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* x86: check segment descriptor read result in 64-bit OUTS emulationstaging-4.1stable-4.1Matthew Daley2013-10-101-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When emulating such an operation from a 64-bit context (CS has long mode set), and the data segment is overridden to FS/GS, the result of reading the overridden segment's descriptor (read_descriptor) is not checked. If it fails, data_base is left uninitialized. This can lead to 8 bytes of Xen's stack being leaked to the guest (implicitly, i.e. via the address given in a #PF). Coverity-ID: 1055116 This is CVE-2013-4368 / XSA-67. Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com> Fix formatting. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> master commit: 0771faba163769089c9f05f7f76b63e397677613 master date: 2013-10-10 15:19:53 +0200
* x86: properly set up fbld emulation operand addressJan Beulich2013-09-301-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | This is CVE-2013-4361 / XSA-66. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> master commit: 28b706efb6abb637fabfd74cde70a50935a5640b master date: 2013-09-30 14:18:58 +0200
* x86: properly handle hvm_copy_from_guest_{phys,virt}() errorsJan Beulich2013-09-304-31/+66
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ignoring them generally implies using uninitialized data and, in all but two of the cases dealt with here, potentially leaking hypervisor stack contents to guests. This is CVE-2013-4355 / XSA-63. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> master commit: 6bb838e7375f5b031e9ac346b353775c90de45dc master date: 2013-09-30 14:17:46 +0200
* x86/xsave: initialize unused register state when restoring for guestJan Beulich2013-09-251-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In order to avoid leaking register contents from the prior use of the registers restored through xrstor due to a guest enabling certain xcr0 bits late (particularly after the context restor in question), force restoring of all known registers (the ones that never got saved would be forced to their init state). This is CVE-2013-1442 / XSA-62. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> master commit: 63a75ba0de817d6f384f96d25427a05c313e2179 master date: 2013-09-25 10:41:25 +0200
* update Xen version to 4.1.6.1RELEASE-4.1.6.1Jan Beulich2013-09-102-2/+2
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* oxenstored: Fix process.ml build after 070ab4c50593Ian Jackson2013-09-091-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This change: 070ab4c505934951f86f42dd8403cf62bc5822f0 "oxenstored: Protect oxenstored from malicious domains" broke the build because it had an unresolved semantic (but not textual) conflict with c69fddbd5dfa3004aaf2d0f2dde00c9ec3dd6d5d "tools/ocaml: Remove log library from tools/ocaml/libs" (which is in 4.2 but not 4.1) Fix this by using the 4.1.x idiom in the new error handling introduced in 070ab4c50593. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: David Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com>
* update Xen version to 4.1.6RELEASE-4.1.6Jan Beulich2013-09-092-2/+2
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* AMD IOMMU: add missing checkJan Beulich2013-09-061-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | We shouldn't accept IVHD tables specifying IO-APIC IDs beyond the limit we support (MAX_IO_APICS, currently 128). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulapanit@amd.com> master commit: 3785d30efe8264b899499e0883b10cc434bd0959 master date: 2013-08-29 09:31:37 +0200
* VT-d: warn about Compatibility Format Interrupts being enabled by firmwareJan Beulich2013-09-061-4/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | ... as being insecure. Also drop the second (redundant) read DMAR_GSTS_REG from enable_intremap(). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by Xiantao Zhang <xiantao.zhang@intel.com> master commit: c9c6abab583d27fdca1d979a7f1d18ae30f54e9b master date: 2013-08-21 16:44:58 +0200
