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* tools/debugger/kdd: Remove dependencies files during make cleanDaniel Kiper2013-07-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Remove dependencies files during make clean. Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> (cherry picked from commit 38bdfb9197b93262248ff489eed336d80db52b54)
* tools/xenmon: Fix typo in MakefileDaniel Kiper2013-07-171-1/+1
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> (cherry picked from commit ea5e515ba19c423e15ca33023cd3c9d2c9aa807f)
* tools/xenstat/libxenstat: Remove src/libxenstat.a file during make cleanDaniel Kiper2013-07-171-1/+1
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> (cherry picked from commit 03b90b005939416463c79a45d91729e8a00742fa)
* tools/libfsimage: Fix clean and distclean make targetsDaniel Kiper2013-07-172-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If there is a single colon for a given target and the target is redefined in another place (e.g. in included file) then make executes only new target and displays following warning: Makefile:35: warning: overriding commands for target `clean' tools/libfsimage/common/../../../tools/libfsimage/Rules.mk:25: warning: ignoring old commands for target `clean' To cope with that issue define all required targets as double-colon rules. Additionally, remove some redundant stuff. Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> (cherry picked from commit 667d8a84b244d02e9c6a2d02d6a02fc90c2efb4e)
* pygrub/GrubConf: fix boot problem for fedora 19 grub.cfg (2nd attempt)Marcel J.E. Mol2013-07-171-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Booting a fedora 19 domU failed because a it could not properly parse the grub.cfg file. This was cased by set default="${next_entry}" This statement actually is within an 'if' statement, so maybe it would be better to skip code within if/fi blocks... But this patch seems to work fine. Signed-off-by: Marcel Mol <marcel@mesa.nl> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citix.com> Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> (cherry picked from commit d513814db6af2b298b8776d7ffc5fb1261e176f4)
* Fix issue with 'xl list -l' showing domids as -1 when using SXPIan Murray2013-07-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | During investigation of other issues, it came to light that in at least 4.2.2, "xl list -l" displays domain ids as -1 when using SXP, irrespective of actual value. Ian C identified that this issue was likely fixed in the upcoming 4.3 release but the commit responsible for the fix (a73a7a0c647a9a5e30d8bc473c0a1e8648817183) was not likely a candidate for backporting in its entirety. Therefore, this patch is just an isolation of the hunk to fix the above issue. Original Commit Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Backport Created-by: Ian Murray <murrayie@yahoo.co.uk>
* libxl_json: Fix backport of JSON_BOOL to 4.2.2Don Slutz2013-07-121-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | git commit 2b3072ed0cbeed8c0385f20e92ba0f1201db8a17 ('libxl_json: Replace JSON_TRUE/FALSE by JSON_BOOL.') has the setting of obj->u.b git commit 6a2aca9fdef0499e613715baf107f2296b9007cf ('libxl_json: Replace JSON_TRUE/FALSE by JSON_BOOL.') does not. This shows up by vnc-port and vnc-listen are missing in xenstore when they should not be. Signed-off-by: Don Slutz <dslutz@verizon.com> Acked-By: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
* libxl: suppress device assignment to HVM guest when there is no IOMMUJan Beulich2013-07-091-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This in effect copies similar logic from xend: While there's no way to check whether a device is assigned to a particular guest, XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device at least allows checking whether an IOMMU is there and whether a device has been assign to _some_ guest. For the time being, this should be enough to cover for the missing error checking/recovery in other parts of libxl's device assignment paths. There remains a (functionality-, but not security-related) race in that the iommu should be set up earlier, but this is too risky a change for this stage of the 4.3 release. This is a security issue, XSA-61. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Tested-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> master commit: 826eb17271d3c647516d9944c47b0779afedea25 master date: 2013-07-01 15:20:28 +0100
* Revert "hvmloader: always include HPET table"Jan Beulich2013-07-081-5/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit e4fd0475a08fda414da27c4e57b568f147cfc07e. Conflicts: tools/firmware/hvmloader/acpi/build.c Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir.xen@gmail.com> master commit: 4867685f7916bb594a67f2f64a28bbf5ecb4949c master date: 2013-07-08 13:20:20 +0200
* also override library path for hotplug scriptsJan Beulich2013-07-011-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | Overriding PATH but not LD_LIBRARY_PATH is bogus, as it may result in the use of mismatched binaries and libraries. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> master commit: d0f535e9af564642250badf1fa300725ef996616 master date: 2013-06-26 18:06:24 +0200
* libxl: Restrict permissions on PV console device xenstore nodesIan Jackson2013-06-275-34/+80
