| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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c/s 20281:95ea2052b41b, which introduces Grant Table version 2
hypercalls introduces a vulnerability whereby the compat hypercall
handler can fall into an infinite loop.
If the watchdog is enabled, Xen will die after the timeout.
This is a security problem, XSA-24 / CVE-2012-4539.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26151:b64a7d868f06
Backport-requested-by: security@xen.org
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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If the guest has not fully populated its top-level PAE entries when it calls
HVMOP_pagetable_dying, the shadow code could try to unhook entries from
MFN 0. Add a check to avoid that case.
This issue was introduced by c/s 21239:b9d2db109cf5.
This is a security problem, XSA-23 / CVE-2012-4538.
Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-4.1-testing changeset: 23409:61eb3d030f52
Backport-requested-by: security@xen.org
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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In certain conditions, such as low memory, set_p2m_entry() can fail.
Currently, the p2m and m2p tables will get out of sync because we still
update the m2p table after the p2m update has failed.
If that happens, subsequent guest-invoked memory operations can cause
BUG()s and ASSERT()s to kill Xen.
This is fixed by only updating the m2p table iff the p2m was
successfully updated.
This is a security problem, XSA-22 / CVE-2012-4537.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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The timer action for a vcpu periodic timer is to calculate the next
expiry time, and to reinsert itself into the timer queue. If the
deadline ends up in the past, Xen never leaves __do_softirq(). The
affected PCPU will stay in an infinite loop until Xen is killed by the
watchdog (if enabled).
This is a security problem, XSA-20 / CVE-2012-4535.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26148:bf58b94b3cef
Backport-requested-by: security@xen.org
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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This is XSA-14 / CVE-2012-3496
Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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The upper 32 bits of this register are reserved and should be written as
zero.
This is XSA-12 / CVE-2012-3494
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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If there is no cpufreq driver (e.g., with an AMD Opteron 8212) then
reading the P state statistics causes a deadlock as an uninitialized
spinlock is locked in do_get_pm_info(). The spinlock is initialized in
cpufreq_statistic_init() which is not called if cpufreq_driver ==
NULL.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 25706:7fd5facb6084
xen-unstable date: Fri Aug 03 09:50:28 2012 +0200
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Avoids worst case behavour when guest has a large p2m.
This is XSA-11 / CVE-2012-3433
Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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highest_gsi() returns the last valid GSI, not a count.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Joe Jin <joe.jin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 25688:e6266fc76d08
xen-unstable date: Fri Jul 27 12:22:13 2012 +0200
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According to vt-d specs, the addr in IOTLB invalidation descriptor
should be 4K page aligned.
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 25617:75eb78d6cf54
xen-unstable date: Thu Jul 19 15:46:02 2012 +0100
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The fact that handle_mmio(), and thus the instruction emulator, is
being run through twice for emulations that require involvement of the
device model, allows for the second run to see a different guest state
than the first one. Since only the MMIO-specific emulation routines
update the vCPU's io_state, if they get invoked on the second pass,
internal state (and particularly this variable) can be left in a state
making successful emulation of a subsequent MMIO operation impossible.
Consequently, whenever the emulator invocation returns without
requesting a retry of the guest instruction, reset io_state.
[ This is a security issue. XSA#10. -iwj ]
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 25682:ffcb24876b4f
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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As Xen currently stands, it will attempt to interpret the first few
bytes of the initcall section as a struct kernel_param.
The reason that this not caused problems is because in the overflow
case, param->name is actually a function pointer to the first
initcall, and intepreting it as string is very unlikely to match an
ASCII command line parameter name.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 25587:2cffb7bf6e57
xen-unstable date: Tue Jul 03 13:38:19 2012 +0100
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Additionally, correct the text description to reflect what is being
done, and make use of fatal_trap() in preference to kexec_crash() in
case an unknown NMI occurs before a kdump kernel has been loaded.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 25478:6d1a30dc47e8
xen-unstable date: Mon Jun 11 15:12:50 2012 +0100
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The Interrupt Stack Table entries in a 64bit TSS are a 1 based data
structure as far as hardware is concerned. As a result, the code
setting up stacks in subarch_percpu_traps_init() fills in the wrong
IST entries.