* pygrub: add Debian extlinux.conf pathIan Jackson2013-09-031-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is Debian bug #697407. http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=697407 Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ijc@hellion.org.uk> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> (cherry picked from commit 258d27a1d9fb33a490bef1381f52d522225c3dca) Conflicts: tools/pygrub/src/pygrub Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* oxenstored: Protect oxenstored from malicious domains.Ian Jackson2013-09-035-6/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | add check logic when read from IO ring, and if error happens, then mark the reading connection as "bad", Unless vm reboot, oxenstored will not handle message from this connection any more. xs_ring_stubs.c: add a more strict check on ring reading connection.ml, domain.ml: add getter and setter for bad flag process.ml: if exception raised when reading from domain's ring, mark this domain as "bad" xenstored.ml: if a domain is marked as "bad", do not handle it. Signed-off-by: John Liu <john.liuqiming@huawei.com> Acked-by: David Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com> (cherry picked from commit 704302ce9404c73cfb687d31adcf67094ab5bb53) (cherry picked from commit a978634bee4db6c5e0ceeb66adcc5114f3f9bc48) Conflicts: tools/ocaml/xenstored/domain.ml Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> (cherry picked from commit 9f93027afd796a98d7b92898f4ccc772796a4874)
* update Xen version to 4.1.6-rc24.1.6-rc2Jan Beulich2013-08-272-2/+2
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* Correct X2-APIC HVM emulationJuergen Gross2013-08-221-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | commit 6859874b61d5ddaf5289e72ed2b2157739b72ca5 ("x86/HVM: fix x2APIC APIC_ID read emulation") introduced an error for the hvm emulation of x2apic. Any try to write to APIC_ICR MSR will result in a GP fault. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <juergen.gross@ts.fujitsu.com> master commit: 69962e19ed432570f6cdcfdb5f6f22d6e3c54e6c master date: 2013-08-22 11:24:00 +0200
* xen: Add stdbool.h workaround for BSD.Tim Deegan2013-08-202-2/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On *BSD, stdbool.h lives in /usr/include, but we don't want to have that on the search path in case we pick up any headers from the build host's C libraries. Copy the equivalent hack already in place for stdarg.h: on all supported compilers the contents of stdbool.h are trivial, so just supply the things we need in a xen/stdbool.h header. Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> Tested-by: Patrick Welche <prlw1@cam.ac.uk> master commit: 7b9685ca4ed2fd723600ce66eb20a6d0c115b6cb master date: 2013-08-15 22:00:45 +0100
* x86/time: fix check for negative time in __update_vcpu_system_time()Tim Deegan2013-08-201-1/+2
| | | | | | | | Clang points out that u64 stime variable is always >= 0. Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> master commit: ab7f9a793c78dfea81c037b34b0dd2db7070d8f8 master date: 2013-08-15 13:17:10 +0200
* x86/MTRR: fix range check in mtrr_add_page()Jan Beulich2013-08-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | Extracted from Yinghai Lu's Linux commit d5c78673 ("x86: Fix /proc/mtrr with base/size more than 44bits"). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: f67af6d5803b6a015e30cb490a94f9547cb0437c master date: 2013-08-14 11:20:26 +0200
* VT-d: protect against bogus information coming from BIOSJan Beulich2013-08-202-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add checks similar to those done by Linux: The DRHD address must not be all zeros or all ones (Linux only checks for zero), and capabilities as well as extended capabilities must not be all ones. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Guthro <benjamin.guthro@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Tested-by: Ben Guthro <benjamin.guthro@citrix.com> Acked by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com> Acked-by: Xiantao Zhang <xiantao.zhang@intel.com> master commit: e8e8b030ecf916fea19639f0b6a446c1c9dbe174 master date: 2013-08-14 11:18:24 +0200
* libelf: Fix typo in header guard macroPatrick Welche2013-08-201-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | s/__LIBELF_PRIVATE_H_/__LIBELF_PRIVATE_H__/ Signed-off-by: Patrick Welche <prlw1@cam.ac.uk> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> master commit: 0aec8823501f8ee058c1ba673d2ac3e0f3f2e8db master date: 2013-08-08 12:47:38 +0100
* x86: explicit suffix in inline assembler (for clang).Tim Deegan2013-08-161-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fixes the clang build, and has no effect on gcc's output. Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> master commit: 59a28b5f045331641cbf0c1fc8d5d67afe328939 master date: 2013-02-14 14:20:06 +0100 Note that this isn't just a build fix - if the "delta" input ends up in memory, gas would default to 32-bit operand size (and should really warn about the ambiguity).
