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-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/080-ath10k_thermal_config.patch2
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/300-ath10k-add-CCMP-PN-replay-protection-for-fragmented-.patch180
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/301-ath10k-drop-fragments-with-multicast-DA-for-PCIe.patch66
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/302-ath10k-drop-fragments-with-multicast-DA-for-SDIO.patch40
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/303-ath10k-drop-MPDU-which-has-discard-flag-set-by-firmw.patch54
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/304-ath10k-Fix-TKIP-Michael-MIC-verification-for-PCIe.patch48
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/305-ath10k-Validate-first-subframe-of-A-MSDU-before-proc.patch109
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/402-ath_regd_optional.patch2
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/551-ath9k_ubnt_uap_plus_hsr.patch2
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/922-ath10k-increase-rx-buffer-size-to-2048.patch2
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/974-ath10k_add-LED-and-GPIO-controlling-support-for-various-chipsets.patch2
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/rt2x00/602-rt2x00-introduce-rt2x00eeprom.patch2
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/380-mac80211-assure-all-fragments-are-encrypted.patch69
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/381-mac80211-prevent-mixed-key-and-fragment-cache-attack.patch87
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/382-mac80211-properly-handle-A-MSDUs-that-start-with-an-.patch66
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/383-cfg80211-mitigate-A-MSDU-aggregation-attacks.patch40
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/384-mac80211-drop-A-MSDUs-on-old-ciphers.patch54
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/385-mac80211-add-fragment-cache-to-sta_info.patch313
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/386-mac80211-check-defrag-PN-against-current-frame.patch109
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/387-mac80211-prevent-attacks-on-TKIP-WEP-as-well.patch62
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/388-mac80211-do-not-accept-forward-invalid-EAPOL-frames.patch94
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/389-mac80211-extend-protection-against-mixed-key-and-fra.patch68
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/500-mac80211_configure_antenna_gain.patch2
23 files changed, 1466 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/080-ath10k_thermal_config.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/080-ath10k_thermal_config.patch
index de6f9d9bb0..55d48daa79 100644
--- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/080-ath10k_thermal_config.patch
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/080-ath10k_thermal_config.patch
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
void ath10k_thermal_event_temperature(struct ath10k *ar, int temperature);
--- a/local-symbols
+++ b/local-symbols
-@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ ATH10K_SNOC=
+@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ ATH10K_SNOC=
ATH10K_DEBUG=
ATH10K_DEBUGFS=
ATH10K_SPECTRAL=
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/300-ath10k-add-CCMP-PN-replay-protection-for-fragmented-.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/300-ath10k-add-CCMP-PN-replay-protection-for-fragmented-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0ce49b22ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/300-ath10k-add-CCMP-PN-replay-protection-for-fragmented-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+From: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:52 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: add CCMP PN replay protection for fragmented
+ frames for PCIe
+
+PN replay check for not fragmented frames is finished in the firmware,
+but this was not done for fragmented frames when ath10k is used with
+QCA6174/QCA6377 PCIe. mac80211 has the function
+ieee80211_rx_h_defragment() for PN replay check for fragmented frames,
+but this does not get checked with QCA6174 due to the
+ieee80211_has_protected() condition not matching the cleared Protected
+bit case.
+
+Validate the PN of received fragmented frames within ath10k when CCMP is
+used and drop the fragment if the PN is not correct (incremented by
+exactly one from the previous fragment). This applies only for
+QCA6174/QCA6377 PCIe.
+
+Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+---
+
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h
+@@ -846,6 +846,7 @@ enum htt_security_types {
+
+ #define ATH10K_HTT_TXRX_PEER_SECURITY_MAX 2
+ #define ATH10K_TXRX_NUM_EXT_TIDS 19
++#define ATH10K_TXRX_NON_QOS_TID 16
+
+ enum htt_security_flags {
+ #define HTT_SECURITY_TYPE_MASK 0x7F
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
+@@ -1746,16 +1746,87 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_csum_offload
+ msdu->ip_summed = ath10k_htt_rx_get_csum_state(msdu);
+ }
+
++static u64 ath10k_htt_rx_h_get_pn(struct ath10k *ar, struct sk_buff *skb,
++ u16 offset,
++ enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype)
++{
++ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
++ u64 pn = 0;
++ u8 *ehdr;
++
++ hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)(skb->data + offset);
++ ehdr = skb->data + offset + ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
++
++ if (enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM_WPA2) {
++ pn = ehdr[0];
++ pn |= (u64)ehdr[1] << 8;
++ pn |= (u64)ehdr[4] << 16;
++ pn |= (u64)ehdr[5] << 24;
++ pn |= (u64)ehdr[6] << 32;
++ pn |= (u64)ehdr[7] << 40;
++ }
++ return pn;
++}
++
++static bool ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_pn_check(struct ath10k *ar,
++ struct sk_buff *skb,
++ u16 peer_id,
++ u16 offset,
++ enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype)
++{
++ struct ath10k_peer *peer;
++ union htt_rx_pn_t *last_pn, new_pn = {0};
++ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
++ bool more_frags;
++ u8 tid, frag_number;
++ u32 seq;
++
++ peer = ath10k_peer_find_by_id(ar, peer_id);
++ if (!peer) {
++ ath10k_dbg(ar, ATH10K_DBG_HTT, "invalid peer for frag pn check\n");
++ return false;
++ }
++
++ hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)(skb->data + offset);
++ if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
++ tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr);
++ else
++ tid = ATH10K_TXRX_NON_QOS_TID;
++
++ last_pn = &peer->frag_tids_last_pn[tid];
++ new_pn.pn48 = ath10k_htt_rx_h_get_pn(ar, skb, offset, enctype);
++ more_frags = ieee80211_has_morefrags(hdr->frame_control);
++ frag_number = le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl) & IEEE80211_SCTL_FRAG;
++ seq = (__le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl) & IEEE80211_SCTL_SEQ) >> 4;
++
++ if (frag_number == 0) {
++ last_pn->pn48 = new_pn.pn48;
++ peer->frag_tids_seq[tid] = seq;
++ } else {
++ if (seq != peer->frag_tids_seq[tid])
++ return false;
++
++ if (new_pn.pn48 != last_pn->pn48 + 1)
++ return false;
++
++ last_pn->pn48 = new_pn.pn48;
++ }
++
++ return true;
++}
++
+ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct ath10k *ar,
+ struct sk_buff_head *amsdu,
