diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'package/network')
9 files changed, 1083 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/Makefile b/package/network/services/hostapd/Makefile index f531e660ff..6af396f35b 100644 --- a/package/network/services/hostapd/Makefile +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/Makefile @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk PKG_NAME:=hostapd -PKG_RELEASE:=2 +PKG_RELEASE:=3 PKG_SOURCE_URL:=http://w1.fi/hostap.git PKG_SOURCE_PROTO:=git diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0001-OpenSSL-Use-constant-time-operations-for-private-big.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0001-OpenSSL-Use-constant-time-operations-for-private-big.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7a73b09ff9 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0001-OpenSSL-Use-constant-time-operations-for-private-big.patch @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +From d42c477cc794163a3757956bbffca5cea000923c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 11:43:03 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 01/14] OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private + bignums + +This helps in reducing measurable timing differences in operations +involving private information. BoringSSL has removed BN_FLG_CONSTTIME +and expects specific constant time functions to be called instead, so a +bit different approach is needed depending on which library is used. + +The main operation that needs protection against side channel attacks is +BN_mod_exp() that depends on private keys (the public key validation +step in crypto_dh_derive_secret() is an exception that can use the +faster version since it does not depend on private keys). + +crypto_bignum_div() is currently used only in SAE FFC case with not +safe-prime groups and only with values that do not depend on private +keys, so it is not critical to protect it. + +crypto_bignum_inverse() is currently used only in SAE FFC PWE +derivation. The additional protection here is targeting only OpenSSL. +BoringSSL may need conversion to using BN_mod_inverse_blinded(). + +This is related to CVE-2019-9494 and CVE-2019-9495. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +--- + src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c ++++ b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c +@@ -549,7 +549,8 @@ int crypto_mod_exp(const u8 *base, size_ + bn_result == NULL) + goto error; + +- if (BN_mod_exp(bn_result, bn_base, bn_exp, bn_modulus, ctx) != 1) ++ if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(bn_result, bn_base, bn_exp, bn_modulus, ++ ctx, NULL) != 1) + goto error; + + *result_len = BN_bn2bin(bn_result, result); +@@ -1295,8 +1296,9 @@ int crypto_bignum_exptmod(const struct c + bnctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (bnctx == NULL) + return -1; +- res = BN_mod_exp((BIGNUM *) d, (const BIGNUM *) a, (const BIGNUM *) b, +- (const BIGNUM *) c, bnctx); ++ res = BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime((BIGNUM *) d, (const BIGNUM *) a, ++ (const BIGNUM *) b, (const BIGNUM *) c, ++ bnctx, NULL); + BN_CTX_free(bnctx); + + return res ? 0 : -1; +@@ -1315,6 +1317,11 @@ int crypto_bignum_inverse(const struct c + bnctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (bnctx == NULL) + return -1; ++#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL ++ /* TODO: use BN_mod_inverse_blinded() ? */ ++#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */ ++ BN_set_flags((BIGNUM *) a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); ++#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */ + res = BN_mod_inverse((BIGNUM *) c, (const BIGNUM *) a, + (const BIGNUM *) b, bnctx); + BN_CTX_free(bnctx); +@@ -1348,6 +1355,9 @@ int crypto_bignum_div(const struct crypt + bnctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (bnctx == NULL) + return -1; ++#ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL ++ BN_set_flags((BIGNUM *) a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); ++#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */ + res = BN_div((BIGNUM *) c, NULL, (const BIGNUM *) a, + (const BIGNUM *) b, bnctx); + BN_CTX_free(bnctx); +@@ -1439,8 +1449,8 @@ int crypto_bignum_legendre(const struct + /* exp = (p-1) / 2 */ + !BN_sub(exp, (const BIGNUM *) p, BN_value_one()) || + !BN_rshift1(exp, exp) || +- !BN_mod_exp(tmp, (const BIGNUM *) a, exp, (const BIGNUM *) p, +- bnctx)) ++ !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(tmp, (const BIGNUM *) a, exp, ++ (const BIGNUM *) p, bnctx, NULL)) + goto fail; + + if (BN_is_word(tmp, 1)) diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0002-Add-helper-functions-for-constant-time-operations.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0002-Add-helper-functions-for-constant-time-operations.