* x86/time: Update wallclock in shared info when altering domain time offsetAndrew Cooper2013-08-081-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | domain_set_time_offset() udpates d->time_offset_seconds, but does not correct the wallclock in the shared info, meaning that it is incorrect until the next XENPF_settime hypercall from dom0 which resynchronises the wallclock for all domains. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: 915a59f25c5eddd86bc2cae6389d0ed2ab87e69e master date: 2013-07-18 09:16:15 +0200
* x86/cpuidle: Change logging for unknown APIC IDsAndrew Cooper2013-08-082-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Dom0 uses this hypercall to pass ACPI information to Xen. It is not very uncommon for more cpus to be listed in the ACPI tables than are present on the system, particularly on systems with a common BIOS for a 2 and 4 socket server varients. As Dom0 does not control the number of entries in the ACPI tables, and is required to pass everything it finds to Xen, change the logging. There is now an single unconditional warning for the first unknown ID, and further warnings if "cpuinfo" is requested by the user on the command line. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> master commit: 85047d9e4f4afeb73bca1e98f705a2f4f1d51c03 master date: 2013-07-17 08:45:20 +0200
* x86/mm: Ensure useful progress in alloc_l2_table()Andrew Cooper2013-08-081-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While debugging the issue which turned out to be XSA-58, a printk in this loop showed that it was quite easy to never make useful progress, because of consistently failing the preemption check. One single l2 entry is a reasonable amount of work to do, even if an action is pending, and also assures forwards progress across repeat continuations. Tweak the continuation criteria to fail on the first iteration of the loop. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: d3a55d7d9bb518efe08143d050deff9f4ee80ec1 master date: 2013-07-04 10:33:18 +0200
* update Xen version to 4.1.6-rc14.1.6-rc1Ian Jackson2013-07-191-1/+1
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* tools/debugger/kdd: Remove dependencies files during make cleanDaniel Kiper2013-07-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Remove dependencies files during make clean. Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> (cherry picked from commit 38bdfb9197b93262248ff489eed336d80db52b54)
* tools/libfsimage: Fix clean and distclean make targetsDaniel Kiper2013-07-172-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If there is a single colon for a given target and the target is redefined in another place (e.g. in included file) then make executes only new target and displays following warning: Makefile:35: warning: overriding commands for target `clean' tools/libfsimage/common/../../../tools/libfsimage/Rules.mk:25: warning: ignoring old commands for target `clean' To cope with that issue define all required targets as double-colon rules. Additionally, remove some redundant stuff. Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> (cherry picked from commit 667d8a84b244d02e9c6a2d02d6a02fc90c2efb4e)
* QEMU_TAG updateIan Jackson2013-07-171-3/+3
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* pygrub/GrubConf: fix boot problem for fedora 19 grub.cfg (2nd attempt)Marcel J.E. Mol2013-07-171-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Booting a fedora 19 domU failed because a it could not properly parse the grub.cfg file. This was cased by set default="${next_entry}" This statement actually is within an 'if' statement, so maybe it would be better to skip code within if/fi blocks... But this patch seems to work fine. Signed-off-by: Marcel Mol <marcel@mesa.nl> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citix.com> Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> (cherry picked from commit d513814db6af2b298b8776d7ffc5fb1261e176f4)
* iommu/amd: Workaround for erratum 787Suravee Suthikulpanit2013-07-111-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The IOMMU interrupt handling in bottom half must clear the PPR log interrupt and event log interrupt bits to re-enable the interrupt. This is done by writing 1 to the memory mapped register to clear the bit. Due to hardware bug, if the driver tries to clear this bit while the IOMMU hardware also setting this bit, the conflict will result with the bit being set. If the interrupt handling code does not make sure to clear this bit, subsequent changes in the event/PPR logs will no longer generating interrupts, and would result if buffer overflow. After clearing the bits, the driver must read back the register to verify. Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Adjust to apply on top of heavily modified patch 1. Adjust flow to get away with a single readl() in each instance of the status register checks. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Acked-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> master commit: 9eabb0735400e2b6059dfa3f0b47a426f61f570a master date: 2013-07-02 08:50:41 +0200
