| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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If seg->pfn is too large, the arithmetic in the range check might
overflow, defeating the range check.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
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This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
v8: Add a comment explaining where the number 6 comes from.
v6: This patch is new in v6 of the series.
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These functions take guest pfns and look them up in the p2m. They did
no range checking.
However, some callers, notably xc_dom_boot.c:setup_hypercall_page want
to pass untrusted guest-supplied value(s). It is most convenient to
detect this here and return INVALID_MFN.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Chuck Anderson <chuck.anderson@oracle.com>
v6: Check for underflow too (thanks to Andrew Cooper).
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A sufficiently malformed input to libxc (such as a malformed input ELF
or other guest-controlled data) might cause one of libxc's malloc() to
fail. In this case we need to make sure we don't dereference or do
pointer arithmetic on the result.
Search for all occurrences of \b(m|c|re)alloc in libxc, and all
functions which call them, and add appropriate error checking where
missing.
This includes the functions xc_dom_malloc*, which now print a message
when they fail so that callers don't have to do so.
The function xc_cpuid_to_str wasn't provided with a sane return value
and has a pretty strange API, which now becomes a little stranger.
There are no in-tree callers.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
v8: Move a check in xc_exchange_page to the previous patch
(ie, remove it from this patch).
v7: Add a missing check for a call to alloc_str.
Add arithmetic overflow check in xc_dom_malloc.
Coding style fix.
v6: Fix a missed call `pfn_err = calloc...' in xc_domain_restore.c.
Fix a missed call `new_pfn = xc_map_foreign_range...' in
xc_offline_page.c
v5: This patch is new in this version of the series.
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The return values from xc_dom_*_to_ptr and xc_map_foreign_range are
sometimes dereferenced, or subjected to pointer arithmetic, without
checking whether the relevant function failed and returned NULL.
Add an appropriate error check at every call site.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
v8: Add a missing check in xc_offline_page.c:xc_exchange_page,
which was in the next patch in v7 of the series.
Also improve the message.
I think in this particular error case it may be that the results
are a broken guest, but turning this from a possible host tools
crash into a guest problem seems to solve the potential security
problem.
v7: Simplify an error DOMPRINTF to not use "load ? : ".
Make DOMPRINTF allocation error messages consistent.
Do not set elf->dest_pages in xc_dom_load_elf_kernel
if xc_dom_seg_to_ptr_pages fails.
v5: This patch is new in this version of the series.
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This is a simple binary image loader with its own metadata format.
However, it is too careless with image-supplied values.
Add the following checks:
* That the image is bigger than the metadata table; otherwise the
pointer arithmetic to calculate the metadata table location may
yield undefined and dangerous values.
* When clamping the end of the region to search, that we do not
calculate pointers beyond the end of the image. The C
specification does not permit this and compilers are becoming ever
more determined to miscompile code when they can "prove" various
falsehoods based on assertions from the C spec.
* That the supplied image is big enough for the text we are allegedly
copying from it. Otherwise we might have a read overrun and copy
the results (perhaps a lot of secret data) into the guest.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
v9: Use clearer code for calculating probe_end in find_table.
v6: Add a missing `return -EINVAL' (Matthew Daley).
Fix an error in the commit message (Matthew Daley).
v5: This patch is new in this version of the series.
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Abolish ELF_PTRVAL_[CONST_]{CHAR,VOID}; change uses to elf_ptrval.
Abolish ELF_HANDLE_DECL_NONCONST; change uses to ELF_HANDLE_DECL.
Abolish ELF_OBSOLETE_VOIDP_CAST; simply remove all uses.
No functional change. (Verified by diffing assembler output.)
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
v2: New patch.
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Ensure that libelf does not have any loops which can run away
indefinitely even if the input is bogus. (Grepped for \bfor, \bwhile
and \bgoto in libelf and xc_dom_*loader*.c.)