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..87e41aea87 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0002-Add-helper-functions-for-constant-time-operations.patch @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +From 6e34f618d37ddbb5854c42e2ad4fca83492fa7b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 18:38:30 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 02/14] Add helper functions for constant time operations + +These functions can be used to help implement constant time operations +for various cryptographic operations that must minimize externally +observable differences in processing (both in timing and also in +internal cache use, etc.). + +This is related to CVE-2019-9494 and CVE-2019-9495. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +--- + src/utils/const_time.h | 191 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 191 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 src/utils/const_time.h + +--- /dev/null ++++ b/src/utils/const_time.h +@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ ++/* ++ * Helper functions for constant time operations ++ * Copyright (c) 2019, The Linux Foundation ++ * ++ * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license. ++ * See README for more details. ++ * ++ * These helper functions can be used to implement logic that needs to minimize ++ * externally visible differences in execution path by avoiding use of branches, ++ * avoiding early termination or other time differences, and forcing same memory ++ * access pattern regardless of values. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef CONST_TIME_H ++#define CONST_TIME_H ++ ++ ++#if defined(__clang__) ++#define NO_UBSAN_UINT_OVERFLOW \ ++ __attribute__((no_sanitize("unsigned-integer-overflow"))) ++#else ++#define NO_UBSAN_UINT_OVERFLOW ++#endif ++ ++ ++/** ++ * const_time_fill_msb - Fill all bits with MSB value ++ * @val: Input value ++ * Returns: Value with all the bits set to the MSB of the input val ++ */ ++static inline unsigned int const_time_fill_msb(unsigned int val) ++{ ++ /* Move the MSB to LSB and multiple by -1 to fill in all bits. */ ++ return (val >> (sizeof(val) * 8 - 1)) * ~0U; ++} ++ ++ ++/* Returns: -1 if val is zero; 0 if val is not zero */ ++static inline unsigned int const_time_is_zero(unsigned int val) ++ NO_UBSAN_UINT_OVERFLOW ++{ ++ /* Set MSB to 1 for 0 and fill rest of bits with the MSB value */ ++ return const_time_fill_msb(~val & (val - 1)); ++} ++ ++ ++/* Returns: -1 if a == b; 0 if a != b */ ++static inline unsigned int const_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) ++{ ++ return const_time_is_zero(a ^ b); ++} ++ ++ ++/* Returns: -1 if a == b; 0 if a != b */ ++static inline u8 const_time_eq_u8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) ++{ ++ return (u8) const_time_eq(a, b); ++} ++ ++ ++/** ++ * const_time_eq_bin - Constant time memory comparison ++ * @a: First buffer to compare ++ * @b: Second buffer to compare ++ * @len: Number of octets to compare ++ * Returns: -1 if buffers are equal, 0 if not ++ * ++ * This function is meant for comparing passwords or hash values where ++ * difference in execution time or memory access pattern could provide external ++ * observer information about the location of the difference in the memory ++ * buffers. The return value does not behave like memcmp(), i.e., ++ * const_time_eq_bin() cannot be used to sort items into a defined order. Unlike ++ * memcmp(), the execution time of const_time_eq_bin() does not depend on the ++ * contents of the compared memory buffers, but only on the total compared ++ * length. ++ */ ++static inline unsigned int const_time_eq_bin(const void *a, const void *b, ++ size_t len) ++{ ++ const u8 *aa = a; ++ const u8 *bb = b; ++ size_t i; ++ u8 res = 0; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) ++ res |= aa[i] ^ bb[i]; ++ ++ return const_time_is_zero(res); ++} ++ ++ ++/** ++ * const_time_select - Constant time unsigned int selection ++ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select ++ * @true_val: Value to select for the true case ++ * @false_val: Value to select for the false case ++ * Returns: true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0 ++ */ ++static inline unsigned int const_time_select(unsigned int mask, ++ unsigned int true_val, ++ unsigned int false_val) ++{ ++ return (mask & true_val) | (~mask & false_val); ++} ++ ++ ++/** ++ * const_time_select_int - Constant time int selection ++ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select ++ * @true_val: Value to select for the true case ++ * @false_val: Value to select for the false case ++ * Returns: true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0 ++ */ ++static inline int const_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int true_val, ++ int false_val) ++{ ++ return (int) const_time_select(mask, (unsigned int) true_val, ++ (unsigned int) false_val); ++} ++ ++ ++/** ++ * const_time_select_u8 - Constant time u8 selection ++ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select ++ * @true_val: Value to select for the true case ++ * @false_val: Value to select for the false case ++ * Returns: true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0 ++ */ ++static inline u8 const_time_select_u8(u8 mask, u8 true_val, u8 false_val) ++{ ++ return (u8) const_time_select(mask, true_val, false_val); ++} ++ ++ ++/** ++ * const_time_select_s8 - Constant time s8 