* iommu/amd: Fix logic for clearing the IOMMU interrupt bitsSuravee Suthikulpanit2013-07-112-25/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The IOMMU interrupt bits in the IOMMU status registers are "read-only, and write-1-to-clear (RW1C). Therefore, the existing logic which reads the register, set the bit, and then writing back the values could accidentally clear certain bits if it has been set. The correct logic would just be writing only the value which only set the interrupt bits, and leave the rest to zeros. This patch also, clean up #define masks as Jan has suggested. Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> With iommu_interrupt_handler() properly having got switched its readl() from status to control register, the subsequent writel() needed to be switched too (and the RW1C comment there was bogus). Some of the cleanup went too far - undone. Further, with iommu_interrupt_handler() now actually disabling the interrupt sources, they also need to get re-enabled by the tasklet once it finished processing the respective log. This also implies re-running the tasklet so that log entries added between reading the log and re- enabling the interrupt will get handled in a timely manner. Finally, guest write emulation to the status register needs to be done with the RW1C (and RO for all other bits) semantics in mind too. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Acked-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> master commit: 2823a0c7dfc979db316787e1dd42a8845e5825c0 master date: 2013-07-02 08:49:43 +0200
* x86: don't pass negative time to gtime_to_gtsc() (try 2)Jan Beulich2013-07-111-9/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This mostly reverts commit eb60be3d ("x86: don't pass negative time to gtime_to_gtsc()") and instead corrects __update_vcpu_system_time()'s handling of this_cpu(cpu_time).stime_local_stamp dating back before the start of a HVM guest (which would otherwise lead to a negative value getting passed to gtime_to_gtsc(), causing scale_delta() to produce meaningless output). Flushing the value to zero was wrong, and printing a message for something that can validly happen wasn't very useful either. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: 5ad914bc867c5a6a4957869c89918f4e1f9dd9c4 master date: 2013-07-02 08:48:03 +0200
* AMD/intremap: Prevent use of per-device vector maps until irq logic is fixedAndrew Cooper2013-07-111-2/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | XSA-36 changed the default vector map mode from global to per-device. This is because a global vector map does not prevent one PCI device from impersonating another and launching a DoS on the system. However, the per-device vector map logic is broken for devices with multiple MSI-X vectors, which can either result in a failed ASSERT() or misprogramming of a guests interrupt remapping tables. The core problem is not trivial to fix. In an effort to get AMD systems back to a non-regressed state, introduce a new type of vector map called per-device-global. This uses per-device vector maps in the IOMMU, but uses a single used_vector map for the core IRQ logic. This patch is intended to be removed as soon as the per-device logic is fixed correctly. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> master commit: f0fe8227624d5c02715ed086867d12cd24f6ff47 master date: 2013-06-27 14:01:18 +0200
* libelf: fix printing of pointersJan Beulich2013-07-111-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | Printing them as decimal number, the more with 0x prefix, is confusing and presumably relatively useless to most of us. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> master commit: 59912eb06fda88af6c5ec16a2a382619d3829a7b master date: 2013-06-26 14:43:52 +0100
* x86/hvm: fix HVMOP_inject_trap return value on successTim Deegan2013-07-111-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | Reported-by: Antony Saba <Antony.Saba@mandiant.com> Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> master commit: a12d15d8c1d512a4ed6498b39f9058f69a1c1f6c master date: 2013-06-21 17:01:50 +0200
* x86/HVM: fix initialization of wallclock time for PVHVM on migrationRoger Pau Monné2013-07-111-19/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Call update_domain_wallclock_time on hvm_latch_shinfo_size even if the bitness of the guest has already been set, this fixes the problem with the wallclock not being set for PVHVM guests on resume from migration. Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> Clean up the resulting code and retain the (slightly adjusted) original comment. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: f8e8fd56bd7d5675e8331b4ec74bae76c9dbf24e master date: 2013-06-12 10:05:39 +0200
