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* hostapd: ubus: make (B)SSID optional for neighbor reportDavid Bauer2020-09-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | Make the BSSID and SSID fields optional when configuring a neighbor report into hostapd. Both options can now be an empty string. For the BSSID, the first 6 byte are copied from the neighbor report. For the SSID, the SSID for the affected hostapd BSS is used. Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
* hostapd: ubus: send notification instead of eventDavid Bauer2020-09-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | Rafal Milecki pointed out that ubus events are meant for low-level ubus events only (e.g. addition or removal of an object). Higher level events should happen as notifications on the ubus object itself. Dispatch BSS events on the main hostapd ubus object instead of publishing them as ubus events. Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
* hostapd: ubus: fix infinite loop when configuring RRM NRDavid Bauer2020-09-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | The return-code was set, however it was never returned, nor was the loop interrupted. Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
* hostapd: send procd event on BSS updateDavid Bauer2020-09-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | Dispatch ubus events also to procd in order to trigger service reloads on hostapd updates. Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
* hostapd: send ubus event on BSS updateDavid Bauer2020-09-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | hostapd will emit a ubus event with the eventname hostapd.<ifname>.<event> when adding, removing or reloading a BSS. This way, services which install state (for example the RMM neighbor list) can on-demand reinstall this information for the BSS without polling this state. Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
* hostapd: add support for per-BSS airtime configurationDavid Bauer2020-09-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for per-BSS airtime weight configuration. This allows to set a airtime weight per BSS as well as a ratio limit based on the weight. Support for this feature is only enabled in the full flavors of hostapd. Consult the hostapd.conf documentation (Airtime policy configuration) for more information on the inner workings of the exposed settings. Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
* hostapd: add UCI support for Hotspot 2.0Daniel Golle2020-09-081-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
* hostapd: add hs20 variantDaniel Golle2020-09-011-1/+21
| | | | | | Add hostapd variant compiled with support for Hotspot 2.0 AP features. Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
* hostapd: recognize option "key" as alias for "auth_secret"Jo-Philipp Wich2020-08-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The hostapd configuration logic is supposed to accept "option key" as legacy alias for "option auth_secret". This particular fallback option failed to work though because "key" was not a registered configuration variable. Fix this issue by registering the "key" option as well, similar to the existing "server" nad "port" options. Ref: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/3282 Suggested-by: Michael Jones <mike@meshplusplus.com> Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* hostapd: add wpad-basic-wolfssl variantPetr Štetiar2020-08-071-0/+13
| | | | | | | | | Add package which provides size optimized wpad with support for just WPA-PSK, SAE (WPA3-Personal), 802.11r and 802.11w. Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz> [adapt to recent changes, add dependency for WPA_WOLFSSL config] Signed-off-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de>
* hostapd: reorganize config selection hierarchy for WPA3Adrian Schmutzler2020-07-311-16/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The current selection of DRIVER_MAKEOPTS and TARGET_LDFLAGS is exceptionally hard to read. This tries to make things a little easier by inverting the hierarchy of the conditions, so SSL_VARIANT is checked first and LOCAL_VARIANT is checked second. This exploits the fact that some of the previous conditions were unnecessary, e.g. there is no hostapd-mesh*, so we don't need to exclude this combination. It also should make it a little easier to see which options are actually switched by SSL_VARIANT and which by LOCAL_VARIANT. The patch is supposed to be cosmetic. Signed-off-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de>
* hostapd: improve TITLE for packagesAdrian Schmutzler2020-07-301-27/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | For a few packages, the current TITLE is too long, so it is not displayed at all when running make menuconfig. Despite, there is no indication of OpenSSL vs. wolfSSL in the titles. Thus, this patch adjusts titles to be generally shorter, and adds the SSL variant to it. While at it, make things easier by creating a shared definition for eapol-test like it's done already for all the other flavors. Signed-off-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de>
* hostapd: update mesh DFS patches and add mesh HE supportDaniel Golle2020-07-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Drop outdated and by now broken patchset originally supplied by Peter Oh in August 2018 but never merged upstream. Instead add the more promissing rework recently submitted by Markus Theil who picked up Peter's patchset, fixed and completed it and added support for HE (802.11ax) in mesh mode. This is only compile tested and needs some real-life testing. Fixes: FS#3214 Fixes: 167028b750 ("hostapd: Update to version 2.9 (2019-08-08)") Fixes: 0a3ec87a66 ("hostapd: update to latest Git hostap_2_9-1238-gdd2daf0848ed") Fixes: 017320ead3 ("hostapd: bring back mesh patches") Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