selection ++ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select ++ * @true_val: Value to select for the true case ++ * @false_val: Value to select for the false case ++ * Returns: true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0 ++ */ ++static inline s8 const_time_select_s8(u8 mask, s8 true_val, s8 false_val) ++{ ++ return (s8) const_time_select(mask, (unsigned int) true_val, ++ (unsigned int) false_val); ++} ++ ++ ++/** ++ * const_time_select_bin - Constant time binary buffer selection copy ++ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to copy ++ * @true_val: Buffer to copy for the true case ++ * @false_val: Buffer to copy for the false case ++ * @len: Number of octets to copy ++ * @dst: Destination buffer for the copy ++ * ++ * This function copies the specified buffer into the destination buffer using ++ * operations with identical memory access pattern regardless of which buffer ++ * is being copied. ++ */ ++static inline void const_time_select_bin(u8 mask, const u8 *true_val, ++ const u8 *false_val, size_t len, ++ u8 *dst) ++{ ++ size_t i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) ++ dst[i] = const_time_select_u8(mask, true_val[i], false_val[i]); ++} ++ ++ ++static inline int const_time_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t len) ++{ ++ const u8 *aa = a; ++ const u8 *bb = b; ++ int diff, res = 0; ++ unsigned int mask; ++ ++ if (len == 0) ++ return 0; ++ do { ++ len--; ++ diff = (int) aa[len] - (int) bb[len]; ++ mask = const_time_is_zero((unsigned int) diff); ++ res = const_time_select_int(mask, res, diff); ++ } while (len); ++ ++ return res; ++} ++ ++#endif /* CONST_TIME_H */ diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0003-OpenSSL-Use-constant-time-selection-for-crypto_bignu.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0003-OpenSSL-Use-constant-time-selection-for-crypto_bignu.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0d89b46cb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0003-OpenSSL-Use-constant-time-selection-for-crypto_bignu.patch @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +From c93461c1d98f52681717a088776ab32fd97872b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2019 00:24:12 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 03/14] OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for + crypto_bignum_legendre() + +Get rid of the branches that depend on the result of the Legendre +operation. This is needed to avoid leaking information about different +temporary results in blinding mechanisms. + +This is related to CVE-2019-9494 and CVE-2019-9495. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +--- + src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c | 15 +++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c ++++ b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c +@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ + #endif /* CONFIG_ECC */ + + #include "common.h" ++#include "utils/const_time.h" + #include "wpabuf.h" + #include "dh_group5.h" + #include "sha1.h" +@@ -1435,6 +1436,7 @@ int crypto_bignum_legendre(const struct + BN_CTX *bnctx; + BIGNUM *exp = NULL, *tmp = NULL; + int res = -2; ++ unsigned int mask; + + if (TEST_FAIL()) + return -2; +@@ -1453,12 +1455,13 @@ int crypto_bignum_legendre(const struct + (const BIGNUM *) p, bnctx, NULL)) + goto fail; + +- if (BN_is_word(tmp, 1)) +- res = 1; +- else if (BN_is_zero(tmp)) +- res = 0; +- else +- res = -1; ++ /* Return 1 if tmp == 1, 0 if tmp == 0, or -1 otherwise. Need to use ++ * constant time selection to avoid branches here. */ ++ res = -1; ++ mask = const_time_eq(BN_is_word(tmp, 1), 1); ++ res = const_time_select_int(mask, 1, res); ++ mask = const_time_eq(BN_is_zero(tmp), 1); ++ res = const_time_select_int(mask, 0, res); + + fail: + BN_clear_free(tmp); diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0005-SAE-Minimize-timing-differences-in-PWE-derivation.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0005-SAE-Minimize-timing-differences-in-PWE-derivation.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e72a9cbe5a --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0005-SAE-Minimize-timing-differences-in-PWE-derivation.patch @@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ +From 6513db3e96c43c2e36805cf5ead349765d18eaf7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 13:05:09 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 05/14] SAE: Minimize timing differences in PWE derivation + +The QR test result can provide information about the password to an +attacker, so try to minimize differences in how the +sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc() result is used. (CVE-2019-9494) + +Use heap memory for the dummy password to allow the same password length +to be used even with long passwords. + +Use constant time selection functions to track the real vs. dummy +variables so that the exact same operations can be performed for both QR +test results. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +--- + src/common/sae.