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Matthew Daley has observed that the PV console protocol places sensitive host state into a guest writeable xenstore locations, this includes: - The pty used to communicate between the console backend daemon and its client, allowing the guest administrator to read and write arbitrary host files. - The output file, allowing the guest administrator to write arbitrary host files or to target arbitrary qemu chardevs which include sockets, udp, ptr, pipes etc (see -chardev in qemu(1) for a more complete list). - The maximum buffer size, allowing the guest administrator to consume more resources than the host administrator has configured. - The backend to use (qemu vs xenconsoled), potentially allowing the guest administrator to confuse host software. So we arrange to make the sensitive keys in the xenstore frontend directory read only for the guest. This is safe since the xenstore permissions model, unlike POSIX directory permissions, does not allow the guest to remove and recreate a node if it has write access to the containing directory. There are a few associated wrinkles: - The primary PV console is "special". It's xenstore node is not under the usual /devices/ subtree and it does not use the customary xenstore state machine protocol. Unfortunately its directory is used for other things, including the vnc-port node, which we do not want the guest to be able to write to. Rather than trying to track down all the possible secondary uses of this directory just make it r/o to the guest. All newly created subdirectories inherit these permissions and so are now safe by default. - The other serial consoles do use the customary xenstore state machine and therefore need write access to at least the "protocol" and "state" nodes, however they may also want to use arbitrary "feature-foo" nodes (although I'm not aware of any) and therefore we cannot simply lock down the entire frontend directory. Instead we add support to libxl__device_generic_add for frontend keys which are explicitly read only and use that to lock down the sensitive keys. - Minios' console frontend wants to write the "type" node, which it has no business doing since this is a host/toolstack level decision. This fails now that the node has become read only to the PV guest. Since the toolstack already writes this node just remove the attempt to set it. This is CVE-2013-2211 / XSA-57 Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Conflicts: tools/libxl/libxl.c (no vtpm, free front_ro on error in libxl__device_console_add)
* libxc: Better range check in xc_dom_alloc_segmentIan Jackson2013-06-141-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | If seg->pfn is too large, the arithmetic in the range check might overflow, defeating the range check. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
* libxc: check blob size before proceeding in xc_dom_check_gzipMatthew Daley2013-06-141-0/+5
| | | | | | This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
* libxc: range checks in xc_dom_p2m_host and _guestIan Jackson2013-06-141-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | These functions take guest pfns and look them up in the p2m. They did no range checking. However, some callers, notably xc_dom_boot.c:setup_hypercall_page want to pass untrusted guest-supplied value(s). It is most convenient to detect this here and return INVALID_MFN. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Changes from Xen 4.2 version of this patch: * 4.2 lacks dom->rambase_pfn, so don't add/subtract/check it. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* libxc: check return values from mallocIan Jackson2013-06-149-3/+54
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A sufficiently malformed input to libxc (such as a malformed input ELF or other guest-controlled data) might cause one of libxc's malloc() to fail. In this case we need to make sure we don't dereference or do pointer arithmetic on the result. Search for all occurrences of \b(m|c|re)alloc in libxc, and all functions which call them, and add appropriate error checking where missing. This includes the functions xc_dom_malloc*, which now print a message when they fail so that callers don't have to do so. The function xc_cpuid_to_str wasn't provided with a sane return value and has a pretty strange API, which now becomes a little stranger. There are no in-tree callers. Changes in the Xen 4.2 version of this series: * No need to fix code relating to ARM. * No need to fix code relating to superpage support. * Additionally fix `dom->p2m_host = xc_dom_malloc...' in xc_dom_ia64.c. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* libxc: check failure of xc_dom_*_to_ptr, xc_map_foreign_rangeIan Jackson2013-06-148-0/+120
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The return values from xc_dom_*_to_ptr and xc_map_foreign_range are sometimes dereferenced, or subjected to pointer arithmetic, without checking whether the relevant function failed and returned NULL. Add an appropriate error check at every call site. Changes in the 4.2 backport of this series: * Fix tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c:setup_pgtables_x86_32. * Fix tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c:start_info_ia64. * Fix tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_dom_fwloader.c:xc_dom_load_fw_kernel. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* libxc: Add range checking to xc_dom_binloaderIan Jackson2013-06-141-2/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is a simple binary image loader with its own metadata format. However, it is too careless with image-supplied values. Add the following checks: * That the image is bigger than the metadata table; otherwise the pointer arithmetic to calculate the metadata table location may yield undefined and dangerous values. * When clamping the end of the region to search, that we do not calculate pointers beyond the end of the image. The C specification does not permit this and compilers are becoming ever more determined to miscompile code when they can "prove" various falsehoods based on assertions from the C spec. * That the supplied image is big enough for the text we are allegedly copying from it. Otherwise we might have a read overrun and copy the results (perhaps a lot of secret data) into the guest. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* libelf: abolish obsolete macrosIan Jackson2013-06-142-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Abolish ELF_PTRVAL_[CONST_]{CHAR,VOID}; change uses to elf_ptrval. Abolish ELF_HANDLE_DECL_NONCONST; change uses to ELF_HANDLE_DECL. Abolish ELF_OBSOLETE_VOIDP_CAST; simply remove all uses. No functional change. (Verified by diffing assembler output.) Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> v2: New patch.