+ struct ieee80211_rx_status *status,
+ bool fill_crypt_header,
+ u8 *rx_hdr,
+- enum ath10k_pkt_rx_err *err)
++ enum ath10k_pkt_rx_err *err,
++ u16 peer_id,
++ bool frag)
+ {
+ struct sk_buff *first;
+ struct sk_buff *last;
+- struct sk_buff *msdu;
++ struct sk_buff *msdu, *temp;
+ struct htt_rx_desc *rxd;
+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
+ enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype;
+@@ -1768,6 +1839,7 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct
+ bool is_decrypted;
+ bool is_mgmt;
+ u32 attention;
++ bool frag_pn_check = true;
+
+ if (skb_queue_empty(amsdu))
+ return;
+@@ -1866,6 +1938,24 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct
+ }
+
+ skb_queue_walk(amsdu, msdu) {
++ if (frag && !fill_crypt_header && is_decrypted &&
++ enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM_WPA2)
++ frag_pn_check = ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_pn_check(ar,
++ msdu,
++ peer_id,
++ 0,
++ enctype);
++
++ if (!frag_pn_check) {
++ /* Discard the fragment with invalid PN */
++ temp = msdu->prev;
++ __skb_unlink(msdu, amsdu);
++ dev_kfree_skb_any(msdu);
++ msdu = temp;
++ frag_pn_check = true;
++ continue;
++ }
++
+ ath10k_htt_rx_h_csum_offload(msdu);
+ ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap(ar, msdu, status, first_hdr, enctype,
+ is_decrypted);
+@@ -2071,7 +2161,8 @@ static int ath10k_htt_rx_handle_amsdu(st
+ ath10k_htt_rx_h_unchain(ar, &amsdu, &drop_cnt, &unchain_cnt);
+
+ ath10k_htt_rx_h_filter(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, &drop_cnt_filter);
+- ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, true, first_hdr, &err);
++ ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, true, first_hdr, &err, 0,
++ false);
+ msdus_to_queue = skb_queue_len(&amsdu);
+ ath10k_htt_rx_h_enqueue(ar, &amsdu, rx_status);
+
+@@ -3027,7 +3118,7 @@ static int ath10k_htt_rx_in_ord_ind(stru
+ ath10k_htt_rx_h_ppdu(ar, &amsdu, status, vdev_id);
+ ath10k_htt_rx_h_filter(ar, &amsdu, status, NULL);
+ ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, status, false, NULL,
+- NULL);
++ NULL, peer_id, frag);
+ ath10k_htt_rx_h_enqueue(ar, &amsdu, status);
+ break;
+ case -EAGAIN:
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/301-ath10k-drop-fragments-with-multicast-DA-for-PCIe.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/301-ath10k-drop-fragments-with-multicast-DA-for-PCIe.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7288c66612
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/301-ath10k-drop-fragments-with-multicast-DA-for-PCIe.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: drop fragments with multicast DA for PCIe
+
+Fragmentation is not used with multicast frames. Discard unexpected
+fragments with multicast DA. This fixes CVE-2020-26145.
+
+Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+---
+
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
+@@ -1768,6 +1768,16 @@ static u64 ath10k_htt_rx_h_get_pn(struct
+ return pn;
+ }
+
++static bool ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_multicast_check(struct ath10k *ar,
++ struct sk_buff *skb,
++ u16 offset)
++{
++ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
++
++ hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)(skb->data + offset);
++ return !is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1);
++}
++
+ static bool ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_pn_check(struct ath10k *ar,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 peer_id,
+@@ -1839,7 +1849,7 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct
+ bool is_decrypted;
+ bool is_mgmt;
+ u32 attention;
+- bool frag_pn_check = true;
++ bool frag_pn_check = true, multicast_check = true;
+
+ if (skb_queue_empty(amsdu))
+ return;
+@@ -1946,13 +1956,20 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct
+ 0,
+ enctype);
+
+- if (!frag_pn_check) {
+- /* Discard the fragment with invalid PN */
++ if (frag)
++ multicast_check = ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_multicast_check(ar,
++ msdu,
++ 0);
++
++ if (!frag_pn_check || !multicast_check) {
++ /* Discard the fragment with invalid PN or multicast DA
++ */
+ temp = msdu->prev;
+ __skb_unlink(msdu, amsdu);
+ dev_kfree_skb_any(msdu);
+ msdu = temp;
+ frag_pn_check = true;
++ multicast_check = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/302-ath10k-drop-fragments-with-multicast-DA-for-SDIO.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/302-ath10k-drop-fragments-with-multicast-DA-for-SDIO.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..85d9ce65e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/302-ath10k-drop-fragments-with-multicast-DA-for-SDIO.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:54 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: drop fragments with multicast DA for SDIO
+
+Fragmentation is not used with multicast frames. Discard unexpected
+fragments with multicast DA. This fixes CVE-2020-26145.
+
+Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 SDIO WLAN.RMH.4.4.1-00049
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+---
+
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
+@@ -2617,6 +2617,13 @@ static bool ath10k_htt_rx_proc_rx_frag_i
+ rx_desc = (struct htt_hl_rx_desc *)(skb->data + tot_hdr_len);
+ rx_desc_info = __le32_to_cpu(rx_desc->info);
+
++ hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)((u8 *)rx_desc + rx_hl->fw_desc.len);
++
++ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) {
++ /* Discard the fragment with multicast DA */
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ if (!MS(rx_desc_info, HTT_RX_DESC_HL_INFO_ENCRYPTED)) {
+ spin_unlock_bh(&ar->data_lock);
+ return ath10k_htt_rx_proc_rx_ind_hl(htt, &resp->rx_ind_hl, skb,
+@@ -2624,8 +2631,6 @@ static bool ath10k_htt_rx_proc_rx_frag_i
+ HTT_RX_NON_TKIP_MIC);
+ }
+
+- hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)((u8 *)rx_desc + rx_hl->fw_desc.len);
+-
+ if (ieee80211_has_retry(hdr->frame_control))
+ goto err;
+
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/303-ath10k-drop-MPDU-which-has-discard-flag-set-by-firmw.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/303-ath10k-drop-MPDU-which-has-discard-flag-set-by-firmw.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..03bce4231b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/303-ath10k-drop-MPDU-which-has-discard-flag-set-by-firmw.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:55 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: drop MPDU which has discard flag set by firmware
+ for SDIO
+
+When the discard flag is set by the firmware for an MPDU, it should be
+dropped. This allows a mitigation for CVE-2020-24588 to be implemented
+in the firmware.
+
+Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 SDIO WLAN.RMH.4.4.1-00049
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+---
+
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
+@@ -2312,6 +2312,11 @@ static bool ath10k_htt_rx_proc_rx_ind_hl
+ fw_desc = &rx->fw_desc;
+ rx_desc_len = fw_desc->len;
+
++ if (fw_desc->u.bits.discard) {
++ ath10k_dbg(ar, ATH10K_DBG_HTT, "htt discard mpdu\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ /* I have not yet seen any case where num_mpdu_ranges > 1.
+ * qcacld does not seem handle that case either, so we introduce the
+ * same limitiation here as well.
