hostapd: backport extra changes related to KRACK

While these changes are not included in the advisory, upstream
encourages users to merge them.
See http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/hostap/2017-October/037989.html

Signed-off-by: Stijn Tintel <stijn@linux-ipv6.be>

9 files changed, 442 insertions, 9 deletions

diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/008-WPA-Extra-defense-against-PTK-reinstalls-in-4-way-ha.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/008-WPA-Extra-defense-against-PTK-reinstalls-in-4-way-ha.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..40f6b56965
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/008-WPA-Extra-defense-against-PTK-reinstalls-in-4-way-ha.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From a00e946c1c9a1f9cc65c72900d2a444ceb1f872e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2017 23:53:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] WPA: Extra defense against PTK reinstalls in 4-way handshake
+
+Currently, reinstallations of the PTK are prevented by (1) assuring the
+same TPTK is only set once as the PTK, and (2) that one particular PTK
+is only installed once. This patch makes it more explicit that point (1)
+is required to prevent key reinstallations. At the same time, this patch
+hardens wpa_supplicant such that future changes do not accidentally
+break this property.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -1728,6 +1728,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_verify_eapol_k
+ 			sm->ptk_set = 1;
+ 			os_memcpy(&sm->ptk, &sm->tptk, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ 			os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
++			/*
++			 * This assures the same TPTK in sm->tptk can never be
++			 * copied twice to sm->pkt as the new PTK. In
++			 * combination with the installed flag in the wpa_ptk
++			 * struct, this assures the same PTK is only installed
++			 * once.
++			 */
++			sm->renew_snonce = 1;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/009-Clear-PMK-length-and-check-for-this-when-deriving-PT.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/009-Clear-PMK-length-and-check-for-this-when-deriving-PT.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ed7d79ec1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/009-Clear-PMK-length-and-check-for-this-when-deriving-PT.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From b488a12948751f57871f09baa345e59b23959a41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 8 Oct 2017 13:18:02 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Clear PMK length and check for this when deriving PTK
+
+Instead of setting the default PMK length for the cleared PMK, set the
+length to 0 and explicitly check for this when deriving PTK to avoid
+unexpected key derivation with an all-zeroes key should it be possible
+to somehow trigger PTK derivation to happen before PMK derivation.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.c | 5 +++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c      | 7 ++++---
+ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.c
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.c
+@@ -225,6 +225,11 @@ int wpa_pmk_to_ptk(const u8 *pmk, size_t
+ 	u8 tmp[WPA_KCK_MAX_LEN + WPA_KEK_MAX_LEN + WPA_TK_MAX_LEN];
+ 	size_t ptk_len;
+ 
++	if (pmk_len == 0) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: No PMK set for PT derivation");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
+ 	if (os_memcmp(addr1, addr2, ETH_ALEN) < 0) {
+ 		os_memcpy(data, addr1, ETH_ALEN);
+ 		os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, addr2, ETH_ALEN);
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -584,7 +584,8 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_
+ 	/* Calculate PTK which will be stored as a temporary PTK until it has
+ 	 * been verified when processing message 3/4. */
+ 	ptk = &sm->tptk;
+-	wpa_derive_ptk(sm, src_addr, key, ptk);
++	if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm, src_addr, key, ptk) < 0)
++		goto failed;
+ 	if (sm->pairwise_cipher == WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
+ 		u8 buf[8];
+ 		/* Supplicant: swap tx/rx Mic keys */
+@@ -2705,8 +2706,8 @@ void wpa_sm_set_pmk_from_pmksa(struct wp
+ 		sm->pmk_len = sm->cur_pmksa->pmk_len;
+ 		os_memcpy(sm->pmk, sm->cur_pmksa->pmk, sm->pmk_len);
+ 	} else {
+-		sm->pmk_len = PMK_LEN;
+-		os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, PMK_LEN);
++		sm->pmk_len = 0;
++		os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, PMK_LEN_MAX);