Changes needed:
* elf_note_next uses the note's unchecked alleged length, which might
wrap round. If it does, return ELF_MAX_PTRVAL (0xfff..fff) instead,
which will be beyond the end of the section and so terminate the
caller's loop. Also check that the returned psuedopointer is sane.
* In various loops over section and program headers, check that the
calculated header pointer is still within the image, and quit the
loop if it isn't.
* Some fixed limits to avoid potentially O(image_size^2) loops:
- maximum length of strings: 4K (longer ones ignored totally)
- maximum total number of ELF notes: 65536 (any more are ignored)
* Check that the total program contents (text, data) we copy or
initialise doesn't exceed twice the output image area size.
* Remove an entirely useless loop from elf_xen_parse (!)
* Replace a nested search loop in in xc_dom_load_elf_symtab in
xc_dom_elfloader.c by a precomputation of a bitmap of referenced
symtabs.
We have not changed loops which might, in principle, iterate over the
whole image - even if they might do so one byte at a time with a
nontrivial access check function in the middle.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
v8: Fix the two loops in libelf-dominfo.c; the comment about
PT_NOTE and SHT_NOTE wasn't true because the checks did
"continue", not "break".
Add a comment about elf_note_next's expectations of the caller's
loop conditions (which most plausible callers will follow anyway).
v5: Fix regression due to wrong image size loop limit calculation.
Check return value from xc_dom_malloc.
v4: Fix regression due to misplacement of test in elf_shdr_by_name
(uninitialised variable).
Introduce fixed limits.
Avoid O(size^2) loops.
Check returned psuedopointer from elf_note_next is correct.
A few style fixes.
v3: Fix a whitespace error.
v2: BUGFIX: elf_shdr_by_name, elf_note_next: Reject new <= old, not just <.
elf_shdr_by_name: Change order of checks to be a bit clearer.
elf_load_bsdsyms: shdr loop check, improve chance of brokenness detection.
Style fixes.
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Signed integers have undesirable undefined behaviours on overflow.
Malicious compilers can turn apparently-correct code into code with
security vulnerabilities etc.
So use only unsigned integers. Exceptions are booleans (which we have
already changed) and error codes.
We _do_ change all the chars which aren't fixed constants from our own
text segment, but not the char*s. This is because it is safe to
access an arbitrary byte through a char*, but not necessarily safe to
convert an arbitrary value to a char.
As a consequence we need to compile libelf with -Wno-pointer-sign.
It is OK to change all the signed integers to unsigned because all the
inequalities in libelf are in contexts where we don't "expect"
negative numbers.
In libelf-dominfo.c:elf_xen_parse we rename a variable "rc" to
"more_notes" as it actually contains a note count derived from the
input image. The "error" return value from elf_xen_parse_notes is
changed from -1 to ~0U.
grepping shows only one occurrence of "PRId" or "%d" or "%ld" in
libelf and xc_dom_elfloader.c (a "%d" which becomes "%u").
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
For those concerned about unintentional functional changes, the
following rune produces a version of the patch which is much smaller
and eliminates only non-functional changes:
GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF=.../unsigned-differ git-diff <before>..<after>
where <before> and <after> are git refs for the code before and after
this patch, and unsigned-differ is this shell script:
#!/bin/bash
set -e
seddery () {
perl -pe 's/\b(?:elf_errorstatus|elf_negerrnoval)\b/int/g'
}
path="$1"
in="$2"
out="$5"
set +e
diff -pu --label "$path~" <(seddery <"$in") --label "$path" <(seddery <"$out")
rc=$?
set -e
if [ $rc = 1 ]; then rc=0; fi
exit $rc
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
v8: Use "?!?!" to express consternation instead of a ruder phrase.
v5: Introduce ELF_NOTE_INVALID, instead of using a literal ~0U.
v4: Fix regression in elf_round_up; use uint64_t here.
v3: Changes to booleans split off into separate patch.
v2: BUGFIX: Eliminate conversion to int of return from elf_xen_parse_notes.
BUGFIX: Fix the one printf format thing which needs changing.
Remove irrelevant change to constify note_desc.name in libelf-dominfo.c.