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/rx_desc.h
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/rx_desc.h
+@@ -1282,7 +1282,19 @@ struct fw_rx_desc_base {
+ #define FW_RX_DESC_UDP (1 << 6)
+
+ struct fw_rx_desc_hl {
+- u8 info0;
++ union {
++ struct {
++ u8 discard:1,
++ forward:1,
++ any_err:1,
++ dup_err:1,
++ reserved:1,
++ inspect:1,
++ extension:2;
++ } bits;
++ u8 info0;
++ } u;
++
+ u8 version;
+ u8 len;
+ u8 flags;
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/304-ath10k-Fix-TKIP-Michael-MIC-verification-for-PCIe.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/304-ath10k-Fix-TKIP-Michael-MIC-verification-for-PCIe.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..da9d6802bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/304-ath10k-Fix-TKIP-Michael-MIC-verification-for-PCIe.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:56 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: Fix TKIP Michael MIC verification for PCIe
+
+TKIP Michael MIC was not verified properly for PCIe cases since the
+validation steps in ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify() in mac80211 did
+not get fully executed due to unexpected flag values in
+ieee80211_rx_status.
+
+Fix this by setting the flags property to meet mac80211 expectations for
+performing Michael MIC validation there. This fixes CVE-2020-26141. It
+does the same as ath10k_htt_rx_proc_rx_ind_hl() for SDIO which passed
+MIC verification case. This applies only to QCA6174/QCA9377 PCIe.
+
+Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+---
+
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
+@@ -1974,6 +1974,11 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct
+ }
+
+ ath10k_htt_rx_h_csum_offload(msdu);
++
++ if (frag && !fill_crypt_header &&
++ enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_TKIP_WPA)
++ status->flag &= ~RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED;
++
+ ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap(ar, msdu, status, first_hdr, enctype,
+ is_decrypted);
+
+@@ -1991,6 +1996,11 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct
+
+ hdr = (void *)msdu->data;
+ hdr->frame_control &= ~__cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
++
++ if (frag && !fill_crypt_header &&
++ enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_TKIP_WPA)
++ status->flag &= ~RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED &
++ ~RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED;
+ }
+ }
+
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/305-ath10k-Validate-first-subframe-of-A-MSDU-before-proc.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/305-ath10k-Validate-first-subframe-of-A-MSDU-before-proc.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0bdbed78d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/305-ath10k-Validate-first-subframe-of-A-MSDU-before-proc.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+From: Sriram R <srirrama@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:57 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: Validate first subframe of A-MSDU before
+ processing the list
+
+In certain scenarios a normal MSDU can be received as an A-MSDU when
+the A-MSDU present bit of a QoS header gets flipped during reception.
+Since this bit is unauthenticated, the hardware crypto engine can pass
+the frame to the driver without any error indication.
+
+This could result in processing unintended subframes collected in the
+A-MSDU list. Hence, validate A-MSDU list by checking if the first frame
+has a valid subframe header.
+
+Comparing the non-aggregated MSDU and an A-MSDU, the fields of the first
+subframe DA matches the LLC/SNAP header fields of a normal MSDU.
+In order to avoid processing such frames, add a validation to
+filter such A-MSDU frames where the first subframe header DA matches
+with the LLC/SNAP header pattern.
+
+Tested-on: QCA9984 hw1.0 PCI 10.4-3.10-00047
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Sriram R <srirrama@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+---
+
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
+@@ -2108,14 +2108,62 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_unchain(stru
+ ath10k_unchain_msdu(amsdu, unchain_cnt);
+ }
+
++static bool ath10k_htt_rx_validate_amsdu(struct ath10k *ar,
++ struct sk_buff_head *amsdu)
++{
++ u8 *subframe_hdr;
++ struct sk_buff *first;
++ bool is_first, is_last;
++ struct htt_rx_desc *rxd;
++ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
++ size_t hdr_len, crypto_len;
++ enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype;
++ int bytes_aligned = ar->hw_params.decap_align_bytes;
++
++ first = skb_peek(amsdu);
++
++ rxd = (void *)first->data - sizeof(*rxd);
++ hdr = (void *)rxd->rx_hdr_status;
++
++ is_first = !!(rxd->msdu_end.common.info0 &
++ __cpu_to_le32(RX_MSDU_END_INFO0_FIRST_MSDU));
++ is_last = !!(rxd->msdu_end.common.info0 &
++ __cpu_to_le32(RX_MSDU_END_INFO0_LAST_MSDU));
++
++ /* Return in case of non-aggregated msdu */
++ if (is_first && is_last)
++ return true;
++
++ /* First msdu flag is not set for the first msdu of the list */
++ if (!is_first)
++ return false;
++
++ enctype = MS(__le32_to_cpu(rxd->mpdu_start.info0),
++ RX_MPDU_START_INFO0_ENCRYPT_TYPE);
++
++ hdr_len = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
++ crypto_len = ath10k_htt_rx_crypto_param_len(ar, enctype);
++
++ subframe_hdr = (u8 *)hdr + round_up(hdr_len, bytes_aligned) +
++ crypto_len;
++
++ /* Validate if the amsdu has a proper first subframe.
++ * There are chances a single msdu can be received as amsdu when
++ * the unauthenticated amsdu flag of a QoS header
++ * gets flipped in non-SPP AMSDU's, in such cases the first
++ * subframe has llc/snap header in place of a valid da.
++ * return false if the da matches rfc1042 pattern
++ */
++ if (ether_addr_equal(subframe_hdr, rfc1042_header))
++ return false;
++
++ return true;
++}
++
+ static bool ath10k_htt_rx_amsdu_allowed(struct ath10k *ar,
+ struct sk_buff_head *amsdu,
+ struct ieee80211_rx_status *rx_status)
+ {
+- /* FIXME: It might be a good idea to do some fuzzy-testing to drop
+- * invalid/dangerous frames.
+- */
+-
+ if (!rx_status->freq) {
+ ath10k_dbg(ar, ATH10K_DBG_HTT, "no channel configured; ignoring frame(s)!\n");
+ return false;
+@@ -2126,6 +2174,11 @@ static bool ath10k_htt_rx_amsdu_allowed(
+ return false;
+ }
+
++ if (!ath10k_htt_rx_validate_amsdu(ar, amsdu)) {
++ ath10k_dbg(ar, ATH10K_DBG_HTT, "invalid amsdu received\n");
++ return false;
++ }
++
+ return true;
+ }
+
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/402-ath_regd_optional.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/402-ath_regd_optional.patch
index bf87d3551a..3c9180b113 100644
--- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/402-ath_regd_optional.patch
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/402-ath_regd_optional.patch
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@
help
--- a/local-symbols
+++ b/local-symbols
-@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ ADM8211=
+@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ ADM8211=
ATH_COMMON=
WLAN_VENDOR_ATH=
ATH_DEBUG=
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/551-ath9k_ubnt_uap_plus_hsr.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/551-ath9k_ubnt_uap_plus_hsr.patch
index acb9ad443c..cd2bdbf1a0 100644
--- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/551-ath9k_ubnt_uap_plus_hsr.patch
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/551-ath9k_ubnt_uap_plus_hsr.patch
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@
--- a/local-symbols
+++ b/local-symbols
-@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ ATH9K_WOW=
+@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ ATH9K_WOW=
ATH9K_RFKILL=
ATH9K_CHANNEL_CONTEXT=
ATH9K_PCOEM=
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/922-ath10k-increase-rx-buffer-size-to-2048.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/922-ath10k-increase-rx-buffer-size-to-2048.patch
index abce361673..8f7a60eec8 100644
--- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/922-ath10k-increase-rx-buffer-size-to-2048.patch
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/922-ath10k-increase-rx-buffer-size-to-2048.patch
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Forwarded: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11367055/
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h
-@@ -2242,7 +2242,7 @@ struct htt_rx_chan_info {
+@@ -2243,7 +2243,7 @@ struct htt_rx_chan_info {
* Should be: sizeof(struct htt_host_rx_desc) + max rx MSDU size,
* rounded up to a cache line size.