The result is that the MCE handler executes on the stack set up for
NMIs; the NMI handler executes on a stack set up for Double Faults,
and Double Faults are executed with a stack pointer set to 0.
Once the #DF handler starts to execute, it will usually take a page
fault looking up the address at 0xfffffffffffffff8, which will cause a
triple fault. If a guest has mapped a page in that location, then it
will have some state overwritten, but as the #DF handler always calls
panic(), this is not a problem the guest will have time to care about.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 25271:54da0329e259
xen-unstable date: Thu May 10 11:04:32 2012 +0100
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Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 24511:a141f6d64916
xen-unstable date: Sun Jan 15 22:02:35 2012 +0000
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Processors with this erratum are subject to a DoS attack by unprivileged
guest users.
This is XSA-9 / CVE-2012-2934.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 25481:422880dc94a4
xen-unstable date: Tue Jun 12 11:33:42 2012 +0100
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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When guest use of sysenter (64-bit PV guest) or syscall (32-bit PV
guest) gets converted into a GP fault (due to no callback having got
registered), we must
- honor the GP fault handler's request the keep enabled or mask event
delivery
- not allow TBF_EXCEPTION to remain set past the generation of the
(guest) exception in the vCPU's trap_bounce.flags, as that would
otherwise allow for the next exception occurring in guest mode,
should it happen to get handled in Xen itself, to nevertheless get
bounced to the guest kernel.
Also, just like compat mode syscall handling already did, native mode
sysenter handling should, when converting to #GP, subtract 2 from the
RIP present in the frame so that the guest's GP fault handler would
see the fault pointing to the offending instruction instead of past it.
Finally, since those exception generating code blocks needed to be
modified anyway, convert them to make use of UNLIKELY_{START,END}().
[ This bug is security vulnerability, XSA-8 / CVE-2012-0218. ]
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 25200:80f4113be500 25204:569d6f05e1ef
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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Check for non-canonical guest RIP before attempting to execute sysret.
If sysret is executed with a non-canonical value in RCX, Intel CPUs
take the fault in ring0, but we will necessarily already have switched
to the the user's stack pointer.
This is a security vulnerability, XSA-7 / CVE-2012-0217.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir.xen@gmail.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 25480:76eaf5966c05
xen-unstable date: Tue Jun 12 11:33:40 2012 +0100
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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These cause warnings under warn_unused_result, and for read/write we
ought to deal with partial io results.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 25299:01d64a3dea71
xen-unstable date: Fri May 11 18:30:29 2012 +0100
blktap2: Fix another uninitialised value error
gcc -O1 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -m32 -march=i686 -g
-fno-strict-aliasing -std=gnu99 -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes
-Wdeclaration-after-statement -D__XEN_TOOLS__ -MMD -MF
.block-remus.o.d -D_LARGEFILE_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64
-D_LARGEFILE_SOURCE -D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE -fno-optimize-sibling-calls
-mno-tls-direct-seg-refs -Werror -g -Wno-unused -fno-strict-aliasing
-I../include -I../drivers
-I/home/osstest/build.12828.build-i386/xen-unstable/tools/blktap2/drivers/../../../tools/libxc
-I/home/osstest/build.12828.build-i386/xen-unstable/tools/blktap2/drivers/../../../tools/include
-D_GNU_SOURCE -DUSE_NFS_LOCKS -c -o block-remus.o block-remus.c
block-remus.c: In function 'ramdisk_flush':
block-remus.c:508: error: 'buf' may be used uninitialized in this
function
make[5]: *** [block-remus.o] Error 1
This is because gcc can see that merge_requests doesn't always set
*mergedbuf but gcc isn't able to prove that it always does so if
merge_requests returns 0 and that in that case the value of
ramdisk_flush::buf isn't used.
This is too useful a warning to disable, despite the occasional false
positive of this form. The conventional approach is to suppress the
warning by explicitly initialising the variable to 0.
