diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | package/network/services/samba36/Makefile | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | package/network/services/samba36/patches/028-CVE-2016-2125-v3.6.patch | 59 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | package/network/services/samba36/patches/029-CVE-2017-7494-v3-6.patch (renamed from package/network/services/samba36/patches/028-CVE-2017-7494-v3-6.patch) | 0 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | package/network/services/samba36/patches/030-CVE-2017-15275-v3.6.patch (renamed from package/network/services/samba36/patches/029-CVE-2017-15275.patch) | 0 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | package/network/services/samba36/patches/031-CVE-2017-12163-v3.6.patch | 136 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | package/network/services/samba36/patches/032-CVE-2017-12150-v3.6.patch | 75 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | package/network/services/samba36/patches/032-CVE-2018-1050-v3-6.patch | 49 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | package/network/services/samba36/patches/200-remove_printer_support.patch | 4 |
8 files changed, 322 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/Makefile b/package/network/services/samba36/Makefile index 55e1428d49..30e26195ff 100644 --- a/package/network/services/samba36/Makefile +++ b/package/network/services/samba36/Makefile @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk PKG_NAME:=samba PKG_VERSION:=3.6.25 -PKG_RELEASE:=9 +PKG_RELEASE:=10 PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://download.samba.org/pub/samba \ https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/stable diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/028-CVE-2016-2125-v3.6.patch b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/028-CVE-2016-2125-v3.6.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8e174f0e7b --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/028-CVE-2016-2125-v3.6.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From: =?utf-8?q?Guido_G=C3=BCnther?= <agx@sigxcpu.org> +Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2016 19:21:49 +0100 +Subject: security-CVE-2016-2125: Don't pass GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG by default + +This is a backport of upstream commits + + b1a056f77e793efc45df34ab7bf78fbec1bf8a59 + b83897ae49fdee1fda73c10c7fe73362bfaba690 (code not used in wheezy) + 3106964a640ddf6a3c08c634ff586a814f94dff8 (code not used in wheezy) +--- + source3/librpc/crypto/gse.c | 1 - + source3/libsmb/clifsinfo.c | 2 +- + source4/auth/gensec/gensec_gssapi.c | 2 +- + source4/scripting/bin/nsupdate-gss | 2 +- + 4 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +--- a/source3/librpc/crypto/gse.c ++++ b/source3/librpc/crypto/gse.c +@@ -162,7 +162,6 @@ static NTSTATUS gse_context_init(TALLOC_ + memcpy(&gse_ctx->gss_mech, gss_mech_krb5, sizeof(gss_OID_desc)); + + gse_ctx->gss_c_flags = GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | +- GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG | + GSS_C_DELEG_POLICY_FLAG | + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | + GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG; +--- a/source3/libsmb/clifsinfo.c ++++ b/source3/libsmb/clifsinfo.c +@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ static NTSTATUS make_cli_gss_blob(TALLOC + &es->s.gss_state->gss_ctx, + srv_name, + GSS_C_NO_OID, /* default OID. */ +- GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG | GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG, ++ GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG | GSS_C_DELEG_POLICY_FLAG, + GSS_C_INDEFINITE, /* requested ticket lifetime. */ + NULL, /* no channel bindings */ + p_tok_in, +--- a/source4/auth/gensec/gensec_gssapi.c ++++ b/source4/auth/gensec/gensec_gssapi.c +@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_start(stru + if (gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings, "gensec_gssapi", "mutual", true)) { + gensec_gssapi_state->want_flags |= GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG; + } +- if (gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings, "gensec_gssapi", "delegation", true)) { ++ if (gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings, "gensec_gssapi", "delegation", false)) { + gensec_gssapi_state->want_flags |= GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG; + } + if (gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings, "gensec_gssapi", "replay", true)) { +--- a/source4/scripting/bin/nsupdate-gss ++++ b/source4/scripting/bin/nsupdate-gss +@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ sub negotiate_tkey($$$$) + my $flags = + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | + GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG | +- GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG; ++ GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG; + + + $status = GSSAPI::Cred::acquire_cred(undef, 120, undef, GSS_C_INITIATE, diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/028-CVE-2017-7494-v3-6.patch b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/029-CVE-2017-7494-v3-6.patch index 17b020d88a..17b020d88a 100644 --- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/028-CVE-2017-7494-v3-6.patch +++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/029-CVE-2017-7494-v3-6.patch diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/029-CVE-2017-15275.patch b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/030-CVE-2017-15275-v3.6.patch index 055a15e87e..055a15e87e 100644 --- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/029-CVE-2017-15275.patch +++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/030-CVE-2017-15275-v3.6.patch diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/031-CVE-2017-12163-v3.6.patch b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/031-CVE-2017-12163-v3.6.