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* update Xen version to 4.3.1-rc24.3.1-rc2staging-4.3stable-4.3Jan Beulich2013-10-172-3/+3
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* fix DOMID_IO mapping permission checksDaniel De Graaf2013-10-161-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the permission checks for memory mapping were moved from get_pg_owner to xsm_mmu_update in aaba7a677, the exception for DOMID_IO was not taken into account. This will cause IO memory mappings by PV domains (mini-os in particular) to fail when XSM/FLASK is not being used. This patch reintroduces the exception for DOMID_IO; the actual restrictions on IO memory mappings have always been checked separately using iomem_access_permitted, so this change should not break existing access control. Reported-by: Eduardo Peixoto Macedo <epm@cin.ufpe.br> Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> master commit: 07344c0f33be13bf9232a113681ef9087557f706 master date: 2013-09-26 10:15:47 +0200
* x86: check for canonical address before doing page walksJan Beulich2013-10-142-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | ... as there doesn't really exists any valid mapping for them. Particularly in the case of do_page_walk() this also avoids returning non-NULL for such invalid input. Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: 6fd9b0361e2eb5a7f12bdd5cbf7e42c0d1937d26 master date: 2013-10-11 09:31:16 +0200
* x86: add address validity check to guest_map_l1e()Jan Beulich2013-10-141-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | Just like for guest_get_eff_l1e() this prevents accessing as page tables (and with the wrong memory attribute) internal data inside Xen happening to be mapped with 1Gb pages. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper@citrix.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: d06a0d715ec1423b6c42141ab1b0ff69a3effb56 master date: 2013-10-11 09:29:43 +0200
* x86: correct LDT checksJan Beulich2013-10-145-26/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - MMUEXT_SET_LDT should behave as similarly to the LLDT instruction as possible: fail only if the base address is non-canonical - instead LDT descriptor accesses should fault if the descriptor address ends up being non-canonical (by ensuring this we at once avoid reading an entry from the mach-to-phys table and consider it a page table entry) - fault propagation on using LDT selectors must distinguish #PF and #GP (the latter must be raised for a non-canonical descriptor address, which also applies to several other uses of propagate_page_fault(), and hence the problem is being fixed there) - map_ldt_shadow_page() should properly wrap addresses for 32-bit VMs At once remove the odd invokation of map_ldt_shadow_page() from the MMUEXT_SET_LDT handler: There's nothing really telling us that the first LDT page is going to be preferred over others. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: 40d66baa46ca8a9ffa6df3e063a967d08ec92bcf master date: 2013-10-11 09:28:26 +0200
* QEMU_TAG updateIan Jackson2013-10-111-3/+3
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* xl: fix `xl cpupool-list' behavior in case no pool name is providedDario Faggioli2013-10-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | since it errors out, asking for at least one argument, and does not display any useful output, which is wrong (we want the list and the info about all the existing cpupools). IOW, the output is as follows: ~# xl cpupool-list -c 'xl cpupool-list' requires at least 1 argument. ... While it should be as follows: ~# xl cpupool-list -c Name CPU list Pool-0 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15 Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com> Acked-by: Juergen Gross <juergen.gross@ts.fujitsu.com> (cherry picked from commit 3998afdbf99959582dcd9f9f4df5a6fe7ce4ded8)
* libxl: fix out-of-memory error handling in libxl_list_cpupoolMatthew Daley2013-10-101-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | ...otherwise it will return freed memory. All the current users of this function check already for a NULL return, so use that. Coverity-ID: 1056194 This is CVE-2013-4371 / XSA-70 Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> (cherry picked from commit 4c37ed562224295c0f8b00211287d57cae629782)
* tools/ocaml: fix erroneous free of cpumap in stub_xc_vcpu_getaffinityMatthew Daley2013-10-101-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | Not sure how it got there... Coverity-ID: 1056196 This is CVE-2013-4370 / XSA-69 Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> (cherry picked from commit 3cd10fd21220f2b814324e6e732004f8f0487d0a)
