1 files changed, 33 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/network/utils/curl/patches/406-CVE-2019-3822.patch b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/406-CVE-2019-3822.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bb8bb6cb3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/406-CVE-2019-3822.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 50c9484278c63b958655a717844f0721263939cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 12:59:28 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] ntlm: fix *_type3_message size check to avoid buffer overflow
+
+Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-3822.html
+Reported-by: Wenxiang Qian
+CVE-2019-3822
+---
+ lib/vauth/ntlm.c | 11 +++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
++++ b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
+@@ -776,11 +776,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_ntlm_type3_mes
+   });
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_NTRESPONSES
+-  if(size < (NTLM_BUFSIZE - ntresplen)) {
+-    DEBUGASSERT(size == (size_t)ntrespoff);
+-    memcpy(&ntlmbuf[size], ptr_ntresp, ntresplen);
+-    size += ntresplen;
++  /* ntresplen + size should not be risking an integer overflow here */
++  if(ntresplen + size > sizeof(ntlmbuf)) {
++    failf(data, "incoming NTLM message too big");
++    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+   }
++  DEBUGASSERT(size == (size_t)ntrespoff);
++  memcpy(&ntlmbuf[size], ptr_ntresp, ntresplen);
++  size += ntresplen;
+ 
+   DEBUG_OUT({
+     fprintf(stderr, "\n   ntresp=");