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d7faa1388d --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/031-CVE-2017-12163-v3.6.patch @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +From: =?utf-8?q?Guido_G=C3=BCnther?= <agx@sigxcpu.org> +Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2017 20:02:03 +0200 +Subject: CVE-2017-12163: s3:smbd: Prevent client short SMB1 write from + writing server memory to file. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13020 + +Author: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> +--- + source3/smbd/reply.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+) + +--- a/source3/smbd/reply.c ++++ b/source3/smbd/reply.c +@@ -3979,6 +3979,9 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request + } + + /* Ensure we don't write bytes past the end of this packet. */ ++ /* ++ * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163. ++ */ + if (data + numtowrite > smb_base(req->inbuf) + smb_len(req->inbuf)) { + reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); + error_to_writebrawerr(req); +@@ -4080,6 +4083,11 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request + exit_server_cleanly("secondary writebraw failed"); + } + ++ /* ++ * We are not vulnerable to CVE-2017-12163 ++ * here as we are guarenteed to have numtowrite ++ * bytes available - we just read from the client. ++ */ + nwritten = write_file(req,fsp,buf+4,startpos+nwritten,numtowrite); + if (nwritten == -1) { + TALLOC_FREE(buf); +@@ -4161,6 +4169,7 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_reques + connection_struct *conn = req->conn; + ssize_t nwritten = -1; + size_t numtowrite; ++ size_t remaining; + SMB_OFF_T startpos; + const char *data; + NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK; +@@ -4193,6 +4202,17 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_reques + startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0); + data = (const char *)req->buf + 3; + ++ /* ++ * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than ++ * they sent. CVE-2017-12163. ++ */ ++ remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data); ++ if (numtowrite > remaining) { ++ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); ++ END_PROFILE(SMBwriteunlock); ++ return; ++ } ++ + if (!fsp->print_file && numtowrite > 0) { + init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid, + (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK, +@@ -4274,6 +4294,7 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req + { + connection_struct *conn = req->conn; + size_t numtowrite; ++ size_t remaining; + ssize_t nwritten = -1; + SMB_OFF_T startpos; + const char *data; +@@ -4314,6 +4335,17 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req + startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0); + data = (const char *)req->buf + 3; + ++ /* ++ * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than ++ * they sent. CVE-2017-12163. ++ */ ++ remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data); ++ if (numtowrite > remaining) { ++ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); ++ END_PROFILE(SMBwrite); ++ return; ++ } ++ + if (!fsp->print_file) { + init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid, + (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK, +@@ -4525,6 +4557,9 @@ void reply_write_and_X(struct smb_reques + return; + } + } else { ++ /* ++ * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163. ++ */ + if (smb_doff > smblen || smb_doff + numtowrite < numtowrite || + smb_doff + numtowrite > smblen) { + reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); +@@ -4894,6 +4929,7 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request + { + connection_struct *conn = req->conn; + size_t numtowrite; ++ size_t remaining; + ssize_t nwritten = -1; + NTSTATUS close_status = NT_STATUS_OK; + SMB_OFF_T startpos; +@@ -4927,6 +4963,17 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request + mtime = convert_time_t_to_timespec(srv_make_unix_date3(req->vwv+4)); + data = (const char *)req->buf + 1; + ++ /* ++ * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than ++ * they sent. CVE-2017-12163. ++ */ ++ remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data); ++ if (numtowrite > remaining) { ++ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); ++ END_PROFILE(SMBwriteclose); ++ return; ++ } ++ + if (!fsp->print_file) { + init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid, + (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK, +@@ -5497,6 +5544,9 @@ void reply_printwrite(struct smb_request + + numtowrite = SVAL(req->buf, 1); + ++ /* ++ * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163. ++ */ + if (req->buflen < numtowrite + 3) { + reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); + END_PROFILE(SMBsplwr); diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/032-CVE-2017-12150-v3.6.patch b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/032-CVE-2017-12150-v3.6.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..01589b8a74 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/032-CVE-2017-12150-v3.6.patch @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +From: =?utf-8?q?Guido_G=C3=BCnther?