* libxl: fix vif rate parsingIan Jackson2013-10-102-6/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | strtok can return NULL here. We don't need to use strtok anyway, so just use a simple strchr method. Coverity-ID: 1055642 This is CVE-2013-4369 / XSA-68 Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com> Fix type. Add test case Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.campbell@citrix.com> (cherry picked from commit c53702cee1d6f9f1b72f0cae0b412e21bcda8724)
* x86: check segment descriptor read result in 64-bit OUTS emulationMatthew Daley2013-10-101-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When emulating such an operation from a 64-bit context (CS has long mode set), and the data segment is overridden to FS/GS, the result of reading the overridden segment's descriptor (read_descriptor) is not checked. If it fails, data_base is left uninitialized. This can lead to 8 bytes of Xen's stack being leaked to the guest (implicitly, i.e. via the address given in a #PF). Coverity-ID: 1055116 This is CVE-2013-4368 / XSA-67. Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com> Fix formatting. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> master commit: 0771faba163769089c9f05f7f76b63e397677613 master date: 2013-10-10 15:19:53 +0200
* xsm: forbid PV guest console readsDaniel De Graaf2013-10-091-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | The CONSOLEIO_read operation was incorrectly allowed to PV guests if the hypervisor was compiled in debug mode (with VERBOSE defined). Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> master commit: 65ba631bcb62c79eb33ebfde8a0471fd012c37a8 master date: 2013-10-04 12:51:44 +0200
* Nested VMX: fix IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1 msr emulationYang Zhang2013-10-093-4/+53
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, it use hardcode value for IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1. This is wrong. We should check guest's cpuid to know which bits are writeable in CR4 by guest and allow the guest to set the corresponding bit only when guest has the feature. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com> Cleanup. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com> master commit: c6f92aed0e209df823d2cb5780dbb1ea12fc6d4a master date: 2013-10-04 12:30:09 +0200
* Nested VMX: check VMX capability before read VMX related MSRsYang Zhang2013-10-093-0/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | VMX MSRs only available when the CPU support the VMX feature. In addition, VMX_TRUE* MSRs only available when bit 55 of VMX_BASIC MSR is set. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com> Cleanup. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com> master commit: 190b667ac20e8175758f4a3a0f13c4d990e6af7e master date: 2013-10-04 12:28:14 +0200
* x86/percpu: Force INVALID_PERCPU_AREA into the non-canonical address regionAndrew Cooper2013-10-091-1/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This causes accidental uses of per_cpu() on a pcpu with an INVALID_PERCPU_AREA to result in a #GF for attempting to access the middle of the non-canonical virtual address region. This is preferable to the current behaviour, where incorrect use of per_cpu() will result in an effective NULL structure dereference which has security implication in the context of PV guests. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: 7cfb0053629c4dd1a6f01dc43cca7c0c25b8b7bf master date: 2013-10-04 12:24:34 +0200
* x86/idle: Fix get_cpu_idle_time()'s interaction with offline pcpusAndrew Cooper2013-10-092-7/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Checking for "idle_vcpu[cpu] != NULL" is insufficient protection against offline pcpus. From a hypercall, vcpu_runstate_get() will determine "v != current", and try to take the vcpu_schedule_lock(). This will try to look up per_cpu(schedule_data, v->processor) and promptly suffer a NULL structure deference as v->processors' __per_cpu_offset is INVALID_PERCPU_AREA. One example might look like this: ... Xen call trace: [<ffff82c4c0126ddb>] vcpu_runstate_get+0x50/0x113 [<ffff82c4c0126ec6>] get_cpu_idle_time+0x28/0x2e [<ffff82c4c012b5cb>] do_sysctl+0x3db/0xeb8 [<ffff82c4c023280d>] compat_hypercall+0xbd/0x116 Pagetable walk from 0000000000000040: L4[0x000] = 0000000186df8027 0000000000028207 L3[0x000] = 0000000188e36027 00000000000261c9 L2[0x000] = 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff **************************************** Panic on CPU 11: ... get_cpu_idle_time() has been updated to correctly deal with offline pcpus itself by returning 0, in the same way as it would if it was missing the idle_vcpu[] pointer. In doing so, XENPF_getidletime needed updating to correctly retain its described behaviour of clearing bits in the cpumap for offline pcpus. As this crash can only be triggered with toolstack hypercalls, it is not a security issue and just a simple bug. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: 0aa27ce3351f7eb09d13e863a1d5f303086aa32a master date: 2013-10-04 12:23:23 +0200
