diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0051-crypto-chacha20poly1305-prevent-integer-overflow-on-.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0051-crypto-chacha20poly1305-prevent-integer-overflow-on-.patch | 40 |
1 files changed, 40 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0051-crypto-chacha20poly1305-prevent-integer-overflow-on-.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0051-crypto-chacha20poly1305-prevent-integer-overflow-on-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1ed49e5b6c --- /dev/null +++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0051-crypto-chacha20poly1305-prevent-integer-overflow-on-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> +Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2020 12:42:01 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - prevent integer overflow on large + input + +commit c9cc0517bba9f0213f1e55172feceb99e5512daf upstream. + +This code assigns src_len (size_t) to sl (int), which causes problems +when src_len is very large. Probably nobody in the kernel should be +passing this much data to chacha20poly1305 all in one go anyway, so I +don't think we need to change the algorithm or introduce larger types +or anything. But we should at least error out early in this case and +print a warning so that we get reports if this does happen and can look +into why anybody is possibly passing it that much data or if they're +accidently passing -1 or similar. + +Fixes: d95312a3ccc0 ("crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - reimplement crypt_from_sg() routine") +Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5+ +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> +Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> +Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> +--- + lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +--- a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c ++++ b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c +@@ -235,6 +235,9 @@ bool chacha20poly1305_crypt_sg_inplace(s + __le64 lens[2]; + } b __aligned(16); + ++ if (WARN_ON(src_len > INT_MAX)) ++ return false; ++ + chacha_load_key(b.k, key); + + b.iv[0] = 0; |