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authorJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>2013-03-12 16:46:09 +0100
committerJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>2013-03-12 16:46:09 +0100
commitb56fe0b46f98afe918455bae193d543d3ffc4598 (patch)
tree217093cedeed88a1cf5b3b40e6d8a064070f68cf
parent672c075ab39e2dea517a75d5e6091e6df82c3f71 (diff)
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x86/MSI: add mechanism to fully protect MSI-X table from PV guest accesses
This adds two new physdev operations for Dom0 to invoke when resource allocation for devices is known to be complete, so that the hypervisor can arrange for the respective MMIO ranges to be marked read-only before an eventual guest getting such a device assigned even gets started, such that it won't be able to set up writable mappings for these MMIO ranges before Xen has a chance to protect them. This also addresses another issue with the code being modified here, in that so far write protection for the address ranges in question got set up only once during the lifetime of a device (i.e. until either system shutdown or device hot removal), while teardown happened when the last interrupt was disposed of by the guest (which at least allowed the tables to be writable when the device got assigned to a second guest [instance] after the first terminated). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> master changeset: 4245d331e0e75de8d1bddbbb518f3a8ce6d0bb7e master date: 2013-03-08 14:05:34 +0100
-rw-r--r--xen/arch/x86/msi.c198
-rw-r--r--xen/arch/x86/physdev.c14
-rw-r--r--xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h1
-rw-r--r--xen/include/public/physdev.h15
-rw-r--r--xen/include/xen/pci.h1
5 files changed, 160 insertions, 69 deletions
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
index 1579dfc870..ef332fb11e 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
@@ -602,8 +602,8 @@ static u64 read_pci_mem_bar(u8 bus, u8 slot, u8 func, u8 bir, int vf)
* @entries: pointer to an array of struct msix_entry entries
* @nvec: number of @entries
*
- * Setup the MSI-X capability structure of device function with a
- * single MSI-X irq. A return of zero indicates the successful setup of
+ * Setup the MSI-X capability structure of device function with the requested
+ * number MSI-X irqs. A return of zero indicates the successful setup of
* requested MSI-X entries with allocated irqs or non-zero for otherwise.
**/
static int msix_capability_init(struct pci_dev *dev,
@@ -611,84 +611,67 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct pci_dev *dev,
struct msi_desc **desc,
unsigned int nr_entries)
{
- struct msi_desc *entry;
- int pos;
+ struct msi_desc *entry = NULL;
+ int pos, vf;
u16 control;
- u64 table_paddr, entry_paddr;
- u32 table_offset, entry_offset;
- u8 bir;
- void __iomem *base;
- int idx;
+ u64 table_paddr;
+ u32 table_offset;
+ u8 bir, pbus, pslot, pfunc;
u8 bus = dev->bus;
u8 slot = PCI_SLOT(dev->devfn);
u8 func = PCI_FUNC(dev->devfn);
ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&pcidevs_lock));
- ASSERT(desc);
pos = pci_find_cap_offset(bus, slot, func, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
control = pci_conf_read16(bus, slot, func, msix_control_reg(pos));
msix_set_enable(dev, 0);/* Ensure msix is disabled as I set it up */
- /* MSI-X Table Initialization */
- entry = alloc_msi_entry();
- if ( !entry )
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if ( desc )
+ {
+ entry = alloc_msi_entry();
+ if ( !entry )
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ ASSERT(msi);
+ }
- /* Request & Map MSI-X table region */
+ /* Locate MSI-X table region */
table_offset = pci_conf_read32(bus, slot, func, msix_table_offset_reg(pos));
bir = (u8)(table_offset & PCI_MSIX_BIRMASK);
table_offset &= ~PCI_MSIX_BIRMASK;
- entry_offset = msi->entry_nr * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE;
- table_paddr = msi->table_base + table_offset;
- entry_paddr = table_paddr + entry_offset;
- idx = msix_get_fixmap(dev, table_paddr, entry_paddr);
- if ( idx < 0 )
+ if ( !dev->info.is_virtfn )
{
- xfree(entry);
- return idx;
+ pbus = bus;
+ pslot = slot;
+ pfunc = func;
+ vf = -1;
}
- base = (void *)(fix_to_virt(idx) +
- ((unsigned long)entry_paddr & ((1UL << PAGE_SHIFT) - 1)));
