avr/qmk/firmware - [no description]

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author	jotix <69703151+jotix@users.noreply.github.com>	2020-09-21 22:54:09 -0300
committer	GitHub <noreply@github.com>	2020-09-21 18:54:09 -0700
commit	924823cfb420a61986b5bb816b2c82ba6c0210a1 (patch)
tree	2d078cf0ad123e0d026de07231e970e5c1a6b495 /docs/gitbook
parent	ccab502241f3028c2c10f20f0e319fb41dd965ca (diff)
download	firmware-924823cfb420a61986b5bb816b2c82ba6c0210a1.tar.gz firmware-924823cfb420a61986b5bb816b2c82ba6c0210a1.tar.bz2 firmware-924823cfb420a61986b5bb816b2c82ba6c0210a1.zip

update jotix ortho_4x12 keymap: add some missing keycodes (#10289)

Diffstat (limited to 'docs/gitbook')

0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions

// =================================================================== // // Copyright (c) 2005, Intel Corp. // All rights reserved. // // Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without // modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions // are met: // // * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright // notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. // * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above // copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following // disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided // with the distribution. // * Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its // contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived // from this software without specific prior written permission. // // THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS // "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT // LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS // FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE // COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, // INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES // (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR // SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) // HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, // STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) // ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED // OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. // =================================================================== // // vtpm_manager.c // // This file will house the main logic of the VTPM Manager // // ================================================================== #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <string.h> #include "vtpm_manager.h" #include "vtpmpriv.h" #include "vtsp.h" #include "bsg.h" #include "hashtable.h" #include "hashtable_itr.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" VTPM_GLOBALS *vtpm_globals=NULL; // --------------------------- Well Known Auths -------------------------- const TPM_AUTHDATA SRK_AUTH = {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}; #ifdef WELL_KNOWN_OWNER_AUTH static BYTE FIXED_OWNER_AUTH[20] = {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}; #endif // -------------------------- Hash table functions -------------------- static unsigned int hashfunc32(void *ky) { return (* (UINT32 *) ky); } static int equals32(void *k1, void *k2) { return (*(UINT32 *) k1 == *(UINT32 *) k2); } // --------------------------- Functions ------------------------------ TPM_RESULT VTPM_Create_Manager(){ TPM_RESULT status = TPM_SUCCESS; // Generate Auth for Owner #ifdef WELL_KNOWN_OWNER_AUTH memcpy(vtpm_globals->owner_usage_auth, FIXED_OWNER_AUTH, sizeof(TPM_AUTHDATA)); #else Crypto_GetRandom(vtpm_globals->owner_usage_auth, sizeof(TPM_AUTHDATA) ); #endif // Take Owership of TPM CRYPTO_INFO ek_cryptoInfo; status = VTSP_ReadPubek(vtpm_globals->manager_tcs_handle, &ek_cryptoInfo); // If we can read PubEK then there is no owner and we should take it. // We use the abilty to read the pubEK to flag that the TPM is owned. // FIXME: Change to just trying to take ownership and react to the status if (status == TPM_SUCCESS) { TPMTRYRETURN(VTSP_TakeOwnership(vtpm_globals->manager_tcs_handle, (const TPM_AUTHDATA*)&vtpm_globals->owner_usage_auth, &SRK_AUTH, &ek_cryptoInfo, &vtpm_globals->keyAuth)); TPMTRYRETURN(VTSP_DisablePubekRead(vtpm_globals->manager_tcs_handle, (const TPM_AUTHDATA*)&vtpm_globals->owner_usage_auth, &vtpm_globals->keyAuth)); } else { vtpmloginfo(VTPM_LOG_VTPM, "Failed to readEK meaning TPM has an owner. Creating Keys off existing SRK.