| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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This change:
070ab4c505934951f86f42dd8403cf62bc5822f0
"oxenstored: Protect oxenstored from malicious domains"
broke the build because it had an unresolved semantic (but not
textual) conflict with
c69fddbd5dfa3004aaf2d0f2dde00c9ec3dd6d5d
"tools/ocaml: Remove log library from tools/ocaml/libs"
(which is in 4.2 but not 4.1)
Fix this by using the 4.1.x idiom in the new error handling introduced
in 070ab4c50593.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: David Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com>
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This is Debian bug #697407.
http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=697407
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ijc@hellion.org.uk>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 258d27a1d9fb33a490bef1381f52d522225c3dca)
Conflicts:
tools/pygrub/src/pygrub
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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add check logic when read from IO ring, and if error happens,
then mark the reading connection as "bad", Unless vm reboot,
oxenstored will not handle message from this connection any more.
xs_ring_stubs.c: add a more strict check on ring reading
connection.ml, domain.ml: add getter and setter for bad flag
process.ml: if exception raised when reading from domain's ring,
mark this domain as "bad"
xenstored.ml: if a domain is marked as "bad", do not handle it.
Signed-off-by: John Liu <john.liuqiming@huawei.com>
Acked-by: David Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 704302ce9404c73cfb687d31adcf67094ab5bb53)
(cherry picked from commit a978634bee4db6c5e0ceeb66adcc5114f3f9bc48)
Conflicts:
tools/ocaml/xenstored/domain.ml
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9f93027afd796a98d7b92898f4ccc772796a4874)
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Remove dependencies files during make clean.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38bdfb9197b93262248ff489eed336d80db52b54)
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If there is a single colon for a given target and the target
is redefined in another place (e.g. in included file) then
make executes only new target and displays following warning:
Makefile:35: warning: overriding commands for target `clean'
tools/libfsimage/common/../../../tools/libfsimage/Rules.mk:25:
warning: ignoring old commands for target `clean'
To cope with that issue define all required targets as double-colon
rules. Additionally, remove some redundant stuff.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 667d8a84b244d02e9c6a2d02d6a02fc90c2efb4e)
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Booting a fedora 19 domU failed because a it could not properly
parse the grub.cfg file. This was cased by
set default="${next_entry}"
This statement actually is within an 'if' statement, so maybe it would
be better to skip code within if/fi blocks...
But this patch seems to work fine.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Mol <marcel@mesa.nl>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citix.com>
Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
(cherry picked from commit d513814db6af2b298b8776d7ffc5fb1261e176f4)
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This in effect copies similar logic from xend: While there's no way to
check whether a device is assigned to a particular guest,
XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device at least allows checking whether an
IOMMU is there and whether a device has been assign to _some_
guest.
For the time being, this should be enough to cover for the missing
error checking/recovery in other parts of libxl's device assignment
paths.
There remains a (functionality-, but not security-related) race in
that the iommu should be set up earlier, but this is too risky a
change for this stage of the 4.3 release.
This is a security issue, XSA-61.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
master commit: 826eb17271d3c647516d9944c47b0779afedea25
master date: 2013-07-01 15:20:28 +0100
master commit: 826eb17271d3c647516d9944c47b0779afedea25
master date: 2013-07-01 15:20:28 +0100
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Matthew Daley has observed that the PV console protocol places sensitive host
state into a guest writeable xenstore locations, this includes:
- The pty used to communicate between the console backend daemon and its
client, allowing the guest administrator to read and write arbitrary host
files.
- The output file, allowing the guest administrator to write arbitrary host
files or to target arbitrary qemu chardevs which include sockets, udp, ptr,
pipes etc (see -chardev in qemu(1) for a more complete list).
- The maximum buffer size, allowing the guest administrator to consume more
resources than the host administrator has configured.
- The backend to use (qemu vs xenconsoled), potentially allowing the guest
administrator to confuse host software.
So we arrange to make the sensitive keys in the xenstore frontend directory
read only for the guest. This is safe since the xenstore permissions model,
unlike POSIX directory permissions, does not allow the guest to remove and
recreate a node if it has write access to the containing directory.
There are a few associated wrinkles:
- The primary PV console is "special". It's xenstore node is not under the
usual /devices/ subtree and it does not use the customary xenstore state
machine protocol. Unfortunately its directory is used for other things,
including the vnc-port node, which we do not want the guest to be able to
write to. Rather than trying to track down all the possible secondary uses
of this directory just make it r/o to the guest. All newly created
subdirectories inherit these permissions and so are now safe by default.
