj = backend._lib.sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(sk, i) + backend.openssl_assert(obj != backend._ffi.NULL) + oid = x509.ObjectIdentifier(_obj2txt(backend, obj)) + ekus.append(oid) + + return x509.ExtendedKeyUsage(ekus) + + +_DISTPOINT_TYPE_FULLNAME = 0 +_DISTPOINT_TYPE_RELATIVENAME = 1 + + +def _decode_crl_distribution_points(backend, cdps): + cdps = backend._ffi.cast("Cryptography_STACK_OF_DIST_POINT *", cdps) + cdps = backend._ffi.gc(cdps, backend._lib.sk_DIST_POINT_free) + num = backend._lib.sk_DIST_POINT_num(cdps) + + dist_points = [] + for i in range(num): + full_name = None + relative_name = None + crl_issuer = None + reasons = None + cdp = backend._lib.sk_DIST_POINT_value(cdps, i) + if cdp.reasons != backend._ffi.NULL: + # We will check each bit from RFC 5280 + # ReasonFlags ::= BIT STRING { + # unused (0), + # keyCompromise (1), + # cACompromise (2), + # affiliationChanged (3), + # superseded (4), + # cessationOfOperation (5), + # certificateHold (6), + # privilegeWithdrawn (7), + # aACompromise (8) } + reasons = [] + get_bit = backend._lib.ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit + if get_bit(cdp.reasons, 1): + reasons.append(x509.ReasonFlags.key_compromise) + + if get_bit(cdp.reasons, 2): + reasons.append(x509.ReasonFlags.ca_compromise) + + if get_bit(cdp.reasons, 3): + reasons.append(x509.ReasonFlags.affiliation_changed) + + if get_bit(cdp.reasons, 4): + reasons.append(x509.ReasonFlags.superseded) + + if get_bit(cdp.reasons, 5): + reasons.append(x509.ReasonFlags.cessation_of_operation) + + if get_bit(cdp.reasons, 6): + reasons.append(x509.ReasonFlags.certificate_hold) + + if get_bit(cdp.reasons, 7): + reasons.append(x509.ReasonFlags.privilege_withdrawn) + + if get_bit(cdp.reasons, 8): + reasons.append(x509.ReasonFlags.aa_compromise) + + reasons = frozenset(reasons) + + if cdp.CRLissuer != backend._ffi.NULL: + crl_issuer = _decode_general_names(backend, cdp.CRLissuer) + + # Certificates may have a crl_issuer/reasons and no distribution + # point so make sure it's not null. + if cdp.distpoint != backend._ffi.NULL: + # Type 0 is fullName, there is no #define for it in the code. + if cdp.distpoint.type == _DISTPOINT_TYPE_FULLNAME: + full_name = _decode_general_names( + backend, cdp.distpoint.name.fullname + ) + # OpenSSL code doesn't test for a specific type for + # relativename, everything that isn't fullname is considered + # relativename. + else: + rns = cdp.distpoint.name.relativename + rnum = backend._lib.sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(rns) + attributes = [] + for i in range(rnum): + rn = backend._lib.sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value( + rns, i + ) + backend.openssl_assert(rn != backend._ffi.NULL) + attributes.append( + _decode_x509_name_entry(backend, rn) + ) + + relative_name = x509.Name(attributes) + + dist_points.append( + x509.DistributionPoint( + full_name, relative_name, reasons, crl_issuer + ) + ) + + return x509.CRLDistributionPoints(dist_points) + + +def _decode_inhibit_any_policy(backend, asn1_int): + asn1_int = backend._ffi.cast("ASN1_INTEGER *", asn1_int) + asn1_int = backend._ffi.gc(asn1_int, backend._lib.ASN1_INTEGER_free) + skip_certs = backend._asn1_integer_to_int(asn1_int) + return x509.InhibitAnyPolicy(skip_certs) + + +# CRLReason ::= ENUMERATED { +# unspecified (0), +# keyCompromise (1), +# cACompromise (2), +# affiliationChanged (3), +# superseded (4), +# cessationOfOperation (5), +# certificateHold (6), +# -- value 7 is not used +# removeFromCRL (8), +# privilegeWithdrawn (9), +# aACompromise (10) } +_CRL_ENTRY_REASON_CODE_TO_ENUM = { + 0: x509.ReasonFlags.unspecified, + 1: x509.ReasonFlags.key_compromise, + 2: x509.ReasonFlags.ca_compromise, + 3: x509.ReasonFlags.affiliation_changed, + 4: x509.ReasonFlags.superseded, + 5: x509.ReasonFlags.cessation_of_operation, + 6: x509.ReasonFlags.certificate_hold, + 8: x509.ReasonFlags.remove_from_crl, + 9: x509.ReasonFlags.privilege_withdrawn, + 10: x509.ReasonFlags.aa_compromise, +} + + +_CRL_ENTRY_REASON_ENUM_TO_CODE = { + x509.ReasonFlags.unspecified: 0, + x509.ReasonFlags.key_compromise: 1, + x509.ReasonFlags.ca_compromise: 2, + x509.ReasonFlags.affiliation_changed: 3, + x509.ReasonFlags.superseded: 4, + x509.ReasonFlags.cessation_of_operation: 5, + x509.ReasonFlags.certificate_hold: 6, + x509.ReasonFlags.remove_from_crl: 8, + x509.ReasonFlags.privilege_withdrawn: 9, + x509.ReasonFlags.aa_compromise: 10 +} + + +def _decode_crl_reason(backend, enum): + enum = backend._ffi.cast("ASN1_ENUMERATED *", enum) + enum = backend._ffi.gc(enum, backend._lib.ASN1_ENUMERATED_free) + code = backend._lib.ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(enum) + + try: + return x509.CRLReason(_CRL_ENTRY_REASON_CODE_TO_ENUM[code]) + except KeyError: + raise ValueError("Unsupported reason code: {0}".format(code)) + + +def _decode_invalidity_date(backend, inv_date): + generalized_time = backend._ffi.cast( + "ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *", inv_date + ) + generalized_time = backend._ffi.gc( + generalized_time, backend._lib.ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free + ) + return x509.InvalidityDate( + backend._parse_asn1_generalized_time(generalized_time) + ) + + +def _decode_cert_issuer(backend, ext): + """ + This handler decodes the CertificateIssuer entry extension directly + from the X509_EXTENSION object. This is necessary because this entry + extension is not directly supported by OpenSSL 0.9.8. + """ + + data_ptr_ptr = backend._ffi.new("const unsigned char **") + data_ptr_ptr[0] = ext.value.data + gns = backend._lib.d2i_GENERAL_NAMES( + backend._ffi.NULL, data_ptr_ptr, ext.value.length + ) + + # Check the result of d2i_GENERAL_NAMES() is valid. Usually this is covered + # in _X509ExtensionParser but since we are responsible for decoding this + # entry extension ourselves, we have to this here. + if gns == backend._ffi.NULL: + backend._consume_errors() + raise ValueError( + "The {0} extension is corrupted and can't be parsed".format( + CRLEntryExtensionOID.CERTIFICATE_ISSUER)) + + gns = backend._ffi.gc(gns, backend._lib.GENERAL_NAMES_free) + return x509.CertificateIssuer(_decode_general_names(backend, gns)) + + +_EXTENSION_HANDLERS = { + ExtensionOID.BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: _decode_basic_constraints, + ExtensionOID.SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER: _decode_subject_key_identifier, + ExtensionOID.KEY_USAGE: _decode_key_usage, + ExtensionOID.SUBJECT_ALTERNATIVE_NAME: _decode_subject_alt_name, + ExtensionOID.EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE: _decode_extended_key_usage, + ExtensionOID.AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER: _decode_authority_key_identifier, + ExtensionOID.AUTHORITY_INFORMATION_ACCESS: ( + _decode_authority_information_access + ), + ExtensionOID.CERTIFICATE_POLICIES: _decode_certificate_policies, + ExtensionOID.CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS: _decode_crl_distribution_points, + ExtensionOID.OCSP_NO_CHECK: _decode_ocsp_no_check, + ExtensionOID.INHIBIT_ANY_POLICY: _decode_inhibit_any_policy, + ExtensionOID.ISSUER_ALTERNATIVE_NAME: _decode_issuer_alt_name, + ExtensionOID.NAME_CONSTRAINTS: _decode_name_constraints, +} + +_REVOKED_EXTENSION_HANDLERS = { + CRLEntryExtensionOID.CRL_REASON: _decode_crl_reason, + CRLEntryExtensionOID.INVALIDITY_DATE: _decode_invalidity_date, + CRLEntryExtensionOID.CERTIFICATE_ISSUER: _decode_cert_issuer, +} + +_REVOKED_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSIONS = set([ + CRLEntryExtensionOID.CERTIFICATE_ISSUER, +]) + +_CRL_EXTENSION_HANDLERS = { + ExtensionOID.CRL_NUMBER: _decode_crl_number, + ExtensionOID.AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER: _decode_authority_key_identifier, + ExtensionOID.ISSUER_ALTERNATIVE_NAME: _decode_issuer_alt_name, + ExtensionOID.AUTHORITY_INFORMATION_ACCESS: ( + _decode_authority_information_access + ), +} + +_CERTIFICATE_EXTENSION_PARSER = _X509ExtensionParser( + ext_count=lambda backend, x: backend._lib.X509_get_ext_count(x), + get_ext=lambda backend, x, i: backend._lib.X509_get_ext(x, i), + handlers=_EXTENSION_HANDLERS +) + +_CSR_EXTENSION_PARSER = _X509ExtensionParser( + ext_count=lambda backend, x: backend._lib.sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(x), + get_ext=lambda backend, x, i: backend._lib.sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(x, i), + handlers=_EXTENSION_HANDLERS +) + +_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE_EXTENSION_PARSER = _X509ExtensionParser( + ext_count=lambda backend, x: backend._lib.X509_REVOKED_get_ext_count(x), + get_ext=lambda backend, x, i: backend._lib.X509_REVOKED_get_ext(x, i), + handlers=_REVOKED_EXTENSION_HANDLERS, + unsupported_exts=_REVOKED_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSIONS +) + +_CRL_EXTENSION_PARSER = _X509ExtensionParser( + ext_count=lambda backend, x: backend._lib.X509_CRL_get_ext_count(x), + get_ext=lambda backend, x, i: backend._lib.X509_CRL_get_ext(x, i), + handlers=_CRL_EXTENSION_HANDLERS, +) |