hostapd: fix post v2.4 security issues

- WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser (CVE-2015-4141)
- EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit and Confirm
  (CVE-2015-4143)
- EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit and Confirm
  (CVE-2015-4143)
- EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment reassembly
  (CVE-2015-4144, CVE-2015-4145)
- EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment reassembly
  (CVE-2015-4144, CVE-2015-4145)
- EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior (CVE-2015-4146)
- NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser (CVE-2015-8041)
- WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM Sleep Mode Response frame if no PMF in use
  (CVE-2015-5310)
- EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation (CVE-2015-5315)
- EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation (CVE-2015-5314)
- EAP-pwd peer: Fix error path for unexpected Confirm message (CVE-2015-5316)

Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>

SVN-Revision: 48185

11 files changed, 554 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/003-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/003-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..36b4ca2946
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/003-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser
+
+strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
+resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
+result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
+argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
+
+This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
+has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
+would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
+upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
+(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
+
+Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
+rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
+larger than the maximum configured body length.
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c
+index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644
+--- a/src/wps/httpread.c
++++ b/src/wps/httpread.c
+@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+ 					if (!isxdigit(*cbp))
+ 						goto bad;
+ 					h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16);
++					if (h->chunk_size < 0 ||
++					    h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) {
++						wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++							   "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d",
++							   h->chunk_size);
++						goto bad;
++					}
+ 					/* throw away chunk header
+ 					 * so we have only real data
+ 					 */
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/004-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/004-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..91627fb7b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/004-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit
+ and Confirm
+
+The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
+checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
+overflow when processing an invalid message.
+
+Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
+processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
+make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
+message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+index f2b0926..a629437 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 	BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+ 	u16 offset;
+ 	u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
++	size_t prime_len, order_len;
++
++	if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) {
++		ret->ignore = TRUE;
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
++	prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
++	order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
++
++	if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
++			   (unsigned int) payload_len,
++			   (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
++		goto fin;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+ 	    ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
+@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 	u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
+ 	int offset;
+ 
++	if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
++		ret->ignore = TRUE;
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
++	if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
++			   (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
+ 	 *	prf
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/005-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/005-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5dca20b277
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/005-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit
+ and Confirm
+
+The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
+checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
+overflow when processing an invalid message.
+
+Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
+processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
+make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
+message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 	BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+ 	EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
+ 	int res = 0;
++	size_t prime_len, order_len;
+ 
+ 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
+ 
++	prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
++	order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
++
++	if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
++			   (unsigned int) payload_len,
++			   (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
+ 	if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+ 	    ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+ 	    ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 	u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
+ 	int offset;
+ 
++	if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
++			   (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
+ 	/* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
+ 	grp = htons(data->group_num);
+ 	ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/006-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/006-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4d2f9d8aef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/006-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 477c74395acd0123340457ba6f15ab345d42016e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:23:04 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 3/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
+ reassembly
+
+The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
+Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
+prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
+have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
+as a huge positive integer.
+
+In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
+before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
+potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+index a629437..1d2079b 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -866,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ 	 * if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field
+ 	 */
+ 	if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
++		if (len < 2) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++				   "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
++			ret->ignore = TRUE;
++			return NULL;
++		}
+ 		tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose "
+ 			   "total length = %d", tot_len);
+ 		if (tot_len > 15000)
+ 			return NULL;
++		if (data->inbuf) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++				   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
++			ret->ignore = TRUE;
++			return NULL;
++		}
+ 		data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
+ 		if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
+ 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer "
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/007-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/007-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7edef099eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/007-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 3035cc2894e08319b905bd6561e8bddc8c2db9fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:06 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 4/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
+ reassembly
+
+The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
+Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
+prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
+have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
+as a huge positive integer.
+
+In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
+before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
+potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+index 3189105..2bfc3c2 100644
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -942,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+ 	 * the first fragment has a total length
+ 	 */
+ 	if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
++		if (len < 2) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++				   "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
++			return;
++		}
+ 		tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total "
+ 			   "length = %d", tot_len);
+ 		if (tot_len > 15000)
+ 			return;
++		if (data->inbuf) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++				   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
++			return;
++		}
+ 		data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
+ 		if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
+ 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to "
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/008-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/008-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a601323f14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/008-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 28a069a545b06b99eb55ad53f63f2c99e65a98f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:28 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 5/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior
+
+The L (Length) and M (More) flags needs to be cleared before deciding
+whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This
+fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid
+for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in
+triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process
+due to invalid buffer allocation.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+index 1d2079b..e58b13a 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ 	/*
+ 	 * we have output! Do we need to fragment it?
+ 	 */
++	lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch);
+ 	len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf);
+ 	if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) {
+ 		resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu,
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/009-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/009-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dd3462465e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/009-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From df9079e72760ceb7ebe7fb11538200c516bdd886 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 21:57:28 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser
+
+It was possible for the 32-bit record->total_length value to end up
+wrapping around due to integer overflow if the longer form of payload
+length field is used and record->payload_length gets a value close to
+2^32. This could result in ndef_parse_record() accepting a too large
+payload length value and the record type filter reading up to about 20
+bytes beyond the end of the buffer and potentially killing the process.
+This could also result in an attempt to allocate close to 2^32 bytes of
+heap memory and if that were to succeed, a buffer read overflow of the
+same length which would most likely result in the process termination.
+In case of record->total_length ending up getting the value 0, there
+would be no buffer read overflow, but record parsing would result in an
+infinite loop in ndef_parse_records().
+
+Any of these error cases could potentially be used for denial of service
+attacks over NFC by using a malformed NDEF record on an NFC Tag or
+sending them during NFC connection handover if the application providing
+the NDEF message to hostapd/wpa_supplicant did no validation of the
+received records. While such validation is likely done in the NFC stack
+that needs to parse the NFC messages before further processing,
+hostapd/wpa_supplicant better be prepared for any data being included
+here.
+
+Fix this by validating record->payload_length value in a way that
+detects integer overflow. (CID 122668)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/wps/ndef.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/wps/ndef.c b/src/wps/ndef.c
+index 5604b0a..50d018f 100644
+--- a/src/wps/ndef.c
++++ b/src/wps/ndef.c
+@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size,
+ 		if (size < 6)
+ 			return -1;
+ 		record->payload_length = ntohl(*(u32 *)pos);
++		if (record->payload_length > size - 6)
++			return -1;
+ 		pos += sizeof(u32);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -68,7 +70,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size,
+ 	pos += record->payload_length;
+ 
+ 	record->total_length = pos - data;
+-	if (record->total_length > size)
++	if (record->total_length > size ||
++	    record->total_length < record->payload_length)
+ 		return -1;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/010-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/010-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..00e5b7c771
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/010-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 6b12d93d2c7428a34bfd4b3813ba339ed57b698a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2015 15:45:50 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM Sleep Mode Response frame if no
+ PMF in use
+
+WNM Sleep Mode Response frame is used to update GTK/IGTK only if PMF is
+enabled. Verify that PMF is in use before using this field on station
+side to avoid accepting unauthenticated key updates. (CVE-2015-5310)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
+index 954de67..7d79499 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
+@@ -187,6 +187,12 @@ static void wnm_sleep_mode_exit_success(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ 	end = ptr + key_len_total;
+ 	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Key Data", ptr, key_len_total);
+ 
++	if (key_len_total && !wpa_sm_pmf_enabled(wpa_s->wpa)) {
++		wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO,
++			"WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM-Sleep Mode Response - PMF not enabled");
++		return;
++	}
++
+ 	while (ptr + 1 < end) {
+ 		if (ptr + 2 + ptr[1] > end) {
+ 			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Invalid Key Data element "
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/011-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/011-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..82c26398b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/011-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation
+
+All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
+room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
+fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
+The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
+buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
+termination. (CVE-2015-5315)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++----
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+index 1f78544..75ceef1 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ 	/*
+ 	 * buffer and ACK the fragment
+ 	 */
+-	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
++	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
+ 		data->in_frag_pos += len;
+ 		if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
+ 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack "
+@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ 			return NULL;
+ 		}
+ 		wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
+-
++	}
++	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
+ 		resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD,
+ 				     EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE,
+ 				     EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData));
+@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ 	 * we're buffering and this is the last fragment
+ 	 */
+ 	if (data->in_frag_pos) {
+-		wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
+ 			   (int) len);
+-		data->in_frag_pos += len;
+ 		pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
+ 		len = data->in_frag_pos;
+ 	}
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/012-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/012-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bfc4c74e95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/012-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From bef802ece03f9ae9d52a21f0cf4f1bc2c5a1f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:24:16 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation
+
+All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
+room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
+fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
+The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
+buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
+termination. (CVE-2015-5314)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+index cb83ff7..9f787ab 100644
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+ 	/*
+ 	 * the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set
+ 	 */
+-	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
++	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
+ 		if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
+ 			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow "
+ 				   "attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)",
+@@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+ 		}
+ 		wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
+ 		data->in_frag_pos += len;
++	}
++	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment",
+ 			   (int) len);
+ 		return;
+@@ -990,8 +992,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+ 	 * buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last)
+ 	 */
+ 	if (data->in_frag_pos) {
+-		wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
+-		data->in_frag_pos += len;
+ 		pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
+ 		len = data->in_frag_pos;
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/013-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/013-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3088f6a6dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/013-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 95577884ca4fa76be91344ff7a8d5d1e6dc3da61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 19:35:44 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix error path for unexpected Confirm message
+
+If the Confirm message is received from the server before the Identity
+exchange has been completed, the group has not yet been determined and
+data->grp is NULL. The error path in eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange()
+did not take this corner case into account and could end up
+dereferencing a NULL pointer and terminating the process if invalid
+message sequence is received. (CVE-2015-5316)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+index 75ceef1..892b590 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -774,7 +774,8 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 	wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, conf, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
+ 
+ fin:
+-	bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
++	if (data->grp)
++		bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
+ 	BN_clear_free(x);
+ 	BN_clear_free(y);
+ 	if (data->outbuf == NULL) {
+-- 
+1.9.1
+