- The other serial consoles do use the customary xenstore state machine and
therefore need write access to at least the "protocol" and "state" nodes,
however they may also want to use arbitrary "feature-foo" nodes (although
I'm not aware of any) and therefore we cannot simply lock down the entire
frontend directory. Instead we add support to libxl__device_generic_add for
frontend keys which are explicitly read only and use that to lock down the
sensitive keys.
- Minios' console frontend wants to write the "type" node, which it has no
business doing since this is a host/toolstack level decision. This fails
now that the node has become read only to the PV guest. Since the toolstack
already writes this node just remove the attempt to set it.
This is CVE-2013-2211 / XSA-57
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Conflicts (4.2 backport):
tools/libxl/libxl.c (no vtpm, free front_ro on error in
libxl__device_console_add)
Conflicts (4.1 backport):
extras/mini-os/console/xenbus.c
tools/libxl/libxl.c
tools/libxl/libxl_device.c
tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h
tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c
- minios code was in xencons_ring.c
- many places need &gc not just gc
- libxl__xs_writev path is not const
- varios minor context fixups
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This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
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These functions take guest pfns and look them up in the p2m. They did
no range checking.
However, some callers, notably xc_dom_boot.c:setup_hypercall_page want
to pass untrusted guest-supplied value(s). It is most convenient to
detect this here and return INVALID_MFN.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Changes from Xen 4.2 version of this patch:
* 4.2 lacks dom->rambase_pfn, so don't add/subtract/check it.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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A sufficiently malformed input to libxc (such as a malformed input ELF
or other guest-controlled data) might cause one of libxc's malloc() to
fail. In this case we need to make sure we don't dereference or do
pointer arithmetic on the result.
Search for all occurrences of \b(m|c|re)alloc in libxc, and all
functions which call them, and add appropriate error checking where
missing.
This includes the functions xc_dom_malloc*, which now print a message
when they fail so that callers don't have to do so.
The function xc_cpuid_to_str wasn't provided with a sane return value
and has a pretty strange API, which now becomes a little stranger.
There are no in-tree callers.
Changes in the Xen 4.2 version of this series:
* No need to fix code relating to ARM.
* No need to fix code relating to superpage support.
* Additionally fix `dom->p2m_host = xc_dom_malloc...' in xc_dom_ia64.c.
Changes in the Xen 4.1 version of this series:
* An additional check is needed in xc_flask.c:xc_flask_access.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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The return values from xc_dom_*_to_ptr and xc_map_foreign_range are
sometimes dereferenced, or subjected to pointer arithmetic, without
checking whether the relevant function failed and returned NULL.
Add an appropriate error check at every call site.
Changes in the 4.2 backport of this series:
* Fix tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c:setup_pgtables_x86_32.
* Fix tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c:start_info_ia64.
* Fix tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_dom_fwloader.c:xc_dom_load_fw_kernel.
Conflicts in the 4.1 backport of this series:
* xc_dom_load_elf_kernel has less error handling in 4.1.
* the VM generation ID code is not in 4.1.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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This is a simple binary image loader with its own metadata format.
However, it is too careless with image-supplied values.
Add the following checks:
* That the image is bigger than the metadata table; otherwise the
pointer arithmetic to calculate the metadata table location may
yield undefined and dangerous values.
* When clamping the end of the region to search, that we do not
calculate pointers beyond the end of the image. The C
specification does not permit this and compilers are becoming ever
more determined to miscompile code when they can "prove" various
falsehoods based on assertions from the C spec.
* That the supplied image is big enough for the text we are allegedly
copying from it. Otherwise we might have a read overrun and copy
the results (perhaps a lot of secret data) into the guest.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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Abolish ELF_PTRVAL_[CONST_]{CHAR,VOID}; change uses to elf_ptrval.
Abolish ELF_HANDLE_DECL_NONCONST; change uses to ELF_HANDLE_DECL.
Abolish ELF_OBSOLETE_VOIDP_CAST; simply remove all uses.
No functional change. (Verified by diffing assembler output.)
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Conflicts in the 4.1 backport:
* elf_load_image is not in 4.1.
* elf_note_numeric_array is not in 4.1.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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Ensure that libelf does not have any loops which can run away
indefinitely even if the input is bogus. (Grepped for \bfor, \bwhile
and \bgoto in libelf and xc_dom_*loader*.c.)