This has just come to light because 25275:27d63b9f111a reenabled
optimisation for this area of code, and gcc's data flow analysis
(which is required to trigger the uninitialised variable warning) only
occurs when optimisation is turned on.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 25281:60064411a8a9
xen-unstable date: Thu May 10 14:26:14 2012 +0100
blktap2: Do not build with -O0
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 25275:27d63b9f111a
xen-unstable date: Thu May 10 11:22:18 2012 +0100
blktap2: Fix uninitialised value error.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 25274:cb82b5aa73bd
xen-unstable date: Thu May 10 11:21:59 2012 +0100
tools/blktap2: fix out of bounds access in block-log.c
block-log.c: In function 'ctl_close_sock':
block-log.c:363:23: warning: array subscript is above array bounds
[-Warray-bounds]
Adjust loop condition in ctl_close_sock() to fix warning.
Adjust array acccess in ctl_close() to actually access the array
member.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 25273:83a02f225bde
xen-unstable date: Thu May 10 11:20:04 2012 +0100
tools/blktap2: fix build errors caused by Werror in
vhd_journal_write_entry
-O2 -Wall -Werror triggers these warnings:
libvhd-journal.c: In function 'vhd_journal_write_entry':
libvhd-journal.c:335: warning: statement with no effect
Really return the error from vhd_journal_write() to caller.
v2:
- simplify the patch by just adding the missing return statement
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 25272:ca02580986d2
xen-unstable date: Thu May 10 11:19:05 2012 +0100
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Win2k8 x64 reads this MSR on revF chips, where it wasn't publically
available; it uses a magic constant in %rdi as a password, which we
don't have in rdmsr_safe(). Since we'll ignore the later writes, just
use a plausible value here (the reset value from rev10h chips) if the
real CPU didn't provide one.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 24990:322300fd2ebd
xen-unstable date: Thu Mar 08 09:17:21 2012 +0000
svm: amend c/s 24990:322300fd2ebd (fake BU_CFG MSR on AMD revF)
Let's restrict such a hack to the known affected family.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 25058:f47d91cb0faa
xen-unstable date: Thu Mar 15 15:09:18 2012 +0100
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compat M2P table
The epfn is being compared to (RDWR_COMPAT_MPT_VIRT_END -
RDWR_COMPAT_MPT_VIRT_START) without a 2 bit shift, resulting in the
epfn being compared to the size of the RDWR_COMPAT_MPT table in bytes
instead of the maximum page frame number that the RDWR_COMPAT_MPT
table can map.
Signed-off-by: Malcolm Crossley <malcolm.crossley@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 25242:b7ce6a88bebb
xen-unstable date: Wed Apr 25 12:35:56 2012 +0200
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Linux up to now is not smart enough to properly clear the HPET when it
boots, which is particularly a problem when a kdump attempt from
running under Xen is being made. Linux itself added code to work
around
this to its shutdown paths quite some time ago, so let's do something
similar in Xen: Save the configuration register settings during boot,
and restore them during shutdown. This should cover the majority of
cases where the secondary kernel might not come up because timer
interrupts don't work.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 25101:f06ff3dfde08
xen-unstable date: Tue Mar 27 15:20:23 2012 +0200
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Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 25099:4bd752a4cdf3
xen-unstable date: Fri Mar 23 20:51:48 2012 +0000
x86_emulate: raise #UD rather than #GP on invalid use of LOCK prefix
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 25098:2e45b26bc412
xen-unstable date: Fri Mar 23 20:45:16 2012 +0000
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The operand needs to use the 'w' modifier in case the compiler happens
to pick a register (which apparently it does for no-one but the
reporter of this problem).
