| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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... as there doesn't really exists any valid mapping for them.
Particularly in the case of do_page_walk() this also avoids returning
non-NULL for such invalid input.
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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As it currently stands, the string "domain_crash_sync called from entry.S" is
not helpful at identifying why the domain was crashed, and a debug build of
Xen doesn't help the matter
This patch improves the information printed, by pointing to where the crash
decision was made.
Specific improvements include:
* Moving the ascii string "domain_crash_sync called from entry.S\n" away from
some semi-hot code cache lines.
* Moving the printk into C code (especially as this_cpu() is miserable to use
in assembly code)
* Undo the previous confusing situation of having the
domain_crash_synchronous() as a macro in C code, yet a global symbol in
assembly code.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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Now that the direct map area can extend all the way up to almost the
end of address space, this is wasteful.
Also fold two almost redundant messages in SRAT parsing into one.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Malcolm Crossley <malcolm.crossley@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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Rather than blindly defining the native name to the compat one, when
we want to pass the compat structure to a native function we ought to
verify that their layouts match. With a respective xlat.lst entry
there's then also no need anymore to do such aliasing.
While cleaaning up that file I also noticed that the Cx and Px
interface handling here has quite a few unnecessary #define-s - delete
them.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
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Also clean up some cases of misused/opencoded ENTRY()
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
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Depending on the state of the conring and serial_tx_buffer,
console_force_unlock() can be a long running operation, usually because of
serial_start_sync()
XenServer testing has found a reliable case where console_force_unlock() on
one PCPU takes long enough for another PCPU to timeout due to the watchdog
(such as waiting for a tlb flush callin).
The watchdog timeout causes the second PCPU to repeat the
console_force_unlock(), at which point the first PCPU typically fails an
assertion in spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->tx_lock) (because the tx_lock has
been unlocked behind itself).
console_force_unlock() is only on emergency paths, so one way or another the
host is going down. Disable the watchdog before forcing the console lock to
help prevent having pcpus completing with each other to bring the host down.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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Augment watchdog_setup() to be able to possibly return an error, and introduce
watchdog_enabled() as a better alternative to knowing the architectures
internal details.
This patch does not change the x86 implementaion, beyond making it compile.
For header files, some includes of xen/nmi.h were only for the watchdog
functions, so are replaced rather than adding an extra include of
xen/watchdog.h
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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In all cases when a hypercall page is written, __HYPERVISOR_iret is first
written as a regular hypercall, then subsequently rewritten in its special
case.
For VMX and SVM, this means that following the ud2a instruction is 3 bytes of
an imm32 parameter. For a ring3 kernel, this means that following the syscall
instruction is the second half of 'pop %r11'.
For a ring1 kernel, the iret case ends up as the same number of bytes as the
rest of the hypercalls, but it is pointless writing it twice, and is changed
for consistency.
Therefore, skip the loop iteration which would write the incorrect
__HYPERVISOR_iret hypercall. This removes junk machine code from the tail and
makes disassemblers rather more happy when looking at the hypercall page.
Also, a miscellaneous whitespace fix in the comment for ring3 kernel.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
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While boot time calls don't need this, run time uses of the function
which may result in L2 page tables getting populated need to be
serialized to avoid two CPUs populating the same L2 (or L3) entry,
overwriting each other's results.
This is expected to fix what would seem to be a regression from commit
b0581b92 ("x86: make map_domain_page_global() a simple wrapper around
vmap()"), albeit that change only made more readily visible the already
existing issue.
This patch intentionally does not
- add locking to the page table de-allocation logic in
destroy_xen_mappings() (the only user having potential races here,
msix_put_fixmap(), gets converted to use __set_fixmap() instead)
- avoid races between super page splitting and reconstruction in
map_pages_to_xen() (no such uses exist; races between multiple
splitting attempts or between multiple reconstruction attempts are
being taken care of)
If we wanted to take care of these, we'd need to alter the behavior
of virt_to_xen_l?e() - they would need to return with the lock held
then.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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With vcpu->domain->arch.perdomain_l3_pg no longer getting set up for
the idle domain, this creates an invalid L4 entry (due to translating
a NULL struct page_info pointer to a physical address).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
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Otherwise, with arch_compat_vcpu_op() calling arch_do_vcpu_op() to
handle it, it results in -ENOSYS after 6ff9e4f7 ("xen: move
VCPUOP_register_vcpu_info to common code") for 32-bit x86 domains.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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... as it may take significant amounts of time.
Since we can't re-invoke the operation in a second attempt, the
continuation logic must be slightly tweaked so that we make sure
do_mmuext_op() gets run one more time even when the preempted unpin
operation was the last one in a batch.
This is part of CVE-2013-1918 / XSA-45.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
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... as it may take significant amounts of time.
The function, being moved to mm.c as the better home for it anyway, and
to avoid having to make a new helper function there non-static, is
given a "preemptible" parameter temporarily (until, in a subsequent
patch, its other caller is also being made capable of dealing with
preemption).