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- + 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/common/sae.c ++++ b/src/common/sae.c +@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ + #include "includes.h" + + #include "common.h" ++#include "utils/const_time.h" + #include "crypto/crypto.h" + #include "crypto/sha256.h" + #include "crypto/random.h" +@@ -269,15 +270,12 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct + const u8 *prime, + const struct crypto_bignum *qr, + const struct crypto_bignum *qnr, +- struct crypto_bignum **ret_x_cand) ++ u8 *pwd_value) + { +- u8 pwd_value[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; + struct crypto_bignum *y_sqr, *x_cand; + int res; + size_t bits; + +- *ret_x_cand = NULL; +- + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed", pwd_seed, SHA256_MAC_LEN); + + /* pwd-value = KDF-z(pwd-seed, "SAE Hunting and Pecking", p) */ +@@ -286,7 +284,7 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct + prime, sae->tmp->prime_len, pwd_value, bits) < 0) + return -1; + if (bits % 8) +- buf_shift_right(pwd_value, sizeof(pwd_value), 8 - bits % 8); ++ buf_shift_right(pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len, 8 - bits % 8); + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value", + pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len); + +@@ -297,20 +295,13 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct + if (!x_cand) + return -1; + y_sqr = crypto_ec_point_compute_y_sqr(sae->tmp->ec, x_cand); +- if (!y_sqr) { +- crypto_bignum_deinit(x_cand, 1); ++ crypto_bignum_deinit(x_cand, 1); ++ if (!y_sqr) + return -1; +- } + + res = is_quadratic_residue_blind(sae, prime, bits, qr, qnr, y_sqr); + crypto_bignum_deinit(y_sqr, 1); +- if (res <= 0) { +- crypto_bignum_deinit(x_cand, 1); +- return res; +- } +- +- *ret_x_cand = x_cand; +- return 1; ++ return res; + } + + +@@ -431,25 +422,30 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae + const u8 *addr[3]; + size_t len[3]; + size_t num_elem; +- u8 dummy_password[32]; +- size_t dummy_password_len; ++ u8 *dummy_password, *tmp_password; + int pwd_seed_odd = 0; + u8 prime[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; + size_t prime_len; +- struct crypto_bignum *x = NULL, *qr, *qnr; ++ struct crypto_bignum *x = NULL, *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL; ++ u8 x_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; ++ u8 x_cand_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; + size_t bits; +- int res; +- +- dummy_password_len = password_len; +- if (dummy_password_len > sizeof(dummy_password)) +- dummy_password_len = sizeof(dummy_password); +- if (random_get_bytes(dummy_password, dummy_password_len) < 0) +- return -1; ++ int res = -1; ++ u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_* ++ * mask */ ++ ++ os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin)); ++ ++ dummy_password = os_malloc(password_len); ++ tmp_password = os_malloc(password_len); ++ if (!dummy_password || !tmp_password || ++ random_get_bytes(dummy_password, password_len) < 0) ++ goto fail; + + prime_len = sae->tmp->prime_len; + if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(sae->tmp->prime, prime, sizeof(prime), + prime_len) < 0) +- return -1; ++ goto fail; + bits = crypto_ec_prime_len_bits(sae->tmp->ec); + + /* +@@ -458,7 +454,7 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae + */ + if (get_random_qr_qnr(prime, prime_len, sae->tmp->prime, bits, + &qr, &qnr) < 0) +- return -1; ++ goto fail; + + wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password", + password, password_len); +@@ -474,7 +470,7 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae + */ + sae_pwd_seed_key(addr1, addr2, addrs); + +- addr[0] = password; ++ addr[0] = tmp_password; + len[0] = password_len; + num_elem = 1; + if (identifier) { +@@ -491,9 +487,8 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae + * attacks that attempt to determine the number of iterations required + * in the loop. + */ +- for (counter = 1; counter <= k || !x; counter++) { ++ for (counter = 1; counter <= k || !found; counter++) { + u8 pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN]; +- struct crypto_bignum *x_cand; + + if (counter > 200) { + /* This should not happen in practice */ +@@ -501,40 +496,49 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae + break; + } + +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: counter = %u", counter); ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: counter = %03u", counter); ++ const_time_select_bin(found, dummy_password, password, ++ password_len, tmp_password); + if (hmac_sha256_vector(addrs, sizeof(addrs), num_elem, + addr, len, pwd_seed) < 0) + break; + + res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(sae, pwd_seed, +- prime, qr, qnr, &x_cand); ++ prime, qr, qnr, x_cand_bin); ++ const_time_select_bin(found, x_bin, x_cand_bin, prime_len, ++ x_bin); ++ pwd_seed_odd = const_time_select_u8( ++ found, pwd_seed_odd, ++ pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN - 1] & 0x01); ++ os_memset(pwd_seed, 0, sizeof(pwd_seed)); + if (res < 0) + goto fail; +- if (res > 0 && !x) { +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, +- "SAE: Selected pwd-seed