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authorIan Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>2013-06-14 16:45:40 +0100
committerIan Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>2013-06-14 16:45:40 +0100
commit40b76f1fb04af421c1415f7bcb168dfaa6960d0d (patch)
treeea58681ba3a08de48a8fc7e42d5578002bd4de6d
parent4a3a60d8caee49af6951a672c55b08436a8d1f86 (diff)
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libxc: Add range checking to xc_dom_binloader
This is a simple binary image loader with its own metadata format. However, it is too careless with image-supplied values. Add the following checks: * That the image is bigger than the metadata table; otherwise the pointer arithmetic to calculate the metadata table location may yield undefined and dangerous values. * When clamping the end of the region to search, that we do not calculate pointers beyond the end of the image. The C specification does not permit this and compilers are becoming ever more determined to miscompile code when they can "prove" various falsehoods based on assertions from the C spec. * That the supplied image is big enough for the text we are allegedly copying from it. Otherwise we might have a read overrun and copy the results (perhaps a lot of secret data) into the guest. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-rw-r--r--tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c15
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c
index bde93f7184..8596a2804c 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c
@@ -123,10 +123,13 @@ static struct xen_bin_image_table *find_table(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
uint32_t *probe_ptr;
uint32_t *probe_end;
+ if ( dom->kernel_size < sizeof(*table) )
+ return NULL;
probe_ptr = dom->kernel_blob;
- probe_end = dom->kernel_blob + dom->kernel_size - sizeof(*table);
- if ( (void*)probe_end > (dom->kernel_blob + 8192) )
+ if ( dom->kernel_size > (8192 + sizeof(*table)) )
probe_end = dom->kernel_blob + 8192;
+ else
+ probe_end = dom->kernel_blob + dom->kernel_size - sizeof(*table);
for ( table = NULL; probe_ptr < probe_end; probe_ptr++ )
{
@@ -282,6 +285,14 @@ static int xc_dom_load_bin_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if ( image_size < skip ||
+ image_size - skip < text_size )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: image is too small for declared text size",
+ __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
memcpy(dest, image + skip, text_size);
memset(dest + text_size, 0, bss_size);