Changes needed:
* elf_note_next uses the note's unchecked alleged length, which might
wrap round. If it does, return ELF_MAX_PTRVAL (0xfff..fff) instead,
which will be beyond the end of the section and so terminate the
caller's loop.
* In various loops over section and program headers, check that the
calculated header pointer is still within the image, and quit the
loop if it isn't.
We have not changed loops which might, in principle, iterate over the
whole image - even if they might do so one byte at a time with a
nontrivial access check function in the middle.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Conflicts in Xen 4.1 version of the series:
* Trivial conflict due to elf_note_numeric_array not existing.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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Copy the one file tools/libxc/xc_bitops.h from xen.git#aa1355f9.
We will need this for the next patch, which calls for a bitmap in
libxc.
xc_bitops.h was introduced to unify various existing sets of bitmap
operations. In this patch we backport only the introduction, not the
replacement of the other instances. So we introduce another instance
Sorry :-/.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
This patch is unique to the Xen 4.1 version of the XSA-55 series.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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Signed integers have undesirable undefined behaviours on overflow.
Malicious compilers can turn apparently-correct code into code with
security vulnerabilities etc.
So use only unsigned integers. Exceptions are booleans (which we have
already changed) and error codes.
We _do_ change all the chars which aren't fixed constants from our own
text segment, but not the char*s. This is because it is safe to
access an arbitrary byte through a char*, but not necessarily safe to
convert an arbitrary value to a char.
As a consequence we need to compile libelf with -Wno-pointer-sign.
It is OK to change all the signed integers to unsigned because all the
inequalities in libelf are in contexts where we don't "expect"
negative numbers.
In libelf-dominfo.c:elf_xen_parse we rename a variable "rc" to
"more_notes" as it actually contains a note count derived from the
input image. The "error" return value from elf_xen_parse_notes is
changed from -1 to ~0U.
grepping shows only one occurrence of "PRId" or "%d" or "%ld" in
libelf and xc_dom_elfloader.c (a "%d" which becomes "%u").
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Conflicts in 4.1 series:
* xc_dom_load_elf_kernel has no rc variable to change.
* elf_load_image doesn't exist.
For those concerned about unintentional functional changes, the
following rune produces a version of the patch which is much smaller
and eliminates only non-functional changes:
GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF=.../unsigned-differ git-diff <before>..<after>
where <before> and <after> are git refs for the code before and after
this patch, and unsigned-differ is this shell script:
#!/bin/bash
set -e
seddery () {
perl -pe 's/\b(?:elf_errorstatus|elf_negerrnoval)\b/int/g'
}
path="$1"
in="$2"
out="$5"
set +e
diff -pu --label "$path~" <(seddery <"$in") --label "$path" <(seddery <"$out")
rc=$?
set -e
if [ $rc = 1 ]; then rc=0; fi
exit $rc
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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We want to remove uses of "int" because signed integers have
undesirable undefined behaviours on overflow. Malicious compilers can
turn apparently-correct code into code with security vulnerabilities
etc.
In this patch we change all the booleans in libelf to C99 bool,
from <stdbool.h>.
For the one visible libelf boolean in libxc's public interface we
retain the use of int to avoid changing the ABI; libxc converts it to
a bool for consumption by libelf.
It is OK to change all values only ever used as booleans to _Bool
(bool) because conversion from any scalar type to a _Bool works the
same as the boolean test in if() or ?: and is always defined (C99
6.3.1.2). But we do need to check that all these variables really are
only ever used that way. (It is theoretically possible that the old
code truncated some 64-bit values to 32-bit ints which might become
zero depending on the value, which would mean a behavioural change in
this patch, but it seems implausible that treating 0x????????00000000
as false could have been intended.)
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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This arranges that if the new pointer reference error checking
tripped, we actually get a message about it. In this patch these
messages do not change the actual return values from the various
functions: so pointer reference errors do not prevent loading. This
is for fear that some existing kernels might cause the code to make
these wild references, which would then break, which is not a good
thing in a security patch.
In xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c we have to introduce an "out" label and
change all of the "return rc" beyond the relevant point into "goto
out".
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Differences in 4.1 backport:
* No xen/arch/arm.
* There was less error handling in xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
so less need to change it.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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elf_is_elfbinary didn't take a length parameter and could potentially
access out of range when provided with a very short image.
