diff options
author | Nicolas Thill <nico@openwrt.org> | 2009-04-25 16:33:00 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Nicolas Thill <nico@openwrt.org> | 2009-04-25 16:33:00 +0000 |
commit | 1e0fd6d7dcb88c36e89912bbcca0e727061ec46c (patch) | |
tree | 40666250613d7fdbc892c9bf1a7128c58a7b448f /package/openssl/patches/001-upstream_dtls_cisco.patch | |
parent | d9be507b8ff5a4a2f31591c27ea35fff0ab07c36 (diff) | |
download | upstream-1e0fd6d7dcb88c36e89912bbcca0e727061ec46c.tar.gz upstream-1e0fd6d7dcb88c36e89912bbcca0e727061ec46c.tar.bz2 upstream-1e0fd6d7dcb88c36e89912bbcca0e727061ec46c.zip |
[package] openssl: add a patch to support DTLS compatibility with Cisco AnyConnect & OpenConnect VPN clients (thanks to freezer)
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/trunk@15410 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
Diffstat (limited to 'package/openssl/patches/001-upstream_dtls_cisco.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | package/openssl/patches/001-upstream_dtls_cisco.patch | 139 |
1 files changed, 139 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/openssl/patches/001-upstream_dtls_cisco.patch b/package/openssl/patches/001-upstream_dtls_cisco.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..46f4bb2233 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/openssl/patches/001-upstream_dtls_cisco.patch @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +--- a/ssl/d1_clnt.c ++++ b/ssl/d1_clnt.c +@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s + + static SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_client_method(int ver) + { +- if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION) ++ if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION || ver == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + return(DTLSv1_client_method()); + else + return(NULL); +@@ -181,7 +181,8 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) + s->server=0; + if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); + +- if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) ++ if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) && ++ (s->version & 0xff00 ) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + ret = -1; +--- a/ssl/d1_lib.c ++++ b/ssl/d1_lib.c +@@ -187,7 +187,10 @@ void dtls1_free(SSL *s) + void dtls1_clear(SSL *s) + { + ssl3_clear(s); +- s->version=DTLS1_VERSION; ++ if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT) ++ s->version=DTLS1_BAD_VER; ++ else ++ s->version=DTLS1_VERSION; + } + + /* +--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c ++++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c +@@ -987,15 +987,17 @@ start: + if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) + { + struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr; ++ int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; + + dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr); + + /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know + * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ + /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */ +- if ( (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER && rr->length != 3) || +- (s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && rr->length != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH) || +- (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) ++ if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) ++ ccs_hdr_len = 3; ++ ++ if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) || (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) + { + i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); +@@ -1311,7 +1313,7 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, con + #if 0 + /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */ + if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done +- && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION) ++ && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) + { + /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites + * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) +--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c ++++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c +@@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) + + if (!ok) return((int)n); + +- if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION) ++ if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + { + if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) + { +--- a/ssl/ssl.h ++++ b/ssl/ssl.h +@@ -510,6 +510,8 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st + #define SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE 0x00002000L + /* Don't use RFC4507 ticket extension */ + #define SSL_OP_NO_TICKET 0x00004000L ++/* Use Cisco's "speshul" version of DTLS_BAD_VER (as client) */ ++#define SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT 0x00008000L + + /* As server, disallow session resumption on renegotiation */ + #define SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 0x00010000L +--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c +@@ -995,7 +995,8 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,v + s->max_cert_list=larg; + return(l); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU: +- if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION) ++ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || ++ SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + { + s->d1->mtu = larg; + return larg; +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +@@ -211,6 +211,11 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int sess + ss->ssl_version=TLS1_VERSION; + ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } ++ else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) ++ { ++ ss->ssl_version=DTLS1_BAD_VER; ++ ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; ++ } + else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) + { + ss->ssl_version=DTLS1_VERSION; +--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c ++++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c +@@ -765,10 +765,10 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md + HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac); + HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac,mac_sec,EVP_MD_size(hash),hash,NULL); + +- if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) ++ if (ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER || ++ (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)) + { + unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq; +- + s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p); + memcpy (p,&seq[2],6); + +@@ -793,7 +793,7 @@ printf("rec="); + {unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); } + #endif + +- if ( SSL_version(ssl) != DTLS1_VERSION) ++ if ( SSL_version(ssl) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(ssl) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) + { + for (i=7; i>=0; i--) + { |