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* ppp: update to version 2.4.7.git-2019-05-18Hans Dedecker2019-05-186-287/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | c9d9dbf pppoe: Custom host-uniq tag 44012ae plugins/rp-pppoe: Fix compile errors Refresh patches Drop 520-uniq patch as upstream accepted Drop 150-debug_compile_fix patch as fixed upstream Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* netifd: update to latest git HEADHans Dedecker2019-05-181-3/+3
| | | | | | | 22e8e58 interface-ip: use ptp address as well to find local address target f1aa0f9 treewide: pass bool as second argument of blobmsg_check_attr Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* odhcpd: update to latest git HEAD (FS#2242)Hans Dedecker2019-05-171-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 41a74cb config: remove 'ignore' config option c0c8034 treewide: init assignment lists head f98b7ee config: use list safe iterator in lease_delete 3c9810b dhcpv4: fix lease ordering by ip address b60c384 config: use multi-stage parsing of uci sections a2dd8d6 treewide: always init interface list heads during initialization a17665e dhcpv4: do not allow pool end address to overlap with broadcast address 6b951c5 treewide: give file descriptors safe initial value 39e11ed dhcpv4: DHCP pool size is off-by-one 4a600ce dhcpv4: add support for Parameter Request List option 55 09e5eca dhcpv4: fix DHCP packet size 3cd4876 ndp: fix syslog flooding (FS#2242) 79fbba1 config: set default loglevel to LOG_WARNING Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* nftables: Fix compilation with uClibc-ngRosen Penev2019-05-152-1/+29
| | | | | | | | Missing header for va_list. Signed-off-by: Rosen Penev <rosenp@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz> [updated with upstream version of the patch]
* iperf: Update to version 2.0.13Hauke Mehrtens2019-05-144-216/+10
| | | | | | The removed patches are already integrated in the upstream version. Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
* ppp: update to version 2.4.7.git-2019-05-06Hans Dedecker2019-05-138-32/+32
| | | | | | | fcb076c Various fixes for errors found by coverity static analysis (#109) d98ab38 Merge branch 'pppd_print_changes' of https://github.com/nlhintz/ppp into nlhintz-pppd_print_changes Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* lldpd: add option to edit hostnameLucian Cristian2019-05-112-0/+5
| | | | | | | also fixes the annoying repeating syslog lldp[]: unable to get system name Signed-off-by: Lucian Cristian <lucian.cristian@gmail.com>
* lldpd: update to 1.0.3Lucian Cristian2019-05-112-11/+25
| | | | | | Support for CDP PD PoE Signed-off-by: Lucian Cristian <lucian.cristian@gmail.com>
* netifd: update to latest git HEADHans Dedecker2019-05-081-3/+3
| | | | | | | f6fb700 interface-ip: fine tune IPv6 mtu warning 975a5c4 interface: tidy ipv6 mtu warning Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* Revert "uhttpd: disable concurrent requests by default"Jo-Philipp Wich2019-04-232-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit c6aa9ff38870a30dbe6da17e4edad6039fe10ddf. Further testing has revealed that we will need to allow concurrent requests after all, especially for situations where CGI processes initiate further HTTP requests to the local host. Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* odhcpd: update to latest git HEAD (FS#2243, FS#2244)Hans Dedecker2019-04-191-3/+3
| | | | | | 6633efe router: fix dns search list option Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* dropbear: allow build without dbclientRosy Song2019-04-182-4/+9
| | | | | | This can save ~16KBytes size for the ipk Signed-off-by: Rosy Song <rosysong@rosinson.com>
* odhcpd: update to latest git HEAD (FS#2206)Hans Dedecker2019-04-171-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | 38bc630 router: use ra_lifetime as lifetime for RA options (FS#2206) 0523bdd router: improve code readibility 0a3b279 Revert "router:" 207f8e0 treewide: align syslog loglevels f1d7da9 router: 0e048ac treewide: fix compiler warnings 83698f6 CMakeList.txt: enable extra compiler checks Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* netifd: update to latest git HEADHans Dedecker2019-04-151-3/+3
| | | | | | | | 666c14f system-linux: remove debug tracing 08989e4 interface: add neighbor config support bfd4de3 interface: fix "if-down" hotplug event handling Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* umbim: update to latest git HEADPetr Štetiar2019-04-151-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | 24f9dc7 Iron out all extra compiler warnings 9d8dbc9 Enable extra compiler checks ff8d356 mbim-proxy support ccca03f umbim: add registration set support Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9497, CVE-2019-9498, CVE-2019-9499Stefan Lippers-Hollmann2019-04-115-1/+467