* hostapd: add config symbol for allowing drivers to enable 802.11ax supportFelix Fietkau2020-06-101-0/+6
| | | | | | Also expose a build feature for it Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
* hostapd: update to latest Git hostap_2_9-1331-g5a8b366233f5Petr Štetiar2020-06-091-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Bump to latest Git and refresh all patches in order to get fix for "UPnP SUBSCRIBE misbehavior in hostapd WPS AP" (CVE-2020-12695). General security vulnerability in the way the callback URLs in the UPnP SUBSCRIBE command are used were reported (VU#339275, CVE-2020-12695). Some of the described issues may be applicable to the use of UPnP in WPS AP mode functionality for supporting external registrars. Ref: https://w1.fi/security/2020-1/ Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* hostapd: bring back mesh patchesDaniel Golle2020-05-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Bring back 802.11s mesh features to the level previously available before the recent hostapd version bump. This is mostly to support use of 802.11s on DFS channels, but also making mesh forwarding configurable which is crucial for use of 802.11s MAC with other routing protocols, such as batman-adv, on top. While at it, fix new compiler warning by adapting 700-wifi-reload.patch to upstream changes, now building without any warnings again. Fixes: 0a3ec87a66 ("hostapd: update to latest Git hostap_2_9-1238-gdd2daf0848ed") Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
* hostapd: disable support for Wired Equivalent Privacy by defaultPetr Štetiar2020-05-211-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Upstream in commit 200c7693c9a1 ("Make WEP functionality an optional build parameter") has made WEP functionality an optional build parameter disabled as default, because WEP should not be used for anything anymore. As a step towards removing it completely, they moved all WEP related functionality behind CONFIG_WEP blocks and disabled it by default. This functionality is subject to be completely removed in a future release. So follow this good security advice, deprecation notice and disable WEP by default, but still allow custom builds with WEP support via CONFIG_WPA_ENABLE_WEP config option till upstream removes support for WEP completely. Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* hostapd: update to latest Git hostap_2_9-1238-gdd2daf0848edPetr Štetiar2020-05-211-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Bump package to latest upstream Git HEAD which is commit dd2daf0848ed ("HE: Process HE 6 GHz band capab from associating HE STA"). Since last update there was 1238 commits done in the upstream tree with 618 files changed, 53399 insertions, 24928 deletions. I didn't bothered to rebase mesh patches as the changes seems not trivial and I don't have enough knowledge of those parts to do/test that properly, so someone else has to forward port them, ideally upstream them so we don't need to bother anymore. I've just deleted them for now: 004-mesh-use-setup-completion-callback-to-complete-mesh-.patch 005-mesh-update-ssid-frequency-as-pri-sec-channel-switch.patch 006-mesh-inform-kernel-driver-DFS-handler-in-userspace.patch 007-mesh-apply-channel-attributes-before-running-Mesh.patch 011-mesh-Allow-DFS-channels-to-be-selected-if-dfs-is-ena.patch 013-mesh-do-not-allow-pri-sec-channel-switch.patch 015-mesh-do-not-use-offchan-mgmt-tx-on-DFS.patch 016-mesh-fix-channel-switch-error-during-CAC.patch 018-mesh-make-forwarding-configurable.patch Refreshed all other patches, removed upstreamed patches: 051-wpa_supplicant-fix-race-condition-in-mesh-mpm-new-pe.patch 067-0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch 070-driver_nl80211-fix-WMM-queue-mapping-for-regulatory-.patch 071-driver_nl80211-fix-regulatory-limits-for-wmm-cwmin-c.patch 090-wolfssl-fix-crypto_bignum_sum.patch 091-0001-wolfssl-Fix-compiler-warnings-on-size_t-printf-forma.patch 091-0002-wolfssl-Fix-crypto_bignum_rand-implementation.patch 091-0003-wolfssl-Do-not-hardcode-include-directory-in-wpa_sup.patch 800-usleep.patch Tested-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> [ipq8065/NBG6817; ipq40xx/MAP-AC2200] Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* hostapd: backport wolfssl bignum fixesDaniel Golle2020-05-161-1/+1
| | | | | | | | crypto_bignum_rand() use needless time-consuming filtering which resulted in SAE no longer connecting within time limits. Import fixes from hostap upstream to fix that. Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
* hostapd: reduce to a single instance per serviceDaniel Golle2020-04-141-2/+2
| | | | Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
* hostapd: backport usleep patchRosen Penev2020-04-131-1/+1
| | | | | | Optionally fixes compilation with uClibc-ng. Signed-off-by: Rosen Penev <rosenp@gmail.com>
* hostapd: Move hostapd variants to WirelessAPD menuKevin Darbyshire-Bryant2020-04-051-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | It seemed very confusing when trying to select the different variants of hostapd which are somewhat scattered about under the menu 'Network'. Moving all hostapd variants under a common submenu helps avoid confusion. Inspired-by: Kevin Mahoney <kevin.mahoney@zenotec.net> [Fixup badly formatted patch, change menu name] Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ldir@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