* libelf: check loops for running awayIan Jackson2013-06-141-9/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ensure that libelf does not have any loops which can run away indefinitely even if the input is bogus. (Grepped for \bfor, \bwhile and \bgoto in libelf and xc_dom_*loader*.c.) Changes needed: * elf_note_next uses the note's unchecked alleged length, which might wrap round. If it does, return ELF_MAX_PTRVAL (0xfff..fff) instead, which will be beyond the end of the section and so terminate the caller's loop. Also check that the returned psuedopointer is sane. * In various loops over section and program headers, check that the calculated header pointer is still within the image, and quit the loop if it isn't. * Some fixed limits to avoid potentially O(image_size^2) loops: - maximum length of strings: 4K (longer ones ignored totally) - maximum total number of ELF notes: 65536 (any more are ignored) * Check that the total program contents (text, data) we copy or initialise doesn't exceed twice the output image area size. * Remove an entirely useless loop from elf_xen_parse (!) * Replace a nested search loop in in xc_dom_load_elf_symtab in xc_dom_elfloader.c by a precomputation of a bitmap of referenced symtabs. We have not changed loops which might, in principle, iterate over the whole image - even if they might do so one byte at a time with a nontrivial access check function in the middle. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* libelf: use only unsigned integersIan Jackson2013-06-144-31/+42
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed integers have undesirable undefined behaviours on overflow. Malicious compilers can turn apparently-correct code into code with security vulnerabilities etc. So use only unsigned integers. Exceptions are booleans (which we have already changed) and error codes. We _do_ change all the chars which aren't fixed constants from our own text segment, but not the char*s. This is because it is safe to access an arbitrary byte through a char*, but not necessarily safe to convert an arbitrary value to a char. As a consequence we need to compile libelf with -Wno-pointer-sign. It is OK to change all the signed integers to unsigned because all the inequalities in libelf are in contexts where we don't "expect" negative numbers. In libelf-dominfo.c:elf_xen_parse we rename a variable "rc" to "more_notes" as it actually contains a note count derived from the input image. The "error" return value from elf_xen_parse_notes is changed from -1 to ~0U. grepping shows only one occurrence of "PRId" or "%d" or "%ld" in libelf and xc_dom_elfloader.c (a "%d" which becomes "%u"). This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. For those concerned about unintentional functional changes, the following rune produces a version of the patch which is much smaller and eliminates only non-functional changes: GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF=.../unsigned-differ git-diff <before>..<after> where <before> and <after> are git refs for the code before and after this patch, and unsigned-differ is this shell script: #!/bin/bash set -e seddery () { perl -pe 's/\b(?:elf_errorstatus|elf_negerrnoval)\b/int/g' } path="$1" in="$2" out="$5" set +e diff -pu --label "$path~" <(seddery <"$in") --label "$path" <(seddery <"$out") rc=$? set -e if [ $rc = 1 ]; then rc=0; fi exit $rc Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* libelf: use C99 bool for booleansIan Jackson2013-06-141-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We want to remove uses of "int" because signed integers have undesirable undefined behaviours on overflow. Malicious compilers can turn apparently-correct code into code with security vulnerabilities etc. In this patch we change all the booleans in libelf to C99 bool, from <stdbool.h>. For the one visible libelf boolean in libxc's public interface we retain the use of int to avoid changing the ABI; libxc converts it to a bool for consumption by libelf. It is OK to change all values only ever used as booleans to _Bool (bool) because conversion from any scalar type to a _Bool works the same as the boolean test in if() or ?: and is always defined (C99 6.3.1.2). But we do need to check that all these variables really are only ever used that way. (It is theoretically possible that the old code truncated some 64-bit values to 32-bit ints which might become zero depending on the value, which would mean a behavioural change in this patch, but it seems implausible that treating 0x????????00000000 as false could have been intended.) This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
* libelf: Make all callers call elf_check_brokenIan Jackson2013-06-143-4/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This arranges that if the new pointer reference error checking tripped, we actually get a message about it. In this patch these messages do not change the actual return values from the various functions: so pointer reference errors do not prevent loading. This is for fear that some existing kernels might cause the code to make these wild references, which would then break, which is not a good thing in a security patch. In xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c we have to introduce an "out" label and change all of the "return rc" beyond the relevant point into "goto out". Difference in the 4.2 series, compared to unstable: * tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_x86.c:setup_guest and xen/arch/arm/kernel.c:kernel_try_elf_prepare have different error handling in 4.2 to unstable; patch adjusted accordingly. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> xen-unstable version Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
