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-rw-r--r--package/network/services/samba36/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--package/network/services/samba36/patches/010-patch-cve-2015-5252.patch43
-rw-r--r--package/network/services/samba36/patches/011-patch-cve-2015-5296.patch112
-rw-r--r--package/network/services/samba36/patches/012-patch-cve-2015-5299.patch97
4 files changed, 253 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/Makefile b/package/network/services/samba36/Makefile
index 344909f0bc..87d7002f43 100644
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/Makefile
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/Makefile
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=samba
PKG_VERSION:=3.6.25
-PKG_RELEASE:=1
+PKG_RELEASE:=1.1
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=http://ftp.samba.org/pub/samba \
http://ftp.samba.org/pub/samba/stable
diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/010-patch-cve-2015-5252.patch b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/010-patch-cve-2015-5252.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8922a6e505
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/010-patch-cve-2015-5252.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 2e94b6ec10f1d15e24867bab3063bb85f173406a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2015 10:58:11 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2015-5252: s3: smbd: Fix symlink verification (file
+ access outside the share).
+
+Ensure matching component ends in '/' or '\0'.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11395
+
+Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
+---
+ source3/smbd/vfs.c | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/smbd/vfs.c b/source3/smbd/vfs.c
+index 6c56964..bd93b7f 100644
+--- a/source3/smbd/vfs.c
++++ b/source3/smbd/vfs.c
+@@ -982,6 +982,7 @@ NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_struct *conn, const char *fname)
+ if (!allow_widelinks || !allow_symlinks) {
+ const char *conn_rootdir;
+ size_t rootdir_len;
++ bool matched;
+
+ conn_rootdir = SMB_VFS_CONNECTPATH(conn, fname);
+ if (conn_rootdir == NULL) {
+@@ -992,8 +993,10 @@ NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_struct *conn, const char *fname)
+ }
+
+ rootdir_len = strlen(conn_rootdir);
+- if (strncmp(conn_rootdir, resolved_name,
+- rootdir_len) != 0) {
++ matched = (strncmp(conn_rootdir, resolved_name,
++ rootdir_len) == 0);
++ if (!matched || (resolved_name[rootdir_len] != '/' &&
++ resolved_name[rootdir_len] != '\0')) {
+ DEBUG(2, ("check_reduced_name: Bad access "
+ "attempt: %s is a symlink outside the "
+ "share path\n", fname));
+--
+2.5.0
diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/011-patch-cve-2015-5296.patch b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/011-patch-cve-2015-5296.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eaafd1c667
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/011-patch-cve-2015-5296.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+From 25139116756cc285a3a5534834cc276ef1b7baaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2015 21:17:02 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] CVE-2015-5296: s3:libsmb: force signing when requiring
+ encryption in do_connect()
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11536
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+---
+ source3/libsmb/clidfs.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+index 23e1471..f153b6b 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+@@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ static struct cli_state *do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ const char *username;
+ const char *password;
+ NTSTATUS status;
++ int signing_state = get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(auth_info);
++
++ if (force_encrypt) {
++ signing_state = Required;
++ }
+
+ /* make a copy so we don't modify the global string 'service' */
+ servicename = talloc_strdup(ctx,share);
+@@ -132,7 +137,7 @@ static struct cli_state *do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ zero_sockaddr(&ss);
+
+ /* have to open a new connection */
+- c = cli_initialise_ex(get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(auth_info));
++ c = cli_initialise_ex(signing_state);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ d_printf("Connection to %s failed\n", server_n);
+ return NULL;
+--
+2.5.0
+
+
+From 060adb0abdeda51b8b622c6020b5dea0c8dde1cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2015 21:17:02 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2015-5296: s3:libsmb: force signing when requiring
+ encryption in SMBC_server_internal()
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11536
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+---
+ source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c | 13 +++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c
+index 45be660..167f2c9 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c
