aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/target/linux/generic/patches-3.6/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'target/linux/generic/patches-3.6/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch')
-rw-r--r--target/linux/generic/patches-3.6/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch27
1 files changed, 27 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/target/linux/generic/patches-3.6/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch b/target/linux/generic/patches-3.6/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8fe1884320
--- /dev/null
+++ b/target/linux/generic/patches-3.6/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 6e601a53566d84e1ffd25e7b6fe0b6894ffd79c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
+Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2013 01:13:47 +0000
+Subject: sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]
+
+Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
+with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
+sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
+condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
+doors for a privilege escalation.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
+Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+---
+--- a/net/core/sock_diag.c
++++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c
+@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk
+ if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
++ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
+ if (hndl == NULL)
+ err = -ENOENT;