In xc_dom_load_elf_symtab change one sizeof(int) to sizeof(unsigned).
Do not change type of 2nd argument to memset.
Provide seddery for easier review.
Style fix.
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We want to remove uses of "int" because signed integers have
undesirable undefined behaviours on overflow. Malicious compilers can
turn apparently-correct code into code with security vulnerabilities
etc.
In this patch we change all the booleans in libelf to C99 bool,
from <stdbool.h>.
For the one visible libelf boolean in libxc's public interface we
retain the use of int to avoid changing the ABI; libxc converts it to
a bool for consumption by libelf.
It is OK to change all values only ever used as booleans to _Bool
(bool) because conversion from any scalar type to a _Bool works the
same as the boolean test in if() or ?: and is always defined (C99
6.3.1.2). But we do need to check that all these variables really are
only ever used that way. (It is theoretically possible that the old
code truncated some 64-bit values to 32-bit ints which might become
zero depending on the value, which would mean a behavioural change in
this patch, but it seems implausible that treating 0x????????00000000
as false could have been intended.)
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
v3: Use <stdbool.h>'s bool (or _Bool) instead of defining elf_bool.
Split this into a separate patch.
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This arranges that if the new pointer reference error checking
tripped, we actually get a message about it. In this patch these
messages do not change the actual return values from the various
functions: so pointer reference errors do not prevent loading. This
is for fear that some existing kernels might cause the code to make
these wild references, which would then break, which is not a good
thing in a security patch.
In xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c we have to introduce an "out" label and
change all of the "return rc" beyond the relevant point into "goto
out".
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
v5: Fix two whitespace errors.
v3.1:
Add error check to xc_dom_parse_elf_kernel.
Move check in xc_hvm_build_x86.c:setup_guest to right place.
v2 was Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
v2 was Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
v2: Style fixes.
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elf_is_elfbinary didn't take a length parameter and could potentially
access out of range when provided with a very short image.
We only need to check the size is enough for the actual dereference in
elf_is_elfbinary; callers are just using it to check the magic number
and do their own checks (usually via the new elf_ptrval system) before
dereferencing other parts of the header.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
v7: Add a comment about the limited function of elf_is_elfbinary.
v2: Style fix.
Fix commit message subject.
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We change the ELF_PTRVAL and ELF_HANDLE types and associated macros:
* PTRVAL becomes a uintptr_t, for which we provide a typedef
elf_ptrval. This means no arithmetic done on it can overflow so
the compiler cannot do any malicious invalid pointer arithmetic
"optimisations". It also means that any places where we
dereference one of these pointers without using the appropriate
macros or functions become a compilation error.
So we can be sure that we won't miss any memory accesses.
All the PTRVAL variables were previously void* or char*, so
the actual address calculations are unchanged.
* ELF_HANDLE becomes a union, one half of which keeps the pointer
value and the other half of which is just there to record the
type.
The new type is not a pointer type so there can be no address
calculations on it whose meaning would change. Every assignment or
access has to go through one of our macros.
* The distinction between const and non-const pointers and char*s
and void*s in libelf goes away. This was not important (and
anyway libelf tended to cast away const in various places).
* The fields elf->image and elf->dest are renamed. That proves
that we haven't missed any unchecked uses of these actual
pointer values.
* The caller may fill in elf->caller_xdest_base and _size to
specify another range of memory which is safe for libelf to
access, besides the input and output images.
* When accesses fail due to being out of range, we mark the elf
"broken". This will be checked and used for diagnostics in
a following patch.
We do not check for write accesses to the input image. This is
because libelf actually does this in a number of places. So we
simply permit that.
* Each caller of libelf which used to set dest now sets
dest_base and dest_size.
* In xc_dom_load_elf_symtab we provide a new actual-pointer
value hdr_ptr which we get from mapping the guest's kernel
area and use (checking carefully) as the caller_xdest area.
* The STAR(h) macro in libelf-dominfo.c now uses elf_access_unsigned.