* x86: don't blindly create L3 tables for the direct mapJan Beulich2013-10-094-28/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the direct map area can extend all the way up to almost the end of address space, this is wasteful. Also fold two almost redundant messages in SRAT parsing into one. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Tested-by: Malcolm Crossley <malcolm.crossley@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: ca145fe70bad3a25ad54c6ded1ef237e45a2311e master date: 2013-09-30 15:28:12 +0200
* update Xen version to 4.3.1-rc14.3.1-rc1Jan Beulich2013-10-011-1/+1
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* x86: properly set up fbld emulation operand addressJan Beulich2013-09-301-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | This is CVE-2013-4361 / XSA-66. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> master commit: 28b706efb6abb637fabfd74cde70a50935a5640b master date: 2013-09-30 14:18:58 +0200
* x86/mm/shadow: Fix initialization of PV shadow L4 tables.Tim Deegan2013-09-301-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Shadowed PV L4 tables must have the same Xen mappings as their unshadowed equivalent. This is done by copying the Xen entries verbatim from the idle pagetable, and then using guest_l4_slot() in the SHADOW_FOREACH_L4E() iterator to avoid touching those entries. adc5afbf1c70ef55c260fb93e4b8ce5ccb918706 (x86: support up to 16Tb) changed the definition of ROOT_PAGETABLE_XEN_SLOTS to extend right to the top of the address space, which causes the shadow code to copy Xen mappings into guest-kernel-address slots too. In the common case, all those slots are zero in the idle pagetable, and no harm is done. But if any slot above #271 is non-zero, Xen will crash when that slot is later cleared (it attempts to drop shadow-pagetable refcounts on its own L4 pagetables). Fix by using the new ROOT_PAGETABLE_PV_XEN_SLOTS when appropriate. Monitor pagetables need the full Xen mappings, so they keep using the old name (with its new semantics). This is CVE-2013-4356 / XSA-64. Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> master commit: f46befdd825c8a459c5eb21adb7d5b0dc6e30ad5 master date: 2013-09-30 14:18:25 +0200
* x86: properly handle hvm_copy_from_guest_{phys,virt}() errorsJan Beulich2013-09-304-31/+66
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ignoring them generally implies using uninitialized data and, in all but two of the cases dealt with here, potentially leaking hypervisor stack contents to guests. This is CVE-2013-4355 / XSA-63. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> master commit: 6bb838e7375f5b031e9ac346b353775c90de45dc master date: 2013-09-30 14:17:46 +0200
* x86/HVM: refuse doing string operations in certain situationsJan Beulich2013-09-271-0/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | We shouldn't do any acceleration for - "rep movs" when either side is passed through MMIO or when both sides are handled by qemu - "rep ins" and "rep outs" when the memory operand is any kind of MMIO Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: 14fcce2fa883405bab26b60821a6cc5f2c770833 master date: 2013-09-23 09:55:14 +0200
* x86/HVM: linear address must be canonical for the whole accessed rangeJan Beulich2013-09-271-12/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | ... rather than just for the first byte. While at it, also - make the real mode case at least dpo a wrap around check - drop the mis-named "gpf" label (we're not generating faults here) and use in-place returns instead Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: 7f12732670b31b2fea899a4160d455574658474f master date: 2013-09-23 09:53:55 +0200
* sched_credit: filter node-affinity mask against online cpusDario Faggioli2013-09-271-11/+46
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | in _csched_cpu_pick(), as not doing so may result in the domain's node-affinity mask (as retrieved by csched_balance_cpumask() ) and online mask (as retrieved by cpupool_scheduler_cpumask() ) having an empty intersection. Therefore, when attempting a node-affinity load balancing step and running this: ... /* Pick an online CPU from the proper affinity mask */ csched_balance_cpumask(vc, balance_step, &cpus); cpumask_and(&cpus, &cpus, online); ... we end up with an empty cpumask (in cpus). At this point, in the following code: .... /* If present, prefer vc's current processor */ cpu = cpumask_test_cpu(vc->processor, &cpus) ? vc->processor : cpumask_cycle(vc->processor, &cpus); .... an ASSERT (from inside cpumask_cycle() ) triggers like this: (XEN) Xen call trace: (XEN) [<ffff82d08011b124>] _csched_cpu_pick+0x1d2/0x652 (XEN) [<ffff82d08011b5b2>] csched_cpu_pick+0xe/0x10 (XEN) [<ffff82d0801232de>] vcpu_migrate+0x167/0x31e (XEN) [<ffff82d0801238cc>] cpu_disable_scheduler+0x1c8/0x287 (XEN) [<ffff82d080101b3f>] cpupool_unassign_cpu_helper+0x20/0xb4 (XEN) [<ffff82d08010544f>] continue_hypercall_tasklet_handler+0x4a/0xb1 (XEN) [<ffff82d080127793>] do_tasklet_work+0x78/0xab (XEN) [<ffff82d080127a70>] do_tasklet+0x5f/0x8b (XEN) [<ffff82d080158985>] idle_loop+0x57/0x5e (XEN) (XEN) (XEN) **************************************** (XEN) Panic on CPU 1: (XEN) Assertion 'cpu < nr_cpu_ids' failed at /home/dario/Sources/xen/xen/xen.git/xen/include/xe:16481 It is for example sufficient to have a domain with node-affinity to NUMA node 1 running, and issueing a `xl cpupool-numa-split' would make the above happen. That is because, by default, all the existing domains remain assigned to the first cpupool, and it now (after the cpupool-numa-split) only includes NUMA node 0. This change prevents that by generalizing the function used for figuring out whether a node-affinity load balancing step is legit or not. This way we can, in _csched_cpu_pick(), figure out early enough that the mask would end up empty, skip the step all together and avoid the splat. Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> master commit: 5e5a44b6c942d6ea47f15d6f1ed02b03e0d69445 master date: 2013-09-20 11:37:28 +0200
* watchdog/crash: Always disable watchdog in console_force_unlock()Andrew Cooper2013-09-272-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Depending on the state of the conring and serial_tx_buffer, console_force_unlock() can be a long running operation, usually because of serial_start_sync() XenServer testing has found a reliable case where console_force_unlock() on one PCPU takes long enough for another PCPU to timeout due to the watchdog (such as waiting for a tlb flush callin). The watchdog timeout causes the second PCPU to repeat the console_force_unlock(), at which point the first PCPU typically fails an assertion in spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->tx_lock) (because the tx_lock has been unlocked behind itself). console_force_unlock() is only on emergency paths, so one way or another the host is going down. Disable the watchdog before forcing the console lock to help prevent having pcpus completing with each other to bring the host down. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: 7b9fa702ca323164d6b49e8b639a57f880454a8c master date: 2013-08-13 14:31:01 +0200
* xen/conring: Write to console ring even if console lock is bustedAndrew Cooper2013-09-271-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | console_lock_busted gets set when an NMI/MCE/Double Fault handler decides to bring Xen down in an emergency. conring_puts() cannot block and does not have problematic interactions with the console_lock. Therefore, choosing to not put the string into the console ring simply means that the kexec environment cant find any panic() message caused by an IST interrupt, which is unhelpful for debugging purposes. In the case that two pcpus fight with console_force_unlock(), having slightly garbled strings in the console ring is far more useful than having nothing at all. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Matt Wilson <msw@amazon.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: 66450c1d1ab3c4480bbba949113b95d1ab6a943a master date: 2013-08-06 17:45:00 +0200
* x86/xsave: initialize extended register state when guests enable itJan Beulich2013-09-251-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Till now, when setting previously unset bits in XCR0 we wouldn't touch the active register state, thus leaving in the newly enabled registers whatever a prior user of it left there, i.e. potentially leaking information between guests. This is CVE-2013-1442 / XSA-62. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> master commit: 63a75ba0de817d6f384f96d25427a05c313e2179 master date: 2013-09-25 10:41:25 +0200
* unmodified_drivers: enable unplug per defaultOlaf Hering2013-09-231-1/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since xen-3.3 an official unplug protocol for emulated hardware is available in the toolstack. The pvops kernel does the unplug per default, so it is safe to do it also in the drivers for forward ported xenlinux. Currently its required to load xen-platform-pci with the module parameter dev_unplug=all, which is cumbersome. Also recognize the dev_unplug=never parameter, which provides the default before this patch. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de> master commit: df17e9c889c48c9c10aa3f9dd0bb11077f54efc4 master date: 2013-09-20 11:41:08 +0200
* x86/HVM: properly handle MMIO reads and writes wider than a machine wordJan Beulich2013-09-231-20/+95
| | | | | | | | | | | Just like real hardware we ought to split such accesses transparently to the caller. With little extra effort we can at once even handle page crossing accesses correctly. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: 3b89f08a498ddac09d4002d9849e329018ceb107 master date: 2013-09-20 11:01:08 +0200