\n"); } // Generate storage key's auth Crypto_GetRandom( &vtpm_globals->storage_key_usage_auth, sizeof(TPM_AUTHDATA) ); TCS_AUTH osap; TPM_AUTHDATA sharedsecret; TPMTRYRETURN( VTSP_OSAP(vtpm_globals->manager_tcs_handle, TPM_ET_KEYHANDLE, TPM_SRK_KEYHANDLE, &SRK_AUTH, &sharedsecret, &osap) ); osap.fContinueAuthSession = FALSE; TPMTRYRETURN( VTSP_CreateWrapKey( vtpm_globals->manager_tcs_handle, TPM_KEY_BIND, (const TPM_AUTHDATA*)&vtpm_globals->storage_key_usage_auth, TPM_SRK_KEYHANDLE, (const TPM_AUTHDATA*)&sharedsecret, &vtpm_globals->storageKeyWrap, &osap) ); // Generate boot key's auth TPM_AUTHDATA bootKeyWrapAuth; memset(&bootKeyWrapAuth, 0, sizeof(bootKeyWrapAuth)); TPMTRYRETURN( VTSP_OSAP(vtpm_globals->manager_tcs_handle, TPM_ET_KEYHANDLE, TPM_SRK_KEYHANDLE, &SRK_AUTH, &sharedsecret, &osap) ); osap.fContinueAuthSession = FALSE; // FIXME: This key protects the global secrets on disk. It should use TPM // PCR bindings to limit its use to legit configurations. // Current binds are open, implying a Trusted VM contains this code. // If this VM is not Trusted, use measurement and PCR bindings. TPMTRYRETURN( VTSP_CreateWrapKey( vtpm_globals->manager_tcs_handle, TPM_KEY_BIND, (const TPM_AUTHDATA*)&bootKeyWrapAuth, TPM_SRK_KEYHANDLE, (const TPM_AUTHDATA*)&sharedsecret, &vtpm_globals->bootKeyWrap, &osap) ); // Populate CRYPTO_INFO vtpm_globals->bootKey. This does not load it into the TPM TPMTRYRETURN( VTSP_LoadKey( vtpm_globals->manager_tcs_handle, TPM_SRK_KEYHANDLE, &vtpm_globals->bootKeyWrap, NULL, NULL, NULL, &vtpm_globals->bootKey, TRUE ) ); TPMTRYRETURN( VTSP_SaveState(vtpm_globals->manager_tcs_handle) ); goto egress; abort_egress: exit(1); egress: vtpmloginfo(VTPM_LOG_VTPM, "Finished initialized new VTPM manager (Status = %d).\n", status); return status; } /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// TPM_RESULT VTPM_Init_Manager() { TPM_RESULT status = TPM_FAIL, serviceStatus; BYTE *randomsead; UINT32 randomsize=256; if ((vtpm_globals = (VTPM_GLOBALS *) malloc(sizeof(VTPM_GLOBALS))) == NULL){ status = TPM_FAIL; goto abort_egress; } memset(vtpm_globals, 0, sizeof(VTPM_GLOBALS)); vtpm_globals->connected_dmis = 0; if ((vtpm_globals->dmi_map = create_hashtable(10, hashfunc32, equals32)) == NULL){ status = TPM_FAIL; goto abort_egress; } // Create new TCS Object vtpm_globals->manager_tcs_handle = 0; TPMTRYRETURN(TCS_create()); // Create TCS Context for service TPMTRYRETURN( TCS_OpenContext(&vtpm_globals->manager_tcs_handle ) ); TPMTRYRETURN( TCSP_GetRandom(vtpm_globals->manager_tcs_handle, &randomsize, &randomsead)); Crypto_Init(randomsead, randomsize); TPMTRYRETURN( TCS_FreeMemory (vtpm_globals->manager_tcs_handle, randomsead)); // Create OIAP session for service's authorized commands TPMTRYRETURN( VTSP_OIAP( vtpm_globals->manager_tcs_handle, &vtpm_globals->keyAuth) ); vtpm_globals->keyAuth.fContinueAuthSession = TRUE; vtpm_globals->mig_keys = NULL; // If fails, create new Manager. serviceStatus = VTPM_LoadManagerData(); if (serviceStatus == TPM_IOERROR) { vtpmloginfo(VTPM_LOG_VTPM, "Failed to read manager file. Assuming first time initialization.\n"); TPMTRYRETURN( VTPM_Create_Manager() ); TPMTRYRETURN( VTPM_SaveManagerData() ); } else if (serviceStatus != TPM_SUCCESS) { vtpmlogerror(VTPM_LOG_VTPM, "Failed to read existing manager file"); exit(1); } //Load Storage Key TPMTRYRETURN( VTSP_LoadKey( vtpm_globals->manager_tcs_handle, TPM_SRK_KEYHANDLE, &vtpm_globals->storageKeyWrap, &SRK_AUTH, &vtpm_globals->storageKeyHandle, &vtpm_globals->keyAuth, &vtpm_globals->storageKey, FALSE ) ); // Create entry for Dom0 for control messages TPMTRYRETURN( VTPM_Handle_New_DMI(NULL) ); goto egress; abort_egress: egress: return(status); } /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// void VTPM_Stop_Manager() { VTPM_DMI_RESOURCE *dmi_res; struct hashtable_itr *dmi_itr; // Close all the TCS contexts. TCS should evict keys based on this if (hashtable_count(vtpm_globals->dmi_map) > 0) { dmi_itr = hashtable_iterator(vtpm_globals->dmi_map); do { dmi_res = (VTPM_DMI_RESOURCE *) hashtable_iterator_value(dmi_itr); if (dmi_res->connected) close_dmi( dmi_res ); // Not really interested in return code } while (hashtable_iterator_advance(dmi_itr)); free (dmi_itr); } if ( VTPM_SaveManagerData() != TPM_SUCCESS ) vtpmlogerror(VTPM_LOG_VTPM, "Unable to save manager data.\n"); TCS_CloseContext(vtpm_globals->manager_tcs_handle); TCS_destroy(); hashtable_destroy(vtpm_globals->dmi_map, 1); free(vtpm_globals); Crypto_Exit(); vtpmloginfo(VTPM_LOG_VTPM, "VTPM Manager stopped.\n"); }


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