= <agx@sigxcpu.org> +Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2017 20:01:34 +0200 +Subject: CVE-2017-12150 + +These are the three upstream patches + + From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> + Subject: CVE-2017-12150: s3:lib: get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state use Required for smb_encrypt + + This is an addition to the fixes for CVE-2015-5296. + + It applies to smb2mount -e, smbcacls -e and smbcquotas -e. + + BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997 + + + From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> + Subject: CVE-2017-12150: libgpo: make use of Required for SMB signing in gpo_connect_server() + + It's important that we use a signed connection to get the GPOs! + + BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997 + + Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> + Backported-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org> + + + From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> + Subject: CVE-2017-12150: s3:libsmb: only fallback to anonymous if authentication was not requested + + With forced encryption or required signing we should also don't fallback. + + BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997 + +--- + libgpo/gpo_fetch.c | 2 +- + source3/lib/util_cmdline.c | 3 +++ + source3/libsmb/clidfs.c | 2 ++ + 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c ++++ b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c +@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static NTSTATUS gpo_connect_server(ADS_S + ads->auth.password, + CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_KERBEROS | + CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_FALLBACK_AFTER_KERBEROS, +- Undefined); ++ Required); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) { + DEBUG(10,("check_refresh_gpo: " + "failed to connect: %s\n", +--- a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c ++++ b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c +@@ -122,6 +122,9 @@ bool set_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state + + int get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(const struct user_auth_info *auth_info) + { ++ if (auth_info->smb_encrypt) { ++ return Required; ++ } + return auth_info->signing_state; + } + +--- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c ++++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c +@@ -202,7 +202,9 @@ static struct cli_state *do_connect(TALL + /* If a password was not supplied then + * try again with a null username. */ + if (password[0] || !username[0] || ++ force_encrypt || client_is_signing_mandatory(c) || + get_cmdline_auth_info_use_kerberos(auth_info) || ++ get_cmdline_auth_info_use_ccache(auth_info) || + !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(cli_session_setup(c, "", + "", 0, + "", 0, diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/032-CVE-2018-1050-v3-6.patch b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/032-CVE-2018-1050-v3-6.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4c44243a63 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/032-CVE-2018-1050-v3-6.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From 6cc45e3452194f312e04109cfdae047eb0719c7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> +Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2018 15:56:03 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2018-1050: s3: RPC: spoolss server. Protect against null + pointer derefs. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11343 + +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> +--- + source3/rpc_server/spoolss/srv_spoolss_nt.c | 13 +++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) + +--- a/source3/rpc_server/spoolss/srv_spoolss_nt.c ++++ b/source3/rpc_server/spoolss/srv_spoolss_nt.c +@@ -176,6 +176,11 @@ static void prune_printername_cache(void + static const char *canon_servername(const char *servername) + { + const char *pservername = servername; ++ ++ if (servername == NULL) { ++ return ""; ++ } ++ + while (*pservername == '\\') { + pservername++; + } +@@ -2080,6 +2085,10 @@ WERROR _spoolss_DeletePrinterDriver(stru + return WERR_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + ++ if (r->in.architecture == NULL || r->in.driver == NULL) { ++ return WERR_INVALID_ENVIRONMENT; ++ } ++ + /* check that we have a valid driver name first */ + + if ((version = get_version_id(r->in.architecture)) == -1) +@@ -2225,6 +2234,10 @@ WERROR _spoolss_DeletePrinterDriverEx(st + return WERR_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + ++ if (r->in.architecture == NULL || r->in.driver == NULL) { ++ return WERR_INVALID_ENVIRONMENT; ++ } ++ + /* check that we have a valid driver name first */ + if (get_version_id(r->in.architecture) == -1) { + /* this is what NT returns */ diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/200-remove_printer_support.patch b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/200-remove_printer_support.patch index de567a7627..90f13feb0d 100644 --- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/200-remove_printer_support.patch +++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/200-remove_printer_support.patch @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ d_printf(_("Usage:\n")); --- a/source3/smbd/reply.c +++ b/source3/smbd/reply.c -@@ -5208,7 +5208,11 @@ void reply_printopen(struct smb_request +@@ -5255,7 +5255,11 @@ void reply_printopen(struct smb_request return; } @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED); END_PROFILE(SMBsplopen); return; -@@ -5314,7 +5318,10 @@ void reply_printqueue(struct smb_request +@@ -5361,7 +5365,10 @@ void reply_printqueue(struct smb_request is really quite gross and only worked when there was only one printer - I think we should now only accept it if they get it right (tridge) */ |