* VMX: fix failure path in construct_vmcsGeorge Dunlap2013-09-231-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | If the allocation fails, make sure to call vmx_vmcs_exit(). This is a candidate for backport. Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com> master commit: dad7e45bf44c0569546a3ed7d0fa4182a4a73f0a master date: 2013-09-18 14:45:42 +0200
* x86/HVM: fix failure path in hvm_vcpu_initialiseGeorge Dunlap2013-09-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It looks like one of the failure cases in hvm_vcpu_initialise jumps to the wrong label; this could lead to slow leaks if something isn't cleaned up properly. I will probably change these labels in a future patch, but I figured it was better to have this fix separately. This is also a candidate for backport. Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com> master commit: 925fbcb7fdd6238f26b1576dc1f3e297f1f24f1e master date: 2013-09-18 14:45:24 +0200
* passthrough/amd: Missing 'break'Tim Deegan2013-09-231-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Coverity CID 1055502 Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> master commit: 72fa4fdf647ba99ecaf39589a93cde8dd36eed3c master date: 2013-09-17 16:36:25 +0100
* hvm/vpmu: Prevent dump handlers from incorrectly mutating stateAndrew Cooper2013-09-233-16/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Discovered by Coverity, CID 1055181 core2_vpmu_dump() was incorrectly setting VPMU_CONTEXT_LOADED when it was intending to check for it. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> This would have been avoided if the dump function declared all its pointers "const" - doing this now (also in SVM). Also fixing some indentation issues at once. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> master commit: 42c5b1214071d363a52c6356dfe2ed820f500849 master date: 2013-09-16 12:22:20 +0200
* x86: machine_restart() must not call acpi_dmar_reinstate() twiceJan Beulich2013-09-231-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | .. as that function is not idempotent (it always alters the table checksum). The (generally) duplicate call was a result from it being made before machine_restart() re-invoking itself on the boot CPU. Considering that no problem arose so far from the table corruption I doubt that we need to restore the correct table signature on the reboot path in general. The only case I can see this as potentially necessary is the tboot one, hence do the call just in that case. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: a54dc5f4fe1eae6b1beb21326ef0338cd3969cd1 master date: 2013-09-13 14:27:34 +0200
* cpufreq: missing check of copy_from_guest()Tim Deegan2013-09-231-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | Coverity CID 1055131 Coverity CID 1055132 Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> master commit: 803f9a6cdfeda64beee908576de0ad02d6b0c480 master date: 2013-09-12 17:47:08 +0100
* libxc/x86: fix page table creation for huge guestsJan Beulich2013-09-231-8/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The switch-over logic from one page directory to the next was wrong; it needs to be deferred until we actually reach the last page within a given region, instead of being done when the last entry of a page directory gets started with. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> master commit: 06d086832155fc7f5344e9d108b979de34674d11 master date: 2013-09-12 17:41:04 +0200
* x86: fix memory cut-off when using PFN compressionJan Beulich2013-09-232-9/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For one setup_max_pdx(), when invoked a second time (after SRAT got parsed), needs to start from the original max_page value again (using the already adjusted one from the first invocation would not allow the cut-off boundary to be moved up). Second, _if_ we need to cut off some part of memory, we must not allow this to also propagate into the NUMA accounting. Otherwise cutoff_node() results in nodes_cover_memory() to find some parts of memory apparently not having a PXM association, causing all SRAT info to be ignored. The only possibly problematic consumer of node_spanned_pages (the meaning of which gets altered here in that it now also includes memory Xen can't actively make use of) is XEN_SYSCTL_numainfo: At a first glance the potentially larger reported memory size shouldn't confuse tool stacks. And finally we must not put our boot time modules at addresses which (at that time) can't be guaranteed to be accessible later. This applies to both the EFI boot loader and the module relocation code. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> Acked-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com> master commit: 8efce9d69998a3d3c720ac7dbdb9b7e240369957 master date: 2013-09-12 09:52:53 +0200