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | EAP-pwd missing commit validation Published: April 10, 2019 Identifiers: - CVE-2019-9497 (EAP-pwd server not checking for reflection attack) - CVE-2019-9498 (EAP-pwd server missing commit validation for scalar/element) - CVE-2019-9499 (EAP-pwd peer missing commit validation for scalar/element) Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/ Vulnerability EAP-pwd implementation in hostapd (EAP server) and wpa_supplicant (EAP peer) was discovered not to validate the received scalar and element values in EAP-pwd-Commit messages properly. This could result in attacks that would be able to complete EAP-pwd authentication exchange without the attacker having to know the used password. A reflection attack is possible against the EAP-pwd server since the hostapd EAP server did not verify that the EAP-pwd-Commit contains scalar/element values that differ from the ones the server sent out itself. This allows the attacker to complete EAP-pwd authentication without knowing the password, but this does not result in the attacker being able to derive the session key (MSK), i.e., the attacker would not be able to complete the following key exchange (e.g., 4-way handshake in RSN/WPA). An attack using invalid scalar/element values is possible against both the EAP-pwd server and peer since hostapd and wpa_supplicant did not validate these values in the received EAP-pwd-Commit messages. If the used crypto library does not implement additional checks for the element (EC point), this could result in attacks where the attacker could use a specially crafted commit message values to manipulate the exchange to result in deriving a session key value from a very small set of possible values. This could further be used to attack the EAP-pwd server in a practical manner. An attack against the EAP-pwd peer is slightly more complex, but still consider practical. These invalid scalar/element attacks could result in the attacker being able to complete authentication and learn the session key and MSK to allow the key exchange to be completed as well, i.e., the attacker gaining access to the network in case of the attack against the EAP server or the attacker being able to operate a rogue AP in case of the attack against the EAP peer. While similar attacks might be applicable against SAE, it should be noted that the SAE implementation in hostapd and wpa_supplicant does have the validation steps that were missing from the EAP-pwd implementation and as such, these attacks do not apply to the current SAE implementation. Old versions of wpa_supplicant/hostapd did not include the reflection attack check in the SAE implementation, though, since that was added in June 2015 for v2.5 (commit 6a58444d27fd 'SAE: Verify that own/peer commit-scalar and COMMIT-ELEMENT are different'). Vulnerable versions/configurations All hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support (CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled in the runtime configuration) are vulnerable against the reflection attack. All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support (CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled in the runtime configuration) are vulnerable against the invalid scalar/element attack when built against a crypto library that does not have an explicit validation step on imported EC points. The following list indicates which cases are vulnerable/not vulnerable: - OpenSSL v1.0.2 or older: vulnerable - OpenSSL v1.1.0 or newer: not vulnerable - BoringSSL with commit 38feb990a183 ('Require that EC points are on the curve.') from September 2015: not vulnerable - BoringSSL without commit 38feb990a183: vulnerable - LibreSSL: vulnerable - wolfssl: vulnerable Acknowledgments Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi) for discovering and reporting the issues and for proposing changes to address them in the implementation. Possible mitigation steps - Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild: CVE-2019-9497: EAP-pwd server: Detect reflection attacks CVE-2019-9498: EAP-pwd server: Verify received scalar and element EAP-pwd: Check element x,y coordinates explicitly CVE-2019-9499: EAP-pwd client: Verify received scalar and element EAP-pwd: Check element x,y coordinates explicitly These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/ - Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> [bump PKG_RELEASE] Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9496Stefan Lippers-Hollmann2019-04-112-1/+53