* hostapd: fix segfault in wpa_supplicant ubusDaniel Golle2020-03-181-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | When introducing ubus reload support, ubus initialization was moved to the service level instead of being carried out when adding a BSS configuration. While this works when using wpa_supplicant in that way, it breaks the ability to run wpa_supplicant on the command line, eg. for debugging purposes. Fix that by re-introducing ubus context intialization when adding configuration. Reported-by: @PolynomialDivision https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/2417 Fixes: 60fb4c92b6 ("hostapd: add ubus reload") Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
* hostapd: start hostapd/wpa_supplicant for all wiphy devicesPiotr Dymacz2020-02-241-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | c888e17e06 ("hostapd: manage instances via procd instead of pidfile") added procd support for managing hostapd and wpa_supplicant daemons but at the same time limited wiphy names to 'phy*'. This brings back initial behaviour (introduced in 60fb4c92b6 ("hostapd: add ubus reload") and makes procd manage daemons for any wiphy device found in '/sys/class/ieee80211'. CC: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> CC: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org> Signed-off-by: Piotr Dymacz <pepe2k@gmail.com>
* hostapd: remove erroneous $(space) redefinitionJo-Philipp Wich2020-02-081-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The $(space) definition in the hostapd Makefile ceased to work with GNU Make 4.3 and later, leading to syntax errors in the generated Kconfig files. Drop the superfluous redefinition and reuse the working $(space) declaration from rules.mk to fix this issue. Fixes: GH#2713 Ref: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/2713#issuecomment-583722469 Reported-by: Karel Kočí <cynerd@email.cz> Suggested-by: Jonas Gorski <jonas.gorski@gmail.com> Tested-by: Shaleen Jain <shaleen@jain.sh> Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* hostapd: add support for system cert bundle validationDavid Lam2020-01-161-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, it is very cumbersome for a user to connect to a WPA-Enterprise based network securely because the RADIUS server's CA certificate must first be extracted from the EAPOL handshake using tcpdump or other methods before it can be pinned using the ca_cert(2) fields. To make this process easier and more secure (combined with changes in openwrt/openwrt#2654), this commit adds support for validating against the built-in CA bundle when the ca-bundle package is installed. Related LuCI changes in openwrt/luci#3513. Signed-off-by: David Lam <david@thedavid.net> [bump PKG_RELEASE] Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* hostapd: cleanup IBSS-RSNDaniel Golle2020-01-161-1/+1
| | | | | | set noscan also for IBSS and remove redundant/obsolete variable. Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
* hostapd: add dtim_period, local_pwr_constraint, spectrum_mgmt_requiredKyle Copperfield2020-01-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The sender domain has a DMARC Reject/Quarantine policy which disallows sending mailing list messages using the original "From" header. To mitigate this problem, the original message has been wrapped automatically by the mailing list software. Allows dtim_period to be configurable, the default is from hostapd. Adds additional regulatory tunables for power constraint and spectrum managment. Signed-off-by: Kyle Copperfield <kmcopper@danwin1210.me>
* hostapd: add support for subject validationDavid Lam2020-01-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The wpa_supplicant supports certificate subject validation via the subject match(2) and altsubject_match(2) fields. domain_match(2) and domain_suffix_match(2) fields are also supported for advanced matches. This validation is especially important when connecting to access points that use PAP as the Phase 2 authentication type. Without proper validation, the user's password can be transmitted to a rogue access point in plaintext without the user's knowledge. Most organizations already require these attributes to be included to ensure that the connection from the STA and the AP is secure. Includes LuCI changes via openwrt/luci#3444. From the documentation: subject_match - Constraint for server certificate subject. This substring is matched against the subject of the authentication server certificate. If this string is set, the server sertificate is only accepted if it contains this string in the subject. The subject string is in following format: /C=US/ST=CA/L=San Francisco/CN=Test AS/emailAddress=as .example.com subject_match2 - Constraint for server certificate subject. This field is like subject_match, but used for phase 2 (inside EAP-TTLS/PEAP/FAST tunnel) authentication. altsubject_match - Constraint for server certificate alt. subject. Semicolon separated string of entries to be matched against the alternative subject name of the authentication server certificate. If this string is set, the server sertificate is only accepted if it contains one of the entries in an alternative subject name extension. altSubjectName string is in following format: TYPE:VALUE Example: EMAIL:server@example.com Example: DNS:server.example.com;DNS:server2.example.com Following types are supported: EMAIL, DNS, URI altsubject_match2 - Constraint for server certificate alt. subject. This field is like altsubject_match, but used for phase 2 (inside EAP-TTLS/PEAP/FAST tunnel) authentication. domain_match - Constraint for server domain name. If set, this FQDN is used as a full match requirement for the server certificate in SubjectAltName dNSName element(s). If a matching dNSName is found, this constraint is met. If no dNSName values are present, this constraint