This is part of CVE-2013-1918 / XSA-45.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
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... as it causes problems if we happen to exit back via IRET: In the
course of trying to handle the fault, the hypervisor creates a stack
frame by hand, and uses PUSHFQ to set the respective EFLAGS field, but
expects to be able to IRET through that stack frame to the second
portion of the fixup code (which causes a #GP due to the stored EFLAGS
having NT set).
And even if this worked (e.g if we cleared NT in that path), it would
then (through the fail safe callback) cause a #GP in the guest with the
SYSENTER handler's first instruction as the source, which in turn would
allow guest user mode code to crash the guest kernel.
Inject a #GP on the fake (NULL) address of the SYSENTER instruction
instead, just like in the case where the guest kernel didn't register
a corresponding entry point.
This is CVE-2013-1917 / XSA-44.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citirx.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
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This is even more so as the field doesn't have a comment to that effect
in the structure definition.
Once modifying the respective assembly code, also convert the
IRQSTAT_shift users to do a 32-bit shift only (as we won't support 48M
CPUs any time soon) and use "cmpl" instead of "testl" when checking the
field (both reducing code size).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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Otherwise, we may end up in the scheduler, keeping NMIs masked for a
possibly unbounded period of time (until whenever the next IRET gets
executed). Enforce timely event processing by sending a self IPI.
Of course it's open for discussion whether to always use the straight
exit path from handle_ist_exception.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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... using the new per-domain mapping management functions, adding
destroy_perdomain_mapping() to the previously introduced pair.
Rather than using an order-1 Xen heap allocation, use (currently 2)
individual domain heap pages to populate space in the per-domain
mapping area.
Also fix a benign off-by-one mistake in is_compat_arg_xlat_range().
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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arm64 is going to add another one shortly, so take control now.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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The emacs variable to set the C style from a local variable block is
c-file-style, not c-set-style.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com
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Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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This mainly involves adjusting the number of L4 entries needing copying
between page tables (which is now different between PV and HVM/idle
domains), and changing the cutoff point and method when more than the
supported amount of memory is found in a system.
Since TMEM doesn't currently cope with the full 1:1 map not always
being visible, it gets forcefully disabled in that case.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Acked-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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This involves no longer storing virtual addresses of the per-domain
mapping L2 and L3 page tables.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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... to allow frames for up to 16Tb.
At the same time, add the super page frame table coordinates to the
comment describing the address space layout.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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... noticed while putting together the 16Tb support patches for x86.
Briefly, this (in order of the changes below)
- fixes an inefficiency in x86's context switch code (translations to/
from struct page are more involved than to/from MFNs)
- drop unnecessary MFM-to-page conversions
- drop a redundant call to destroy_xen_mappings() (an indentical call
is being made a few lines up)
- simplify a VA-to-MFN translation
- drop dead code (several occurrences)
- add a missing __init annotation
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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Re-using "addr" here was a mistake, as it is a 32-bit quantity.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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Do so by simply re-using _show_registers().
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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Experimentally, certain crash kernels will triple fault very early
after starting if started with NMIs disabled. This was discovered
when experimenting with a debug keyhandler which deliberately created
a reentrant NMI, causing stack corruption.
Because of this discovered bug, and that the future changes to the NMI
handling will make the kexec path more fragile, take the time now to
bullet-proof the kexec behaviour to be safer in more circumstances.
This patch adds three new low level routines:
* nmi_crash
This is a special NMI handler for using during a kexec crash.
* enable_nmis
This function enables NMIs by executing an iret-to-self, to
disengage the hardware NMI latch.
* trap_nop
This is a no op handler which irets immediately. It is not
declared
with ENTRY() to avoid the extra alignment overhead.
And adds three new IDT entry helper routines:
* _write_gate_lower
This is a substitute for using cmpxchg16b to update a 128bit
structure at once. It assumes that the top 64 bits are unchanged
(and ASSERT()s the fact) and performs a regular write on the lower
64 bits.
* _set_gate_lower
This is functionally equivalent to the already present
_set_gate(), except it uses _write_gate_lower rather than updating
both 64bit values.
* _update_gate_addr_lower
This is designed to update an IDT entry handler only, without
altering any other settings in the entry. It also uses
_write_gate_lower.
The IDT entry helpers are required because:
* Is it unsafe to attempt a disable/update/re-enable cycle on the
NMI or MCE IDT entries.
* We need to be able to update NMI handlers without changing the IST
entry.
As a result, the new behaviour of the kexec_crash path is:
nmi_shootdown_cpus() will:
* Disable the crashing cpus NMI/MCE interrupt stack tables.
Disabling the stack tables removes race conditions which would
lead
to corrupt exception frames and infinite loops. As this pcpu is
never planning to execute a sysret back to a pv vcpu, the update
is
safe from a security point of view.
* Swap the NMI trap handlers.
The crashing pcpu gets the nop handler, to prevent it getting
stuck in
an NMI context, causing a hang instead of crash. The non-crashing
pcpus all get the nmi_crash handler which is designed never to
return.
do_nmi_crash() will:
* Save the crash notes and shut the pcpu down.