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | hostapd: fix SAE confirm missing state validation Published: April 10, 2019 Identifiers: - CVE-2019-9496 (SAE confirm missing state validation in hostapd/AP) Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-3/ Vulnerability When hostapd is used to operate an access point with SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals; also known as WPA3-Personal), an invalid authentication sequence could result in the hostapd process terminating due to a NULL pointer dereference when processing SAE confirm message. This was caused by missing state validation steps when processing the SAE confirm message in hostapd/AP mode. Similar cases against the wpa_supplicant SAE station implementation had already been tested by the hwsim test cases, but those sequences did not trigger this specific code path in AP mode which is why the issue was not discovered earlier. An attacker in radio range of an access point using hostapd in SAE configuration could use this issue to perform a denial of service attack by forcing the hostapd process to terminate. Vulnerable versions/configurations All hostapd versions with SAE support (CONFIG_SAE=y in the build configuration and SAE being enabled in the runtime configuration). Possible mitigation steps - Merge the following commit to hostapd and rebuild: SAE: Fix confirm message validation in error cases These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-3/ - Update to hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> [bump PKG_RELEASE] Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9495Stefan Lippers-Hollmann2019-04-112-1/+320
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | EAP-pwd side-channel attack Published: April 10, 2019 Identifiers: - CVE-2019-9495 (cache attack against EAP-pwd) Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/ Vulnerability Number of potential side channel attacks were recently discovered in the SAE implementations used by both hostapd and wpa_supplicant (see security advisory 2019-1 and VU#871675). EAP-pwd uses a similar design for deriving PWE from the password and while a specific attack against EAP-pwd is not yet known to be tested, there is no reason to believe that the EAP-pwd implementation would be immune against the type of cache attack that was identified for the SAE implementation. Since the EAP-pwd implementation in hostapd (EAP server) and wpa_supplicant (EAP peer) does not support MODP groups, the timing attack described against SAE is not applicable for the EAP-pwd implementation. A novel cache-based attack against SAE handshake would likely be applicable against the EAP-pwd implementation. Even though the wpa_supplicant/hostapd PWE derivation iteration for EAP-pwd has protections against timing attacks, this new cache-based attack might enable an attacker to determine which code branch is taken in the iteration if the attacker is able to run unprivileged code on the victim machine (e.g., an app installed on a smart phone or potentially a JavaScript code on a web site loaded by a web browser). This depends on the used CPU not providing sufficient protection to prevent unprivileged applications from observing memory access patterns through the shared cache (which is the most likely case with today's designs). The attacker could use information about the selected branch to learn information about the password and combine this information from number of handshake instances with an offline dictionary attack. With sufficient number of handshakes and sufficiently weak password, this might result in full recovery of the used password if that password is not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks. This attack requires the attacker to be able to run a program on the target device. This is not commonly the case on an authentication server (EAP server), so the most likely target for this would be a client device using EAP-pwd. The commits listed in the end of this advisory change the EAP-pwd implementation shared by hostapd and wpa_supplicant to perform the PWE derivation loop using operations that use constant time and memory access pattern to minimize the externally observable differences from operations that depend on the password even for the case where the attacker might be able to run unprivileged code on the same device. Vulnerable versions/configurations All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support (CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled in the runtime configuration). It should also be noted that older versions of wpa_supplicant/hostapd prior to v2.7 did not include additional protection against certain timing differences. The definition of the EAP-pwd (RFC 5931) does not describe such protection, but the same issue that was addressed in SAE earlier can be applicable against EAP-pwd as well and as such, that implementation specific extra protection (commit 22ac3dfebf7b, "EAP-pwd: Mask timing of PWE derivation") is needed to avoid showing externally visible timing differences that could leak information about the password. Any uses of older wpa_supplicant/hostapd versions with EAP-pwd are recommended to update to v2.7 or newer in