is matched against SubjectName CN using same full match comparison. This behavior is similar to domain_suffix_match, but has the requirement of a full match, i.e., no subdomains or wildcard matches are allowed. Case-insensitive comparison is used, so "Example.com" matches "example.com", but would not match "test.Example.com". More than one match string can be provided by using semicolons to separate the strings (e.g., example.org;example.com). When multiple strings are specified, a match with any one of the values is considered a sufficient match for the certificate, i.e., the conditions are ORed together. domain_match2 - Constraint for server domain name. This field is like domain_match, but used for phase 2 (inside EAP-TTLS/PEAP/FAST tunnel) authentication. domain_suffix_match - Constraint for server domain name. If set, this FQDN is used as a suffix match requirement for the AAA server certificate in SubjectAltName dNSName element(s). If a matching dNSName is found, this constraint is met. If no dNSName values are present, this constraint is matched against SubjectName CN using same suffix match comparison. Suffix match here means that the host/domain name is compared one label at a time starting from the top-level domain and all the labels in domain_suffix_match shall be included in the certificate. The certificate may include additional sub-level labels in addition to the required labels. More than one match string can be provided by using semicolons to separate the strings (e.g., example.org;example.com). When multiple strings are specified, a match with any one of the values is considered a sufficient match for the certificate, i.e., the conditions are ORed together. For example, domain_suffix_match=example.com would match test.example.com but would not match test-example.com. This field is like domain_match, but used for phase 2 (inside EAP-TTLS/PEAP/FAST tunnel) authentication. domain_suffix_match2 - Constraint for server domain name. This field is like domain_suffix_match, but used for phase 2 (inside EAP-TTLS/PEAP/FAST tunnel) authentication. Signed-off-by: David Lam <david@thedavid.net>
* hostapd: Activate PIE by defaultHauke Mehrtens2020-01-131-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This activates PIE ASLR support by default when the regular option is selected. This increases the binary size by 26% uncompressed and 16% compressed on MIPS BE. old: 460,933 /usr/sbin/wpad 283,891 wpad-basic_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mips_24kc.ipk new: 584,508 /usr/sbin/wpad 330,281 wpad-basic_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mips_24kc.ipk Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de> Acked-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
* hostapd: add ubus reloadJohn Crispin2019-11-121-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add ubus interface to hostapd and wpa_supplicant to allow dynamically reloading wiface configuration without having to restart the hostapd process. As a consequence, both hostapd and wpa_supplicant are now started persistently on boot for each wifi device in the system and then receive ubus calls adding, modifying or removing interface configuration. At a later stage it would be desirable to reduce the services to one single instance managing all radios. Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
* hostapd: Add mesh support for wpad fullHauke Mehrtens2019-09-221-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This increases the size of the binary slightly: old: 427722 wpad-wolfssl_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk 431696 wpad-openssl_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk new: 442109 wpad-wolfssl_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk 445997 wpad-openssl_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
* hostapd: Update to version 2.9 (2019-08-08)Hauke Mehrtens2019-09-221-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The size of the ipkgs increase a bit (between 0.7% and 1.1%): old 2019-04-21 (2.8): 288264 wpad-basic_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk 256188 wpad-mini_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk 427475 wpad-openssl_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk 423071 wpad-wolfssl_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk new 2019-08-08 (2.9): 290217 wpad-basic_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk 258745 wpad-mini_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk 431732 wpad-openssl_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk 427641 wpad-wolfssl_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
* hostapd: Update to version 2.8 (2019-04-21)Hauke Mehrtens2019-09-221-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This also syncs the configuration files with the default configuration files, but no extra options are activated or deactivated. The mesh patches were partially merged into hostapd 2.8, the remaining patches were extracted from patchwork and are now applied by OpenWrt. The patches still have open questions which are not fixed by the author. They were taken from this page: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/hostap/list/?series=62725&state=* The changes in 007-mesh-apply-channel-attributes-before-running-Mesh.patch where first applied to hostapd, but later reverted in hostapd commit 3e949655ccc5 because they caused memory leaks. The size of the ipkgs increase a bit (between 1.3% and 2.3%): old 2018-12-02 (2.7): 283337 wpad-basic_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk 252857 wpad-mini_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk 417473 wpad-openssl_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk 415105 wpad-wolfssl_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk new 2019-04-21 (2.8): 288264 wpad-basic_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk 256188 wpad-mini_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk 427475 wpad-openssl_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk 423071 wpad-wolfssl_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de> Tested-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