*/
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/974-ath10k_add-LED-and-GPIO-controlling-support-for-various-chipsets.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/974-ath10k_add-LED-and-GPIO-controlling-support-for-various-chipsets.patch
index ac46e35b67..5e74687826 100644
--- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/974-ath10k_add-LED-and-GPIO-controlling-support-for-various-chipsets.patch
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/974-ath10k_add-LED-and-GPIO-controlling-support-for-various-chipsets.patch
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ v13:
ath10k_core-$(CONFIG_DEV_COREDUMP) += coredump.o
--- a/local-symbols
+++ b/local-symbols
-@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ ATH10K_DEBUG=
+@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ ATH10K_DEBUG=
ATH10K_DEBUGFS=
ATH10K_SPECTRAL=
ATH10K_THERMAL=
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/rt2x00/602-rt2x00-introduce-rt2x00eeprom.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/rt2x00/602-rt2x00-introduce-rt2x00eeprom.patch
index e74d9a9aa0..1c52132da6 100644
--- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/rt2x00/602-rt2x00-introduce-rt2x00eeprom.patch
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/rt2x00/602-rt2x00-introduce-rt2x00eeprom.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
--- a/local-symbols
+++ b/local-symbols
-@@ -332,6 +332,7 @@ RT2X00_LIB_FIRMWARE=
+@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ RT2X00_LIB_FIRMWARE=
RT2X00_LIB_CRYPTO=
RT2X00_LIB_LEDS=
RT2X00_LIB_DEBUGFS=
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/380-mac80211-assure-all-fragments-are-encrypted.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/380-mac80211-assure-all-fragments-are-encrypted.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..69398459f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/380-mac80211-assure-all-fragments-are-encrypted.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
+Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:42 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: assure all fragments are encrypted
+
+Do not mix plaintext and encrypted fragments in protected Wi-Fi
+networks. This fixes CVE-2020-26147.
+
+Previously, an attacker was able to first forward a legitimate encrypted
+fragment towards a victim, followed by a plaintext fragment. The
+encrypted and plaintext fragment would then be reassembled. For further
+details see Section 6.3 and Appendix D in the paper "Fragment and Forge:
+Breaking Wi-Fi Through Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation".
+
+Because of this change there are now two equivalent conditions in the
+code to determine if a received fragment requires sequential PNs, so we
+also move this test to a separate function to make the code easier to
+maintain.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+---
+
+--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
+@@ -2204,6 +2204,16 @@ ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee802
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
++static bool requires_sequential_pn(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, __le16 fc)
++{
++ return rx->key &&
++ (rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP ||
++ rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256 ||
++ rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP ||
++ rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256) &&
++ ieee80211_has_protected(fc);
++}
++
+ static ieee80211_rx_result debug_noinline
+ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
+ {
+@@ -2248,12 +2258,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
+ /* This is the first fragment of a new frame. */
+ entry = ieee80211_reassemble_add(rx->sdata, frag, seq,
+ rx->seqno_idx, &(rx->skb));
+- if (rx->key &&
+- (rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP ||
+- rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256 ||
+- rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP ||
+- rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256) &&
+- ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) {
++ if (requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc)) {
+ int queue = rx->security_idx;
+
+ /* Store CCMP/GCMP PN so that we can verify that the
+@@ -2295,11 +2300,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
+ u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN], *rpn;
+ int queue;
+
+- if (!rx->key ||
+- (rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP &&
+- rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256 &&
+- rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP &&
+- rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256))
++ if (!requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ memcpy(pn, entry->last_pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+ for (i = IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/381-mac80211-prevent-mixed-key-and-fragment-cache-attack.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/381-mac80211-prevent-mixed-key-and-fragment-cache-attack.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..de0f89a5b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/381-mac80211-prevent-mixed-key-and-fragment-cache-attack.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
+Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:43 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks
+
+Simultaneously prevent mixed key attacks (CVE-2020-24587) and fragment
+cache attacks (CVE-2020-24586). This is accomplished by assigning a
+unique color to every key (per interface) and using this to track which
+key was used to decrypt a fragment. When reassembling frames, it is
+now checked whether all fragments were decrypted using the same key.
+
+To assure that fragment cache attacks are also prevented, the ID that is
+assigned to keys is unique even over (re)associations and (re)connects.
+This means fragments separated by a (re)association or (re)connect will
+not be reassembled. Because mac80211 now also prevents the reassembly of
+mixed encrypted and plaintext fragments, all cache attacks are prevented.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+---
+
+--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
++++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
+@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry {
+ u8 rx_queue;
+ bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
+ u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */
++ unsigned int key_color;
+ };
+
+
+--- a/net/mac80211/key.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/key.c
+@@ -799,6 +799,7 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_
+ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
+ struct sta_info *sta)
+ {
++ static atomic_t key_color = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+ struct ieee80211_key *old_key;
+ int idx = key->conf.keyidx;
+ bool pairwise = key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE;
+@@ -850,6 +851,12 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_
+ key->sdata = sdata;
+ key->sta = sta;
+
++ /*
++ * Assign a unique ID to every key so we can easily prevent mixed
++ * key and fragment cache attacks.
++ */
++ key->color = atomic_inc_return(&key_color);
++
+ increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
+
+ ret = ieee80211_key_replace(sdata, sta, pairwise, old_key, key);
+--- a/net/mac80211/key.h
++++ b/net/mac80211/key.h
+@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
+ } debugfs;
+ #endif
+
++ unsigned int color;
++
+ /*
+ * key config, must be last because it contains key
+ * material as variable length member
+--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
+@@ -2265,6 +2265,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
+ * next fragment has a sequential PN value.