* libelf: Check pointer references in elf_is_elfbinaryIan Jackson2013-06-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | elf_is_elfbinary didn't take a length parameter and could potentially access out of range when provided with a very short image. We only need to check the size is enough for the actual dereference in elf_is_elfbinary; callers are just using it to check the magic number and do their own checks (usually via the new elf_ptrval system) before dereferencing other parts of the header. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
* libelf: check all pointer accessesIan Jackson2013-06-142-11/+48
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We change the ELF_PTRVAL and ELF_HANDLE types and associated macros: * PTRVAL becomes a uintptr_t, for which we provide a typedef elf_ptrval. This means no arithmetic done on it can overflow so the compiler cannot do any malicious invalid pointer arithmetic "optimisations". It also means that any places where we dereference one of these pointers without using the appropriate macros or functions become a compilation error. So we can be sure that we won't miss any memory accesses. All the PTRVAL variables were previously void* or char*, so the actual address calculations are unchanged. * ELF_HANDLE becomes a union, one half of which keeps the pointer value and the other half of which is just there to record the type. The new type is not a pointer type so there can be no address calculations on it whose meaning would change. Every assignment or access has to go through one of our macros. * The distinction between const and non-const pointers and char*s and void*s in libelf goes away. This was not important (and anyway libelf tended to cast away const in various places). * The fields elf->image and elf->dest are renamed. That proves that we haven't missed any unchecked uses of these actual pointer values. * The caller may fill in elf->caller_xdest_base and _size to specify another range of memory which is safe for libelf to access, besides the input and output images. * When accesses fail due to being out of range, we mark the elf "broken". This will be checked and used for diagnostics in a following patch. We do not check for write accesses to the input image. This is because libelf actually does this in a number of places. So we simply permit that. * Each caller of libelf which used to set dest now sets dest_base and dest_size. * In xc_dom_load_elf_symtab we provide a new actual-pointer value hdr_ptr which we get from mapping the guest's kernel area and use (checking carefully) as the caller_xdest area. * The STAR(h) macro in libelf-dominfo.c now uses elf_access_unsigned. * elf-init uses the new elf_uval_3264 accessor to access the 32-bit fields, rather than an unchecked field access (ie, unchecked pointer access). * elf_uval has been reworked to use elf_uval_3264. Both of these macros are essentially new in this patch (although they are derived from the old elf_uval) and need careful review. * ELF_ADVANCE_DEST is now safe in the sense that you can use it to chop parts off the front of the dest area but if you chop more than is available, the dest area is simply set to be empty, preventing future accesses. * We introduce some #defines for memcpy, memset, memmove and strcpy: - We provide elf_memcpy_safe and elf_memset_safe which take PTRVALs and do checking on the supplied pointers. - Users inside libelf must all be changed to either elf_mem*_unchecked (which are just like mem*), or elf_mem*_safe (which take PTRVALs) and are checked. Any unchanged call sites become compilation errors. * We do _not_ at this time fix elf_access_unsigned so that it doesn't make unaligned accesses. We hope that unaligned accesses are OK on every supported architecture. But it does check the supplied pointer for validity. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* libelf: check nul-terminated strings properlyIan Jackson2013-06-141-3/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It is not safe to simply take pointers into the ELF and use them as C pointers. They might not be properly nul-terminated (and the pointers might be wild). So we are going to introduce a new function elf_strval for safely getting strings. This will check that the addresses are in range and that there is a proper nul-terminated string. Of course it might discover that there isn't. In that case, it will be made to fail. This means that elf_note_name might fail, too. For the benefit of call sites which are just going to pass the value to a printf-like function, we provide elf_strfmt which returns "(invalid)" on failure rather than NULL. In this patch we introduce dummy definitions of these functions. We introduce calls to elf_strval and elf_strfmt everywhere, and update all the call sites with appropriate error checking. There is not yet any semantic change, since before this patch all the places where we introduce elf_strval dereferenced the value anyway, so it mustn't have been NULL. In future patches, when elf_strval is made able return NULL, when it does so it will mark the elf "broken" so that an appropriate diagnostic can be printed. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
* tools/xcutils/readnotes: adjust print_l1_mfn_valid_noteIan Jackson2013-06-141-5/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use the new PTRVAL macros and elf_access_unsigned in print_l1_mfn_valid_note. No functional change unless the input is wrong, or we are reading a file for a different endianness. Separated out from the previous patch because this change does produce a difference in the generated code. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
