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-rw-r--r--package/network/services/hostapd/patches/0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch48
1 files changed, 48 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1b84f7e86a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From 3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 01:25:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] WPA: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data
+
+Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant
+processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted
+flag set, but not the MIC flag.
+
+When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but
+not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying
+the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when
+negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that
+unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary
+could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information
+in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key).
+(CVE-2018-14526)
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 56f3af7..db94a49 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -2215,6 +2215,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
+
+ if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) &&
+ (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA) && mic_len) {
++ /*
++ * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity
++ * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not
++ * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0
++ * which is the case in this code branch.
++ */
++ if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++ "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data");
++ goto out;
++ }
+ if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, mic_len,
+ ver, key_data,
+ &key_data_len))
+--
+2.7.4
+