+ */
+ entry->check_sequential_pn = true;
++ entry->key_color = rx->key->color;
+ memcpy(entry->last_pn,
+ rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue],
+ IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+@@ -2302,6 +2303,11 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
+
+ if (!requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
++
++ /* Prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks */
++ if (entry->key_color != rx->key->color)
++ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
++
+ memcpy(pn, entry->last_pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+ for (i = IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ pn[i]++;
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/382-mac80211-properly-handle-A-MSDUs-that-start-with-an-.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/382-mac80211-properly-handle-A-MSDUs-that-start-with-an-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3fdabde219
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/382-mac80211-properly-handle-A-MSDUs-that-start-with-an-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
+Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:44 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: properly handle A-MSDUs that start with an
+ RFC 1042 header
+
+Properly parse A-MSDUs whose first 6 bytes happen to equal a rfc1042
+header. This can occur in practice when the destination MAC address
+equals AA:AA:03:00:00:00. More importantly, this simplifies the next
+patch to mitigate A-MSDU injection attacks.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+---
+
+--- a/include/net/cfg80211.h
++++ b/include/net/cfg80211.h
+@@ -5628,7 +5628,7 @@ unsigned int ieee80211_get_mesh_hdrlen(s
+ */
+ int ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ethhdr *ehdr,
+ const u8 *addr, enum nl80211_iftype iftype,
+- u8 data_offset);
++ u8 data_offset, bool is_amsdu);
+
+ /**
+ * ieee80211_data_to_8023 - convert an 802.11 data frame to 802.3
+@@ -5640,7 +5640,7 @@ int ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(struct
+ static inline int ieee80211_data_to_8023(struct sk_buff *skb, const u8 *addr,
+ enum nl80211_iftype iftype)
+ {
+- return ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(skb, NULL, addr, iftype, 0);
++ return ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(skb, NULL, addr, iftype, 0, false);
+ }
+
+ /**
+--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
+@@ -2696,7 +2696,7 @@ __ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(struct ieee80211_
+ if (ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(skb, &ethhdr,
+ rx->sdata->vif.addr,
+ rx->sdata->vif.type,
+- data_offset))
++ data_offset, true))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
+ ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(skb, &frame_list, dev->dev_addr,
+--- a/net/wireless/util.c
++++ b/net/wireless/util.c
+@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_mesh_hdrlen)
+
+ int ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ethhdr *ehdr,
+ const u8 *addr, enum nl80211_iftype iftype,
+- u8 data_offset)
++ u8 data_offset, bool is_amsdu)
+ {
+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
+ struct {
+@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ int ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(struct
+ skb_copy_bits(skb, hdrlen, &payload, sizeof(payload));
+ tmp.h_proto = payload.proto;
+
+- if (likely((ether_addr_equal(payload.hdr, rfc1042_header) &&
++ if (likely((!is_amsdu && ether_addr_equal(payload.hdr, rfc1042_header) &&
+ tmp.h_proto != htons(ETH_P_AARP) &&
+ tmp.h_proto != htons(ETH_P_IPX)) ||
+ ether_addr_equal(payload.hdr, bridge_tunnel_header)))
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/383-cfg80211-mitigate-A-MSDU-aggregation-attacks.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/383-cfg80211-mitigate-A-MSDU-aggregation-attacks.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8ea78dca84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/383-cfg80211-mitigate-A-MSDU-aggregation-attacks.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
+Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:45 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] cfg80211: mitigate A-MSDU aggregation attacks
+
+Mitigate A-MSDU injection attacks (CVE-2020-24588) by detecting if the
+destination address of a subframe equals an RFC1042 (i.e., LLC/SNAP)
+header, and if so dropping the complete A-MSDU frame. This mitigates
+known attacks, although new (unknown) aggregation-based attacks may
+remain possible.
+
+This defense works because in A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks, a
+normal encrypted Wi-Fi frame is turned into an A-MSDU frame. This means
+the first 6 bytes of the first A-MSDU subframe correspond to an RFC1042
+header. In other words, the destination MAC address of the first A-MSDU
+subframe contains the start of an RFC1042 header during an aggregation
+attack. We can detect this and thereby prevent this specific attack.
+For details, see Section 7.2 of "Fragment and Forge: Breaking Wi-Fi
+Through Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation".
+
+Note that for kernel 4.9 and above this patch depends on "mac80211:
+properly handle A-MSDUs that start with a rfc1042 header". Otherwise
+this patch has no impact and attacks will remain possible.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+---
+
+--- a/net/wireless/util.c
++++ b/net/wireless/util.c
+@@ -775,6 +775,9 @@ void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_
+ remaining = skb->len - offset;
+ if (subframe_len > remaining)
+ goto purge;
++ /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks */
++ if (ether_addr_equal(eth.h_dest, rfc1042_header))
++ goto purge;
+
+ offset += sizeof(struct ethhdr);
+ last = remaining <= subframe_len + padding;
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/384-mac80211-drop-A-MSDUs-on-old-ciphers.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/384-mac80211-drop-A-MSDUs-on-old-ciphers.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1b5084c37d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/384-mac80211-drop-A-MSDUs-on-old-ciphers.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:46 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: drop A-MSDUs on old ciphers
+
+With old ciphers (WEP and TKIP) we shouldn't be using A-MSDUs
+since A-MSDUs are only supported if we know that they are, and
+the only practical way for that is HT support which doesn't
+support old ciphers.
+
+However, we would normally accept them anyway. Since we check
+the MMIC before deaggregating A-MSDUs, and the A-MSDU bit in
+the QoS header is not protected in TKIP (or WEP), this enables
+attacks similar to CVE-2020-24588. To prevent that, drop A-MSDUs
+completely with old ciphers.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+---
+
+--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
+@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
+ * Copyright 2007-2010 Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
+ * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH
+ * Copyright(c) 2015 - 2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH
+- * Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Intel Corporation
++ * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+ #include <linux/jiffies.h>
+@@ -2753,6 +2753,23 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(struct ieee80211_rx
+ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
++ if (rx->key) {
++ /*
++ * We should not receive A-MSDUs on pre-HT connections,
++ * and HT connections cannot use old ciphers. Thus drop
++ * them, as in those cases we couldn't even have SPP
++ * A-MSDUs or such.
++ */
++ switch (rx->key->conf.cipher) {
++ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
++ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
++ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
++ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
++ default:
++ break;
++ }
++ }
++
+ return __ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(rx, 0);
+ }
+
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/385-mac80211-add-fragment-cache-to-sta_info.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/385-mac80211-add-fragment-cache-to-sta_info.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b536126d38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/385-mac80211-add-fragment-cache-to-sta_info.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
+From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:47 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: add fragment cache to sta_info
+
+Prior patches protected against fragmentation cache attacks
+by coloring keys, but this shows that it can lead to issues
+when multiple stations use the same sequence number. Add a
+fragment cache to struct sta_info (in addition to the one in
+the interface) to separate fragments for different stations
+properly.
+
+This then automatically clear most of the fragment cache when a
+station disconnects (or reassociates) from an AP, or when client
+interfaces disconnect from the network, etc.