* libelf: introduce macros for memory access and pointer handlingIan Jackson2013-06-143-29/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We introduce a collection of macros which abstract away all the pointer arithmetic and dereferences used for accessing the input ELF and the output area(s). We use the new macros everywhere. For now, these macros are semantically identical to the code they replace, so this patch has no functional change. elf_is_elfbinary is an exception: since it doesn't take an elf*, we need to handle it differently. In a future patch we will change it to take, and check, a length parameter. For now we just mark it with a fixme. That this patch has no functional change can be verified as follows: 0. Copy the scripts "comparison-generate" and "function-filter" out of this commit message. 1. Check out the tree before this patch. 2. Run the script ../comparison-generate .... ../before 3. Check out the tree after this patch. 4. Run the script ../comparison-generate .... ../after 5. diff --exclude=\*.[soi] -ruN before/ after/ |less Expect these differences: * stubdom/zlib-x86_64/ztest*.s2 The filename of this test file apparently contains the pid. * xen/common/version.s2 The xen build timestamp appears in two diff hunks. Verification that this is all that's needed: In a completely built xen.git, find * -name .*.d -type f | xargs grep -l libelf\.h Expect results in: xen/arch/x86: Checked above. tools/libxc: Checked above. tools/xcutils/readnotes: Checked above. tools/xenstore: Checked above. xen/common/libelf: This is the build for the hypervisor; checked in B above. stubdom: We have one stubdom which reads ELFs using our libelf, pvgrub, which is checked above. I have not done this verification for ARM. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> -8<- comparison-generate -8<- #!/bin/bash # usage: # cd xen.git # .../comparison-generate OUR-CONFIG BUILD-RUNE-PREFIX ../before|../after # eg: # .../comparison-generate ~/work/.config 'schroot -pc64 --' ../before set -ex test $# = 3 || need-exactly-three-arguments our_config=$1 build_rune_prefix=$2 result_dir=$3 git clean -x -d -f cp "$our_config" . cat <<END >>.config debug_symbols=n CFLAGS += -save-temps END perl -i~ -pe 's/ -g / -g0 / if m/^CFLAGS/' xen/Rules.mk if [ -f ./configure ]; then $build_rune_prefix ./configure fi $build_rune_prefix make -C xen $build_rune_prefix make -C tools/include $build_rune_prefix make -C stubdom grub $build_rune_prefix make -C tools/libxc $build_rune_prefix make -C tools/xenstore $build_rune_prefix make -C tools/xcutils rm -rf "$result_dir" mkdir "$result_dir" set +x for f in `find xen tools stubdom -name \*.[soi]`; do mkdir -p "$result_dir"/`dirname $f` cp $f "$result_dir"/${f} case $f in *.s) ../function-filter <$f >"$result_dir"/${f}2 ;; esac done echo ok. -8<- -8<- function-filter -8<- #!/usr/bin/perl -w # function-filter # script for massaging gcc-generated labels to be consistent use strict; our @lines; my $sedderybody = "sub seddery () {\n"; while (<>) { push @lines, $_; if (m/^(__FUNCTION__|__func__)\.(\d+)\:/) { $sedderybody .= " s/\\b$1\\.$2\\b/__XSA55MANGLED__$1.$./g;\n"; } } $sedderybody .= "}\n1;\n"; eval $sedderybody or die $@; foreach (@lines) { seddery(); print or die $!; } -8<-
* libelf/xc_dom_load_elf_symtab: Do not use "syms" uninitialisedIan Jackson2013-06-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | xc_dom_load_elf_symtab (with load==0) calls elf_round_up, but it mistakenly used the uninitialised variable "syms" when calculating dom->bsd_symtab_start. This should be a reference to "elf". This change might have the effect of rounding the value differently. Previously if the uninitialised value (a single byte on the stack) was ELFCLASS64 (ie, 2), the alignment would be to 8 bytes, otherwise to 4. However, the value is calculated from dom->kernel_seg.vend so this could only make a difference if that value wasn't already aligned to 8 bytes. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
* libxc: Fix range checking in xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr etc.Ian Jackson2013-06-144-5/+38
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * Ensure that xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr (when called with count==0) does not return a previously-allocated block which is entirely before the requested pfn (!) * Provide a version of xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr, xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr_retcount, which provides the length of the mapped region via an out parameter. * Change xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr to always provide the length of the mapped region and change the call site in xc_dom_binloader.c to check it. The call site in xc_dom_load_elf_symtab will be corrected in a forthcoming patch, and for now ignores the returned length. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* libxc: introduce xc_dom_seg_to_ptr_pagesIan Jackson2013-06-141-3/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | Provide a version of xc_dom_seg_to_ptr which returns the number of guest pages it has actually mapped. This is useful for callers who want to do range checking; we will use this later in this series. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