* hostapd: mirror ieee80211w ap mode defaults in station modeJo-Philipp Wich2019-09-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | For AP mode, OpenWrt automatically sets ieee80211w to either 1 or 2, depending on whether the encryption is set to sae-mixed, or sae/owe/eap suite-b. Mirror the same defaults for client mode connections, in order to allow an OpenWrt station to associate to an OpenWrt ap with SAE, OWE or Suite-B encryption without the need to manually specify "option ieee80211w" on the station. Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* hostapd: fix OWE settings in client modeJo-Philipp Wich2019-09-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | This changes fixes the generation of the wpa_supplicant client configuration in WPA3 OWE client mode. Instead of incorrectly emitting key_mgmt=NONE, use the proper key_mgmt=OWE setting instead. Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* hostapd: SAE/EAP-pwd side-channel attack updateHauke Mehrtens2019-09-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Fixes this security problem: * SAE/EAP-pwd side-channel attack update https://w1.fi/security/2019-6/sae-eap-pwd-side-channel-attack-update.txt Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
* hostapd: Fix security problemHauke Mehrtens2019-09-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | This fixes: CVE-2019-11555 "EAP-pwd message reassembly issue with unexpected fragment" https://w1.fi/security/2019-5/eap-pwd-message-reassembly-issue-with-unexpected-fragment.txt This shouöld not affect OpenWrt in the default settings as we do not use EAP-pwd. Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
* hostapd: Allow CONFIG_IEEE80211W for all but mini variantHauke Mehrtens2019-08-171-6/+2
| | | | | | | | | This commit will activate CONFIG_IEEE80211W for all, but the mini variant when at least one driver supports it. This will add ieee80211w support for the mesh variant for example. Fixes: FS#2397 Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
* hostapd: Remove ROBO switch supportHauke Mehrtens2019-08-171-2/+0
| | | | | | The driver was removed from OpenWrt a long time ago. Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
* build: include BUILD_VARIANT in PKG_BUILD_DIRJeffery To2019-08-051-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | This changes the default PKG_BUILD_DIR to take BUILD_VARIANT into account (if set), so that packages do not need to manually override PKG_BUILD_DIR just to handle variants. This also updates most base packages with variants to use the updated default PKG_BUILD_DIR. Signed-off-by: Jeffery To <jeffery.to@gmail.com>
* hostapd: remove stale WPA_SUPPLICANT_NO_TIMESTAMP_CHECK optionChristian Lamparter2019-06-201-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | Support to disable the timestamp check for certificates in wpa_supplicant (Useful for devices without RTC that cannot reliably get the real date/time) has been accepted in the upstream hostapd. It's implemented in wpa_supplicant as a per-AP flag tls_disable_time_checks=[0|1]. Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>
* hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9497, CVE-2019-9498, CVE-2019-9499Stefan Lippers-Hollmann2019-04-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | EAP-pwd missing commit validation Published: April 10, 2019 Identifiers: - CVE-2019-9497 (EAP-pwd server not checking for reflection attack) - CVE-2019-9498 (EAP-pwd server missing commit validation for scalar/element) - CVE-2019-9499 (EAP-pwd peer missing commit validation for scalar/element) Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/ Vulnerability EAP-pwd implementation in hostapd (EAP server) and wpa_supplicant (EAP peer) was discovered not to validate the received scalar and element values in EAP-pwd-Commit messages properly. This could result in attacks that would be able to complete EAP-pwd authentication exchange without the attacker having to know the used password. A reflection attack is possible against the EAP-pwd server since the hostapd EAP server did not verify that the EAP-pwd-Commit contains scalar/element values that differ from the ones the server sent out itself. This allows the attacker to complete EAP-pwd authentication without knowing the password, but this does not result in the attacker being able to derive the session key (MSK), i.e., the attacker would not be able to complete the following key exchange (e.g., 4-way handshake in RSN/WPA). An attack using invalid scalar/element values is possible against both the EAP-pwd server and peer since hostapd and wpa_supplicant did not validate these values in the received EAP-pwd-Commit messages. If the used crypto library does not implement additional checks for the element (EC point), this could result in attacks where the attacker could use a specially crafted commit message values to manipulate the exchange to result in deriving a session key value from a very small set of possible values. This could further be used to attack the EAP-pwd server in a practical manner. An attack against the EAP-pwd peer is slightly more complex, but still consider practical. These invalid scalar/element attacks could result in the attacker being able to complete authentication and learn the session