kernel: delete Linux 5.4 config and patches

As the upcoming release will be based on Linux 5.10 only, remove all
kernel configuration as well as patches for Linux 5.4.
There were no targets still actively using Linux 5.4.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3a14580411adfb75f9a44eded9f41245b9e44606)

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 248 deletions

diff --git a/target/linux/layerscape/patches-5.4/804-crypto-0040-LF-292-1-crypto-caam-refactor-RNG-initialization.patch b/target/linux/layerscape/patches-5.4/804-crypto-0040-LF-292-1-crypto-caam-refactor-RNG-initialization.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c4c22a1cd5..0000000000
--- a/target/linux/layerscape/patches-5.4/804-crypto-0040-LF-292-1-crypto-caam-refactor-RNG-initialization.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
-From 43f8f404e2e8cd81baa4d89706e40901c466c7bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Horia=20Geant=C4=83?= <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
-Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2020 11:48:39 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] LF-292-1 crypto: caam - refactor RNG initialization
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-RNG (re-)initialization will be needed on pm resume path,
-thus refactor the corresponding code out of the probe callback.
-
-Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
-Reviewed-by: Valentin Ciocoi Radulescu <valentin.ciocoi@nxp.com>
-Signed-off-by: Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand@nxp.com>
-Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <leonard.crestez@nxp.com>
-Signed-off-by: Dong Aisheng <aisheng.dong@nxp.com>
----
- drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c | 189 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
- 1 file changed, 102 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)
-
---- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
-+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
-@@ -327,13 +327,12 @@ static int instantiate_rng(struct device
- /*
-  * kick_trng - sets the various parameters for enabling the initialization
-  *	       of the RNG4 block in CAAM
-- * @pdev - pointer to the platform device
-+ * @dev - pointer to the controller device
-  * @ent_delay - Defines the length (in system clocks) of each entropy sample.
-  */
--static void kick_trng(struct platform_device *pdev, int ent_delay)
-+static void kick_trng(struct device *dev, int ent_delay)
- {
--	struct device *ctrldev = &pdev->dev;
--	struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(ctrldev);
-+	struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
- 	struct caam_ctrl __iomem *ctrl;
- 	struct rng4tst __iomem *r4tst;
- 	u32 val;
-@@ -571,10 +570,105 @@ static void caam_dma_dev_unregister(void
- 	platform_device_unregister(data);
- }
- 
-+static int caam_ctrl_rng_init(struct device *dev)
-+{
-+	struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
-+	struct caam_ctrl __iomem *ctrl = ctrlpriv->ctrl;
-+	int ret, gen_sk, ent_delay = RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MIN;
-+	u8 rng_vid;
-+
-+	if (ctrlpriv->era < 10) {
-+		struct caam_perfmon __iomem *perfmon;
-+
-+		perfmon = ctrlpriv->total_jobrs ?
-+			  (struct caam_perfmon *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->perfmon :
-+			  (struct caam_perfmon *)&ctrl->perfmon;
-+
-+		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_id_ls) &
-+			   CHA_ID_LS_RNG_MASK) >> CHA_ID_LS_RNG_SHIFT;
-+	} else {
-+		struct version_regs __iomem *vreg;
-+
-+		vreg = ctrlpriv->total_jobrs ?
-+			(struct version_regs *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->vreg :
-+			(struct version_regs *)&ctrl->vreg;
-+
-+		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&vreg->rng) & CHA_VER_VID_MASK) >>
-+			  CHA_VER_VID_SHIFT;
-+	}
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * If SEC has RNG version >= 4 and RNG state handle has not been
-+	 * already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
-+	 * In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC f/w.
-+	 */
-+	if (!ctrlpriv->mc_en && rng_vid >= 4) {
-+		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
-+			rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
-+		/*
-+		 * If the secure keys (TDKEK, JDKEK, TDSK), were already
-+		 * generated, signal this to the function that is instantiating
-+		 * the state handles. An error would occur if RNG4 attempts
-+		 * to regenerate these keys before the next POR.
-+		 */
-+		gen_sk = ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_SKVN ? 0 : 1;
-+		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_IFMASK;
-+		do {
-+			int inst_handles =
-+				rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) &
-+								RDSTA_IFMASK;
-+			/*
-+			 * If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
-+			 * (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
-+			 * parameters are properly set and thus the function
-+			 * setting these (kick_trng(...)) is skipped.
-+			 * Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