+
+On the way, also fix the comment there since this brings us in line
+with the recommendation in 802.11-2016 ("An AP should support ...").
+Additionally, remove a useless condition (since there's no problem
+purging an already empty list).
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+---
+
+--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
++++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
+@@ -50,12 +50,6 @@ struct ieee80211_local;
+ #define IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_HEADROOM 8
+ #define IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM 18
+
+-/* IEEE 802.11 (Ch. 9.5 Defragmentation) requires support for concurrent
+- * reception of at least three fragmented frames. This limit can be increased
+- * by changing this define, at the cost of slower frame reassembly and
+- * increased memory use (about 2 kB of RAM per entry). */
+-#define IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX 4
+-
+ /* power level hasn't been configured (or set to automatic) */
+ #define IEEE80211_UNSET_POWER_LEVEL INT_MIN
+
+@@ -88,19 +82,6 @@ extern const u8 ieee80211_ac_to_qos_mask
+
+ #define IEEE80211_MAX_NAN_INSTANCE_ID 255
+
+-struct ieee80211_fragment_entry {
+- struct sk_buff_head skb_list;
+- unsigned long first_frag_time;
+- u16 seq;
+- u16 extra_len;
+- u16 last_frag;
+- u8 rx_queue;
+- bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
+- u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */
+- unsigned int key_color;
+-};
+-
+-
+ struct ieee80211_bss {
+ u32 device_ts_beacon, device_ts_presp;
+
+@@ -912,9 +893,7 @@ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data {
+
+ char name[IFNAMSIZ];
+
+- /* Fragment table for host-based reassembly */
+- struct ieee80211_fragment_entry fragments[IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX];
+- unsigned int fragment_next;
++ struct ieee80211_fragment_cache frags;
+
+ /* TID bitmap for NoAck policy */
+ u16 noack_map;
+@@ -2329,4 +2308,7 @@ u32 ieee80211_calc_expected_tx_airtime(s
+ #define debug_noinline
+ #endif
+
++void ieee80211_init_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache);
++void ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache);
++
+ #endif /* IEEE80211_I_H */
+--- a/net/mac80211/iface.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/iface.c
+@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
+ * Copyright 2008, Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
+ * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Intel Deutschland GmbH
+- * Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Intel Corporation
++ * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Intel Corporation
+ */
+ #include <linux/slab.h>
+ #include <linux/kernel.h>
+@@ -679,16 +679,12 @@ static void ieee80211_set_multicast_list
+ */
+ static void ieee80211_teardown_sdata(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
+ {
+- int i;
+-
+ /* free extra data */
+ ieee80211_free_keys(sdata, false);
+
+ ieee80211_debugfs_remove_netdev(sdata);
+
+- for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX; i++)
+- __skb_queue_purge(&sdata->fragments[i].skb_list);
+- sdata->fragment_next = 0;
++ ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(&sdata->frags);
+
+ if (ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&sdata->vif))
+ ieee80211_mesh_teardown_sdata(sdata);
+@@ -2038,8 +2034,7 @@ int ieee80211_if_add(struct ieee80211_lo
+ sdata->wdev.wiphy = local->hw.wiphy;
+ sdata->local = local;
+
+- for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX; i++)
+- skb_queue_head_init(&sdata->fragments[i].skb_list);
++ ieee80211_init_frag_cache(&sdata->frags);
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sdata->key_list);
+
+--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
+@@ -2133,19 +2133,34 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_
+ return result;
+ }
+
++void ieee80211_init_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache)
++{
++ int i;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cache->entries); i++)
++ skb_queue_head_init(&cache->entries[i].skb_list);
++}
++
++void ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache)
++{
++ int i;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cache->entries); i++)
++ __skb_queue_purge(&cache->entries[i].skb_list);
++}
++
+ static inline struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *
+-ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
++ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache,
+ unsigned int frag, unsigned int seq, int rx_queue,
+ struct sk_buff **skb)
+ {
+ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry;
+
+- entry = &sdata->fragments[sdata->fragment_next++];
+- if (sdata->fragment_next >= IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX)
+- sdata->fragment_next = 0;
++ entry = &cache->entries[cache->next++];
++ if (cache->next >= IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX)
++ cache->next = 0;
+
+- if (!skb_queue_empty(&entry->skb_list))
+- __skb_queue_purge(&entry->skb_list);
++ __skb_queue_purge(&entry->skb_list);
+
+ __skb_queue_tail(&entry->skb_list, *skb); /* no need for locking */
+ *skb = NULL;
+@@ -2160,14 +2175,14 @@ ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee8021
+ }
+
+ static inline struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *
+-ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
++ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache,
+ unsigned int frag, unsigned int seq,
+ int rx_queue, struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr)
+ {
+ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry;
+ int i, idx;
+
+- idx = sdata->fragment_next;
++ idx = cache->next;
+ for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX; i++) {
+ struct ieee80211_hdr *f_hdr;
+ struct sk_buff *f_skb;
+@@ -2176,7 +2191,7 @@ ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee802
+ if (idx < 0)
+ idx = IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX - 1;
+
+- entry = &sdata->fragments[idx];
++ entry = &cache->entries[idx];
+ if (skb_queue_empty(&entry->skb_list) || entry->seq != seq ||
+ entry->rx_queue != rx_queue ||
+ entry->last_frag + 1 != frag)
+@@ -2217,6 +2232,7 @@ static bool requires_sequential_pn(struc
+ static ieee80211_rx_result debug_noinline
+ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
+ {
++ struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache = &rx->sdata->frags;
+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
+ u16 sc;
+ __le16 fc;
+@@ -2238,6 +2254,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
+ goto out_no_led;
+ }
+
++ if (rx->sta)
++ cache = &rx->sta->frags;
++
+ if (likely(!ieee80211_has_morefrags(fc) && frag == 0))
+ goto out;
+
+@@ -2256,7 +2275,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
+
+ if (frag == 0) {
+ /* This is the first fragment of a new frame. */
+- entry = ieee80211_reassemble_add(rx->sdata, frag, seq,
++ entry = ieee80211_reassemble_add(cache, frag, seq,
+ rx->seqno_idx, &(rx->skb));
+ if (requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc)) {
+ int queue = rx->security_idx;
+@@ -2284,7 +2303,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
+ /* This is a fragment for a frame that should already be pending in
+ * fragment cache. Add this fragment to the end of the pending entry.