* libelf: abolish libelf-relocate.cIan Jackson2013-06-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This file is not actually used. It's not built in Xen's instance of libelf; in libxc's it's built but nothing in it is called. Do not compile it in libxc, and delete it. This reduces the amount of work we need to do in forthcoming patches to libelf (particularly since as libelf-relocate.c is not used it is probably full of bugs). This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
* libxc: limit cpu values when setting vcpu affinityPetr Matousek2013-05-311-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When support for pinning more than 64 cpus was added, check for cpu out-of-range values was removed. This can lead to subsequent out-of-bounds cpumap array accesses in case the cpu number is higher than the actual count. This patch returns the check. This is CVE-2013-2072 / XSA-56 Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> master commit: 41abbadef60e5fccdfd688579dd458f7f7887cf5 master date: 2013-05-29 15:49:22 +0100
* tools: fix dependency file generationJan Beulich2013-05-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is a small set of places where files in subdirectories get compiled from the parent directory. Dependency file wise this is no problem as long as the files use names distinct without regard to the directories they sit in, and tools/console/ violates this (in having two main.c files). Hence we need to avoid losing the directory name, both to ensure the two compiler instances don't simultaneously write to the same file (happening of which is what triggered me looking into this) and to guarantee dependencies for all files will be seen by make on an incremental rebuild. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> master commit: 4d788e164d6556d931bc3e0a69e36b8cf7280794 master date: 2013-05-21 10:16:30 +0200
* fix XSA-46 regression with xend/xmJan Beulich2013-05-232-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The hypervisor side changes for XSA-46 require the tool stack to now always map the guest pIRQ before granting access permission to the underlying host IRQ (GSI). This in particular requires that pciif.py no longer can skip this step (assuming qemu would do it) for HVM guests. This in turn exposes, however, an inconsistency between xend and qemu: The former wants to always establish 1:1 mappings between pIRQ and host IRQ (for non-MSI only of course), while the latter always wants to allocate an arbitrary mapping. Since the whole tool stack obviously should always agree on the mapping model, make libxc enforce the 1:1 mapping as the more natural one (as well as being the one that allows for easier debugging, since there no need to find out the extra mapping). Users of libxc that want to establish a particular (rather than an allocated) mapping are still free to do so, as well as tool stacks not based on libxc wanting to implement an allocation based model (which is why it's not the hypervisor that's being changed to enforce either model). Since libxl, like xend, already uses a 1:1 model, it's unaffected by the libxc change (and it being unaffected by the original hypervisor side changes is - afaict - simply due to qemu getting spawned at a later point in time compared to the xend event flow). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Tested-by: Andreas Falck <falck.andreas.lists@gmail.com> (on 4.1) Tested-by: Gordan Bobic <gordan@bobich.net> (on 4.2) Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> master commit: 934a5253d932b6f67fe40fc48975a2b0117e4cce master date: 2013-05-21 11:32:34 +0200
* libxl: Fix SEGV in network-attachIan Jackson2013-04-181-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | When "device/vif" directory exists but is empty l!=NULL, but nb==0, so l[nb-1] is invalid. Add missing check. Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* x86: fix various issues with handling guest IRQsJan Beulich2013-04-182-11/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - properly revoke IRQ access in map_domain_pirq() error path - don't permit replacing an in use IRQ - don't accept inputs in the GSI range for MAP_PIRQ_TYPE_MSI - track IRQ access permission in host IRQ terms, not guest IRQ ones (and with that, also disallow Dom0 access to IRQ0) This is CVE-2013-1919 / XSA-46. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> master commit: 545607eb3cfeb2abf5742d1bb869734f317fcfe5 master date: 2013-04-18 16:11:23 +0200
* tools/blktap2: Handle read/write interrupts in blktap2 control plane.Dr. Greg Wettstein2013-04-151-2/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The following patch: tools: Retry blktap2 tapdisk message on interrupt. Addressed a long standing regression with the blktap2 control plane. An interruption of the select system call would prematurely terminate the message sequence needed to properly shutdown a blktap2 tapdisk instance. Ian Jackson correctly noted that the read and write systems calls responsible for receiving and sending the control messages could also return EINTR resulting in similar effects. While this regression was not noted in field testing this patch adds support to re-start the calls to provide a technically complete implementation of control plane management in the presence of signals. Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <xen@wind.enjellic.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> (cherry picked from commit a5c800142cfc82159fcb85b47116cf296caebcc5)