* x86/HVM: fix x2APIC APIC_ID read emulationZhenguo Wang2013-07-111-3/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | APIC and x2APIC have different format for APIC_ID register. Need translation. Signed-off-by: Zhenguo Wang <wangzhenguo@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Xiaowei Yang <xiaowei.yang@huawei.com> Convert code to use switch(), fixing coding style issue at once, and use GET_xAPIC_ID() on the value read instead of VLAPIC_ID() (reading the field again). In the course of this also properly reject both read and writes on the non-existing MSR corresponding to APIC_ICR2. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> master commit: 6859874b61d5ddaf5289e72ed2b2157739b72ca5 master date: 2013-06-11 09:45:55 +0200
* libxl: suppress device assignment to HVM guest when there is no IOMMUJan Beulich2013-07-091-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This in effect copies similar logic from xend: While there's no way to check whether a device is assigned to a particular guest, XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device at least allows checking whether an IOMMU is there and whether a device has been assign to _some_ guest. For the time being, this should be enough to cover for the missing error checking/recovery in other parts of libxl's device assignment paths. There remains a (functionality-, but not security-related) race in that the iommu should be set up earlier, but this is too risky a change for this stage of the 4.3 release. This is a security issue, XSA-61. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Tested-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> master commit: 826eb17271d3c647516d9944c47b0779afedea25 master date: 2013-07-01 15:20:28 +0100 master commit: 826eb17271d3c647516d9944c47b0779afedea25 master date: 2013-07-01 15:20:28 +0100
* xsm/flask: Fix XSM support for HVMOP_track_dirty_vramAurelien Chartier2013-07-041-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The XSM check for HVMOP_track_dirty_vram is done with a call to xsm_hvm_param, therefore the switch handling that case should be located in flask_hvm_param and not in flask_hvmcontext. This was fixed upstream by the two following patches : * 875756ca34fabc7243c4a682ffd7008710a907e2 (add case in flask_hvm_param) * 652f94327383c5517b709f0a3e4b970216b3d375 (remove case from flask_hvmcontext) Signed-off-by: Aurelien Chartier <aurelien.chartier@citrix.com> Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
* libxl: Restrict permissions on PV console device xenstore nodesIan Jackson2013-06-276-43/+83
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Matthew Daley has observed that the PV console protocol places sensitive host state into a guest writeable xenstore locations, this includes: - The pty used to communicate between the console backend daemon and its client, allowing the guest administrator to read and write arbitrary host files. - The output file, allowing the guest administrator to write arbitrary host files or to target arbitrary qemu chardevs which include sockets, udp, ptr, pipes etc (see -chardev in qemu(1) for a more complete list). - The maximum buffer size, allowing the guest administrator to consume more resources than the host administrator has configured. - The backend to use (qemu vs xenconsoled), potentially allowing the guest administrator to confuse host software. So we arrange to make the sensitive keys in the xenstore frontend directory read only for the guest. This is safe since the xenstore permissions model, unlike POSIX directory permissions, does not allow the guest to remove and recreate a node if it has write access to the containing directory. There are a few associated wrinkles: - The primary PV console is "special". It's xenstore node is not under the usual /devices/ subtree and it does not use the customary xenstore state machine protocol. Unfortunately its directory is used for other things, including the vnc-port node, which we do not want the guest to be able to write to. Rather than trying to track down all the possible secondary uses of this directory just make it r/o to the guest. All newly created subdirectories inherit these permissions and so are now safe by default. - The other serial consoles do use the customary xenstore state machine and therefore need write access to at least the "protocol" and "state" nodes, however they may also want to use arbitrary "feature-foo" nodes (although I'm not aware of any) and therefore we cannot simply lock down the entire frontend directory. Instead we add support to libxl__device_generic_add for frontend keys which are explicitly read only and use that to lock down the sensitive keys. - Minios' console frontend wants to write the "type" node, which it has no business doing since this is a host/toolstack level decision. This fails now that the node has become read only to the PV guest. Since the toolstack already writes this node just remove the attempt to set it. This is CVE-2013-2211 / XSA-57 Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Conflicts (4.2 backport): tools/libxl/libxl.c (no vtpm, free front_ro on error in libxl__device_console_add) Conflicts (4.1 backport): extras/mini-os/console/xenbus.c tools/libxl/libxl.c tools/libxl/libxl_device.c tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c - minios code was in xencons_ring.c - many places need &gc not just gc - libxl__xs_writev path is not const - varios minor context fixups