* elf-init uses the new elf_uval_3264 accessor to access the 32-bit
fields, rather than an unchecked field access (ie, unchecked
pointer access).
* elf_uval has been reworked to use elf_uval_3264. Both of these
macros are essentially new in this patch (although they are derived
from the old elf_uval) and need careful review.
* ELF_ADVANCE_DEST is now safe in the sense that you can use it to
chop parts off the front of the dest area but if you chop more than
is available, the dest area is simply set to be empty, preventing
future accesses.
* We introduce some #defines for memcpy, memset, memmove and strcpy:
- We provide elf_memcpy_safe and elf_memset_safe which take
PTRVALs and do checking on the supplied pointers.
- Users inside libelf must all be changed to either
elf_mem*_unchecked (which are just like mem*), or
elf_mem*_safe (which take PTRVALs) and are checked. Any
unchanged call sites become compilation errors.
* We do _not_ at this time fix elf_access_unsigned so that it doesn't
make unaligned accesses. We hope that unaligned accesses are OK on
every supported architecture. But it does check the supplied
pointer for validity.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
v7: Remove a spurious whitespace change.
v5: Use allow_size value from xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr to set xdest_size
correctly.
If ELF_ADVANCE_DEST advances past the end, mark the elf broken.
Always regard NULL allowable region pointers (e.g. dest_base)
as invalid (since NULL pointers don't point anywhere).
v4: Fix ELF_UNSAFE_PTR to work on 32-bit even when provided 64-bit
values.
Fix xc_dom_load_elf_symtab not to call XC_DOM_PAGE_SIZE
unnecessarily if load is false. This was a regression.
v3.1:
Introduce a change to elf_store_field to undo the effects of
the v3.1 change to the previous patch (the definition there
is not compatible with the new types).
v3: Fix a whitespace error.
v2 was Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
v2: BUGFIX: elf_strval: Fix loop termination condition to actually work.
BUGFIX: elf_strval: Fix return value to not always be totally wild.
BUGFIX: xc_dom_load_elf_symtab: do proper check for small header size.
xc_dom_load_elf_symtab: narrow scope of `hdr_ptr'.
xc_dom_load_elf_symtab: split out uninit'd symtab.class ref fix.
More comments on the lifetime/validity of elf-> dest ptrs etc.
libelf.h: write "obsolete" out in full
libelf.h: rename "dontuse" to "typeonly" and add doc comment
elf_ptrval_in_range: Document trustedness of arguments.
Style and commit message fixes.
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It is not safe to simply take pointers into the ELF and use them as C
pointers. They might not be properly nul-terminated (and the pointers
might be wild).
So we are going to introduce a new function elf_strval for safely
getting strings. This will check that the addresses are in range and
that there is a proper nul-terminated string. Of course it might
discover that there isn't. In that case, it will be made to fail.
This means that elf_note_name might fail, too.
For the benefit of call sites which are just going to pass the value
to a printf-like function, we provide elf_strfmt which returns
"(invalid)" on failure rather than NULL.
In this patch we introduce dummy definitions of these functions. We
introduce calls to elf_strval and elf_strfmt everywhere, and update
all the call sites with appropriate error checking.
There is not yet any semantic change, since before this patch all the
places where we introduce elf_strval dereferenced the value anyway, so
it mustn't have been NULL.
In future patches, when elf_strval is made able return NULL, when it
does so it will mark the elf "broken" so that an appropriate
diagnostic can be printed.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Chuck Anderson <chuck.anderson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
v7: Change readnotes.c check to use two if statements rather than ||.
v2: Fix coding style, in one "if" statement.
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Use the new PTRVAL macros and elf_access_unsigned in
print_l1_mfn_valid_note.
No functional change unless the input is wrong, or we are reading a
file for a different endianness.
Separated out from the previous patch because this change does produce
a difference in the generated code.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Chuck Anderson <chuck.anderson@oracle.com>
v2: Split out into its own patch.