with counter %u", +- counter); +- x = x_cand; +- pwd_seed_odd = pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN - 1] & 0x01; +- os_memset(pwd_seed, 0, sizeof(pwd_seed)); +- +- /* +- * Use a dummy password for the following rounds, if +- * any. +- */ +- addr[0] = dummy_password; +- len[0] = dummy_password_len; +- } else if (res > 0) { +- crypto_bignum_deinit(x_cand, 1); +- } ++ /* Need to minimize differences in handling res == 0 and 1 here ++ * to avoid differences in timing and instruction cache access, ++ * so use const_time_select_*() to make local copies of the ++ * values based on whether this loop iteration was the one that ++ * found the pwd-seed/x. */ ++ ++ /* found is 0 or 0xff here and res is 0 or 1. Bitwise OR of them ++ * (with res converted to 0/0xff) handles this in constant time. ++ */ ++ found |= res * 0xff; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed result %d found=0x%02x", ++ res, found); + } + +- if (!x) { ++ if (!found) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not generate PWE"); + res = -1; + goto fail; + } + ++ x = crypto_bignum_init_set(x_bin, prime_len); ++ if (!x) { ++ res = -1; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ + if (!sae->tmp->pwe_ecc) + sae->tmp->pwe_ecc = crypto_ec_point_init(sae->tmp->ec); + if (!sae->tmp->pwe_ecc) +@@ -543,7 +547,6 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae + res = crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(sae->tmp->ec, + sae->tmp->pwe_ecc, x, + pwd_seed_odd); +- crypto_bignum_deinit(x, 1); + if (res < 0) { + /* + * This should not happen since we already checked that there +@@ -555,6 +558,11 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae + fail: + crypto_bignum_deinit(qr, 0); + crypto_bignum_deinit(qnr, 0); ++ os_free(dummy_password); ++ bin_clear_free(tmp_password, password_len); ++ crypto_bignum_deinit(x, 1); ++ os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin)); ++ os_memset(x_cand_bin, 0, sizeof(x_cand_bin)); + + return res; + } diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0006-SAE-Avoid-branches-in-is_quadratic_residue_blind.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0006-SAE-Avoid-branches-in-is_quadratic_residue_blind.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6d93cb2480 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0006-SAE-Avoid-branches-in-is_quadratic_residue_blind.patch @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +From 362704dda04507e7ebb8035122e83d9f0ae7c320 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 19:34:38 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 06/14] SAE: Avoid branches in is_quadratic_residue_blind() + +Make the non-failure path in the function proceed without branches based +on r_odd and in constant time to minimize risk of observable differences +in timing or cache use. (CVE-2019-9494) + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +--- + src/common/sae.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------ + 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/common/sae.c ++++ b/src/common/sae.c +@@ -209,12 +209,14 @@ get_rand_1_to_p_1(const u8 *prime, size_ + + static int is_quadratic_residue_blind(struct sae_data *sae, + const u8 *prime, size_t bits, +- const struct crypto_bignum *qr, +- const struct crypto_bignum *qnr, ++ const u8 *qr, const u8 *qnr, + const struct crypto_bignum *y_sqr) + { +- struct crypto_bignum *r, *num; ++ struct crypto_bignum *r, *num, *qr_or_qnr = NULL; + int r_odd, check, res = -1; ++ u8 qr_or_qnr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; ++ size_t prime_len = sae->tmp->prime_len; ++ unsigned int mask; + + /* + * Use the blinding technique to mask y_sqr while determining +@@ -225,7 +227,7 @@ static int is_quadratic_residue_blind(st + * r = a random number between 1 and p-1, inclusive + * num = (v * r * r) modulo p + */ +- r = get_rand_1_to_p_1(prime, sae->tmp->prime_len, bits, &r_odd); ++ r = get_rand_1_to_p_1(prime, prime_len, bits, &r_odd); + if (!r) + return -1; + +@@ -235,41 +237,45 @@ static int is_quadratic_residue_blind(st + crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, r, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0) + goto fail; + +- if (r_odd) { +- /* +- * num = (num * qr) module p +- * LGR(num, p) = 1 ==> quadratic residue +- */ +- if (crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, qr, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0) +- goto fail; +- check = 1; +- } else { +- /* +- * num = (num * qnr) module p +- * LGR(num, p) = -1 ==> quadratic residue +- */ +- if (crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, qnr, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0) +- goto fail; +- check = -1; +- } ++ /* ++ * Need to minimize differences in handling different cases, so try to ++ * avoid branches and timing differences. ++ * ++ * If r_odd: ++ * num = (num * qr) module p ++ * LGR(num, p) = 1 ==> quadratic residue ++ * else: ++ * num = (num * qnr) module p ++ * LGR(num, p) = -1 ==> quadratic residue ++ */ ++ mask = const_time_is_zero(r_odd); ++ const_time_select_bin(mask, qnr, qr, prime_len, qr_or_qnr_bin); ++ qr_or_qnr = crypto_bignum_init_set(qr_or_qnr_bin, prime_len); ++ if (!qr_or_qnr || ++ crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, qr_or_qnr, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0) ++ goto fail; ++ /* r_odd is 0 or 1; branchless version of check = r_odd ? 