* sched/arinc653: check for guest data transfer failuresMatthew Daley2013-09-231-2/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Coverity-ID: 1055121 Coverity-ID: 1055122 Coverity-ID: 1055123 Coverity-ID: 1055124 Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: 546ba2f17008387cf9821df46e6dac04f0883a9b master date: 2013-09-10 17:16:02 +0200
* tools: xen-mceinj: Add missing return value checksBastian Blank2013-09-131-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | The return value of vasprintf must be checked. This check is enforced with the compiler options used in Debian by request and in Ubuntu by default. Check the return value and abort on error. Signed-off-by: Bastian Blank <waldi@debian.org> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> (cherry picked from commit 1efe90faa31be104a24fe75323429d227eae1d9f)
* libxl: Allow network driver domains when run_hotplug_scritps is setGeorge Dunlap2013-09-132-11/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As of commit 05bfd984dfe7014f1f5ea1133608b9bab589c120, hotplug scripts are not run if backend_domid != LIBXL_TOOSTACK_DOMID; so there is no reason to restrict this for network driver domains any more. This is a candidate for backporting to 4.3. Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@citrix.com> CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> (cherry picked from commit 8f46b1cb99fe519ac39d10d0796c6be37fb1d178)
* make this tree's maintainership explicitJan Beulich2013-09-131-3/+8
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* Nested VMX: Clear bit 31 of IA32_VMX_BASIC MSRYang Zhang2013-09-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | The bit 31 of revision_id will set to 1 if vmcs shadowing enabled. And according intel SDM, the bit 31 of IA32_VMX_BASIC MSR is always 0. So we cannot set low 32 bit of IA32_VMX_BASIC to revision_id directly. Must clear the bit 31 to 0. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> master commit: f3a4eb9253826d1e49e682314c8666b28fa0b717 master date: 2013-09-10 16:41:35 +0200
* x86/xsave: fix migration from xsave-capable to xsave-incapable hostJan Beulich2013-09-1210-88/+172
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With CPUID features suitably masked this is supposed to work, but was completely broken (i.e. the case wasn't even considered when the original xsave save/restore code was written). First of all, xsave_enabled() wrongly returned the value of cpu_has_xsave, i.e. not even taking into consideration attributes of the vCPU in question. Instead this function ought to check whether the guest ever enabled xsave support (by writing a [non-zero] value to XCR0). As a result of this, a vCPU's xcr0 and xcr0_accum must no longer be initialized to XSTATE_FP_SSE (since that's a valid value a guest could write to XCR0), and the xsave/xrstor as well as the context switch code need to suitably account for this (by always enforcing at least this part of the state to be saved/loaded). This involves undoing large parts of c/s 22945:13a7d1f7f62c ("x86: add strictly sanity check for XSAVE/XRSTOR") - we need to cleanly distinguish between hardware capabilities and vCPU used features. Next both HVM and PV save code needed tweaking to not always save the full state supported by the underlying hardware, but just the parts that the guest actually used. Similarly the restore code should bail not just on state being restored that the hardware cannot handle, but also on inconsistent save state (inconsistent XCR0 settings or size of saved state not in line with XCR0). And finally the PV extended context get/set code needs to use slightly different logic than the HVM one, as here we can't just key off of xsave_enabled() (i.e. avoid doing anything if a guest doesn't use xsave) because the tools use this function to determine host capabilities as well as read/write vCPU state. The set operation in particular needs to be capable of cleanly dealing with input that consists of only the xcr0 and xcr0_accum values (if they're both zero then no further data is required). While for things to work correctly both sides (saving _and_ restoring host) need to run with the fixed code, afaict no breakage should occur if either side isn't up to date (other than the breakage that this patch attempts to fix). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: 4cc1344447a0458df5d222960f2adf1b65084fa8 master date: 2013-09-09 14:36:54 +0200
* x86/xsave: initialization improvementsJan Beulich2013-09-123-15/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | - properly validate available feature set on APs - also validate xsaveopt availability on APs - properly indicate whether the initialization is on the BSP (we shouldn't be using "cpu == 0" checks for this) Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: c6066e78f4a66005b0d5d86c6ade32e2ab78923a master date: 2013-08-30 10:56:07 +0200