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We introduce a collection of macros which abstract away all the
pointer arithmetic and dereferences used for accessing the input ELF
and the output area(s). We use the new macros everywhere.
For now, these macros are semantically identical to the code they
replace, so this patch has no functional change.
elf_is_elfbinary is an exception: since it doesn't take an elf*, we
need to handle it differently. In a future patch we will change it to
take, and check, a length parameter. For now we just mark it with a
fixme.
That this patch has no functional change can be verified as follows:
0. Copy the scripts "comparison-generate" and "function-filter"
out of this commit message.
1. Check out the tree before this patch.
2. Run the script ../comparison-generate .... ../before
3. Check out the tree after this patch.
4. Run the script ../comparison-generate .... ../after
5. diff --exclude=\*.[soi] -ruN before/ after/ |less
Expect these differences:
* stubdom/zlib-x86_64/ztest*.s2
The filename of this test file apparently contains the pid.
* xen/common/version.s2
The xen build timestamp appears in two diff hunks.
Verification that this is all that's needed:
In a completely built xen.git,
find * -name .*.d -type f | xargs grep -l libelf\.h
Expect results in:
xen/arch/x86: Checked above.
tools/libxc: Checked above.
tools/xcutils/readnotes: Checked above.
tools/xenstore: Checked above.
xen/common/libelf:
This is the build for the hypervisor; checked in B above.
stubdom:
We have one stubdom which reads ELFs using our libelf,
pvgrub, which is checked above.
I have not done this verification for ARM.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
v7: Add uintptr_t cast to ELF_UNSAFE_PTR. Still verifies.
Use git foo not git-foo in commit message verification script.
v4: Fix elf_load_binary's phdr message to be correct on 32-bit.
Fix ELF_OBSOLETE_VOIDP_CAST to work on 32-bit.
Indent scripts in commit message.
v3.1:
Change elf_store_field to verify correctly on 32-bit.
comparison-generate copes with Xen 4.1's lack of ./configure.
v2: Use Xen style for multi-line comments.
Postpone changes to readnotes.c:print_l1_mfn_valid_note.
Much improved verification instructions with new script.
Fixed commit message subject.
-8<- comparison-generate -8<-
#!/bin/bash
# usage:
# cd xen.git
# .../comparison-generate OUR-CONFIG BUILD-RUNE-PREFIX ../before|../after
# eg:
# .../comparison-generate ~/work/.config 'schroot -pc64 --' ../before
set -ex
test $# = 3 || need-exactly-three-arguments
our_config=$1
build_rune_prefix=$2
result_dir=$3
git clean -x -d -f
cp "$our_config" .
cat <<END >>.config
debug_symbols=n
CFLAGS += -save-temps
END
perl -i~ -pe 's/ -g / -g0 / if m/^CFLAGS/' xen/Rules.mk
if [ -f ./configure ]; then
$build_rune_prefix ./configure
fi
$build_rune_prefix make -C xen
$build_rune_prefix make -C tools/include
$build_rune_prefix make -C stubdom grub
$build_rune_prefix make -C tools/libxc
$build_rune_prefix make -C tools/xenstore
$build_rune_prefix make -C tools/xcutils
rm -rf "$result_dir"
mkdir "$result_dir"
set +x
for f in `find xen tools stubdom -name \*.[soi]`; do
mkdir -p "$result_dir"/`dirname $f`
cp $f "$result_dir"/${f}
case $f in
*.s)
../function-filter <$f >"$result_dir"/${f}2
;;
esac
done
echo ok.
-8<-
-8<- function-filter -8<-
#!/usr/bin/perl -w
# function-filter
# script for massaging gcc-generated labels to be consistent
use strict;
our @lines;
my $sedderybody = "sub seddery () {\n";
while (<>) {
push @lines, $_;
if (m/^(__FUNCTION__|__func__)\.(\d+)\:/) {
$sedderybody .= " s/\\b$1\\.$2\\b/__XSA55MANGLED__$1.$./g;\n";
}
}
$sedderybody .= "}\n1;\n";
eval $sedderybody or die $@;
foreach (@lines) {
seddery();
print or die $!;
}
-8<-
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xc_dom_load_elf_symtab (with load==0) calls elf_round_up, but it
mistakenly used the uninitialised variable "syms" when calculating
dom->bsd_symtab_start. This should be a reference to "elf".