We only need to check the size is enough for the actual dereference in
elf_is_elfbinary; callers are just using it to check the magic number
and do their own checks (usually via the new elf_ptrval system) before
dereferencing other parts of the header.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Conflicts in 4.1 backport:
* xen/arch/x86/bzimage.c in 4.1 doesn't use elf_is_elfbinary.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
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We change the ELF_PTRVAL and ELF_HANDLE types and associated macros:
* PTRVAL becomes a uintptr_t, for which we provide a typedef
elf_ptrval. This means no arithmetic done on it can overflow so
the compiler cannot do any malicious invalid pointer arithmetic
"optimisations". It also means that any places where we
dereference one of these pointers without using the appropriate
macros or functions become a compilation error.
So we can be sure that we won't miss any memory accesses.
All the PTRVAL variables were previously void* or char*, so
the actual address calculations are unchanged.
* ELF_HANDLE becomes a union, one half of which keeps the pointer
value and the other half of which is just there to record the
type.
The new type is not a pointer type so there can be no address
calculations on it whose meaning would change. Every assignment or
access has to go through one of our macros.
* The distinction between const and non-const pointers and char*s
and void*s in libelf goes away. This was not important (and
anyway libelf tended to cast away const in various places).
* The fields elf->image and elf->dest are renamed. That proves
that we haven't missed any unchecked uses of these actual
pointer values.
* The caller may fill in elf->caller_xdest_base and _size to
specify another range of memory which is safe for libelf to
access, besides the input and output images.
* When accesses fail due to being out of range, we mark the elf
"broken". This will be checked and used for diagnostics in
a following patch.
We do not check for write accesses to the input image. This is
because libelf actually does this in a number of places. So we
simply permit that.
* Each caller of libelf which used to set dest now sets
dest_base and dest_size.
* In xc_dom_load_elf_symtab we provide a new actual-pointer
value hdr_ptr which we get from mapping the guest's kernel
area and use (checking carefully) as the caller_xdest area.
* The STAR(h) macro in libelf-dominfo.c now uses elf_access_unsigned.
* elf-init uses the new elf_uval_3264 accessor to access the 32-bit
fields, rather than an unchecked field access (ie, unchecked
pointer access).
* elf_uval has been reworked to use elf_uval_3264. Both of these
macros are essentially new in this patch (although they are derived
from the old elf_uval) and need careful review.
* ELF_ADVANCE_DEST is now safe in the sense that you can use it to
chop parts off the front of the dest area but if you chop more than
is available, the dest area is simply set to be empty, preventing
future accesses.
* We introduce some #defines for memcpy, memset, memmove and strcpy:
- We provide elf_memcpy_safe and elf_memset_safe which take
PTRVALs and do checking on the supplied pointers.
- Users inside libelf must all be changed to either
elf_mem*_unchecked (which are just like mem*), or
elf_mem*_safe (which take PTRVALs) and are checked. Any
unchanged call sites become compilation errors.
* We do _not_ at this time fix elf_access_unsigned so that it doesn't
make unaligned accesses. We hope that unaligned accesses are OK on
every supported architecture. But it does check the supplied
pointer for validity.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Additional change in 4.1 backport:
* ELF_PRPTRVAL needs to be defined oddly on 4.1 and earlier because
Xen's headers provide no definitions of uintptr_t or PRIuPTR.
Conflicts:
* Callers of elf_load_binary don't check its return value in 4.1.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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It is not safe to simply take pointers into the ELF and use them as C
pointers. They might not be properly nul-terminated (and the pointers
might be wild).
So we are going to introduce a new function elf_strval for safely
getting strings. This will check that the addresses are in range and
that there is a proper nul-terminated string. Of course it might
discover that there isn't. In that case, it will be made to fail.
This means that elf_note_name might fail, too.
For the benefit of call sites which are just going to pass the value
to a printf-like function, we provide elf_strfmt which returns
"(invalid)" on failure rather than NULL.
In this patch we introduce dummy definitions of these functions. We
introduce calls to elf_strval and elf_strfmt everywhere, and update
all the call sites with appropriate error checking.
There is not yet any semantic change, since before this patch all the
places where we introduce elf_strval dereferenced the value anyway, so
it mustn't have been NULL.
In future patches, when elf_strval is made able return NULL, when it
does so it will mark the elf "broken" so that an appropriate
diagnostic can be printed.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
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Use the new PTRVAL macros and elf_access_unsigned in
print_l1_mfn_valid_note.
No functional change unless the input is wrong, or we are reading a
file for a different endianness.
Separated out from the previous patch because this change does produce
a difference in the generated code.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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We introduce a collection of macros which abstract away all the
pointer arithmetic and dereferences used for accessing the input ELF
and the output area(s). We use the new macros everywhere.
