diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'package')
8 files changed, 324 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/package/network/utils/curl/patches/010-CVE-2015-3143.patch b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/010-CVE-2015-3143.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..697c9c9b6d --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/010-CVE-2015-3143.patch @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From d7d1bc8f08eea1a85ab0d794bc1561659462d937 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> +Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2015 13:26:46 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] ConnectionExists: for NTLM re-use, require credentials to + match + +CVE-2015-3143 + +Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150422A.html +Reported-by: Paras Sethia +--- + lib/url.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/lib/url.c ++++ b/lib/url.c +@@ -3184,7 +3184,11 @@ ConnectionExists(struct SessionHandle *d + } + + if((!(needle->handler->flags & PROTOPT_CREDSPERREQUEST)) || ++#if defined(USE_NTLM) ++ (wantNTLMhttp || check->ntlm.state != NTLMSTATE_NONE)) { ++#else + wantNTLMhttp) { ++#endif + /* This protocol requires credentials per connection or is HTTP+NTLM, + so verify that we're using the same name and password as well */ + if(!strequal(needle->user, check->user) || diff --git a/package/network/utils/curl/patches/011-CVE-2015-3144.patch b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/011-CVE-2015-3144.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7da9489bfd --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/011-CVE-2015-3144.patch @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +From 6218ded6001ea330e589f92b6b2fa12777752b5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> +Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2015 23:52:04 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] fix_hostname: zero length host name caused -1 index offset +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +If a URL is given with a zero-length host name, like in "http://:80" or +just ":80", `fix_hostname()` will index the host name pointer with a -1 +offset (as it blindly assumes a non-zero length) and both read and +assign that address. + +CVE-2015-3144 + +Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150422D.html +Reported-by: Hanno Böck +--- + lib/url.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/lib/url.c ++++ b/lib/url.c +@@ -3606,7 +3606,7 @@ static void fix_hostname(struct SessionH + host->dispname = host->name; + + len = strlen(host->name); +- if(host->name[len-1] == '.') ++ if(len && (host->name[len-1] == '.')) + /* strip off a single trailing dot if present, primarily for SNI but + there's no use for it */ + host->name[len-1]=0; diff --git a/package/network/utils/curl/patches/012-CVE-2015-3145.patch b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/012-CVE-2015-3145.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c7ecbe9c20 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/012-CVE-2015-3145.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From ea595c516bc936a514753597aa6c59fd6eb0765e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> +Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2015 16:37:40 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] cookie: cookie parser out of boundary memory access +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +The internal libcurl function called sanitize_cookie_path() that cleans +up the path element as given to it from a remote site or when read from +a file, did not properly validate the input. If given a path that +consisted of a single double-quote, libcurl would index a newly +allocated memory area with index -1 and assign a zero to it, thus +destroying heap memory it wasn't supposed to. + +CVE-2015-3145 + +Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150422C.html +Reported-by: Hanno Böck +--- + lib/cookie.c | 12 +++++++----- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +--- a/lib/cookie.c ++++ b/lib/cookie.c +@@ -236,11 +236,14 @@ static char *sanitize_cookie_path(const + return NULL; + + /* some stupid site sends path attribute with '"'. */ ++ len = strlen(new_path); + if(new_path[0] == '\"') { +- memmove((void *)new_path, (const void *)(new_path + 1), strlen(new_path)); ++ memmove((void *)new_path, (const void *)(new_path + 1), len); ++ len--; + } +- if(new_path[strlen(new_path) - 1] == '\"') { +- new_path[strlen(new_path) - 1] = 0x0; ++ if(len && (new_path[len - 1] == '\"')) { ++ new_path[len - 1] = 0x0; ++ len--; + } + + /* RFC6265 5.2.4 The Path Attribute */ +@@ -252,8 +255,7 @@ static char *sanitize_cookie_path(const + } + + /* convert /hoge/ to /hoge */ +- len = strlen(new_path); +- if(1 < len && new_path[len - 1] == '/') { ++ if(len && new_path[len - 1] == '/') { + new_path[len - 1] = 0x0; + } + diff --git a/package/network/utils/curl/patches/013-CVE-2015-3148.patch b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/013-CVE-2015-3148.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ed52160a23 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/013-CVE-2015-3148.