This change might have the effect of rounding the value differently.
Previously if the uninitialised value (a single byte on the stack) was
ELFCLASS64 (ie, 2), the alignment would be to 8 bytes, otherwise to 4.
However, the value is calculated from dom->kernel_seg.vend so this
could only make a difference if that value wasn't already aligned to 8
bytes.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Chuck Anderson <chuck.anderson@oracle.com>
v2: Split this change into its own patch for proper review.
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* Ensure that xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr (when called with count==0) does not
return a previously-allocated block which is entirely before the
requested pfn (!)
* Provide a version of xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr, xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr_retcount,
which provides the length of the mapped region via an out parameter.
* Change xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr to always provide the length of the
mapped region and change the call site in xc_dom_binloader.c to
check it. The call site in xc_dom_load_elf_symtab will be corrected
in a forthcoming patch, and for now ignores the returned length.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
v5: This patch is new in v5 of the series.
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Provide a version of xc_dom_seg_to_ptr which returns the number of
guest pages it has actually mapped. This is useful for callers who
want to do range checking; we will use this later in this series.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Chuck Anderson <chuck.anderson@oracle.com>
v7: xc_dom_seg_to_ptr_pages now always expects pages_out!=NULL.
(It seems silly to have it tolerate NULL when all the real callers
pass non-NULL and there's a version which doesn't need pages_out
anyway. Fix the call in xc_dom_seg_to_ptr to have a dummy pages
for pages_out.)
v5: xc_dom_seg_to_ptr_pages sets *pages_out=0 if it returns NULL.
v4 was:
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
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This file is not actually used. It's not built in Xen's instance of
libelf; in libxc's it's built but nothing in it is called. Do not
compile it in libxc, and delete it.
This reduces the amount of work we need to do in forthcoming patches
to libelf (particularly since as libelf-relocate.c is not used it is
probably full of bugs).
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Chuck Anderson <chuck.anderson@oracle.com>
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Commits d0782481 ("xl: export 'outstanding_pages' value from xcinfo")
and bec8f17e ("xen: Remove the XENMEM_get_oustanding_pages and provide
the data via xc_phys_info") added these two fields in libxl_physinfo
and in libxl_dominfo, respectively, but did not include the needed
LIBXL_HAVE_<foo> runes. Adding them.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
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This fixes framebuffer support for device model stubdoms after 3f28d007
which added the target_hack permission but did not allow the permission
to the stubdom it was created for.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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Signed-off-by: Christoph Egger <chegger@amazon.de>
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Dan, the author, states:
> this code is five years old, is distro dependent, and is now
> completely unsupported.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
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The qxl drivers for Windows and Linux end up calling instructions
that cannot be used for MMIO at the moment. Just for the 4.3 release,
remove qxl support.
This patch should be reverted as soon as the 4.4 development window opens.
The issue in question:
(XEN) emulate.c:88:d18 bad mmio size 16
(XEN) io.c:201:d18 MMIO emulation failed @ 0033:7fd2de390430: f3 0f 6f
19 41 83 e8 403
The instruction in question is "movdqu (%rcx),%xmm3". Xen knows how
to emulate it, but unfortunately %xmm3 is 16 bytes long, and the interface
between Xen and qemu at the moment would appear to only allow MMIO accesses
of 8 bytes.
It's too late in the release cycle to find a fix or a workaround.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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On the qemu-xen command line, the number of vcpus initially online and
the number of maximum available vcpus are inverted.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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We've changed the config option from "vifscript" to "vif.default.script". This
was changed in the manpage but not in the example xl.conf.
Also move the option down to be with the other vif options.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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Split coverage informations extracted from xencov utility.