-+			 * the TRNG parameters.
-+			 */
-+			if (!(ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles)) {
-+				dev_info(dev,
-+					 "Entropy delay = %u\n",
-+					 ent_delay);
-+				kick_trng(dev, ent_delay);
-+				ent_delay += 400;
-+			}
-+			/*
-+			 * if instantiate_rng(...) fails, the loop will rerun
-+			 * and the kick_trng(...) function will modify the
-+			 * upper and lower limits of the entropy sampling
-+			 * interval, leading to a sucessful initialization of
-+			 * the RNG.
-+			 */
-+			ret = instantiate_rng(dev, inst_handles,
-+					      gen_sk);
-+			if (ret == -EAGAIN)
-+				/*
-+				 * if here, the loop will rerun,
-+				 * so don't hog the CPU
-+				 */
-+				cpu_relax();
-+		} while ((ret == -EAGAIN) && (ent_delay < RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MAX));
-+		if (ret) {
-+			dev_err(dev, "failed to instantiate RNG");
-+			return ret;
-+		}
-+		/*
-+		 * Set handles init'ed by this module as the complement of the
-+		 * already initialized ones
-+		 */
-+		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_IFMASK;
-+
-+		/* Enable RDB bit so that RNG works faster */
-+		clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->scfgr, 0, SCFGR_RDBENABLE);
-+	}
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- /* Probe routine for CAAM top (controller) level */
- static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
- {
--	int ret, ring, gen_sk, ent_delay = RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MIN;
-+	int ret, ring;
- 	u64 caam_id;
- 	const struct soc_device_attribute *imx_soc_match;
- 	static struct platform_device_info caam_dma_pdev_info = {
-@@ -592,7 +686,6 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_de
- 	struct dentry *dfs_root;
- #endif
- 	u32 scfgr, comp_params;
--	u8 rng_vid;
- 	int pg_size;
- 	int BLOCK_OFFSET = 0;
- 	bool reg_access = true;
-@@ -875,90 +968,12 @@ set_dma_mask:
- 			return ret;
- 	}
- 
--	if (!reg_access)
--		goto report_live;
--
--	if (ctrlpriv->era < 10) {
--		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_id_ls) &
--			   CHA_ID_LS_RNG_MASK) >> CHA_ID_LS_RNG_SHIFT;
--	} else {
--		struct version_regs __iomem *vreg;
--
--		vreg = ring ? (struct version_regs *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->vreg :
--			      (struct version_regs *)&ctrl->vreg;
--
--		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&vreg->rng) & CHA_VER_VID_MASK) >>
--			   CHA_VER_VID_SHIFT;
--	}
--
--	/*
--	 * If SEC has RNG version >= 4 and RNG state handle has not been
--	 * already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
--	 * In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC f/w.
--	 */
--	if (!ctrlpriv->mc_en && rng_vid >= 4) {
--		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
--			rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
--		/*
--		 * If the secure keys (TDKEK, JDKEK, TDSK), were already
--		 * generated, signal this to the function that is instantiating
--		 * the state handles. An error would occur if RNG4 attempts
--		 * to regenerate these keys before the next POR.
--		 */
--		gen_sk = ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_SKVN ? 0 : 1;
--		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_IFMASK;
--		do {
--			int inst_handles =
--				rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) &
--								RDSTA_IFMASK;
--			/*
--			 * If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
--			 * (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
--			 * parameters are properly set and thus the function
--			 * setting these (kick_trng(...)) is skipped.
--			 * Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
--			 * the TRNG parameters.
--			 */
--			if (!(ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles)) {
--				dev_info(dev,
--					 "Entropy delay = %u\n",
--					 ent_delay);
--				kick_trng(pdev, ent_delay);
--				ent_delay += 400;
--			}
--			/*
--			 * if instantiate_rng(...) fails, the loop will rerun
--			 * and the kick_trng(...) function will modfiy the
--			 * upper and lower limits of the entropy sampling
--			 * interval, leading to a sucessful initialization of
--			 * the RNG.
--			 */
--			ret = instantiate_rng(dev, inst_handles,
--					      gen_sk);
--			if (ret == -EAGAIN)
--				/*
--				 * if here, the loop will rerun,
--				 * so don't hog the CPU
--				 */
--				cpu_relax();
--		} while ((ret == -EAGAIN) && (ent_delay < RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MAX));
--		if (ret) {
--			dev_err(dev, "failed to instantiate RNG");
-+	if (reg_access) {
-+		ret = caam_ctrl_rng_init(dev);
-+		if (ret)
- 			return ret;
--		}
--		/*
--		 * Set handles init'ed by this module as the complement of the
--		 * already initialized ones
--		 */
--		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_IFMASK;
--
--		/* Enable RDB bit so that RNG works faster */
--		clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->scfgr, 0, SCFGR_RDBENABLE);
- 	}
- 
--	/* NOTE: RTIC detection ought to go here, around Si time */
--
--report_live:
- 	caam_id = (u64)rd_reg32(&perfmon->caam_id_ms) << 32 |
- 		  (u64)rd_reg32(&perfmon->caam_id_ls);
-