* libxl: don't launch more than one tapdisk process for each diskIan Jackson2013-04-151-7/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When adding a disk don't launch multiple tapdisk instances for the same disk, if transaction fails in device_disk_add reuse the same tapdisk for further tries instead of creating a new instance each time a transaction fails. Reported-by: Darren Shepherd <darren.s.shepherd@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com> Tested-by: Darren Shepherd <darren.s.shepherd@gmail.com> Backport-requested-by: Pasi Karkkainen <pasik@iki.fi> (cherry picked from commit ec398660e89ca18bb8d061d5047d682bd383778a) Conflicts: tools/libxl/libxl.c Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* tools: Retry blktap2 tapdisk message on interrupt.Dr. Greg Wettstein2013-04-111-2/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Re-start blktap2 IPC select call on interrupt. We hunted this miserable bug for a long time. The teardown of a blktap2 tapdisk instance is being carried out inconsistently up to and including the 4.2.1 release. The problem appears to be a classic 'Heisenbug' which disappears if a single function call is added to the tapdisk shutdown path. It is likely this bug has been in existence for the life of the blktap2 code. Control messages to manipulate a tapdisk instance are sent over a UNIX domain socket. A select call is used on both the read and write paths to wait on I/O and to set a timeout for the transmission and reception of the control plane messages. The existing code fails receipt or transmission of the control message on any type of error return from the select call. The xl control process receives an interrupt while waiting in the select call which in turn causes an error return with SIGINT as the return code. This prematurely terminates the teardown of the tapdisk instance leaving it in various states of shutdown. Since multiple messages are needed to implement a full teardown the tapdisk instance can be left in various states ranging from fully connected to only the minor being left allocated. The fix is straight forward. Check the return code from the select call and re-try read or write of the control message if errno is sent to EINTR. The problem manifests itself in the read path but there appears to be little reason to not add the fix to the write path as well. Both paths appear to be cut-and-paste copies of each other. Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> (cherry picked from commit 6cffb2b469a55032a2900ccb8776c0082f346758)
* libxl: run libxl__arch_domain_create() much earlier.Ian Jackson2013-04-094-11/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Among other things, arch_domain_create() sets the shadow(/hap/p2m) memory allocation, which must happen after vcpus are assigned (or the shadow op will fail) but before memory is allocated (or we might run out of p2m memory). libxl__build_pre(), which already sets similar things like maxmem, semes like a reasonable spot for it. That needed a bit of plumbing to get the right datastructure from the caller. As a side-effect, the return code from libxl__arch_domain_create() is no longer ignored. This bug was analysed in: From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> "Re: [Xen-devel] [xen-unstable test] 16788: regressions - FAIL" Date: Mon, 04 Mar 2013 16:34:53 +0000 http://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2013-03/msg00191.html Reported-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> (Cherry-picked from 650354dbc2626b643c12873275ca67782f1382c8.) Conflicts: tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* tools/libxl: Improve videoram settingFabio Fantoni2013-03-042-2/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - If videoram setting is less than 8 mb shows error and exit. - Added videoram setting for qemu upstream with cirrus (added in qemu 1.3). - Updated xl.cfg man. - Default and minimal videoram changed to 16 mb if stdvga is set and upstream qemu is being used. This is required by qemu 1.4 to avoid a xen memory error (qemu 1.3 doesn't complain about it, probably buggy). Signed-off-by: Fabio Fantoni <fabio.fantoni@heliman.it> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Cherry picked from xen-unstable 2e814a017155b885e4d4b5a88dc05e7367a9722a, backport as follows: Signed-off-by: Fabio Fantoni <fabio.fantoni@heliman.it> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* tools: Fix memset(&p,0,sizeof(p)) idiom in several places.Michael Young2013-02-286-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | gcc 4.8 identifies several places where code of the form memset(x, 0, sizeof(x)); is used incorrectly, meaning that less memory is set to zero than required. Signed-off-by: Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> (cherry picked from commit d119301b5816b39b5ba722a2f8b301b37e8e34bd)
* libxl: fix stale timeout event callback raceIan Jackson2013-02-222-77/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Because there is not necessarily any lock held at the point the application (eg, libvirt) calls libxl_osevent_occurred_timeout, in a multithreaded program those calls may be arbitrarily delayed in relation to other activities within the program. Specifically this means when ->timeout_deregister returns, libxl does not know whether it can safely dispose of the for_libxl value or whether it needs to retain it in case of an in-progress call to _occurred_timeout. The interface could be fixed by requiring the application to make a new call into libxl to say that the deregistration was complete. However that new call would have to be threaded through the application's event loop; this is complicated and some application authors are likely not to implement it properly. Furthermore the easiest way to implement this facility in most event loops is to queue up a time event for "now". Shortcut all of this by having libxl always call timeout_modify setting abs={0,0} (ie, ASAP) instead of timeout_deregister. This