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authorJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>2013-03-12 16:46:09 +0100
committerJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>2013-03-12 16:46:09 +0100
commitb56fe0b46f98afe918455bae193d543d3ffc4598 (patch)
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parent672c075ab39e2dea517a75d5e6091e6df82c3f71 (diff)
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x86/MSI: add mechanism to fully protect MSI-X table from PV guest accesses
This adds two new physdev operations for Dom0 to invoke when resource allocation for devices is known to be complete, so that the hypervisor can arrange for the respective MMIO ranges to be marked read-only before an eventual guest getting such a device assigned even gets started, such that it won't be able to set up writable mappings for these MMIO ranges before Xen has a chance to protect them. This also addresses another issue with the code being modified here, in that so far write protection for the address ranges in question got set up only once during the lifetime of a device (i.e. until either system shutdown or device hot removal), while teardown happened when the last interrupt was disposed of by the guest (which at least allowed the tables to be writable when the device got assigned to a second guest [instance] after the first terminated). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> master changeset: 4245d331e0e75de8d1bddbbb518f3a8ce6d0bb7e master date: 2013-03-08 14:05:34 +0100
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