diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'package/network/services')
4 files changed, 253 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/Makefile b/package/network/services/samba36/Makefile index 9e282f0233..7b571a4410 100644 --- a/package/network/services/samba36/Makefile +++ b/package/network/services/samba36/Makefile @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk PKG_NAME:=samba PKG_VERSION:=3.6.25 -PKG_RELEASE:=4 +PKG_RELEASE:=5 PKG_SOURCE_URL:=http://ftp.samba.org/pub/samba \ http://ftp.samba.org/pub/samba/stable diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/010-patch-cve-2015-5252.patch b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/010-patch-cve-2015-5252.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8922a6e505 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/010-patch-cve-2015-5252.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 2e94b6ec10f1d15e24867bab3063bb85f173406a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> +Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2015 10:58:11 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2015-5252: s3: smbd: Fix symlink verification (file + access outside the share). + +Ensure matching component ends in '/' or '\0'. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11395 + +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org> +--- + source3/smbd/vfs.c | 7 +++++-- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/source3/smbd/vfs.c b/source3/smbd/vfs.c +index 6c56964..bd93b7f 100644 +--- a/source3/smbd/vfs.c ++++ b/source3/smbd/vfs.c +@@ -982,6 +982,7 @@ NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_struct *conn, const char *fname) + if (!allow_widelinks || !allow_symlinks) { + const char *conn_rootdir; + size_t rootdir_len; ++ bool matched; + + conn_rootdir = SMB_VFS_CONNECTPATH(conn, fname); + if (conn_rootdir == NULL) { +@@ -992,8 +993,10 @@ NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_struct *conn, const char *fname) + } + + rootdir_len = strlen(conn_rootdir); +- if (strncmp(conn_rootdir, resolved_name, +- rootdir_len) != 0) { ++ matched = (strncmp(conn_rootdir, resolved_name, ++ rootdir_len) == 0); ++ if (!matched || (resolved_name[rootdir_len] != '/' && ++ resolved_name[rootdir_len] != '\0')) { + DEBUG(2, ("check_reduced_name: Bad access " + "attempt: %s is a symlink outside the " + "share path\n", fname)); +-- +2.5.0 diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/011-patch-cve-2015-5296.patch b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/011-patch-cve-2015-5296.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eaafd1c667 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/011-patch-cve-2015-5296.patch @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +From 25139116756cc285a3a5534834cc276ef1b7baaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> +Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2015 21:17:02 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] CVE-2015-5296: s3:libsmb: force signing when requiring + encryption in do_connect() + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11536 + +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> +--- + source3/libsmb/clidfs.c | 7 ++++++- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c +index 23e1471..f153b6b 100644 +--- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c ++++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c +@@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ static struct cli_state *do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, + const char *username; + const char *password; + NTSTATUS status; ++ int signing_state = get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(auth_info); ++ ++ if (force_encrypt) { ++ signing_state = Required; ++ } + + /* make a copy so we don't modify the global string 'service' */ + servicename = talloc_strdup(ctx,share); +@@ -132,7 +137,7 @@ static struct cli_state *do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, + zero_sockaddr(&ss); + + /* have to open a new connection */ +- c = cli_initialise_ex(get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(auth_info)); ++ c = cli_initialise_ex(signing_state); + if (c == NULL) { + d_printf("Connection to %s failed\n", server_n); + return NULL; +-- +2.5.0 + + +From 060adb0abdeda51b8b622c6020b5dea0c8dde1cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> +Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2015 21:17:02 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2015-5296: s3:libsmb: force signing when requiring + encryption in SMBC_server_internal() + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11536 + +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> +--- + source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c | 13 +++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c +index 45be660..167f2c9 100644 +--- a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c ++++ b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c +@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ SMBC_server_internal(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, + const char *username_used; + NTSTATUS status; + char *newserver, *newshare; ++ int signing_state = Undefined; + + zero_sockaddr(&ss); + ZERO_STRUCT(c); +@@ -404,8 +405,12 @@ again: + + zero_sockaddr(&ss); + ++ if (context->internal->smb_encryption_level != SMBC_ENCRYPTLEVEL_NONE) { ++ signing_state = Required; ++ } ++ + /* have to open a new connection */ +- if ((c = cli_initialise()) == NULL) { ++ if ((c = cli_initialise_ex(signing_state)) == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return NULL; + } +@@ -750,6 +755,7 @@ SMBC_attr_server(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, + ipc_srv = SMBC_find_server(ctx, context, server, "*IPC$", + pp_workgroup, pp_username, pp_password); + if (!ipc_srv) { ++ int signing_state = Undefined; + + /* We didn't find a cached connection. Get the password */ + if (!*pp_password || (*pp_password)[0] == '\0') { +@@ -771,6 +777,9 @@ SMBC_attr_server(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, + if (smbc_getOptionUseCCache(context)) { + flags |= CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_CCACHE; + } ++ if (context->internal->smb_encryption_level != SMBC_ENCRYPTLEVEL_NONE) { ++ signing_state = Required; ++ } + + zero_sockaddr(&ss); + nt_status = cli_full_connection(&ipc_cli, +@@ -780,7 +789,7 @@ SMBC_attr_server(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, + *pp_workgroup, + *pp_password, + flags, +- Undefined); ++ signing_state); + if (! NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + DEBUG(1,("cli_full_connection failed! (%s)\n", + nt_errstr(nt_status))); +-- +2.5.0 diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/012-patch-cve-2015-5299.patch b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/012-patch-cve-2015-5299.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..19cbb19890 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/012-patch-cve-2015-5299.patch @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +From 8e49de7754f7171a58a1f94dee0f1138dbee3c60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> +Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 14:54:31 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2015-5299: s3-shadow-copy2: fix missing access check on + snapdir + +Fix originally from <partha@exablox.com> + +https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11529 + +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org> +--- + source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c b/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c +index fedfb53..16c1ed7 100644 +--- a/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c ++++ b/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c +@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ + + #include "includes.h" + #include "smbd/smbd.h" ++#include "smbd/globals.h" ++#include "../libcli/security/security.h" + #include "system/filesys.h" + #include "ntioctl.h" + +@@ -764,6 +766,43 @@ static int shadow_copy2_mkdir(vfs_handle_struct *handle, const char *fname, mod + SHADOW2_NEXT(MKDIR, (handle, name, mode), int, -1); + } + ++static bool check_access_snapdir(struct vfs_handle_struct *handle, ++ const char *path) ++{ ++ struct smb_filename smb_fname; ++ int ret; ++ NTSTATUS status; ++ uint32_t access_granted = 0; ++ ++ ZERO_STRUCT(smb_fname); ++ smb_fname.base_name = talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(), ++ "%s", ++ path); ++ if (smb_fname.base_name == NULL) { ++ return false; ++ } ++ ++ ret = SMB_VFS_NEXT_STAT(handle, &smb_fname); ++ if (ret != 0 || !S_ISDIR(smb_fname.st.st_ex_mode)) { ++ TALLOC_FREE(smb_fname.base_name); ++ return false; ++ } ++ ++ status = smbd_check_open_rights(handle->conn, ++ &smb_fname, ++ SEC_DIR_LIST, ++ &access_granted); ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { ++ DEBUG(0,("user does not have list permission " ++ "on snapdir %s\n", ++ smb_fname.base_name)); ++ TALLOC_FREE(smb_fname.base_name); ++ return false; ++ } ++ TALLOC_FREE(smb_fname.base_name); ++ return true; ++} ++ + static int shadow_copy2_rmdir(vfs_handle_struct *handle, const char *fname) + { + SHADOW2_NEXT(RMDIR, (handle, name), int, -1); +@@ -877,6 +916,7 @@ static int shadow_copy2_get_shadow_copy2_data(vfs_handle_struct *handle, + SMB_STRUCT_DIRENT *d; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(handle->data); + char *snapshot; ++ bool ret; + + snapdir = shadow_copy2_find_snapdir(tmp_ctx, handle); + if (snapdir == NULL) { +@@ -886,6 +926,13 @@ static int shadow_copy2_get_shadow_copy2_data(vfs_handle_struct *handle, + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return -1; + } ++ ret = check_access_snapdir(handle, snapdir); ++ if (!ret) { ++ DEBUG(0,("access denied on listing snapdir %s\n", snapdir)); ++ errno = EACCES; ++ talloc_free(tmp_ctx); ++ return -1; ++ } + + p = SMB_VFS_NEXT_OPENDIR(handle, snapdir, NULL, 0); + +-- +2.5.0 |