-
- entry->msi_attrib.type = PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX;
- entry->msi_attrib.is_64 = 1;
- entry->msi_attrib.entry_nr = msi->entry_nr;
- entry->msi_attrib.maskbit = 1;
- entry->msi_attrib.masked = 1;
- entry->msi_attrib.pos = pos;
- entry->irq = msi->irq;
- entry->dev = dev;
- entry->mask_base = base;
-
- list_add_tail(&entry->list, &dev->msi_list);
-
- if ( !dev->msix_nr_entries )
+ else
{
- u8 pbus, pslot, pfunc;
- int vf;
- u64 pba_paddr;
- u32 pba_offset;
+ pbus = dev->info.physfn.bus;
+ pslot = PCI_SLOT(dev->info.physfn.devfn);
+ pfunc = PCI_FUNC(dev->info.physfn.devfn);
+ vf = PCI_BDF2(dev->bus, dev->devfn);
+ }
- if ( !dev->info.is_virtfn )
- {
- pbus = bus;
- pslot = slot;
- pfunc = func;
- vf = -1;
- }
- else
+ table_paddr = read_pci_mem_bar(pbus, pslot, pfunc, bir, vf);
+ WARN_ON(msi && msi->table_base != table_paddr);
+ if ( !table_paddr )
+ {
+ if ( !msi || !msi->table_base )
{
- pbus = dev->info.physfn.bus;
- pslot = PCI_SLOT(dev->info.physfn.devfn);
- pfunc = PCI_FUNC(dev->info.physfn.devfn);
- vf = PCI_BDF2(dev->bus, dev->devfn);
+ xfree(entry);
+ return -ENXIO;
}
+ table_paddr = msi->table_base;
+ }
+ table_paddr += table_offset;
- ASSERT(!dev->msix_used_entries);
- WARN_ON(msi->table_base !=
- read_pci_mem_bar(pbus, pslot, pfunc, bir, vf));
+ if ( !dev->msix_used_entries )
+ {
+ u64 pba_paddr;
+ u32 pba_offset;
dev->msix_nr_entries = nr_entries;
dev->msix_table.first = PFN_DOWN(table_paddr);
@@ -709,7 +692,42 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct pci_dev *dev,
BITS_TO_LONGS(nr_entries) - 1);
WARN_ON(rangeset_overlaps_range(mmio_ro_ranges, dev->msix_pba.first,
dev->msix_pba.last));
+ }
+
+ if ( entry )
+ {
+ /* Map MSI-X table region */
+ u64 entry_paddr = table_paddr + msi->entry_nr * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE;
+ int idx = msix_get_fixmap(dev, table_paddr, entry_paddr);
+ void __iomem *base;
+
+ if ( idx < 0 )
+ {
+ xfree(entry);
+ return idx;
+ }
+ base = (void *)(fix_to_virt(idx) +
+ ((unsigned long)entry_paddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)));
+
+ /* Mask interrupt here */
+ writel(1, base + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL_OFFSET);
+
+ entry->msi_attrib.type = PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX;
+ entry->msi_attrib.is_64 = 1;
+ entry->msi_attrib.entry_nr = msi->entry_nr;
+ entry->msi_attrib.maskbit = 1;
+ entry->msi_attrib.masked = 1;
+ entry->msi_attrib.pos = pos;
+ entry->irq = msi->irq;
+ entry->dev = dev;
+ entry->mask_base = base;
+
+ list_add_tail(&entry->list, &dev->msi_list);
+ *desc = entry;
+ }
+ if ( !dev->msix_used_entries )
+ {
if ( rangeset_add_range(mmio_ro_ranges, dev->msix_table.first,
dev->msix_table.last) )
WARN();
@@ -720,7 +738,7 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct pci_dev *dev,
if ( dev->domain )
p2m_change_entry_type_global(p2m_get_hostp2m(dev->domain),
p2m_mmio_direct, p2m_mmio_direct);
- if ( !dev->domain || !paging_mode_translate(dev->domain) )
+ if ( desc && (!dev->domain || !paging_mode_translate(dev->domain)) )
{
struct domain *d = dev->domain;
@@ -734,6 +752,13 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct pci_dev *dev,
break;
if ( d )
{
+ if ( !IS_PRIV(d) && dev->msix_warned != d->domain_id )
+ {
+ dev->msix_warned = d->domain_id;
+ printk(XENLOG_ERR
+ "Potentially insecure use of MSI-X on %02x:%02x.%u by Dom%d\n",
+ bus, slot, func, d->domain_id);
+ }
/* XXX How to deal with existing mappings? */
}
}
@@ -742,10 +767,6 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct pci_dev *dev,
WARN_ON(dev->msix_table.first != (table_paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT));
++dev->msix_used_entries;
- /* Mask interrupt here */
- writel(1, entry->mask_base + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL_OFFSET);
-
- *desc = entry;
/* Restore MSI-X enabled bits */
pci_conf_write16(bus, slot, func, msix_control_reg(pos), control);
@@ -876,6 +897,19 @@ static int __pci_enable_msix(struct msi_info *msi, struct msi_desc **desc)
return status;
}
+static void _pci_cleanup_msix(struct pci_dev *dev)
+{
+ if ( !--dev->msix_used_entries )
+ {
+ if ( rangeset_remove_range(mmio_ro_ranges, dev->msix_table.first,
+ dev->msix_table.last) )
+ WARN();