addition to the mitigation steps listed below for the more recently discovered issue. Possible mitigation steps - Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild: OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums Add helper functions for constant time operations OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for crypto_bignum_legendre() EAP-pwd: Use constant time and memory access for finding the PWE These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/ - Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available - Use strong passwords to prevent dictionary attacks Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> [bump PKG_RELEASE] Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9494Stefan Lippers-Hollmann2019-04-119-1/+1083
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SAE side-channel attacks Published: April 10, 2019 Identifiers: - VU#871675 - CVE-2019-9494 (cache attack against SAE) Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/ Vulnerability Number of potential side channel attacks were discovered in the SAE implementations used by both hostapd (AP) and wpa_supplicant (infrastructure BSS station/mesh station). SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals) is also known as WPA3-Personal. The discovered side channel attacks may be able to leak information about the used password based on observable timing differences and cache access patterns. This might result in full password recovery when combined with an offline dictionary attack and if the password is not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks. Cache attack A novel cache-based attack against SAE handshake was discovered. This attack targets SAE with ECC groups. ECC group 19 being the mandatory group to support and the most likely used group for SAE today, so this attack applies to the most common SAE use case. Even though the PWE derivation iteration in SAE has protections against timing attacks, this new cache-based attack enables an attacker to determine which code branch is taken in the iteration if the attacker is able to run unprivileged code on the victim machine (e.g., an app installed on a smart phone or potentially a JavaScript code on a web site loaded by a web browser). This depends on the used CPU not providing sufficient protection to prevent unprivileged applications from observing memory access patterns through the shared cache (which is the most likely case with today's designs). The attacker can use information about the selected branch to learn information about the password and combine this information from number of handshake instances with an offline dictionary attack. With sufficient number of handshakes and sufficiently weak password, this might result in full discovery of the used password. This attack requires the attacker to be able to run a program on the target device. This is not commonly the case on access points, so the most likely target for this would be a client device using SAE in an infrastructure BSS or mesh BSS. The commits listed in the end of this advisory change the SAE implementation shared by hostapd and wpa_supplicant to perform the PWE derivation loop using operations that use constant time and memory access pattern to minimize the externally observable differences from operations that depend on the password even for the case where the attacker might be able to run unprivileged code on the same device. Timing attack The timing attack applies to the MODP groups 22, 23, and 24 where the PWE generation algorithm defined for SAE can have sufficient timing differences for an attacker to be able to determine how many rounds were needed to find the PWE based on the used password and MAC addresses. When the attack is repeated with multiple times, the attacker may be able to gather enough information about the password to be able to recover it fully using an offline dictionary attack if the password is not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks. This attack could be performed by an attacker in radio range of an access point or a station enabling the specific MODP groups. This timing attack requires the applicable MODP groups to be enabled explicitly in hostapd/wpa_supplicant configuration (sae_groups parameter). All versions of hostapd/wpa_supplicant have disabled these groups by default. While this security advisory lists couple of commits introducing additional protection for MODP groups in SAE, it should be noted that the groups 22, 23, and 24 are not considered strong enough to meet the current expectation for a secure system. As such, their use is discouraged even if the additional protection mechanisms in the implementation are included. Vulnerable versions/configurations All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with SAE support (CONFIG_SAE=y in the build configuration and SAE