Reported-by: Lin Ming <mlin@ss.pku.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 25092:a66fb91cb8d3
xen-unstable date: Fri Mar 23 08:39:39 2012 +0100
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On ia64, 21577:c41ab909f08e introduces the following error:
/xen/include/xen/pci.h:52: warning: implicit declaration of function
`PFN_UP'
/xen/include/xen/pci.h:52: error: variable-size type declared
outside of any function
/xen/include/xen/pci.h:53: error: variable-size type declared
outside of any function
Because the macro PFN_UP() is defined on x86 only.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: KUWAMURA Shin'ya <kuwa@jp.fujitsu.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 23074:c80e0fb4fe93
xen-unstable date: Wed Mar 23 13:34:55 2011 +0000
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On ia64, 21530:0383662ea34c introduces the following error:
irq.c:129: warning: initialization from incompatible pointer type
irq.c: In function '__do_IRQ':
irq.c:159: error: too few arguments to function 'desc->handler->end'
irq.c:223: error: too few arguments to function 'desc->handler->end'
irq.c: In function 'pirq_guest_eoi':
irq.c:450: error: too few arguments to function 'desc->handler->end'
irq.c: In function 'pirq_guest_unbind':
irq.c:579: error: too few arguments to function 'desc->handler->end'
This patch is a part of xen-unstable 24145:967845cb565b.
Signed-off-by: KUWAMURA Shin'ya <kuwa@jp.fujitsu.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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This addresses a number of problems in msixtbl_{read,write}():
- address alignment was not checked, allowing for memory corruption in
the hypervisor (write case) or returning of hypervisor private data
to the guest (read case)
- the interrupt mask bit was permitted to be written by the guest
(while Xen's interrupt flow control routines need to control it)
- MAX_MSIX_TABLE_{ENTRIES,PAGES} were pointlessly defined to plain
numbers (making it unobvious why they have these values, and making
the latter non-portable)
- MAX_MSIX_TABLE_PAGES was also off by one (failing to account for a
non-zero table offset); this was also affecting host MSI-X code
- struct msixtbl_entry's table_flags[] was one element larger than
necessary due to improper open-coding of BITS_TO_LONGS()
- msixtbl_read() unconditionally accessed the physical table, even
though the data was only needed in a quarter of all cases
- various calculations were done unnecessarily for both of the rather
distinct code paths in msixtbl_read()
Additionally it is unclear on what basis MAX_MSIX_ACC_ENTRIES was
chosen to be 3.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 24535:fb81b807c154
xen-unstable date: Mon Jan 23 09:35:17 2012 +0000
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shutdown
At least with xend, where there's not even a tool stack side attempt
to de-assign devices during domain shutdown, this allows immediate re-
starts of a domain to work reliably. (There's no apparent reason why
c/s 18010:c1577f094ae4 chose to put this in the asynchronous part of
domain destruction).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 24888:71159fb049f2
xen-unstable date: Fri Feb 24 11:46:32 2012 +0100
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The only cases where we might end up emulating fsincos (as any other
x87 operations without memory operands) are
- when a HVM guest is in real mode (not applicable on AMD)
- between two half page table updates in PAE mode (unlikely, and not
doing the emulation here does affect only performance, not
correctness)
- when a guest maliciously (or erroneously) modifies an (MMIO or page
table update) instruction under emulation (unspecified behavior)
Hence, in order to avoid the erratum to cause harm to the entire host,
don't emulate fsincos on the affected AMD CPU families.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 24417:1452fb248cd5
xen-unstable date: Fri Dec 16 15:45:40 2011 +0100
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Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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This patch disables GartTlbWlk errors on AMD Fam10h CPUs if the BIOS
forgets to do is (or is just too old). Letting these errors enabled
can cause a sync-flood on the CPU causing a reboot.
The AMD BKDG recommends disabling GART TLB Wlk Error completely.
Based on a Linux patch from Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>; see
e.g.
https://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git;a=patch;h=5bbc097d890409d8eff4e3f1d26f11a9d6b7c07e
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 24389:868d82faf651
xen-unstable date: Tue Dec 13 09:45:11 2011 +0100
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Fail with -ERANGE rather than silently truncating 64bit values (a
physical address and size) into 32bit integers for dom0 to consume.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Simplify the bitwise arithmetic a bit.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 24358:9961a6d5356a
xen-unstable date: Mon Dec 05 19:42:46 2011 +0000
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