diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-revert_aes_ccm_port.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-revert_aes_ccm_port.patch | 202 |
1 files changed, 101 insertions, 101 deletions
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-revert_aes_ccm_port.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-revert_aes_ccm_port.patch index 4654bc8ea4..ac7d6b3495 100644 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-revert_aes_ccm_port.patch +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-revert_aes_ccm_port.patch @@ -1,3 +1,104 @@ +--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c ++++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c +@@ -301,15 +301,22 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct iee + } + + +-static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad) ++static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch, ++ int encrypted) + { + __le16 mask_fc; + int a4_included, mgmt; + u8 qos_tid; +- u16 len_a; ++ u8 *b_0, *aad; ++ u16 data_len, len_a; + unsigned int hdrlen; + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; + ++ memset(scratch, 0, 6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ ++ b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++ aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++ + /* + * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt) + * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected +@@ -331,21 +338,20 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s + else + qos_tid = 0; + +- /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC +- * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived +- * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the +- * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take +- * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting +- * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs. +- */ +- b_0[0] = 0x1; ++ data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN; ++ if (encrypted) ++ data_len -= IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN; + ++ /* First block, b_0 */ ++ b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */ + /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN + * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7) + */ + b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4); + memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); + memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); ++ /* l(m) */ ++ put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]); + + /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header + * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */ +@@ -401,8 +407,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8 + u8 *pos; + u8 pn[6]; + u64 pn64; +- u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; +- u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; ++ u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + if (info->control.hw_key && + !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) && +@@ -455,9 +460,9 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8 + return 0; + + pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN; +- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad); +- ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len, +- skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN)); ++ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 0); ++ ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch, pos, len, ++ pos, skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN)); + + return 0; + } +@@ -520,16 +525,16 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee + } + + if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { +- u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; +- u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; ++ u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ +- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad); ++ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 1); + + if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt( +- key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, ++ key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch, + skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, + data_len, +- skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN)) ++ skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN, ++ skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN)) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + } + --- a/net/mac80211/Kconfig +++ b/net/mac80211/Kconfig @@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ config MAC80211 @@ -244,104 +345,3 @@ u32 replays; /* dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */ } ccmp; struct { ---- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c -+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c -@@ -301,16 +301,22 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct iee - } - - --static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, -+static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch, - int encrypted) - { - __le16 mask_fc; - int a4_included, mgmt; - u8 qos_tid; -- u16 len_a; -+ u8 *b_0, *aad; -+ u16 data_len, len_a; - unsigned int hdrlen; - struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; - -+ memset(scratch, 0, 6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE); -+ -+ b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE; -+ aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE; -+ - /* - * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt) - * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected -@@ -332,21 +338,20 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s - else - qos_tid = 0; - -- /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC -- * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived -- * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the -- * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take -- * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting -- * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs. -- */ -- b_0[0] = 0x1; -+ data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN; -+ if (encrypted) -+ data_len -= IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN; - -+ /* First block, b_0 */ -+ b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */ - /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN - * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7) - */ - b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4); - memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); - memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); -+ /* l(m) */ -+ put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]); - - /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header - * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */ -@@ -402,8 +407,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8 - u8 *pos; - u8 pn[6]; - u64 pn64; -- u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; -- u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; -+ u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; - - if (info->control.hw_key && - !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) && -@@ -456,9 +460,9 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8 - return 0; - - pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN; -- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, 0); -- ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len, -- skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN)); -+ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 0); -+ ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch, pos, len, -+ pos, skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN)); - - return 0; - } -@@ -521,16 +525,16 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee - } - - if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { -- u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; -- u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; -+ u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; - /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ -- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, 1); -+ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 1); - - if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt( -- key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, -+ key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch, - skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, - data_len, -- skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN)) -+ skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN, -+ skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN)) - return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; - } - |