being enabled in the runtime configuration). Acknowledgments Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi) and Eyal Ronen (Tel Aviv University) for discovering the issues and for discussions on how to address them. Possible mitigation steps - Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild: OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums Add helper functions for constant time operations OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for crypto_bignum_legendre() SAE: Minimize timing differences in PWE derivation SAE: Avoid branches in is_quadratic_residue_blind() SAE: Mask timing of MODP groups 22, 23, 24 SAE: Use const_time selection for PWE in FFC SAE: Use constant time operations in sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc() These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/ - Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available - In addition to either of the above alternatives, disable MODP groups 1, 2, 5, 22, 23, and 24 by removing them from hostapd/wpa_supplicant sae_groups runtime configuration parameter, if they were explicitly enabled since those groups are not considered strong enough to meet current security expectations. The groups 22, 23, and 24 are related to the discovered side channel (timing) attack. The other groups in the list are consider too weak to provide sufficient security. Note that all these groups have been disabled by default in all hostapd/wpa_supplicant versions and these would be used only if explicitly enabled in the configuration. - Use strong passwords to prevent dictionary attacks Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> [bump PKG_RELEASE] Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* wireguard: remove obvious commentsFlorian Eckert2019-04-091-9/+0
| | | | | | Remove obvious comments to save disk space. Signed-off-by: Florian Eckert <fe@dev.tdt.de>
* wireguard: converted whitespaces from space to tabFlorian Eckert2019-04-091-176/+169
| | | | | | | | | With this change, the file is reduced from 5186 bytes to 4649 bytes that its approximately 10.5 percent less memory consumption. For small devices, sometimes every byte counts. Also, all other protocol handler use tabs instead of spaces. Signed-off-by: Florian Eckert <fe@dev.tdt.de>
* ethtool: bump to 5.0Hans Dedecker2019-04-091-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 170d821 Release version 5.0. 909f8c0 Revert "ethtool: change to new sane powerpc64 kernel headers" a484274 ethtool: dsa: mv88e6xxx: add pretty dump for others 034a17b ethtool: dsa: mv88e6xxx: add pretty dump for 88E6390 7f1cc44 ethtool: dsa: mv88e6xxx: add pretty dump for 88E6352 a13a053 ethtool: dsa: mv88e6xxx: add pretty dump for 88E6161 4e98029 ethtool: dsa: mv88e6xxx: add pretty dump for 88E6185 ff99e46 ethtool: dsa: mv88e6xxx: add pretty dump cb8e980 ethtool: dsa: add pretty dump 4df55c8 ethtool: change to new sane powerpc64 kernel headers 0cb963e ethtool: zero initialize coalesce struct 8f05538 ethtool: don't report UFO on kernels v4.14 and above Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* dropbear: bump to 2019.78Hans Dedecker2019-04-072-48/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Fix dbclient regression in 2019.77. After exiting the terminal would be left in a bad state. Reported by Ryan Woodsmall drop patch applied upstream: 010-tty-modes-werent-reset-for-client.patch Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* wpan-tools: clean up MakefileMichael Heimpold2019-04-061-4/+0
| | | | | | When we only call the default, we do not need to define it explicitly. Signed-off-by: Michael Heimpold <mhei@heimpold.de>
* wireguard: bump to 0.0.20190406Jason A. Donenfeld2019-04-061-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * allowedips: initialize list head when removing intermediate nodes Fix for an important regression in removing allowed IPs from the last snapshot. We have new test cases to catch these in the future as well. * tools: warn if an AllowedIP has a nonzero host part If you try to run `wg set wg0 peer ... allowed-ips 192.168.1.82/24`, wg(8) will now print a warning. Even though we mask this automatically down to 192.168.1.0/24, usually when people specify it like this, it's a mistake. * wg-quick: add 'strip' subcommand The new strip subcommand prints the config file to stdout after stripping it of all wg-quick-specific options. This enables tricks such as: `wg addconf $DEV <(wg-quick strip $DEV)`. * tools: avoid unneccessary next_peer assignments in sort_peers() Small C optimization the compiler was probably already doing. * peerlookup: rename from hashtables * allowedips: do not use __always_inline * device: use skb accessor functions where possible Suggested tweaks from Dave Miller. * blake2s: simplify * blake2s: remove outlen parameter from final The blake2s implementation has been simplified, since we don't use any of the fancy tree hashing parameters or the like. We also no longer separate the output length at initialization time from the output length at finalization time. * global: the _bh variety of rcu helpers have been unified * compat: nf_nat_core.h was removed upstream * compat: backport skb_mark_not_on_list The usual assortment of compat fixes for Linux 5.1. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