* xmalloc: make whole pages xfree() clear the order field (ab)used by xmalloc()Jan Beulich2013-09-121-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Not doing this was found to cause problems with sequences of allocation (multi-page), freeing, and then again allocation of the same page upon boot when interrupts are still disabled (causing the owner field to be non-zero, thus making the allocator attempt a TLB flush and, in its processing, triggering an assertion). Reported-by: Tomasz Wroblewski <tomasz.wroblewski@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Tested-by: Tomasz Wroblewski <tomasz.wroblewski@citrix.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: 0fbf3208d9c1a568aeeb61d9f4fbca03b1cfa1f8 master date: 2013-09-09 14:34:12 +0200
* x86: allow guest to set/clear MSI-X mask bit (try 2)Joby Poriyath2013-09-121-12/+63
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Guest needs the ability to enable and disable MSI-X interrupts by setting the MSI-X control bit, for a passed-through device. Guest is allowed to write MSI-X mask bit only if Xen *thinks* that mask is clear (interrupts enabled). If the mask is set by Xen (interrupts disabled), writes to mask bit by the guest is ignored. Currently, a write to MSI-X mask bit by the guest is silently ignored. A likely scenario is where we have a 82599 SR-IOV nic passed through to a guest. From the guest if you do ifconfig <ETH_DEV> down ifconfig <ETH_DEV> up the interrupts remain masked. On VF reset, the mask bit is set by the controller. At this point, Xen is not aware that mask is set. However, interrupts are enabled by VF driver by clearing the mask bit by writing directly to BAR3 region containing the MSI-X table. From dom0, we can verify that interrupts are being masked using 'xl debug-keys M'. Initially, guest was allowed to modify MSI-X bit. Later this behaviour was changed. See changeset 74c213c506afcd74a8556dd092995fd4dc38b225. Signed-off-by: Joby Poriyath <joby.poriyath@citrix.com> master commit: a35137373aa9042424565e5ee76dc0a3bb7642ae master date: 2013-09-09 10:43:11 +0200
* x86/EFI: properly handle run time memory regions outside the 1:1 mapJan Beulich2013-09-121-11/+93
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Namely with PFN compression, MMIO ranges that the firmware may need runtime access to can live in the holes that gets shrunk/eliminated by PFN compression, and hence no mappings would result from simply copying Xen's direct mapping table's L3 page table entries. Build mappings for this "manually" in the EFI runtime call 1:1 page tables. Use the opportunity to also properly identify (via a forcibly undefined manifest constant) all the disabled code regions associated with it not being acceptable for us to call SetVirtualAddressMap(). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> master commit: a350f3f43bcfac9c1591e28d8e43c505fcb172a5 master date: 2013-09-09 10:40:11 +0200
* x86: Special case __HYPERVISOR_iret rather more when writing hypercall pagesAndrew Cooper2013-09-124-2/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In all cases when a hypercall page is written, __HYPERVISOR_iret is first written as a regular hypercall, then subsequently rewritten in its special case. For VMX and SVM, this means that following the ud2a instruction is 3 bytes of an imm32 parameter. For a ring3 kernel, this means that following the syscall instruction is the second half of 'pop %r11'. For a ring1 kernel, the iret case ends up as the same number of bytes as the rest of the hypercalls, but it is pointless writing it twice, and is changed for consistency. Therefore, skip the loop iteration which would write the incorrect __HYPERVISOR_iret hypercall. This removes junk machine code from the tail and makes disassemblers rather more happy when looking at the hypercall page. Also, a miscellaneous whitespace fix in the comment for ring3 kernel. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> master commit: fca11da0ec956b17d7450d7776c3ffa22a8f538a master date: 2013-07-16 11:10:45 +0200
* hvmloader: fix SeaBIOS interfaceJan Beulich2013-09-094-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The SeaBIOS ROM image may validly exceed 128k in size, it's only our interface code that so far assumed that it wouldn't. Remove that restriction by setting the base address depending on image size. Add a check to HVM loader so that too big images won't result in silent guest failure anymore. Uncomment the intended build-time size check for rombios, moving it into a function so that it would actually compile. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> master commit: 5f2875739beef3a75c7a7e8579b6cbcb464e61b3 master date: 2013-09-05 11:47:03 +0200
* xen/docs: Correct documentation for the conswitch parameterAndrew Cooper2013-09-091-2/+3
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> master commit: cc29e450d1abd2f8be67208dfb78046885a50cca master date: 2013-09-04 18:19:01 +0100
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