There is now an extra per-cpu variable to prevent us from
executing this multiple times. In the case where we reenter
midway through, attempt the whole operation again in preference to
not completing it in the first place.
* Set up another NMI at the LAPIC.
Even when the LAPIC has been disabled, the ID and command
registers are still usable. As a result, we can deliberately
queue up a new NMI to re-interrupt us later if NMIs get unlatched.
Because of the call to __stop_this_cpu(), we have to hand craft
self_nmi() to be safe from General Protection Faults.
* Fall into infinite loop.
machine_kexec() will:
* Swap the MCE handlers to be a nop.
We cannot prevent MCEs from being delivered when we pass off to
the crash kernel, and the less Xen context is being touched the
better.
* Explicitly enable NMIs.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Minor style changes.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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... to save using open-coded bitwise operations, and update all IST
manipulation sites to use the function.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
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- use the variants not validating the VA range when writing back
structures/fields to the same space that they were previously read
from
- when only a single field of a structure actually changed, copy back
just that field where possible
- consolidate copying back results in a few places
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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..., and at once constify the data items among them.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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compat wrapper
When no continuation was established, there must also not be an attempt
to cancel it - hypercall_cancel_continuation(), in the non-HVM, non-
multicall case, adjusts the guest mode return address in a way assuming
that an earlier call hypercall_create_continuation() took place.
Once touching this code, also restructure it slightly to improve
readability and switch to using the more relaxed copy function (copying
from the same guest memory already validated the virtual address
range).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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... and make restore conditional not only upon having saved the state,
but also upon whether saved state was actually modified (and register
values are known to have been preserved).
Note that RBP is unconditionally considered a volatile register (i.e.
irrespective of CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER), since the RBP handling would
become overly complicated due to the need to save/restore it on the
compat mode hypercall path [6th argument].
Note further that for compat mode code paths, saving/restoring R8...R15
is entirely unnecessary - we don't allow those guests to enter 64-bit
mode, and hence they have no way of seeing these registers' contents
(and there consequently also is no information leak, except if the
context saving domctl would be considered such).
Finally, note that this may not properly deal with gdbstub's needs, yet
(but if so, I can't really suggest adjustments, as I don't know that
code).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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More substitutions in this patch, not as obvious as the ones in the
previous patch.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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Note: these changes don't make any difference on x86.
Replace XEN_GUEST_HANDLE with XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM when it is used as
an hypercall argument.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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Tracing functions that don't check tb_init_done are (by convention)
prefixed with __.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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In various cases, 256 was being used instead of NR_VECTORS or a derived
ARRAY_SIZE() expression. In one case (guest_has_trap_callback()), a
wrong (unrelated) constant was used instead of NR_VECTORS.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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The use of "or" in GET_CPUINFO_FIELD so far wasn't ideal, as it doesn't
lend itself to folding this operation with a possibly subsequent one
(e.g. the well known mov+add=lea conversion). Split out the sub-
operations, and shorten assembly code slightly with this.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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Newer VIA CPUs have both 64-bit and VMX support. Enable them to be
recognized for these purposes, at once stripping off any 32-bit CPU
only bits from the respective CPU support file, and adding 64-bit ones
found in recent Linux.
This particularly implies untying the VMX == Intel assumption in a few
places.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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This utilizes the fact that the two bytes of interest are adjacent to
one another and that the resulting 16-bit values of interest are within
a contiguous range of numbers.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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... rather than at boot time, removing unnecessary redundancy between
EFI and legacy boot code.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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... rather than at boot time, removing unnecessary redundancy between
EFI and legacy boot code.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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As a prerequisite for adding an EHCI debug port based console
implementation, set up the page tables needed for (a sub-portion of)
the fixmaps together with other boot time page table construction.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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This was set to zero immediately before the #GP injection code, since
SYSENTER doesn't really have a return address.
Reported-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Furthermore, UREGS_cs and UREGS_rip don't need to be written a second
time, as the PUSHes above already can/do take care of putting in place
the intended values.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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Recent Dom0 kernels want to disable PCI MSI on all devices, yet doing
so on AMD IOMMUs (which get represented by a PCI device) disables part
of the functionality set up by the hypervisor.
Add a mechanism to mark certain PCI devices as having write protected
config spaces (both through port based [method 1] accesses and, for
x86-64, mmconfig), and use that for AMD's IOMMUs.
Note that due to ptwr_do_page_fault() being run first, there'll be a
MEM_LOG() issued for each such mmconfig based write attempt. If that's
undesirable, the order of the calls in fixup_page_fault() would need
to be swapped.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Wei Wang <wei.wang2@amd.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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These additions did not fulfill their purpose - they checked hypervisor
config space accesses instead of guest (Dom0) ones.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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Check for non-canonical guest RIP before attempting to execute sysret.
If sysret is executed with a non-canonical value in RCX, Intel CPUs
take the fault in ring0, but we will necessarily already have switched
to the the user's stack pointer.
This is a security vulnerability, XSA-7 / CVE-2012-0217.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Tested-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir.xen@gmail.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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