1 : -1, */ ++ check = const_time_select_int(mask, -1, 1); + + res = crypto_bignum_legendre(num, sae->tmp->prime); + if (res == -2) { + res = -1; + goto fail; + } +- res = res == check; ++ /* branchless version of res = res == check ++ * (res is -1, 0, or 1; check is -1 or 1) */ ++ mask = const_time_eq(res, check); ++ res = const_time_select_int(mask, 1, 0); + fail: + crypto_bignum_deinit(num, 1); + crypto_bignum_deinit(r, 1); ++ crypto_bignum_deinit(qr_or_qnr, 1); + return res; + } + + + static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed, +- const u8 *prime, +- const struct crypto_bignum *qr, +- const struct crypto_bignum *qnr, ++ const u8 *prime, const u8 *qr, const u8 *qnr, + u8 *pwd_value) + { + struct crypto_bignum *y_sqr, *x_cand; +@@ -429,6 +435,8 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae + struct crypto_bignum *x = NULL, *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL; + u8 x_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; + u8 x_cand_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; ++ u8 qr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; ++ u8 qnr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; + size_t bits; + int res = -1; + u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_* +@@ -453,7 +461,9 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae + * (qnr) modulo p for blinding purposes during the loop. + */ + if (get_random_qr_qnr(prime, prime_len, sae->tmp->prime, bits, +- &qr, &qnr) < 0) ++ &qr, &qnr) < 0 || ++ crypto_bignum_to_bin(qr, qr_bin, sizeof(qr_bin), prime_len) < 0 || ++ crypto_bignum_to_bin(qnr, qnr_bin, sizeof(qnr_bin), prime_len) < 0) + goto fail; + + wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password", +@@ -504,7 +514,7 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae + break; + + res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(sae, pwd_seed, +- prime, qr, qnr, x_cand_bin); ++ prime, qr_bin, qnr_bin, x_cand_bin); + const_time_select_bin(found, x_bin, x_cand_bin, prime_len, + x_bin); + pwd_seed_odd = const_time_select_u8( diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0007-SAE-Mask-timing-of-MODP-groups-22-23-24.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0007-SAE-Mask-timing-of-MODP-groups-22-23-24.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..229d2b1070 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0007-SAE-Mask-timing-of-MODP-groups-22-23-24.patch @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +From 90839597cc4016b33f00055b12d59174c62770a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +Date: Sat, 2 Mar 2019 12:24:09 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 07/14] SAE: Mask timing of MODP groups 22, 23, 24 + +These groups have significant probability of coming up with pwd-value +that is equal or greater than the prime and as such, need for going +through the PWE derivation loop multiple times. This can result in +sufficient timing different to allow an external observer to determine +how many rounds are needed and that can leak information about the used +password. + +Force at least 40 loop rounds for these MODP groups similarly to the ECC +group design to mask timing. This behavior is not described in IEEE Std +802.11-2016 for SAE, but it does not result in different values (i.e., +only different timing), so such implementation specific countermeasures +can be done without breaking interoperability with other implementation. + +Note: These MODP groups 22, 23, and 24 are not considered sufficiently +strong to be used with SAE (or more or less anything else). As such, +they should never be enabled in runtime configuration for any production +use cases. These changes to introduce additional protection to mask +timing is only for completeness of implementation and not an indication +that these groups should be used. + +This is related to CVE-2019-9494. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +--- + src/common/sae.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- + 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/common/sae.c ++++ b/src/common/sae.c +@@ -578,22 +578,27 @@ fail: + } + + ++static int sae_modp_group_require_masking(int group) ++{ ++ /* Groups for which pwd-value is likely to be >= p frequently */ ++ return group == 22 || group == 23 || group == 24; ++} ++ ++ + static int sae_derive_pwe_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1, + const u8 *addr2, const u8 *password, + size_t password_len, const char *identifier) + { +- u8 counter; ++ u8 counter, k; + u8 addrs[2 * ETH_ALEN]; + const u8 *addr[3]; + size_t len[3]; + size_t num_elem; + int found = 0; ++ struct crypto_bignum *pwe = NULL; + +- if (sae->tmp->pwe_ffc == NULL) { +- sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = crypto_bignum_init(); +- if (sae->tmp->pwe_ffc == NULL) +- return -1; +- } ++ crypto_bignum_deinit(sae->tmp->pwe_ffc, 1); ++ sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = NULL; + + wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password", + password, password_len); +@@ -617,7 +622,9 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ffc(struct sae + len[num_elem] = sizeof(counter); + num_elem++; + +- for (counter = 1; !found; counter++) { ++ k = sae_modp_group_require_masking(sae->group) ? 