diff options
author | Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> | 2019-01-28 13:23:34 +0100 |
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committer | Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> | 2019-01-29 11:12:11 +0100 |
commit | e1496d631eb23407a45e5d3a42627d5d591fdb0a (patch) | |
tree | 72fe7ae0e3bbc8ce152ff441347768b377295dfc /package/kernel | |
parent | a5269ffa7a46f3318d35fbdb13d18580717c8498 (diff) | |
download | upstream-e1496d631eb23407a45e5d3a42627d5d591fdb0a.tar.gz upstream-e1496d631eb23407a45e5d3a42627d5d591fdb0a.tar.bz2 upstream-e1496d631eb23407a45e5d3a42627d5d591fdb0a.zip |
mac80211: fix an issue with allocated tailroom for encrypted mgmt packets
Fixes kernel warnings and connectivity issues in encrypted mesh networks
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Diffstat (limited to 'package/kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/384-mac80211-ensure-that-management-tx-skbs-have-encrypt.patch | 48 |
1 files changed, 48 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/384-mac80211-ensure-that-management-tx-skbs-have-encrypt.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/384-mac80211-ensure-that-management-tx-skbs-have-encrypt.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1c1951eadd --- /dev/null +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/384-mac80211-ensure-that-management-tx-skbs-have-encrypt.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> +Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 13:16:45 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: ensure that management tx skbs have encryption + tailroom + +Some drivers use IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_SW_MGMT_TX to indicate that management +frames need to be software encrypted. Since normal data packets are still +encrypted by the hardware, crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt gets decremented +after key upload. This can lead to passing skbs to ccmp_encrypt_skb, which +don't have the needed tailroom for software encryption. + +Change the code to add tailroom for encrypted management packets, even if +crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt is 0. + +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org +Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> +--- + +--- a/net/mac80211/tx.c ++++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c +@@ -1912,9 +1912,16 @@ static int ieee80211_skb_resize(struct i + int head_need, bool may_encrypt) + { + struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local; ++ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; ++ bool enc_tailroom; + int tail_need = 0; + +- if (may_encrypt && sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt) { ++ hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; ++ enc_tailroom = may_encrypt && ++ (sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt || ++ ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)); ++ ++ if (enc_tailroom) { + tail_need = IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM; + tail_need -= skb_tailroom(skb); + tail_need = max_t(int, tail_need, 0); +@@ -1922,8 +1929,7 @@ static int ieee80211_skb_resize(struct i + + if (skb_cloned(skb) && + (!ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, SUPPORTS_CLONED_SKBS) || +- !skb_clone_writable(skb, ETH_HLEN) || +- (may_encrypt && sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt))) ++ !skb_clone_writable(skb, ETH_HLEN) || enc_tailroom)) + I802_DEBUG_INC(local->tx_expand_skb_head_cloned); + else if (head_need || tail_need) + I802_DEBUG_INC(local->tx_expand_skb_head); |