* curl: Update to 7.64.1Daniel Engberg2019-04-062-13/+2
| | | | | | | Update curl to 7.64.1 Remove deprecated patch Signed-off-by: Daniel Engberg <daniel.engberg.lists@pyret.net>
* odhcpd: update to latest git HEADHans Dedecker2019-04-051-3/+3
| | | | | | | | 65a9519 ndp: create ICMPv6 socket per interface c6dae8e router: create ICMPv6 socket per interface e7b1d4b treewide: initialize properly file descriptors Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* openvpn: openssl: explicitly depend on deprecated APIsMagnus Kroken2019-04-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | OpenVPN as of 2.4.7 uses some OpenSSL APIs that are deprecated in OpenSSL >= 1.1.0. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com> [white space fix]
* netifd: update to latest git HEADHans Dedecker2019-04-011-3/+3
| | | | | | | 361b3e4 proto-shell: return error in case setup fails a97297d interface: set interface in TEARDOWN state when checking link state Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* openvpn: update to 2.4.7Magnus Kroken2019-04-013-5/+5
| | | | Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com>
* odhcpd: update to latest git HEADHans Dedecker2019-03-291-3/+3
| | | | | | | 7798d50 netlink: rework IPv4 address refresh logic 0b20876 netlink: rework IPv6 address refresh logic Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* iwinfo: Fix 802.11ad channel to frequencyDaniel Golle2019-03-281-3/+3
| | | | | | | c2cfe9d iwinfo: Fix 802.11ad channel to frequency Fixes 9725aa271a ("iwinfo: update to latest git HEAD") Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
* wireguard: introduce 'nohostroute' optionDaniel Golle2019-03-271-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Instead of creating host-routes depending on fwmark as (accidentally) pushed by commit 1e8bb50b93 ("wireguard: do not add host-dependencies if fwmark is set") use a new config option 'nohostroute' to explicitely prevent creation of the route to the endpoint. Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
* wireguard: do not add host-dependencies if fwmark is setDaniel Golle2019-03-271-6/+8
| | | | | | | | | | The 'fwmark' option is used to define routing traffic to wireguard endpoints to go through specific routing tables. In that case it doesn't make sense to setup routes for host-dependencies in the 'main' table, so skip setting host dependencies if 'fwmark' is set. Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
* odhcpd: update to latest git HEAD (FS#2204)Hans Dedecker2019-03-271-3/+3
| | | | | | 420945c netlink: fix IPv6 address updates (FS#2204) Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* dropbear: split ECC support to basic and fullKonstantin Demin2019-03-252-8/+31
| | | | | | | | | | - limit ECC support to ec*-sha2-nistp256: * DROPBEAR_ECC now provides only basic support for ECC - provide full ECC support as an option: * DROPBEAR_ECC_FULL brings back support for ec{dh,dsa}-sha2-nistp{384,521} - update feature costs in binary size Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
* dropbear: rewrite init script startup logic to handle both host key filesKonstantin Demin2019-03-251-24/+38
| | | | Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
* dropbear: change type of config option "Port" to scalar type "port"Konstantin Demin2019-03-251-1/+1
| | | | | | it was never used anywhere, even LuCI works with "Port" as scalar type. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
* dropbear: introduce config option "keyfile" (replacement for "rsakeyfile")Konstantin Demin2019-03-251-1/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | | * option "keyfile" is more generic than "rsakeyfile". * option "rsakeyfile" is considered to be deprecated and should be removed in future releases. * warn user (in syslog) if option "rsakeyfile" is used * better check options ("rsakeyfile" and "keyfile"): don't append "-r keyfile" to command line if file is absent (doesn't exist or empty), warn user (in syslog) about such files Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
* dropbear: add initial support for ECC host keyKonstantin Demin2019-03-251-0/+2
| | | | Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
* dropbear: fix regression where TTY modes weren't reset for clientKonstantin Demin2019-03-251-0/+46
| | | | | | cherry-pick upstream commit 7bc6280613f5ab4ee86c14c779739070e5784dfe Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