This script accept coverage blob either as file or from input and extract
into files compatible with gcc format (gcda).
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <frediano.ziglio@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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Linux uses sse4_1 and sse4_2, but at the moment libxl uses '.' instead
of '_'. This makes it confusing for people looking in Linux's /proc/cpuinfo
to disable features.
Add the Linux feature names, keeping the old ones for compatability.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.camppbell@citrix.com>
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Two changes:
* Stat the file before calling libxl_cdrom_insert()
* Return an error if anything fails (including libxl_cdrom_insert)
This is in part to work around the fact that the RAW disk type
is used for things that aren't actually files; so we can't call
stat in libxl_device.c:libxl__device_disk_set_backend() because
it may be going over a remote protocol.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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The code had an obvious bug where it would assume that the balloon
amount would always be _something_ and add an E820_RAM entry at the
end of the E820 array. The added E820_RAM would contain the balloon amount
plus the delta of memory that had to be subtracted b/c of the various
E820 entries. That assumption is certainly true when maxmem != mem,
but if guest config has maxmem = memory that is incorrect (as balloon
value is zero). The end result is that the E820 that is constructed
is missing a swath of "delta" memory and in most cases ends up with
only one E820_RAM entry that is of 512MB size on many Intel systems.
Reported-by: Christian Holpert <christian@holpert.de>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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When support for pinning more than 64 cpus was added, check for cpu
out-of-range values was removed. This can lead to subsequent
out-of-bounds cpumap array accesses in case the cpu number is higher
than the actual count.
This patch returns the check.
This is CVE-2013-2072 / XSA-56
Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
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The xl save file uses a different header string to the xm one. Teach the
xendomains script about it.
Signed-off-by: Ian MURRAY <murrayie@yahoo.co.uk>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
[ ijc -- rewrote commit message ]
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The hypervisor side changes for XSA-46 require the tool stack to now
always map the guest pIRQ before granting access permission to the
underlying host IRQ (GSI). This in particular requires that pciif.py
no longer can skip this step (assuming qemu would do it) for HVM
guests.
This in turn exposes, however, an inconsistency between xend and qemu:
The former wants to always establish 1:1 mappings between pIRQ and host
IRQ (for non-MSI only of course), while the latter always wants to
allocate an arbitrary mapping. Since the whole tool stack obviously
should always agree on the mapping model, make libxc enforce the 1:1
mapping as the more natural one (as well as being the one that allows
for easier debugging, since there no need to find out the extra
mapping). Users of libxc that want to establish a particular (rather
than an allocated) mapping are still free to do so, as well as tool
stacks not based on libxc wanting to implement an allocation based
model (which is why it's not the hypervisor that's being changed to
enforce either model).
Since libxl, like xend, already uses a 1:1 model, it's unaffected by
the libxc change (and it being unaffected by the original hypervisor
side changes is - afaict - simply due to qemu getting spawned at a
later point in time compared to the xend event flow).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Falck <falck.andreas.lists@gmail.com> (on 4.1)
Tested-by: Gordan Bobic <gordan@bobich.net> (on 4.2)
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
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There is a small set of places where files in subdirectories get
compiled from the parent directory. Dependency file wise this is no
problem as long as the files use names distinct without regard to the
directories they sit in, and tools/console/ violates this (in having
two main.c files). Hence we need to avoid losing the directory name,
both to ensure the two compiler instances don't simultaneously write
to the same file (happening of which is what triggered me looking
into this) and to guarantee dependencies for all files will be seen
by make on an incremental rebuild.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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With hvmloader telling the guest that it may skip REG_C reads during
the processing of RTC interrupts, the emulation code must not depend
upon these reads to occur. Introduce two modes of operation for the
emulation code, and short of a HVM parameter (too late to be
introduced for 4.3) hard code the mode determination to always assume
that Windows-conforming one for the time being.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> (FreeBSD guest)
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The libxl_cpu_bitmap_alloc(..) function, if provided with a zero
value for max CPUs will call xc_get_max_cpus() which will retrieve
the number of physical CPUs the host has. This is usually
OK if the guest's maxvcpus <= host pcpus. But if the value
is different, then the bitmap for VCPUs is limited by the
number of CPUs the host has.