key and MSK to allow the key exchange to be completed as well, i.e., the attacker gaining access to the network in case of the attack against the EAP server or the attacker being able to operate a rogue AP in case of the attack against the EAP peer. While similar attacks might be applicable against SAE, it should be noted that the SAE implementation in hostapd and wpa_supplicant does have the validation steps that were missing from the EAP-pwd implementation and as such, these attacks do not apply to the current SAE implementation. Old versions of wpa_supplicant/hostapd did not include the reflection attack check in the SAE implementation, though, since that was added in June 2015 for v2.5 (commit 6a58444d27fd 'SAE: Verify that own/peer commit-scalar and COMMIT-ELEMENT are different'). Vulnerable versions/configurations All hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support (CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled in the runtime configuration) are vulnerable against the reflection attack. All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support (CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled in the runtime configuration) are vulnerable against the invalid scalar/element attack when built against a crypto library that does not have an explicit validation step on imported EC points. The following list indicates which cases are vulnerable/not vulnerable: - OpenSSL v1.0.2 or older: vulnerable - OpenSSL v1.1.0 or newer: not vulnerable - BoringSSL with commit 38feb990a183 ('Require that EC points are on the curve.') from September 2015: not vulnerable - BoringSSL without commit 38feb990a183: vulnerable - LibreSSL: vulnerable - wolfssl: vulnerable Acknowledgments Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi) for discovering and reporting the issues and for proposing changes to address them in the implementation. Possible mitigation steps - Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild: CVE-2019-9497: EAP-pwd server: Detect reflection attacks CVE-2019-9498: EAP-pwd server: Verify received scalar and element EAP-pwd: Check element x,y coordinates explicitly CVE-2019-9499: EAP-pwd client: Verify received scalar and element EAP-pwd: Check element x,y coordinates explicitly These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/ - Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> [bump PKG_RELEASE] Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9496Stefan Lippers-Hollmann2019-04-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | hostapd: fix SAE confirm missing state validation Published: April 10, 2019 Identifiers: - CVE-2019-9496 (SAE confirm missing state validation in hostapd/AP) Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-3/ Vulnerability When hostapd is used to operate an access point with SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals; also known as WPA3-Personal), an invalid authentication sequence could result in the hostapd process terminating due to a NULL pointer dereference when processing SAE confirm message. This was caused by missing state validation steps when processing the SAE confirm message in hostapd/AP mode. Similar cases against the wpa_supplicant SAE station implementation had already been tested by the hwsim test cases, but those sequences did not trigger this specific code path in AP mode which is why the issue was not discovered earlier. An attacker in radio range of an access point using hostapd in SAE configuration could use this issue to perform a denial of service attack by forcing the hostapd process to terminate. Vulnerable versions/configurations All hostapd versions with SAE support (CONFIG_SAE=y in the build configuration and SAE being enabled in the runtime configuration). Possible mitigation steps - Merge the following commit to hostapd and rebuild: SAE: Fix confirm message validation in error cases These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-3/ - Update to hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> [bump PKG_RELEASE] Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9495Stefan Lippers-Hollmann2019-04-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | EAP-pwd side-channel attack Published: April 10, 2019 Identifiers: - CVE-2019-9495 (cache attack against EAP-pwd) Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/ Vulnerability Number of potential side channel attacks were recently discovered in the SAE implementations used by both hostapd and wpa_supplicant (see security advisory 2019-1 and VU#871675). EAP-pwd uses a similar design for deriving PWE from the password and while a specific attack against EAP-pwd is not yet known to be tested, there is no reason to believe that the EAP-pwd implementation would be immune against the type of cache attack that was identified for the SAE implementation. Since the EAP-pwd implementation in hostapd (EAP server) and wpa_supplicant (EAP peer) does not support MODP groups, the timing attack described against SAE is not applicable for the EAP-pwd implementation. A novel cache-based attack against SAE handshake would likely be applicable against the EAP-pwd implementation. Even though the wpa_supplicant/hostapd PWE derivation iteration for EAP-pwd has protections against timing attacks, this new cache-based attack might enable an attacker to determine which code branch is taken in the iteration if the attacker is able to run unprivileged code on the victim machine (e.g., an app installed on a smart phone or potentially a JavaScript code on a web site loaded by a web browser). This depends on the used CPU not providing sufficient protection to prevent unprivileged applications from observing memory access patterns through the shared cache (which