For now, these macros are semantically identical to the code they
replace, so this patch has no functional change.
elf_is_elfbinary is an exception: since it doesn't take an elf*, we
need to handle it differently. In a future patch we will change it to
take, and check, a length parameter. For now we just mark it with a
fixme.
Nontrivial differences in the 4.1 backport:
* We need to provide our own elf_uintptr_t since Xen doesn't.
* We see some additional differences in our verification diff.
* The "function-filter" needs to massage additional symbol names.
Conflicts:
* In xc_dom_load_elf_symtab the old code used
*(Elf64_Word*)(&shdr->e64.sh_name) and the new Elf32_Word
but in fact the type in the struct has changed too so the
new code using elf_store_field is still correct.
* loadelfimage, elf_load_image etc. don't exist and are done
directly with memcpy/memset; patch adjusted appropriately.
* elf_note_numeric_array doesn't exist in 4.1.
That this patch has no functional change can be verified as follows:
0. Copy the scripts "comparison-generate" and "function-filter"
out of this commit message.
1. Check out the tree before this patch.
2. Run the script ../comparison-generate .... ../before
3. Check out the tree after this patch.
4. Run the script ../comparison-generate .... ../after
5. diff --exclude=\*.[soi] -ruN before/ after/ |less
Expect these differences:
* stubdom/zlib-x86_64/ztest*.s2
The filename of this test file apparently contains the pid.
* stubdom/grub/kexec.s2:
Large differences following ".section .debug_info" (which
the 4.1 build system erroneously fails to suppress).
* tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.s2 (64-bit build):
One trivial code gen difference with no semantic import.
* xen/common/version.s2
The xen build timestamp appears in two diff hunks.
Verification that this is all that's needed:
In a completely built xen.git,
find * -name .*.d -type f | xargs grep -l libelf\.h
Expect results in:
xen/arch/x86: Checked above.
tools/libxc: Checked above.
tools/xcutils/readnotes: Checked above.
tools/xenstore: Checked above.
xen/common/libelf:
This is the build for the hypervisor; checked in B above.
stubdom:
We have one stubdom which reads ELFs using our libelf,
pvgrub, which is checked above.
I have not done this verification for ARM.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
-8<- comparison-generate -8<-
#!/bin/bash
# usage:
# cd xen.git
# .../comparison-generate OUR-CONFIG BUILD-RUNE-PREFIX ../before|../after
# eg:
# .../comparison-generate ~/work/.config 'schroot -pc64 --' ../before
set -ex
test $# = 3 || need-exactly-three-arguments
our_config=$1
build_rune_prefix=$2
result_dir=$3
git clean -x -d -f
cp "$our_config" .
cat <<END >>.config
debug_symbols=n
CFLAGS += -save-temps
END
perl -i~ -pe 's/ -g / -g0 / if m/^CFLAGS/' xen/Rules.mk
if [ -f ./configure ]; then
$build_rune_prefix ./configure
fi
$build_rune_prefix make -C xen
$build_rune_prefix make -C tools/include
$build_rune_prefix make -C stubdom grub
$build_rune_prefix make -C tools/libxc
$build_rune_prefix make -C tools/xenstore
$build_rune_prefix make -C tools/xcutils
rm -rf "$result_dir"
mkdir "$result_dir"
set +x
for f in `find xen tools stubdom -name \*.[soi]`; do
mkdir -p "$result_dir"/`dirname $f`
cp $f "$result_dir"/${f}
case $f in
*.s)
../function-filter <$f >"$result_dir"/${f}2
;;
esac
done
echo ok.
-8<-
-8<- function-filter -8<-
#!/usr/bin/perl -w
# function-filter
# script for massaging gcc-generated labels to be consistent
use strict;
our @lines;
my $sedderybody = "sub seddery () {\n";
while (<>) {
push @lines, $_;
if (m/^(__FUNCTION__|__func__|_ctx|note_desc|types|last_order|memflags|mutex|d\d_cpu_last|write_count|wall_last|__PRETTY_FUNCTION__)\.(\d+)\:/ ||
m/^\s+\.local\s+(_ctx|write_count|d\d_cpu_last|wall_last|mutex)\.(\d+)\s*$/) {
$sedderybody .= " s/\\b$1\\.$2\\b/__XSA55MANGLED__$1.$./g;\n";
}
}
$sedderybody .= "}\n1;\n";
eval $sedderybody or die $@;
foreach (@lines) {
seddery();
print or die $!;
}
-8<-
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xc_dom_load_elf_symtab (with load==0) calls elf_round_up, but it
mistakenly used the uninitialised variable "syms" when calculating
dom->bsd_symtab_start. This should be a reference to "elf".