40 : 1; ++ ++ for (counter = 1; counter <= k || !found; counter++) { + u8 pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN]; + int res; + +@@ -627,19 +634,30 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ffc(struct sae + break; + } + +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: counter = %u", counter); ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: counter = %02u", counter); + if (hmac_sha256_vector(addrs, sizeof(addrs), num_elem, + addr, len, pwd_seed) < 0) + break; +- res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(sae, pwd_seed, sae->tmp->pwe_ffc); ++ if (!pwe) { ++ pwe = crypto_bignum_init(); ++ if (!pwe) ++ break; ++ } ++ res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(sae, pwd_seed, pwe); + if (res < 0) + break; + if (res > 0) { +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Use this PWE"); + found = 1; ++ if (!sae->tmp->pwe_ffc) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Use this PWE"); ++ sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = pwe; ++ pwe = NULL; ++ } + } + } + ++ crypto_bignum_deinit(pwe, 1); ++ + return found ? 0 : -1; + } + diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0008-SAE-Use-const_time-selection-for-PWE-in-FFC.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0008-SAE-Use-const_time-selection-for-PWE-in-FFC.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..47e1b3c68e --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0008-SAE-Use-const_time-selection-for-PWE-in-FFC.patch @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +From f8f20717f87eff1f025f48ed585c7684debacf72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +Date: Sat, 2 Mar 2019 12:45:33 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 08/14] SAE: Use const_time selection for PWE in FFC + +This is an initial step towards making the FFC case use strictly +constant time operations similarly to the ECC case. +sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc() does not yet have constant time behavior, +though. + +This is related to CVE-2019-9494. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +--- + src/common/sae.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ + 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/common/sae.c ++++ b/src/common/sae.c +@@ -589,17 +589,28 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ffc(struct sae + const u8 *addr2, const u8 *password, + size_t password_len, const char *identifier) + { +- u8 counter, k; ++ u8 counter, k, sel_counter = 0; + u8 addrs[2 * ETH_ALEN]; + const u8 *addr[3]; + size_t len[3]; + size_t num_elem; +- int found = 0; +- struct crypto_bignum *pwe = NULL; ++ u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_* ++ * mask */ ++ u8 mask; ++ struct crypto_bignum *pwe; ++ size_t prime_len = sae->tmp->prime_len * 8; ++ u8 *pwe_buf; + + crypto_bignum_deinit(sae->tmp->pwe_ffc, 1); + sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = NULL; + ++ /* Allocate a buffer to maintain selected and candidate PWE for constant ++ * time selection. */ ++ pwe_buf = os_zalloc(prime_len * 2); ++ pwe = crypto_bignum_init(); ++ if (!pwe_buf || !pwe) ++ goto fail; ++ + wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password", + password, password_len); + +@@ -638,27 +649,33 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ffc(struct sae + if (hmac_sha256_vector(addrs, sizeof(addrs), num_elem, + addr, len, pwd_seed) < 0) + break; +- if (!pwe) { +- pwe = crypto_bignum_init(); +- if (!pwe) +- break; +- } + res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(sae, pwd_seed, pwe); ++ /* res is -1 for fatal failure, 0 if a valid PWE was not found, ++ * or 1 if a valid PWE was found. */ + if (res < 0) + break; +- if (res > 0) { +- found = 1; +- if (!sae->tmp->pwe_ffc) { +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Use this PWE"); +- sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = pwe; +- pwe = NULL; +- } +- } ++ /* Store the candidate PWE into the second half of pwe_buf and ++ * the selected PWE in the beginning of pwe_buf using constant ++ * time selection. */ ++ if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(pwe, pwe_buf + prime_len, prime_len, ++ prime_len) < 0) ++ break; ++ const_time_select_bin(found, pwe_buf, pwe_buf + prime_len, ++ prime_len, pwe_buf); ++ sel_counter = const_time_select_u8(found, sel_counter, counter); ++ mask = const_time_eq_u8(res, 1); ++ found = const_time_select_u8(found, found, mask); + } + +- crypto_bignum_deinit(pwe, 1); ++ if (!found) ++ goto fail; + +- return found ? 0 : -1; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Use PWE from counter = %02u", sel_counter); ++ sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwe_buf, prime_len); ++fail: ++ crypto_bignum_deinit(pwe, 1); ++ bin_clear_free(pwe_buf, prime_len * 2); ++ return sae->tmp->pwe_ffc ? 