This is incorrect as what we want is to hotplug in the guest
the amount of CPUs that the user specified on the command line
and not be limited by the amount of physical CPUs.
This means that a guest config like this:
vcpus=8
maxvcpus=32
and on a 4 PCPU machine doing
xl vcpu-set <guest name> 16
won't work. This is b/c the the size of the bitmap is one byte
so it can only hold up to 8 VCPUs. Hence anything above that
is going to be ignored.
Note that this patch also fixes the bitmap setting - as it
would set all of the bits allowed. Meaning if the user had a 4PCPU
host we would still allow the user to set 8VCPUs. This second
iteration of the patch fixes this.
Note that all of the libxl_cpu_bitmap_[test|set] silently ignore
any test or sets above its size:
if (bit >= bitmap->size * 8)
return 0;
so we were never notified off this bug.
This patch warns the user if they are trying to do this. If the
user really wants to do this they have to provide the --ignore-host
parameter to bypass this check.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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During the review of "libxl: Change claim_mode from bool to int."
Ian Campbell suggested that the xl info should print the
claim information irregardless of the global claim_mode value.
Suggested-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
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During the review it was noticed that it would be better if internally
the claim_mode was held as an 'int' instead of a 'bool'. The reason
is that during the startup of xl, one has call the libxl_defbool_setdefault.
otherwise any usage of claim_mode would result in assert break.
The assert is due to the fact that using defbool without any set
values (either true of false) will cause it hit an assertion.
If we use an 'int' we don't have to worry about it and by default
the value of zero will suffice for checks whether the claim is
enabled or disabled.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
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data via xc_phys_info
During the review of the patches it was noticed that there exists
a race wherein the 'free_memory' value consists of information from
two hypercalls. That is the XEN_SYSCTL_physinfo and XENMEM_get_outstanding_pages.
The free memory the host has available for guest is the difference between
the 'free_pages' (from XEN_SYSCTL_physinfo) and 'outstanding_pages'. As they
are two hypercalls many things can happen in between the execution of them.
This patch resolves this by eliminating the XENMEM_get_outstanding_pages
hypercall and providing the free_pages and outstanding_pages information
via the xc_phys_info structure.
It also removes the XSM hooks and adds locking as needed.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir.xen@gmail.com>
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If there is a single colon for a given target and the target
is redefined in another place (e.g. in included file) then
make executes only new target and displays following warning:
Makefile:35: warning: overriding commands for target `clean'
tools/libfsimage/common/../../../tools/libfsimage/Rules.mk:25:
warning: ignoring old commands for target `clean'
To cope with that issue define all required targets as double-colon
rules. Additionally, remove some redundant stuff.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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xl cd-insert takes a plain file.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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There is no support for IA-64 architecture in Xen.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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Remove dependencies files during make clean.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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This will be handled by the driver domain itself, since the toolstack
does not have access to the physical device because it is in a
different domain.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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Prevent hotplug script execution from libxl if device is on a
different domain.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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Don't try to check physical devices if they belong to a domain
different than the one where the toolstack is running. This prevents
the following error when trying to use storage driver domains:
libxl: debug: libxl_create.c:1246:do_domain_create: ao 0x1819240: create: how=(nil) callback=(nil) poller=0x1818fa0
libxl: debug: libxl_device.c:235:libxl__device_disk_set_backend: Disk vdev=xvda spec.backend=phy
libxl: debug: libxl_device.c:175:disk_try_backend: Disk vdev=xvda, backend phy unsuitable as phys path not a block device
libxl: error: libxl_device.c:278:libxl__device_disk_set_backend: no suitable backend for disk xvda
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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This hotplug script has been tested with IET and NetBSD iSCSI targets,
without authentication.
This hotplug script will only work with PV guests not using pygrub.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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