This change might have the effect of rounding the value differently.
Previously if the uninitialised value (a single byte on the stack) was
ELFCLASS64 (ie, 2), the alignment would be to 8 bytes, otherwise to 4.
However, the value is calculated from dom->kernel_seg.vend so this
could only make a difference if that value wasn't already aligned to 8
bytes.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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* Ensure that xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr (when called with count==0) does not
return a previously-allocated block which is entirely before the
requested pfn (!)
* Provide a version of xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr, xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr_retcount,
which provides the length of the mapped region via an out parameter.
* Change xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr to always provide the length of the
mapped region and change the call site in xc_dom_binloader.c to
check it. The call site in xc_dom_load_elf_symtab will be corrected
in a forthcoming patch, and for now ignores the returned length.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
v5: This patch is new in v5 of the series.
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Provide a version of xc_dom_seg_to_ptr which returns the number of
guest pages it has actually mapped. This is useful for callers who
want to do range checking; we will use this later in this series.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
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This file is not actually used. It's not built in Xen's instance of
libelf; in libxc's it's built but nothing in it is called. Do not
compile it in libxc, and delete it.
This reduces the amount of work we need to do in forthcoming patches
to libelf (particularly since as libelf-relocate.c is not used it is
probably full of bugs).
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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When support for pinning more than 64 cpus was added, check for cpu
out-of-range values was removed. This can lead to subsequent
out-of-bounds cpumap array accesses in case the cpu number is higher
than the actual count.
This patch returns the check.
This is CVE-2013-2072 / XSA-56
Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
master commit: 41abbadef60e5fccdfd688579dd458f7f7887cf5
master date: 2013-05-29 15:49:22 +0100
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There is a small set of places where files in subdirectories get
compiled from the parent directory. Dependency file wise this is no
problem as long as the files use names distinct without regard to the
directories they sit in, and tools/console/ violates this (in having
two main.c files). Hence we need to avoid losing the directory name,
both to ensure the two compiler instances don't simultaneously write
to the same file (happening of which is what triggered me looking
into this) and to guarantee dependencies for all files will be seen
by make on an incremental rebuild.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: 4d788e164d6556d931bc3e0a69e36b8cf7280794
master date: 2013-05-21 10:16:30 +0200
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The hypervisor side changes for XSA-46 require the tool stack to now
always map the guest pIRQ before granting access permission to the
underlying host IRQ (GSI). This in particular requires that pciif.py
no longer can skip this step (assuming qemu would do it) for HVM
guests.
This in turn exposes, however, an inconsistency between xend and qemu:
The former wants to always establish 1:1 mappings between pIRQ and host
IRQ (for non-MSI only of course), while the latter always wants to
allocate an arbitrary mapping. Since the whole tool stack obviously
should always agree on the mapping model, make libxc enforce the 1:1
mapping as the more natural one (as well as being the one that allows
for easier debugging, since there no need to find out the extra
mapping). Users of libxc that want to establish a particular (rather
than an allocated) mapping are still free to do so, as well as tool
stacks not based on libxc wanting to implement an allocation based
model (which is why it's not the hypervisor that's being changed to
enforce either model).
Since libxl, like xend, already uses a 1:1 model, it's unaffected by
the libxc change (and it being unaffected by the original hypervisor
side changes is - afaict - simply due to qemu getting spawned at a
later point in time compared to the xend event flow).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Falck <falck.andreas.lists@gmail.com> (on 4.1)
Tested-by: Gordan Bobic <gordan@bobich.net> (on 4.2)
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 934a5253d932b6f67fe40fc48975a2b0117e4cce
master date: 2013-05-21 11:32:34 +0200
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"libxl: Fix SEGV in network-attach" dropped a necessary &.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
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When "device/vif" directory exists but is empty l!=NULL, but nb==0, so
l[nb-1] is invalid. Add missing check.