is the most likely case with today's designs). The attacker could use information about the selected branch to learn information about the password and combine this information from number of handshake instances with an offline dictionary attack. With sufficient number of handshakes and sufficiently weak password, this might result in full recovery of the used password if that password is not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks. This attack requires the attacker to be able to run a program on the target device. This is not commonly the case on an authentication server (EAP server), so the most likely target for this would be a client device using EAP-pwd. The commits listed in the end of this advisory change the EAP-pwd implementation shared by hostapd and wpa_supplicant to perform the PWE derivation loop using operations that use constant time and memory access pattern to minimize the externally observable differences from operations that depend on the password even for the case where the attacker might be able to run unprivileged code on the same device. Vulnerable versions/configurations All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support (CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled in the runtime configuration). It should also be noted that older versions of wpa_supplicant/hostapd prior to v2.7 did not include additional protection against certain timing differences. The definition of the EAP-pwd (RFC 5931) does not describe such protection, but the same issue that was addressed in SAE earlier can be applicable against EAP-pwd as well and as such, that implementation specific extra protection (commit 22ac3dfebf7b, "EAP-pwd: Mask timing of PWE derivation") is needed to avoid showing externally visible timing differences that could leak information about the password. Any uses of older wpa_supplicant/hostapd versions with EAP-pwd are recommended to update to v2.7 or newer in addition to the mitigation steps listed below for the more recently discovered issue. Possible mitigation steps - Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild: OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums Add helper functions for constant time operations OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for crypto_bignum_legendre() EAP-pwd: Use constant time and memory access for finding the PWE These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/ - Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available - Use strong passwords to prevent dictionary attacks Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> [bump PKG_RELEASE] Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9494Stefan Lippers-Hollmann2019-04-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SAE side-channel attacks Published: April 10, 2019 Identifiers: - VU#871675 - CVE-2019-9494 (cache attack against SAE) Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/ Vulnerability Number of potential side channel attacks were discovered in the SAE implementations used by both hostapd (AP) and wpa_supplicant (infrastructure BSS station/mesh station). SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals) is also known as WPA3-Personal. The discovered side channel attacks may be able to leak information about the used password based on observable timing differences and cache access patterns. This might result in full password recovery when combined with an offline dictionary attack and if the password is not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks. Cache attack A novel cache-based attack against SAE handshake was discovered. This attack targets SAE with ECC groups. ECC group 19 being the mandatory group to support and the most likely used group for SAE today, so this attack applies to the most common SAE use case. Even though the PWE derivation iteration in SAE has protections against timing attacks, this new cache-based attack enables an attacker to determine which code branch is taken in the iteration if the attacker is able to run unprivileged code on the victim machine (e.g., an app installed on a smart phone or potentially a JavaScript code on a web site loaded by a web browser). This depends on the used CPU not providing sufficient protection to prevent unprivileged applications from observing memory access patterns through the shared cache (which is the most likely case with today's designs). The attacker can use information about the selected branch to learn information about the password and combine this information from number of handshake instances with an offline dictionary attack. With sufficient number of handshakes and sufficiently weak password, this might result in full discovery of the used password. This attack requires the attacker to be able to run a program on the target device. This is not commonly the case on access points, so the most likely target for this would be a client device using SAE in an infrastructure BSS or mesh BSS. The commits listed in the end of this advisory change the SAE implementation shared by hostapd and wpa_supplicant to perform the PWE derivation loop using operations that use constant time and memory access pattern to minimize the externally observable differences from operations that depend on the password even for the case where the attacker might be able to run unprivileged code on the same device. Timing attack The timing attack applies to the MODP groups 22, 23, and 24 where the PWE generation algorithm defined for SAE can have sufficient timing differences for an attacker to be able to determine how many rounds were needed to find the PWE based on the used password and MAC addresses. When the attack is repeated with multiple times, the attacker may be