+ if ( rangeset_remove_range(mmio_ro_ranges, dev->msix_pba.first,
+ dev->msix_pba.last) )
+ WARN();
+ }
+}
+
static void __pci_disable_msix(struct msi_desc *entry)
{
struct pci_dev *dev;
@@ -898,15 +932,41 @@ static void __pci_disable_msix(struct msi_desc *entry)
pci_conf_write16(bus, slot, func, msix_control_reg(pos), control);
- if ( !--dev->msix_used_entries )
+ _pci_cleanup_msix(dev);
+}
+
+int pci_prepare_msix(u8 bus, u8 devfn, bool_t off)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct pci_dev *pdev;
+ u8 slot = PCI_SLOT(devfn), func = PCI_FUNC(devfn);
+ unsigned int pos = pci_find_cap_offset(bus, slot, func,
+ PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
+
+ if ( !pos )
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock);
+ pdev = pci_get_pdev(bus, devfn);
+ if ( !pdev )
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ else if ( pdev->msix_used_entries != !!off )
+ rc = -EBUSY;
+ else if ( off )
{
- if ( rangeset_remove_range(mmio_ro_ranges, dev->msix_table.first,
- dev->msix_table.last) )
- WARN();
- if ( rangeset_remove_range(mmio_ro_ranges, dev->msix_pba.first,
- dev->msix_pba.last) )
- WARN();
+ _pci_cleanup_msix(pdev);
+ rc = 0;
}
+ else
+ {
+ u16 control = pci_conf_read16(bus, slot, func, msix_control_reg(pos));
+
+ rc = msix_capability_init(pdev, NULL, NULL,
+ multi_msix_capable(control));
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock);
+
+ return rc;
}
/*
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c b/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
index de364f0c8d..8feb84aa67 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
@@ -548,6 +548,20 @@ ret_t do_physdev_op(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(void) arg)
break;
}
+ case PHYSDEVOP_prepare_msix:
+ case PHYSDEVOP_release_msix: {
+ struct physdev_pci_device dev;
+
+ if ( copy_from_guest(&dev, arg, 1) )
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ else if ( dev.seg )
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ else
+ ret = pci_prepare_msix(dev.bus, dev.devfn,
+ cmd != PHYSDEVOP_prepare_msix);
+ break;
+ }
+
case PHYSDEVOP_restore_msi: {
struct physdev_restore_msi restore_msi;
struct pci_dev *pdev;
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h
index dc402b9702..bd83a577fd 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ extern void unmask_msi_irq(unsigned int irq);
extern void set_msi_affinity(unsigned int vector, cpumask_t mask);
extern int pci_enable_msi(struct msi_info *msi, struct msi_desc **desc);
extern void pci_disable_msi(struct msi_desc *desc);
+extern int pci_prepare_msix(u8 bus, u8 devfn, bool_t off);
extern void pci_cleanup_msi(struct pci_dev *pdev);
extern int setup_msi_irq(struct pci_dev *dev, struct msi_desc *desc, int irq);
extern void teardown_msi_irq(int irq);
diff --git a/xen/include/public/physdev.h b/xen/include/public/physdev.h
index 6f792ee92f..d65f72b40a 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/physdev.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/physdev.h
@@ -264,6 +264,21 @@ typedef struct physdev_get_free_pirq physdev_get_free_pirq_t;
DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(physdev_get_free_pirq_t);
/*
+ * Dom0 should use these two to announce MMIO resources assigned to
+ * MSI-X capable devices won't (prepare) or may (release) change.
+ */
+#define PHYSDEVOP_prepare_msix 30
+#define PHYSDEVOP_release_msix 31
+struct physdev_pci_device {
+ /* IN */
+ uint16_t seg;
+ uint8_t bus;
+ uint8_t devfn;
+};
+typedef struct physdev_pci_device physdev_pci_device_t;
+DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(physdev_pci_device_t);
+
+/*
* Notify that some PIRQ-bound event channels have been unmasked.
* ** This command is obsolete since interface version 0x00030202 and is **
* ** unsupported by newer versions of Xen. **
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/pci.h b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
index e1b9cdd3c9..3b8067ebbe 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/pci.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ struct pci_dev {
int msix_table_refcnt[MAX_MSIX_TABLE_PAGES];
int msix_table_idx[MAX_MSIX_TABLE_PAGES];
spinlock_t msix_table_lock;
+ domid_t msix_warned;
struct domain *domain;
const u8 bus;