+ */
+- entry = ieee80211_reassemble_find(rx->sdata, frag, seq,
++ entry = ieee80211_reassemble_find(cache, frag, seq,
+ rx->seqno_idx, hdr);
+ if (!entry) {
+ I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->rx_handlers_drop_defrag);
+--- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
+@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
+ * Copyright 2006-2007 Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz>
+ * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 - 2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH
+- * Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Intel Corporation
++ * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+@@ -393,6 +393,8 @@ struct sta_info *sta_info_alloc(struct i
+
+ u64_stats_init(&sta->rx_stats.syncp);
+
++ ieee80211_init_frag_cache(&sta->frags);
++
+ sta->sta_state = IEEE80211_STA_NONE;
+
+ /* Mark TID as unreserved */
+@@ -1103,6 +1105,8 @@ static void __sta_info_destroy_part2(str
+
+ ieee80211_sta_debugfs_remove(sta);
+
++ ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(&sta->frags);
++
+ cleanup_single_sta(sta);
+ }
+
+--- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
++++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
+@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
+ * Copyright 2002-2005, Devicescape Software, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH
+ * Copyright(c) 2015-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH
+- * Copyright(c) 2020 Intel Corporation
++ * Copyright(c) 2020-2021 Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+ #ifndef STA_INFO_H
+@@ -439,6 +439,33 @@ struct ieee80211_sta_rx_stats {
+ };
+
+ /*
++ * IEEE 802.11-2016 (10.6 "Defragmentation") recommends support for "concurrent
++ * reception of at least one MSDU per access category per associated STA"
++ * on APs, or "at least one MSDU per access category" on other interface types.
++ *
++ * This limit can be increased by changing this define, at the cost of slower
++ * frame reassembly and increased memory use while fragments are pending.
++ */
++#define IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX 4
++
++struct ieee80211_fragment_entry {
++ struct sk_buff_head skb_list;
++ unsigned long first_frag_time;
++ u16 seq;
++ u16 extra_len;
++ u16 last_frag;
++ u8 rx_queue;
++ bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
++ u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */
++ unsigned int key_color;
++};
++
++struct ieee80211_fragment_cache {
++ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry entries[IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX];
++ unsigned int next;
++};
++
++/*
+ * The bandwidth threshold below which the per-station CoDel parameters will be
+ * scaled to be more lenient (to prevent starvation of slow stations). This
+ * value will be scaled by the number of active stations when it is being
+@@ -531,6 +558,7 @@ struct ieee80211_sta_rx_stats {
+ * @status_stats.last_ack_signal: last ACK signal
+ * @status_stats.ack_signal_filled: last ACK signal validity
+ * @status_stats.avg_ack_signal: average ACK signal
++ * @frags: fragment cache
+ */
+ struct sta_info {
+ /* General information, mostly static */
+@@ -639,6 +667,8 @@ struct sta_info {
+
+ struct cfg80211_chan_def tdls_chandef;
+
++ struct ieee80211_fragment_cache frags;
++
+ /* keep last! */
+ struct ieee80211_sta sta;
+ };
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/386-mac80211-check-defrag-PN-against-current-frame.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/386-mac80211-check-defrag-PN-against-current-frame.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fb2747a609
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/386-mac80211-check-defrag-PN-against-current-frame.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:48 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: check defrag PN against current frame
+
+As pointed out by Mathy Vanhoef, we implement the RX PN check
+on fragmented frames incorrectly - we check against the last
+received PN prior to the new frame, rather than to the one in
+this frame itself.
+
+Prior patches addressed the security issue here, but in order
+to be able to reason better about the code, fix it to really
+compare against the current frame's PN, not the last stored
+one.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+---
+
+--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
++++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
+@@ -227,8 +227,15 @@ struct ieee80211_rx_data {
+ */
+ int security_idx;
+
+- u32 tkip_iv32;
+- u16 tkip_iv16;
++ union {
++ struct {
++ u32 iv32;
++ u16 iv16;
++ } tkip;
++ struct {
++ u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
++ } ccm_gcm;
++ };
+ };
+
+ struct ieee80211_csa_settings {
+--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
+@@ -2318,7 +2318,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
+ if (entry->check_sequential_pn) {
+ int i;
+ u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN], *rpn;
+- int queue;
+
+ if (!requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+@@ -2333,8 +2332,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
+ if (pn[i])
+ break;
+ }
+- queue = rx->security_idx;
+- rpn = rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue];
++
++ rpn = rx->ccm_gcm.pn;
+ if (memcmp(pn, rpn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
+ * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH
++ * Copyright (C) 2020-2021 Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+ #include <linux/netdevice.h>
+@@ -167,8 +168,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct
+
+ update_iv:
+ /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
+- rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
+- rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
++ rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip.iv32;
++ rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip.iv16;
+
+ return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+@@ -294,8 +295,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct iee
+ key, skb->data + hdrlen,
+ skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
+ hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
+- &rx->tkip_iv32,
+- &rx->tkip_iv16);
++ &rx->tkip.iv32,
++ &rx->tkip.iv16);
+ if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
+@@ -552,6 +553,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee
+ }
+
+ memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
++ if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr)))
++ memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+ }
+
+ /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
+@@ -782,6 +785,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct iee
+ }
+
+ memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
++ if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr)))
++ memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+ }
+
+ /* Remove GCMP header and MIC */
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/387-mac80211-prevent-attacks-on-TKIP-WEP-as-well.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/387-mac80211-prevent-attacks-on-TKIP-WEP-as-well.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bc582a6cc2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/387-mac80211-prevent-attacks-on-TKIP-WEP-as-well.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: prevent attacks on TKIP/WEP as well
+
+Similar to the issues fixed in previous patches, TKIP and WEP
+should be protected even if for TKIP we have the Michael MIC
+protecting it, and WEP is broken anyway.
+
+However, this also somewhat protects potential other algorithms
+that drivers might implement.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+---
+
+--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
+@@ -2284,6 +2284,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
+ * next fragment has a sequential PN value.
+ */
+ entry->check_sequential_pn = true;
++ entry->is_protected = true;
+ entry->key_color = rx->key->color;
+ memcpy(entry->last_pn,
+ rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue],
+@@ -2296,6 +2297,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
+ sizeof(rx->key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue]));
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN !=
+ IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
++ } else if (rx->key && ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) {
++ entry->is_protected = true;
++ entry->key_color = rx->key->color;
+ }
+ return RX_QUEUED;
+ }
+@@ -2337,6 +2341,14 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
+ if (memcmp(pn, rpn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
++ } else if (entry->is_protected &&
++ (!rx->key || !ieee80211_has_protected(fc) ||
++ rx->key->color != entry->key_color)) {
++ /* Drop this as a mixed key or fragment cache attack, even
++ * if for TKIP Michael MIC should protect us, and WEP is a
++ * lost cause anyway.