0 : -1; + } + + diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0009-SAE-Use-constant-time-operations-in-sae_test_pwd_see.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0009-SAE-Use-constant-time-operations-in-sae_test_pwd_see.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..150cbeb8ac --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0009-SAE-Use-constant-time-operations-in-sae_test_pwd_see.patch @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +From cff138b0747fa39765cbc641b66cfa5d7f1735d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +Date: Sat, 2 Mar 2019 16:05:56 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 09/14] SAE: Use constant time operations in + sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc() + +Try to avoid showing externally visible timing or memory access +differences regardless of whether the derived pwd-value is smaller than +the group prime. + +This is related to CVE-2019-9494. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +--- + src/common/sae.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- + 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/common/sae.c ++++ b/src/common/sae.c +@@ -311,14 +311,17 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct + } + + ++/* Returns -1 on fatal failure, 0 if PWE cannot be derived from the provided ++ * pwd-seed, or 1 if a valid PWE was derived from pwd-seed. */ + static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed, + struct crypto_bignum *pwe) + { + u8 pwd_value[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN]; + size_t bits = sae->tmp->prime_len * 8; + u8 exp[1]; +- struct crypto_bignum *a, *b; +- int res; ++ struct crypto_bignum *a, *b = NULL; ++ int res, is_val; ++ u8 pwd_value_valid; + + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed", pwd_seed, SHA256_MAC_LEN); + +@@ -330,16 +333,29 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(struct + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value", pwd_value, + sae->tmp->prime_len); + +- if (os_memcmp(pwd_value, sae->tmp->dh->prime, sae->tmp->prime_len) >= 0) +- { +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value >= p"); +- return 0; +- } ++ /* Check whether pwd-value < p */ ++ res = const_time_memcmp(pwd_value, sae->tmp->dh->prime, ++ sae->tmp->prime_len); ++ /* pwd-value >= p is invalid, so res is < 0 for the valid cases and ++ * the negative sign can be used to fill the mask for constant time ++ * selection */ ++ pwd_value_valid = const_time_fill_msb(res); ++ ++ /* If pwd-value >= p, force pwd-value to be < p and perform the ++ * calculations anyway to hide timing difference. The derived PWE will ++ * be ignored in that case. */ ++ pwd_value[0] = const_time_select_u8(pwd_value_valid, pwd_value[0], 0); + + /* PWE = pwd-value^((p-1)/r) modulo p */ + ++ res = -1; + a = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len); ++ if (!a) ++ goto fail; + ++ /* This is an optimization based on the used group that does not depend ++ * on the password in any way, so it is fine to use separate branches ++ * for this step without constant time operations. */ + if (sae->tmp->dh->safe_prime) { + /* + * r = (p-1)/2 for the group used here, so this becomes: +@@ -353,33 +369,34 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(struct + b = crypto_bignum_init_set(exp, sizeof(exp)); + if (b == NULL || + crypto_bignum_sub(sae->tmp->prime, b, b) < 0 || +- crypto_bignum_div(b, sae->tmp->order, b) < 0) { +- crypto_bignum_deinit(b, 0); +- b = NULL; +- } ++ crypto_bignum_div(b, sae->tmp->order, b) < 0) ++ goto fail; + } + +- if (a == NULL || b == NULL) +- res = -1; +- else +- res = crypto_bignum_exptmod(a, b, sae->tmp->prime, pwe); +- +- crypto_bignum_deinit(a, 0); +- crypto_bignum_deinit(b, 0); +- +- if (res < 0) { +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Failed to calculate PWE"); +- return -1; +- } +- +- /* if (PWE > 1) --> found */ +- if (crypto_bignum_is_zero(pwe) || crypto_bignum_is_one(pwe)) { +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE <= 1"); +- return 0; +- } ++ if (!b) ++ goto fail; + +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE found"); +- return 1; ++ res = crypto_bignum_exptmod(a, b, sae->tmp->prime, pwe); ++ if (res < 0) ++ goto fail; ++ ++ /* There were no fatal errors in calculations, so determine the return ++ * value using constant time operations. We get here for number of ++ * invalid cases which are cleared here after having performed all the ++ * computation. PWE is valid if pwd-value was less than prime and ++ * PWE > 1. Start with pwd-value check first and then use constant time ++ * operations to clear res to 0 if PWE is 0 or 1. ++ */ ++ res = const_time_select_u8(pwd_value_valid, 1, 0); ++ is_val = crypto_bignum_is_zero(pwe); ++ res = const_time_select_u8(const_time_is_zero(is_val), res, 0); ++ is_val = crypto_bignum_is_one(pwe); ++ res = const_time_select_u8(const_time_is_zero(is_val), res, 0); ++ ++fail: ++ crypto_bignum_deinit(a, 1); ++ crypto_bignum_deinit(b, 1); ++ return res; + } + + |