will cause the application to call _occurred_timeout. When processing this calldown we see that we were no longer actually interested and simply throw it away. Additionally, there is a race between _occurred_timeout and ->timeout_modify. If libxl ever adjusts the deadline for a timeout the application may already be in the process of calling _occurred, in which case the situation with for_app's lifetime becomes very complicated. Therefore abolish libxl__ev_time_modify_{abs,rel} (which have no callers) and promise to the application only ever to call ->timeout_modify with abs=={0,0}. The application still needs to cope with ->timeout_modify racing with its internal function which calls _occurred_timeout. Document this. This is a forwards-compatible change for applications using the libxl API, and will hopefully eliminate these races in callback-supplying applications (such as libvirt) without the need for corresponding changes to the application. (It is possible that this might expose bugs in applications, though, as previously libxl would never call libxl_osevent_hooks->timeout_modify and now it never calls ->timeout_deregister). For clarity, fold the body of time_register_finite into its one remaining call site. This makes the semantics of ev->infinite slightly clearer. Cc: Bamvor Jian Zhang <bjzhang@suse.com> Cc: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com> Tested-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com> Acked-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* libxl: fix stale fd event callback raceIan Jackson2013-02-222-29/+163
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Because there is not necessarily any lock held at the point the application (eg, libvirt) calls libxl_osevent_occurred_timeout and ..._fd, in a multithreaded program those calls may be arbitrarily delayed in relation to other activities within the program. libxl therefore needs to be prepared to receive very old event callbacks. Arrange for this to be the case for fd callbacks. This requires a new layer of indirection through a "hook nexus" struct which can outlive the libxl__ev_foo. Allocation and deallocation of these nexi is mostly handled in the OSEVENT macros which wrap up the application's callbacks. Document the problem and the solution in a comment in libxl_event.c just before the definition of struct libxl__osevent_hook_nexus. There is still a race relating to libxl__osevent_occurred_timeout; this will be addressed in the following patch. Reported-by: Bamvor Jian Zhang <bjzhang@suse.com> Cc: Bamvor Jian Zhang <bjzhang@suse.com> Cc: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com> Tested-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com> Acked-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Backport-requested-by: Stefano Stabellini <Stefano.Stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Backported-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* libxl: rename "abs" variables to "absolute"Ian Jackson2013-02-221-17/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | No functional change. The purpose is to make it easier to backport patches from Xen 4.3's libxl, as Xen 4.3's libxl has had this done: libxl: Enable -Wshadow. It was convenient to invent $(CFLAGS_LIBXL) to do this. Various renamings to avoid shadowing standard functions: - index(3) - listen(2) - link(2) - abort(3) - abs(3) Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> In this patch we do not change the others, and we do not enable -Wshadow. We're just trying to bring 4.2's libxl textually closer to 4.3's. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* Revert "tools/libxc/xtl: fix logic error in stdiostream_progress"Ian Jackson2013-02-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | This reverts commit 67ef1d1fff26ce249dacbd44b756e56953b6599f. There is probably nothing wrong with this but I send it to 4.2 by mistake. Revert it for now until it has had a chance in unstable.
* tools/libxc/xtl: fix logic error in stdiostream_progressOlaf Hering2013-02-221-1/+1
| | | | | | Setting XTL_STDIOSTREAM_HIDE_PROGRESS should disable progress reporting. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
* libxl: Allow migration with qemu-xen.Alex Bligh2013-02-191-17/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | Backport of xen-unstable patch: : HG changeset patch : User Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com> : Date 1349693136 -3600 : Node ID 0995890022391682a2499a202c3c8608e1d3780a : Parent 08fac5c2bf3dcbc493ce45091383f6ce1938f369 Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Committed-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* libxl: libxl__qmp_save: Add filename as JSON parameter to ↵Alex Bligh2013-02-191-0/+1
| | | | | | xen-save-devices-state Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Committed-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* libxl_dom: Call the right switch logdirty for the right DM.Alex Bligh2013-02-191-3/+42
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch dispatch the switch logdirty call depending on which device model version is running. The call to qemu-xen right now is synchronous, not like the one to qemu-xen-traditional. Backport of xen-unstable patch: : HG changeset patch : User Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com> : Date 1349693136 -3600 : Node ID 08fac5c2bf3dcbc493ce45091383f6ce1938f369 : Parent d4aec9eff7e6d15c2805957af620c82555553b3e Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Committed-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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