* x86: fix emuirq regression from XSA-21 fixJan Beulich2013-06-271-0/+2
| | | | | | | | The XSA-21 patch broke the assumption of "ret" being zero prior to the IRQ_UNBOUND check. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
* x86: fix page refcount handling in page table pin error pathJan Beulich2013-06-263-8/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In the original patch 7 of the series addressing XSA-45 I mistakenly took the addition of the call to get_page_light() in alloc_page_type() to cover two decrements that would happen: One for the PGT_partial bit that is getting set along with the call, and the other for the page reference the caller hold (and would be dropping on its error path). But of course the additional page reference is tied to the PGT_partial bit, and hence any caller of a function that may leave ->arch.old_guest_table non-NULL for error cleanup purposes has to make sure a respective page reference gets retained. Similar issues were then also spotted elsewhere: In effect all callers of get_page_type_preemptible() need to deal with errors in similar ways. To make sure error handling can work this way without leaking page references, a respective assertion gets added to that function. This is CVE-2013-1432 / XSA-58. Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> master commit: 9b167bd2f394f821ae3252d74a15704a4bf91f6d master date: 2013-06-26 15:32:58 +0200
* x86/vtsc: update vcpu_time in hvm_set_guest_timeRoger Pau Monné2013-06-171-1/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | When using a vtsc, hvm_set_guest_time changes hvm_vcpu.stime_offset, which is used in the vcpu time structure to calculate the tsc_timestamp, so after updating stime_offset we need to propagate the change to vcpu_time in order for the guest to get the right time if using the PV clock. Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> master commit: 32c864a35ece2c24a336d183869a546798a4b241 master date: 2013-06-05 10:03:08 +0200
* x86/MCE: disable if MCE banks are not presentAravindh Puthiyaparambil2013-06-171-1/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When booting Xen on VMware ESX 5.1 and Workstation 9, you hit a GPF during MCE initialization. The culprit is line 631 in set_poll_bankmask(): bitmap_copy(mb->bank_map, mca_allbanks->bank_map, nr_mce_banks); What is happening is that in mca_cap_init(), nr_mce_banks is being set to 0. This causes the allocation of bank_map to be set to ZERO_BLOCK_PTR which is the return value for zero-size allocation by xzalloc_array()/_xmalloc(). This results in the bitmap_copy() to fail disastrously. The following patch fixes this issue. Signed-off-by: Aravindh Puthiyaparambil <aravindp@cisco.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Christoph Egger <chegger@amazon.de> master commit: 5cffb77c4072fa5b46700a2dbb3e46c5a54eba6d master date: 2013-06-03 15:42:46 +0200
* x86: fix ordering of operations in destroy_irq()Jan Beulich2013-06-171-23/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The fix for XSA-36, switching the default of vector map management to be per-device, exposed more readily a problem with the cleanup of these vector maps: dynamic_irq_cleanup() clearing desc->arch.used_vectors keeps the subsequently invoked clear_irq_vector() from clearing the bits for both the in-use and a possibly still outstanding old vector. Fix this by folding dynamic_irq_cleanup() into destroy_irq(), which was its only caller, deferring the clearing of the vector map pointer until after clear_irq_vector(). Once at it, also defer resetting of desc->handler until after the loop around smp_mb() checking for IRQ_INPROGRESS to be clear, fixing a (mostly theoretical) issue with the intercation with do_IRQ(): If we don't defer the pointer reset, do_IRQ() could, for non-guest IRQs, call ->ack() and ->end() with different ->handler pointers, potentially leading to an IRQ remaining un-acked. The issue is mostly theoretical because non-guest IRQs are subject to destroy_irq() only on (boot time) error paths. As to the changed locking: Invoking clear_irq_vector() with desc->lock held is okay because vector_lock already nests inside desc->lock (proven by set_desc_affinity(), which takes vector_lock and gets called from various desc->handler->ack implementations, getting invoked with desc->lock held). Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> master commit: 43427e65ccfea0c6dc0232f358287e6cc616b507 master date: 2013-05-31 08:35:22 +0200
* libxc: check blob size before proceeding in xc_dom_check_gzipMatthew Daley2013-06-141-0/+5
| | | | | | This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