* dropbear: honour CFLAGS while building bundled libtomcrypt/libtommathKonstantin Demin2019-03-251-0/+48
| | | | | | | | Felix Fietkau pointed out that bundled libtomcrypt/libtommath do funny stuff with CFLAGS. fix this with checking environment variable OPENWRT_BUILD in both libs. change in dropbear binary size is drastical: 221621 -> 164277. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
* dropbear: fix hardening flags during configureKonstantin Demin2019-03-251-0/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | compiler complains about messed up CFLAGS in build log: <command-line>: warning: "_FORTIFY_SOURCE" redefined <command-line>: note: this is the location of the previous definition and then linker fails: mips-openwrt-linux-musl-gcc [...] -o dropbearmulti [...] collect2: fatal error: ld terminated with signal 11 [Segmentation fault] compilation terminated. /staging_dir/toolchain-mips_24kc_gcc-8.2.0_musl/mips-openwrt-linux-musl/bin/ld: /tmp/cc27zORz.ltrans0.ltrans.o: relocation R_MIPS_HI16 against `cipher_descriptor' can not be used when making a shared object; recompile with -fPIC /staging_dir/toolchain-mips_24kc_gcc-8.2.0_musl/mips-openwrt-linux-musl/bin/ld: /tmp/cc27zORz.ltrans1.ltrans.o: relocation R_MIPS_HI16 against `ses' can not be used when making a shared object; recompile with -fPIC /staging_dir/toolchain-mips_24kc_gcc-8.2.0_musl/mips-openwrt-linux-musl/bin/ld: /tmp/cc27zORz.ltrans2.ltrans.o: relocation R_MIPS_HI16 against `cipher_descriptor' can not be used when making a shared object; recompile with -fPIC /staging_dir/toolchain-mips_24kc_gcc-8.2.0_musl/mips-openwrt-linux-musl/bin/ld: BFD (GNU Binutils) 2.31.1 assertion fail elfxx-mips.c:6550 [...] /staging_dir/toolchain-mips_24kc_gcc-8.2.0_musl/mips-openwrt-linux-musl/bin/ld: BFD (GNU Binutils) 2.31.1 assertion fail elfxx-mips.c:6550 make[3]: *** [Makefile:198: dropbearmulti] Error 1 make[3]: *** Deleting file 'dropbearmulti' make[3]: Leaving directory '/build_dir/target-mips_24kc_musl/dropbear-2018.76' make[2]: *** [Makefile:158: /build_dir/target-mips_24kc_musl/dropbear-2018.76/.built] Error 2 make[2]: Leaving directory '/package/network/services/dropbear' This FTBFS issue was caused by hardening flags set up by dropbear's configure script. By default, Dropbear offers hardening via CFLAGS and LDFLAGS, but this may break or confuse OpenWrt settings. Remove most Dropbear's hardening settings in favour of precise build, but preserve Spectre v2 mitigations: * -mfunction-return=thunk * -mindirect-branch=thunk Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
* dropbear: bump to 2019.77Konstantin Demin2019-03-2512-517/+52
| | | | | | | | | | | | | - drop patches applied upstream: * 010-runtime-maxauthtries.patch * 020-Wait-to-fail-invalid-usernames.patch * 150-dbconvert_standalone.patch * 610-skip-default-keys-in-custom-runs.patch - refresh patches - move OpenWrt configuration from patch to Build/Configure recipe, thus drop patch 120-openwrt_options.patch Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
* netifd: update to latest git HEADHauke Mehrtens2019-03-211-3/+3
| | | | | | | a8cf037 netifd: wireless: Add support for GCMP cipher 34a70b6 netifd: wireless: Add support for 802.11ad Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
* iwinfo: update to latest git HEADHauke Mehrtens2019-03-211-3/+3
| | | | | | | ce1814b iwinfo: Add device ID for Wilocity Wil6210 a8e8275 iwinfo: Add support for 802.11ad Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
* odhcpd: update to latest git HEAD (FS#2160)Hans Dedecker2019-03-211-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | 6d23385 dhcpv6: extra syslog tracing b076916 dhcpv6/router: add support for mutiple master interfaces e4a24dc ndp: fix adding proxy neighbor entries 4ca7f7e router: add extra syslog tracing 8318e93 netlink: fix neighbor event handling (FS#2160) Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* iproute2: update to 5.0.0Deng Qingfang2019-03-207-50/+19
| | | | | | | | | Update iproute2 to 5.0.0 Remove upstream patch 001-tc-fix-undefined-XATTR_SIZE_MAX Alter patch 170-ip_tiny as support for IPX and DECnet is dropped Update patch 010-cake-fwmark to match upstream commit Signed-off-by: Deng Qingfang <dengqf6@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>
* iproute2: add cake fwmark supportRyan Mounce2019-03-202-1/+156
| | | | Signed-off-by: Ryan Mounce <ryan@mounce.com.au>
* ipset: size optimizationsDeng Qingfang2019-03-171-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | ipset utility was linked statically to libipset. Disable static library for dynamic linking to save space. Add -Wl,--gc-sections,--as-needed for further reduction MIPS ipk size: ipset: 29KiB -> 2KiB libipset: 39KiB -> 38KiB Signed-off-by: Deng Qingfang <dengqf6@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-12-29 02:43:15 +0000