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9f1a6ff38b8e7bb97a016794115de28553a6559f)
Conflicts:
tools/libxl/libxl.c
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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- properly revoke IRQ access in map_domain_pirq() error path
- don't permit replacing an in use IRQ
- don't accept inputs in the GSI range for MAP_PIRQ_TYPE_MSI
- track IRQ access permission in host IRQ terms, not guest IRQ ones
(and with that, also disallow Dom0 access to IRQ0)
This is CVE-2013-1919 / XSA-46.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
master commit: 545607eb3cfeb2abf5742d1bb869734f317fcfe5
master date: 2013-04-18 16:11:23 +0200
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Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 4afea3d65321c40bb8afec833c860f92176bfb42
xen-unstable date: Wed Mar 9 16:19:36 2011 +0000
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
[ This is byte-for-byte identical to Bastian Blank's backport of the
same changeset to xen-4.1, as found in Debian xen_4.1.4-2.*
patch debian/patches/upstream-23002:eb64b8f8eebb -iwj ]
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gcc 4.8 identifies several places where code of the form memset(x, 0,
sizeof(x)); is used incorrectly, meaning that less memory is set to
zero than required.
Signed-off-by: Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
(cherry picked from commit d119301b5816b39b5ba722a2f8b301b37e8e34bd)
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It is used for result domid from libxl__domain_make, but actually this
function have assert on an initial value.
This patch is intended for xen-4.1 only - 4.2 and later have reworked
this part of code already containing the fix.
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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Change 26521:2c0fd406f02c (part of XSA-38 / CVE-2013-0215) incorrectly
caused us to ignore rather than process a completely full ring. Check if
producer and consumer are equal before masking to avoid this, since prod ==
cons + PAGE_SIZE after masking becomes prod == cons.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26539:759574df84a6
Backport-requested-by: security@xen.org
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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The maximum size of a message is part of the protocol spec in
xen/include/public/io/xs_wire.h
Before this patch a client which sends an overly large message can
cause a buffer read overrun.
Note if a badly-behaved client sends a very large message
then it will be difficult for them to make their connection
work again-- they will probably need to reboot.
This is a security issue, part of XSA-38 / CVE-2013-0215.
Signed-off-by: David Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26522:ffd30e7388ad
Backport-requested-by: security@xen.org
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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oxenstored makes use of the OCaml Xenbus bindings, in which the
function xs_ring_read in tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xs_ring_stubs.c is used
to read from the shared memory Xenstore ring.
This function does not correctly handle all possible (prod, cons)
states when MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(prod) > MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(cons).
The root cause is the use of the unmasked values of prod and cons to
calculate to_read. If prod is set to an out-of-range value, the ring
peer can cause to_read to be too large or even negative. This allows
the ring peer to force oxenstored to read and write out of range for
the buffers leading to a crash or possibly to privilege escalation.
Correct this by masking the values of cons and prod at the start, so
we only deal with masked values. This makes the logic simpler, as
semantically inappropriate values of the upper bits of the ring
pointers are simply ignored.
The same vulnerability does not exist in the ring writer because the
only use made of the unmasked value is the check which prevents the
prod pointer overtaking the cons pointer. A ring peer which defeats
this check will suffer only lost data.
However, additionally, precautions need to be taken to ensure that
req_cons and req_prod are only read once in each function. Without
the use of volatile or some asm construct, the compiler can "prove"
that req_cons and req_prod do not change unexpectedly and is permitted
to "amplify" the read of (say) req_cons into two reads at different
times, giving two different values for use as cons, and then use the
two sources of cons interchangeably. (The use of xen_mb() does not
forbid this.)
Therefore do the reads of req_cons and req_prod through a volatile
pointer in both xs_ring_read and xs_ring_write.
This is currently believed to be a theoretical vulnerability as we are
not aware of any compilers which amplify reads in this way.
This is a security issue, part of XSA-38 / CVE-2013-0215.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Tested-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26521:2c0fd406f02c
Backport-requested-by: security@xen.org
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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This results in additional leakage in xenstore according to the
automated tests.
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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Establishes correct cleanup behavior for blktap devices. This patch
implements the release of the backend device before calling for
the destruction of the userspace component of the blktap device.
Without this patch the kernel xen-blkback driver deadlocks with
the blktap2 user control plane until the IPC channel is terminated by the
timeout on the select() call. This results in a noticeable delay
in the termination of the guest and causes the blktap minor
number which had been allocated to be orphaned.
Signed-off-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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libxl: attempt to cleanup tapdisk processes on disk backend destroy.
This patch properly terminates the tapdisk2 process(es) started
to service a virtual block device.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 23883:7998217630e2
xen-unstable date: Wed Sep 28 16:42:11 2011 +0100
Signed-off-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Backport-requested-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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The sysfs parser for /sys/bus/scsi/devices understands only the layout
of kernel version 2.6.16. This looks as follows:
/sys/bus/scsi/devices/1:0:0:0/block:sda is a symlink to /sys/block/sda/
/sys/bus/scsi/devices/1:0:0:0/scsi_generic:sg1 is a symlink to /sys/class/scsi_generic/sg1
Both directories contain a 'dev' file with the major:minor information.