* libxc: range checks in xc_dom_p2m_host and _guestIan Jackson2013-06-141-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | These functions take guest pfns and look them up in the p2m. They did no range checking. However, some callers, notably xc_dom_boot.c:setup_hypercall_page want to pass untrusted guest-supplied value(s). It is most convenient to detect this here and return INVALID_MFN. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Changes from Xen 4.2 version of this patch: * 4.2 lacks dom->rambase_pfn, so don't add/subtract/check it. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* libxc: check return values from mallocIan Jackson2013-06-1410-3/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A sufficiently malformed input to libxc (such as a malformed input ELF or other guest-controlled data) might cause one of libxc's malloc() to fail. In this case we need to make sure we don't dereference or do pointer arithmetic on the result. Search for all occurrences of \b(m|c|re)alloc in libxc, and all functions which call them, and add appropriate error checking where missing. This includes the functions xc_dom_malloc*, which now print a message when they fail so that callers don't have to do so. The function xc_cpuid_to_str wasn't provided with a sane return value and has a pretty strange API, which now becomes a little stranger. There are no in-tree callers. Changes in the Xen 4.2 version of this series: * No need to fix code relating to ARM. * No need to fix code relating to superpage support. * Additionally fix `dom->p2m_host = xc_dom_malloc...' in xc_dom_ia64.c. Changes in the Xen 4.1 version of this series: * An additional check is needed in xc_flask.c:xc_flask_access. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* libxc: check failure of xc_dom_*_to_ptr, xc_map_foreign_rangeIan Jackson2013-06-148-0/+113
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The return values from xc_dom_*_to_ptr and xc_map_foreign_range are sometimes dereferenced, or subjected to pointer arithmetic, without checking whether the relevant function failed and returned NULL. Add an appropriate error check at every call site. Changes in the 4.2 backport of this series: * Fix tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c:setup_pgtables_x86_32. * Fix tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c:start_info_ia64. * Fix tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_dom_fwloader.c:xc_dom_load_fw_kernel. Conflicts in the 4.1 backport of this series: * xc_dom_load_elf_kernel has less error handling in 4.1. * the VM generation ID code is not in 4.1. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* libxc: Add range checking to xc_dom_binloaderIan Jackson2013-06-141-2/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is a simple binary image loader with its own metadata format. However, it is too careless with image-supplied values. Add the following checks: * That the image is bigger than the metadata table; otherwise the pointer arithmetic to calculate the metadata table location may yield undefined and dangerous values. * When clamping the end of the region to search, that we do not calculate pointers beyond the end of the image. The C specification does not permit this and compilers are becoming ever more determined to miscompile code when they can "prove" various falsehoods based on assertions from the C spec. * That the supplied image is big enough for the text we are allegedly copying from it. Otherwise we might have a read overrun and copy the results (perhaps a lot of secret data) into the guest. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
* libelf: abolish obsolete macrosIan Jackson2013-06-146-65/+42
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Abolish ELF_PTRVAL_[CONST_]{CHAR,VOID}; change uses to elf_ptrval. Abolish ELF_HANDLE_DECL_NONCONST; change uses to ELF_HANDLE_DECL. Abolish ELF_OBSOLETE_VOIDP_CAST; simply remove all uses. No functional change. (Verified by diffing assembler output.) This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Conflicts in the 4.1 backport: * elf_load_image is not in 4.1. * elf_note_numeric_array is not in 4.1. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
* libelf: check loops for running awayIan Jackson2013-06-145-29/+135
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ensure that libelf does not have any loops which can run away indefinitely even if the input is bogus. (Grepped for \bfor, \bwhile and \bgoto in libelf and xc_dom_*loader*.c.) Changes needed: * elf_note_next uses the note's unchecked alleged length, which might wrap round. If it does, return ELF_MAX_PTRVAL (0xfff..fff) instead, which will be beyond the end of the section and so terminate the caller's loop. * In various loops over section and program headers, check that the calculated header pointer is still within the image, and quit the loop if it isn't. We have not changed loops which might, in principle, iterate over the whole image - even if they might do so one byte at a time with a nontrivial access check function in the middle. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Conflicts in Xen 4.1 version of the series: * Trivial conflict due to elf_note_numeric_array not existing. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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