diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'package/network/services/hostapd/patches/0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | package/network/services/hostapd/patches/0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch | 48 |
1 files changed, 48 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1b84f7e86a --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From 3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 01:25:53 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] WPA: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data + +Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant +processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted +flag set, but not the MIC flag. + +When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but +not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying +the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when +negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that +unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary +could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information +in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key). +(CVE-2018-14526) + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +--- + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 11 +++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 56f3af7..db94a49 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -2215,6 +2215,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr, + + if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) && + (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA) && mic_len) { ++ /* ++ * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity ++ * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not ++ * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0 ++ * which is the case in this code branch. ++ */ ++ if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) { ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, ++ "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data"); ++ goto out; ++ } + if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, mic_len, + ver, key_data, + &key_data_len)) +-- +2.7.4 + |