+@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ SMBC_server_internal(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ const char *username_used;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ char *newserver, *newshare;
++ int signing_state = Undefined;
+
+ zero_sockaddr(&ss);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(c);
+@@ -404,8 +405,12 @@ again:
+
+ zero_sockaddr(&ss);
+
++ if (context->internal->smb_encryption_level != SMBC_ENCRYPTLEVEL_NONE) {
++ signing_state = Required;
++ }
++
+ /* have to open a new connection */
+- if ((c = cli_initialise()) == NULL) {
++ if ((c = cli_initialise_ex(signing_state)) == NULL) {
+ errno = ENOMEM;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+@@ -750,6 +755,7 @@ SMBC_attr_server(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ ipc_srv = SMBC_find_server(ctx, context, server, "*IPC$",
+ pp_workgroup, pp_username, pp_password);
+ if (!ipc_srv) {
++ int signing_state = Undefined;
+
+ /* We didn't find a cached connection. Get the password */
+ if (!*pp_password || (*pp_password)[0] == '\0') {
+@@ -771,6 +777,9 @@ SMBC_attr_server(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ if (smbc_getOptionUseCCache(context)) {
+ flags |= CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_CCACHE;
+ }
++ if (context->internal->smb_encryption_level != SMBC_ENCRYPTLEVEL_NONE) {
++ signing_state = Required;
++ }
+
+ zero_sockaddr(&ss);
+ nt_status = cli_full_connection(&ipc_cli,
+@@ -780,7 +789,7 @@ SMBC_attr_server(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ *pp_workgroup,
+ *pp_password,
+ flags,
+- Undefined);
++ signing_state);
+ if (! NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ DEBUG(1,("cli_full_connection failed! (%s)\n",
+ nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+--
+2.5.0
diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/012-patch-cve-2015-5299.patch b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/012-patch-cve-2015-5299.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..19cbb19890
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/012-patch-cve-2015-5299.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+From 8e49de7754f7171a58a1f94dee0f1138dbee3c60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 14:54:31 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2015-5299: s3-shadow-copy2: fix missing access check on
+ snapdir
+
+Fix originally from <partha@exablox.com>
+
+https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11529
+
+Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
+---
+ source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c b/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c
+index fedfb53..16c1ed7 100644
+--- a/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c
++++ b/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c
+@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
+
+ #include "includes.h"
+ #include "smbd/smbd.h"
++#include "smbd/globals.h"
++#include "../libcli/security/security.h"
+ #include "system/filesys.h"
+ #include "ntioctl.h"
+
+@@ -764,6 +766,43 @@ static int shadow_copy2_mkdir(vfs_handle_struct *handle, const char *fname, mod
+ SHADOW2_NEXT(MKDIR, (handle, name, mode), int, -1);
+ }
+
++static bool check_access_snapdir(struct vfs_handle_struct *handle,
++ const char *path)
++{
++ struct smb_filename smb_fname;
++ int ret;
++ NTSTATUS status;
++ uint32_t access_granted = 0;
++
++ ZERO_STRUCT(smb_fname);
++ smb_fname.base_name = talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(),
++ "%s",
++ path);
++ if (smb_fname.base_name == NULL) {
++ return false;
++ }
++
++ ret = SMB_VFS_NEXT_STAT(handle, &smb_fname);
++ if (ret != 0 || !S_ISDIR(smb_fname.st.st_ex_mode)) {
++ TALLOC_FREE(smb_fname.base_name);
++ return false;
++ }
++
++ status = smbd_check_open_rights(handle->conn,
++ &smb_fname,
++ SEC_DIR_LIST,
++ &access_granted);
++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
++ DEBUG(0,("user does not have list permission "
++ "on snapdir %s\n",
++ smb_fname.base_name));
++ TALLOC_FREE(smb_fname.base_name);
++ return false;
++ }
++ TALLOC_FREE(smb_fname.base_name);
++ return true;
++}
++
+ static int shadow_copy2_rmdir(vfs_handle_struct *handle, const char *fname)
+ {
+ SHADOW2_NEXT(RMDIR, (handle, name), int, -1);
+@@ -877,6 +916,7 @@ static int shadow_copy2_get_shadow_copy2_data(vfs_handle_struct *handle,
+ SMB_STRUCT_DIRENT *d;
+ TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(handle->data);
+ char *snapshot;
++ bool ret;
+
+ snapdir = shadow_copy2_find_snapdir(tmp_ctx, handle);
+ if (snapdir == NULL) {
+@@ -886,6 +926,13 @@ static int shadow_copy2_get_shadow_copy2_data(vfs_handle_struct *handle,
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
++ ret = check_access_snapdir(handle, snapdir);
++ if (!ret) {
++ DEBUG(0,("access denied on listing snapdir %s\n", snapdir));
++ errno = EACCES;
++ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
++ return -1;
++ }
+
+ p = SMB_VFS_NEXT_OPENDIR(handle, snapdir, NULL, 0);
+
+--
+2.5.0