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 6abfb512ed22c2de891a4398616d81a2a0690b5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> +Date: Sat, 18 Apr 2015 23:50:16 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] http_done: close Negotiate connections when done + +When doing HTTP requests Negotiate authenticated, the entire connnection +may become authenticated and not just the specific HTTP request which is +otherwise how HTTP works, as Negotiate can basically use NTLM under the +hood. curl was not adhering to this fact but would assume that such +requests would also be authenticated per request. + +CVE-2015-3148 + +Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150422B.html +Reported-by: Isaac Boukris +--- + lib/http.c | 8 +++++++- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/lib/http.c ++++ b/lib/http.c +@@ -1493,8 +1493,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_done(struct connectda + + #ifdef USE_SPNEGO + if(data->state.proxyneg.state == GSS_AUTHSENT || +- data->state.negotiate.state == GSS_AUTHSENT) ++ data->state.negotiate.state == GSS_AUTHSENT) { ++ /* add forbid re-use if http-code != 401 as a WA ++ * only needed for 401 that failed handling ++ * otherwie state will be RECV with current code */ ++ if((data->req.httpcode != 401) && (data->req.httpcode != 407)) ++ connclose(conn, "Negotiate transfer completed"); + Curl_cleanup_negotiate(data); ++ } + #endif + + /* set the proper values (possibly modified on POST) */ diff --git a/package/network/utils/curl/patches/014-CVE-2015-3153.patch b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/014-CVE-2015-3153.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f6d37d4b54 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/014-CVE-2015-3153.patch @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +From 69a2e8d7ec581695a62527cb2252e7350f314ffa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> +Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2015 15:58:21 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] CURLOPT_HEADEROPT: default to separate + +Make the HTTP headers separated by default for improved security and +reduced risk for information leakage. + +Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150429.html +Reported-by: Yehezkel Horowitz, Oren Souroujon +--- + docs/libcurl/opts/CURLOPT_HEADEROPT.3 | 12 ++++++------ + lib/url.c | 1 + + tests/data/test1527 | 2 +- + tests/data/test287 | 2 +- + tests/libtest/lib1527.c | 1 + + 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +--- a/docs/libcurl/opts/CURLOPT_HEADEROPT.3 ++++ b/docs/libcurl/opts/CURLOPT_HEADEROPT.3 +@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ + .\" * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + .\" * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + .\" * +-.\" * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2014, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al. ++.\" * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2015, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al. + .\" * + .\" * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + .\" * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms +@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ CURLcode curl_easy_setopt(CURL *handle, + Pass a long that is a bitmask of options of how to deal with headers. The two + mutually exclusive options are: + +-\fBCURLHEADER_UNIFIED\fP - keep working as before. This means +-\fICURLOPT_HTTPHEADER(3)\fP headers will be used in requests both to servers +-and proxies. With this option enabled, \fICURLOPT_PROXYHEADER(3)\fP will not +-have any effect. ++\fBCURLHEADER_UNIFIED\fP - the headers specified in ++\fICURLOPT_HTTPHEADER(3)\fP will be used in requests both to servers and ++proxies. With this option enabled, \fICURLOPT_PROXYHEADER(3)\fP will not have ++any effect. + + \fBCURLHEADER_SEPARATE\fP - makes \fICURLOPT_HTTPHEADER(3)\fP headers only get + sent to a server and not to a proxy. Proxy headers must be set with +@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ headers. When doing CONNECT, libcurl wil + headers only to the proxy and then \fICURLOPT_HTTPHEADER(3)\fP headers only to + the server. + .SH DEFAULT +-CURLHEADER_UNIFIED ++CURLHEADER_SEPARATE (changed in 7.42.1, ased CURLHEADER_UNIFIED before then) + .SH PROTOCOLS + HTTP + .SH EXAMPLE +--- a/lib/url.c ++++ b/lib/url.c +@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_init_userdefined(struct Us + set->ssl_enable_alpn = TRUE; + + set->expect_100_timeout = 1000L; /* Wait for a second by default. */ ++ set->sep_headers = TRUE; /* separated header lists by default */ + return result; + } + +--- a/tests/data/test1527 ++++ b/tests/data/test1527 +@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ http-proxy + lib1527 + </tool> + <name> +-Check same headers are generated without CURLOPT_PROXYHEADER ++Check same headers are generated with CURLOPT_HEADEROPT == CURLHEADER_UNIFIED + </name> + <command> + http://the.old.moo.1527:%HTTPPORT/1527 %HOSTIP:%PROXYPORT +--- a/tests/data/test287 ++++ b/tests/data/test287 +@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ http + HTTP proxy CONNECT with custom User-Agent header + </name> + <command> +-http://test.remote.example.com.287:%HTTPPORT/path/287 -H "User-Agent: looser/2007" --proxy http://%HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT --proxytunnel ++http://test.remote.example.com.287:%HTTPPORT/path/287 -H "User-Agent: looser/2015" --proxy http://%HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT --proxytunnel --proxy-header "User-Agent: looser/2007" + </command> + </client> + +--- a/tests/libtest/lib1527.c ++++ b/tests/libtest/lib1527.c +@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ int test(char *URL) + test_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_READFUNCTION, read_callback); + test_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_HTTPPROXYTUNNEL, 1L); + test_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_INFILESIZE, strlen(data)); ++ test_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_HEADEROPT, CURLHEADER_UNIFIED); + + res = curl_easy_perform(curl); + diff --git a/package/network/utils/curl/patches/015-CVE-2015-3236.patch b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/015-CVE-2015-3236.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..720fb94aa0 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/015-CVE-2015-3236.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From e6d7c30734487246e83b95520e81bc1ccf0a2376 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 28 May 2015 20:04:35 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] http: do not leak basic auth credentials on re-used + connections + +CVE-2015-3236 + +This partially reverts commit curl-7_39_0-237-g87c4abb + +Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150617A.html +--- + lib/http.c | 16 ++++------------ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +--- a/lib/http.c ++++ b/lib/http.c +@@ -2333,20 +2333,12 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct connectdata *c + te + ); + +- /* +- * Free userpwd for Negotiate/NTLM. Cannot reuse as it is associated with +- * the connection and shouldn't be repeated over it either. +- */ +- switch (data->state.authhost.picked) { +- case CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE: +- case CURLAUTH_NTLM: +- case CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB: +- Curl_safefree(conn->allocptr.userpwd); +- break; +- } ++ /* clear userpwd to avoid re-using credentials from re-used connections */ ++ Curl_safefree(conn->allocptr.userpwd); + + /* +- * Same for proxyuserpwd ++ * Free proxyuserpwd for Negotiate/NTLM. Cannot reuse as it is associated ++ * with the connection and shouldn't be repeated over it either. + */ + switch (data->state.authproxy.picked) { + case CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE: diff --git a/package/network/utils/curl/patches/016-CVE-2015-3237.patch b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/016-CVE-2015-3237.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6942a04edb --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/016-CVE-2015-3237.patch @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From d2f1a8bdce9d77a277d05adae025d369c1bdd9e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> +Date: Fri, 22 May 2015 10:28:21 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] SMB: rangecheck values read off incoming packet + +CVE-2015-3237 + +Detected by Coverity. CID 1299430. + +Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150617B.html +--- + lib/smb.c | 12 +++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/lib/smb.c ++++ b/lib/smb.c +@@ -783,9 +783,15 @@ static CURLcode smb_request_state(struct + off = Curl_read16_le(((unsigned char *) msg) + + sizeof(struct smb_header) + 13); + if(len > 0) { +- result = Curl_client_write(conn, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, +- (char *)msg + off + sizeof(unsigned int), +- len); ++ struct smb_conn *smbc = &conn->proto.smbc; ++ if(off + sizeof(unsigned int) + len > smbc->got) { ++ failf(conn->data, "Invalid input packet"); ++ result = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; ++ } ++ else ++ result = Curl_client_write(conn, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, ++ (char *)msg + off + sizeof(unsigned int), ++ len); + if(result) { + req->result = result; + next_state = SMB_CLOSE; diff --git a/package/network/utils/curl/patches/200-no_docs_tests.patch b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/200-no_docs_tests.patch index 6a1fdf5b6b..2845577f1c 100644 --- a/package/network/utils/curl/patches/200-no_docs_tests.patch +++ b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/200-no_docs_tests.patch @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- a/Makefile.am +++ b/Makefile.am -@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ CLEANFILES = $(VC6_LIBDSP) $(VC6_SRCDSP) $(VC7_LIBVCPROJ) $(VC7_SRCVCPROJ) \ +@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ CLEANFILES = $(VC6_LIBDSP) $(VC6_SRCDSP) bin_SCRIPTS = curl-config SUBDIRS = lib src include @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ pkgconfig_DATA = libcurl.pc --- a/Makefile.in +++ b/Makefile.in -@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ CLEANFILES = $(VC6_LIBDSP) $(VC6_SRCDSP) $(VC7_LIBVCPROJ) $(VC7_SRCVCPROJ) \ +@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ CLEANFILES = $(VC6_LIBDSP) $(VC6_SRCDSP) bin_SCRIPTS = curl-config SUBDIRS = lib src include |