++ */
++ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ }
+
+ skb_pull(rx->skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc));
+--- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
++++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
+@@ -455,7 +455,8 @@ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry {
+ u16 extra_len;
+ u16 last_frag;
+ u8 rx_queue;
+- bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
++ u8 check_sequential_pn:1, /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
++ is_protected:1;
+ u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */
+ unsigned int key_color;
+ };
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/388-mac80211-do-not-accept-forward-invalid-EAPOL-frames.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/388-mac80211-do-not-accept-forward-invalid-EAPOL-frames.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9a0b78def1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/388-mac80211-do-not-accept-forward-invalid-EAPOL-frames.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:50 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: do not accept/forward invalid EAPOL frames
+
+EAPOL frames are used for authentication and key management between the
+AP and each individual STA associated in the BSS. Those frames are not
+supposed to be sent by one associated STA to another associated STA
+(either unicast for broadcast/multicast).
+
+Similarly, in 802.11 they're supposed to be sent to the authenticator
+(AP) address.
+
+Since it is possible for unexpected EAPOL frames to result in misbehavior
+in supplicant implementations, it is better for the AP to not allow such
+cases to be forwarded to other clients either directly, or indirectly if
+the AP interface is part of a bridge.
+
+Accept EAPOL (control port) frames only if they're transmitted to the
+own address, or, due to interoperability concerns, to the PAE group
+address.
+
+Disable forwarding of EAPOL (or well, the configured control port
+protocol) frames back to wireless medium in all cases. Previously, these
+frames were accepted from fully authenticated and authorized stations
+and also from unauthenticated stations for one of the cases.
+
+Additionally, to avoid forwarding by the bridge, rewrite the PAE group
+address case to the local MAC address.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Co-developed-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+---
+
+--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
+@@ -2541,13 +2541,13 @@ static bool ieee80211_frame_allowed(stru
+ struct ethhdr *ehdr = (struct ethhdr *) rx->skb->data;
+
+ /*
+- * Allow EAPOL frames to us/the PAE group address regardless
+- * of whether the frame was encrypted or not.
++ * Allow EAPOL frames to us/the PAE group address regardless of
++ * whether the frame was encrypted or not, and always disallow
++ * all other destination addresses for them.
+ */
+- if (ehdr->h_proto == rx->sdata->control_port_protocol &&
+- (ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, rx->sdata->vif.addr) ||
+- ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, pae_group_addr)))
+- return true;
++ if (unlikely(ehdr->h_proto == rx->sdata->control_port_protocol))
++ return ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, rx->sdata->vif.addr) ||
++ ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, pae_group_addr);
+
+ if (ieee80211_802_1x_port_control(rx) ||
+ ieee80211_drop_unencrypted(rx, fc))
+@@ -2572,8 +2572,28 @@ static void ieee80211_deliver_skb_to_loc
+ cfg80211_rx_control_port(dev, skb, noencrypt);
+ dev_kfree_skb(skb);
+ } else {
++ struct ethhdr *ehdr = (void *)skb_mac_header(skb);
++
+ memset(skb->cb, 0, sizeof(skb->cb));
+
++ /*
++ * 802.1X over 802.11 requires that the authenticator address
++ * be used for EAPOL frames. However, 802.1X allows the use of
++ * the PAE group address instead. If the interface is part of
++ * a bridge and we pass the frame with the PAE group address,
++ * then the bridge will forward it to the network (even if the
++ * client was not associated yet), which isn't supposed to
++ * happen.
++ * To avoid that, rewrite the destination address to our own
++ * address, so that the authenticator (e.g. hostapd) will see
++ * the frame, but bridge won't forward it anywhere else. Note
++ * that due to earlier filtering, the only other address can
++ * be the PAE group address.
++ */
++ if (unlikely(skb->protocol == sdata->control_port_protocol &&
++ !ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, sdata->vif.addr)))
++ ether_addr_copy(ehdr->h_dest, sdata->vif.addr);
++
+ /* deliver to local stack */
+ if (rx->list)
+ #if LINUX_VERSION_IS_GEQ(4,19,0)
+@@ -2617,6 +2637,7 @@ ieee80211_deliver_skb(struct ieee80211_r
+ if ((sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP ||
+ sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) &&
+ !(sdata->flags & IEEE80211_SDATA_DONT_BRIDGE_PACKETS) &&
++ ehdr->h_proto != rx->sdata->control_port_protocol &&
+ (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN || !sdata->u.vlan.sta)) {
+ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ehdr->h_dest) &&
+ ieee80211_vif_get_num_mcast_if(sdata) != 0) {
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/389-mac80211-extend-protection-against-mixed-key-and-fra.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/389-mac80211-extend-protection-against-mixed-key-and-fra.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..17809263e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/389-mac80211-extend-protection-against-mixed-key-and-fra.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+From: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:51 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: extend protection against mixed key and
+ fragment cache attacks
+
+For some chips/drivers, e.g., QCA6174 with ath10k, the decryption is
+done by the hardware, and the Protected bit in the Frame Control field
+is cleared in the lower level driver before the frame is passed to
+mac80211. In such cases, the condition for ieee80211_has_protected() is
+not met in ieee80211_rx_h_defragment() of mac80211 and the new security
+validation steps are not executed.
+
+Extend mac80211 to cover the case where the Protected bit has been
+cleared, but the frame is indicated as having been decrypted by the
+hardware. This extends protection against mixed key and fragment cache
+attack for additional drivers/chips. This fixes CVE-2020-24586 and
+CVE-2020-24587 for such cases.
+
+Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+---
+
+--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
+@@ -2239,6 +2239,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
+ unsigned int frag, seq;
+ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry;
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
++ struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb);
+
+ hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
+ fc = hdr->frame_control;
+@@ -2297,7 +2298,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
+ sizeof(rx->key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue]));
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN !=
+ IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
+- } else if (rx->key && ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) {
++ } else if (rx->key &&
++ (ieee80211_has_protected(fc) ||
++ (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))) {
+ entry->is_protected = true;
+ entry->key_color = rx->key->color;
+ }
+@@ -2342,13 +2345,19 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+ } else if (entry->is_protected &&
+- (!rx->key || !ieee80211_has_protected(fc) ||
++ (!rx->key ||
++ (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc) &&
++ !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) ||
+ rx->key->color != entry->key_color)) {
+ /* Drop this as a mixed key or fragment cache attack, even
+ * if for TKIP Michael MIC should protect us, and WEP is a
+ * lost cause anyway.
+ */
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
++ } else if (entry->is_protected && rx->key &&
++ entry->key_color != rx->key->color &&
++ (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
++ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ }
+
+ skb_pull(rx->skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc));
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/500-mac80211_configure_antenna_gain.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/500-mac80211_configure_antenna_gain.patch
index 5d5dcd51ad..eb967f77d7 100644
--- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/500-mac80211_configure_antenna_gain.patch
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/500-mac80211_configure_antenna_gain.patch
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
CFG80211_TESTMODE_CMD(ieee80211_testmode_cmd)
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
-@@ -1403,6 +1403,7 @@ struct ieee80211_local {
+@@ -1390,6 +1390,7 @@ struct ieee80211_local {
int dynamic_ps_forced_timeout;
int user_power_level; /* in dBm, for all interfaces */