able to gather enough information about the password to be able to recover it fully using an offline dictionary attack if the password is not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks. This attack could be performed by an attacker in radio range of an access point or a station enabling the specific MODP groups. This timing attack requires the applicable MODP groups to be enabled explicitly in hostapd/wpa_supplicant configuration (sae_groups parameter). All versions of hostapd/wpa_supplicant have disabled these groups by default. While this security advisory lists couple of commits introducing additional protection for MODP groups in SAE, it should be noted that the groups 22, 23, and 24 are not considered strong enough to meet the current expectation for a secure system. As such, their use is discouraged even if the additional protection mechanisms in the implementation are included. Vulnerable versions/configurations All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with SAE support (CONFIG_SAE=y in the build configuration and SAE being enabled in the runtime configuration). Acknowledgments Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi) and Eyal Ronen (Tel Aviv University) for discovering the issues and for discussions on how to address them. Possible mitigation steps - Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild: OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums Add helper functions for constant time operations OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for crypto_bignum_legendre() SAE: Minimize timing differences in PWE derivation SAE: Avoid branches in is_quadratic_residue_blind() SAE: Mask timing of MODP groups 22, 23, 24 SAE: Use const_time selection for PWE in FFC SAE: Use constant time operations in sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc() These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/ - Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available - In addition to either of the above alternatives, disable MODP groups 1, 2, 5, 22, 23, and 24 by removing them from hostapd/wpa_supplicant sae_groups runtime configuration parameter, if they were explicitly enabled since those groups are not considered strong enough to meet current security expectations. The groups 22, 23, and 24 are related to the discovered side channel (timing) attack. The other groups in the list are consider too weak to provide sufficient security. Note that all these groups have been disabled by default in all hostapd/wpa_supplicant versions and these would be used only if explicitly enabled in the configuration. - Use strong passwords to prevent dictionary attacks Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> [bump PKG_RELEASE] Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* hostapd: add Multi-AP patches and config optionsArnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind)2019-02-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Cherry-pick Multi-AP commits from uptream: 9c06f0f6a hostapd: Add Multi-AP protocol support 5abc7823b wpa_supplicant: Add Multi-AP backhaul STA support a1debd338 tests: Refactor test_multi_ap bfcdac1c8 Multi-AP: Don't reject backhaul STA on fronthaul BSS cb3c156e7 tests: Update multi_ap_fronthaul_on_ap to match implementation 56a2d788f WPS: Add multi_ap_subelem to wps_build_wfa_ext() 83ebf5586 wpa_supplicant: Support Multi-AP backhaul STA onboarding with WPS 66819b07b hostapd: Support Multi-AP backhaul STA onboarding with WPS 8682f384c hostapd: Add README-MULTI-AP b1daf498a tests: Multi-AP WPS provisioning Add support for Multi-AP to the UCI configuration. Every wifi-iface gets an option 'multi_ap'. For APs, its value can be 0 (multi-AP support disabled), 1 (backhaul AP), 2 (fronthaul AP), or 3 (fronthaul + backhaul AP). For STAs, it can be 0 (not a backhaul STA) or 1 (backhaul STA, can only associate with backhaul AP). Also add new optional parameter to wps_start ubus call of wpa_supplicant to indicate that a Multi-AP backhaul link is required. Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org> Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
* hostapd: update to version 2018-12-02 (2.7)Hauke Mehrtens2019-01-021-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | This updates hostapd to version the git version from 2018-12-02 which matches the 2.7 release. The removed patches were are already available in the upstream code, one additional backport is needed to fix a compile problem. Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
* hostapd: Make eapol-test depend on libubusHauke Mehrtens2018-12-161-3/+3
| | | | | | | | The eapol-test application also uses the code with the newly activated ubus support, add the missing dependency. Fixes: f5753aae233 ("hostapd: add support for WPS pushbutton station") Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
* hostapd: add support for WPS pushbutton stationDaniel Golle2018-12-121-9/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | similar to hostapd, also add a ubus interface for wpa_supplicant which will allow handling WPS push-button just as it works for hostapd. In order to have wpa_supplicant running without any network configuration (so you can use it to retrieve credentials via WPS), configure wifi-iface in /etc/config/wireless: config wifi-iface 'default_radio0' option device 'radio0' option network 'wwan' option mode 'sta' option encryption 'wps' This section will automatically be edited if credentials have successfully been acquired via WPS. Size difference (mips_24kc): roughly +4kb for the 'full' variants of wpa_supplicant and wpad which do support WPS. Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
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