This patch updates the used regex strings to match also the colon to
make it more robust against possible future changes.
In kernel version 3.0 the layout changed:
/sys/bus/scsi/devices/ contains now additional symlinks to directories
such as host1 and target1:0:0. This patch ignores these as they do not
point to the desired scsi devices. They just clutter the devices array.
The directory layout in '1:0:0:0' changed as well, the 'type:name'
notation was replaced with 'type/name' directories:
/sys/bus/scsi/devices/1:0:0:0/block/sda/
/sys/bus/scsi/devices/1:0:0:0/scsi_generic/sg1/
Both directories contain a 'dev' file with the major:minor information.
This patch adds additional code to walk the subdir to find the 'dev'
file to make sure the given subdirectory is really the kernel name.
In addition this patch makes sure devname is not None.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26010:cff10030c6ea
Backport-requested-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-4.2-testing changeset: 25915:839e5d95d483
Backport-requested-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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Currently the callers of vscsi_get_scsidevices() do not pass a mask
string. This will call "lsscsi -g '[]'", which causes a lsscsi syntax
error. As a result the sysfs parser _vscsi_get_scsidevices() is used.
But this parser is broken and the specified names in the config file are
not found.
Using a mask '*' if no mask was given will call lsscsi correctly and the
following config is parsed correctly:
vscsi=[
'/dev/sg3, 0:0:0:0',
'/dev/disk/by-id/wwn-0x600508b4000cf1c30000800000410000, 0:0:0:1'
]
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26009:2dbfa4d2e107
Backport-requested-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-4.2-testing changeset: 25914:b8916af165b9
Backport-requested-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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Currently pvscsi can not pass SCSI devices that have just a scsi_generic node.
In the following example sg3 is a control LUN for the disk sdd.
But vscsi=['4:0:2:0,0:0:0:0'] does not work because the internal 'devname'
variable remains None. Later writing p-devname to xenstore fails because None
is not a valid string variable.
Since devname is used for just informational purpose use sg also as devname.
carron:~ $ lsscsi -g
[0:0:0:0] disk ATA FK0032CAAZP HPF2 /dev/sda /dev/sg0
[4:0:0:0] disk HP P2000G3 FC/iSCSI T100 /dev/sdb /dev/sg1
[4:0:1:0] disk HP P2000G3 FC/iSCSI T100 /dev/sdc /dev/sg2
[4:0:2:0] storage HP HSV400 0950 - /dev/sg3
[4:0:2:1] disk HP HSV400 0950 /dev/sdd /dev/sg4
[4:0:3:0] storage HP HSV400 0950 - /dev/sg5
[4:0:3:1] disk HP HSV400 0950 /dev/sde /dev/sg6
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26008:eecb528583d7
Backport-requested-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-4.2-testing changeset: 25913:16ced2f387b9
Backport-requested-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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In commit e8d40584, it intended to check xml file size and when empty will
return, the condition should be "if os.path.getsize(xml_path) == 0" rather
then "if not os.path.getsize(xml_path) == 0".
Signed-off-by: Chuang Cao <chuang.cao@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joe Jin <joe.jin@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26088:dd64a1bdbe3a
Backport-requested-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-4.2-testing changeset: 25905:82b61b99d15d
Backport-requested-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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If pygrub was called with --args="some thing", then this string should
be append to the kernel command line. But the last changeset
25941:795c493fe561 contained a typo, it assigns 'args' instead of 'arg'.
Rename the local variable which holds the string from the domain config
file to avoid further confusion.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26018:ecc7627ca6d7
Backport-requested-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-4.2-testing changeset: 25899:dbb1872bbb97
Backport-requested-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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Remove 4 from default runlevel in xenballoond.init.
Similar to what changeset 24847:0900b1c905f1 does in xencommons, remove
runlevel 4 from the other runlevel scripts. LSB defines runlevel 4 as
reserved for local use, the local sysadmin is responsible for symlink
creation in rc4.d.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26007:fe756682cc7f
Backport-requested-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-4.2-testing changeset: 25897:dcd4bf824284
Backport-requested-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26006:8b6870d686d6
Backport-requested-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-4.2-testing changeset: 25896:6adf0c7937bf
Backport-requested-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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