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/010-Optional-AP-side-workaround-for-key-reinstallation-a.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/010-Optional-AP-side-workaround-for-key-reinstallation-a.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..19165cce2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/010-Optional-AP-side-workaround-for-key-reinstallation-a.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+From 6f234c1e2ee1ede29f2412b7012b3345ed8e52d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2017 18:37:43 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Optional AP side workaround for key reinstallation attacks
+
+This adds a new hostapd configuration parameter
+wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries=1 that can be used to disable
+retransmission of EAPOL-Key frames that are used to install
+keys (EAPOL-Key message 3/4 and group message 1/2). This is
+similar to setting wpa_group_update_count=1 and
+wpa_pairwise_update_count=1, but with no impact to message 1/4
+retries and with extended timeout for messages 4/4 and group
+message 2/2 to avoid causing issues with stations that may use
+aggressive power saving have very long time in replying to the
+EAPOL-Key messages.
+
+This option can be used to work around key reinstallation attacks
+on the station (supplicant) side in cases those station devices
+cannot be updated for some reason. By removing the
+retransmissions the attacker cannot cause key reinstallation with
+a delayed frame transmission. This is related to the station side
+vulnerabilities CVE-2017-13077, CVE-2017-13078, CVE-2017-13079,
+CVE-2017-13080, and CVE-2017-13081.
+
+This workaround might cause interoperability issues and reduced
+robustness of key negotiation especially in environments with
+heavy traffic load due to the number of attempts to perform the
+key exchange is reduced significantly. As such, this workaround
+is disabled by default (unless overridden in build
+configuration). To enable this, set the parameter to 1.
+
+It is also possible to enable this in the build by default by
+adding the following to the build configuration:
+
+CFLAGS += -DDEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES=1
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ hostapd/config_file.c  |  2 ++
+ hostapd/defconfig      |  4 ++++
+ hostapd/hostapd.conf   | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/ap/ap_config.c     |  6 ++++++
+ src/ap/ap_config.h     |  1 +
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.c      | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.h      |  1 +
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c |  2 ++
+ 8 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/hostapd/config_file.c
++++ b/hostapd/config_file.c
+@@ -2542,6 +2542,8 @@ static int hostapd_config_fill(struct ho
+ 			return 1;
+ 		}
+ 		bss->wpa_pairwise_update_count = (u32) val;
++	} else if (os_strcmp(buf, "wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries") == 0) {
++		bss->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries = atoi(pos);
+ 	} else if (os_strcmp(buf, "wpa_passphrase") == 0) {
+ 		int len = os_strlen(pos);
+ 		if (len < 8 || len > 63) {
+--- a/hostapd/defconfig
++++ b/hostapd/defconfig
+@@ -372,3 +372,7 @@ CONFIG_IPV6=y
+ # Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE)
+ # Experimental implementation of draft-harkins-owe-07.txt
+ #CONFIG_OWE=y
++
++# Override default value for the wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries configuration
++# parameter. See that parameter in hostapd.conf for more details.
++#CFLAGS += -DDEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES=1
+--- a/hostapd/hostapd.conf
++++ b/hostapd/hostapd.conf
+@@ -1315,6 +1315,30 @@ own_ip_addr=127.0.0.1
+ # Range 1..4294967295; default: 4
+ #wpa_pairwise_update_count=4
+ 
++# Workaround for key reinstallation attacks
++#
++# This parameter can be used to disable retransmission of EAPOL-Key frames that
++# are used to install keys (EAPOL-Key message 3/4 and group message 1/2). This
++# is similar to setting wpa_group_update_count=1 and
++# wpa_pairwise_update_count=1, but with no impact to message 1/4 and with
++# extended timeout on the response to avoid causing issues with stations that
++# may use aggressive power saving have very long time in replying to the
++# EAPOL-Key messages.
++#
++# This option can be used to work around key reinstallation attacks on the
++# station (supplicant) side in cases those station devices cannot be updated
++# for some reason. By removing the retransmissions the attacker cannot cause
++# key reinstallation with a delayed frame transmission. This is related to the
++# station side vulnerabilities CVE-2017-13077, CVE-2017-13078, CVE-2017-13079,
++# CVE-2017-13080, and CVE-2017-13081.
++#
++# This workaround might cause interoperability issues and reduced robustness of
++# key negotiation especially in environments with heavy traffic load due to the
++# number of attempts to perform the key exchange is reduced significantly. As
++# such, this workaround is disabled by default (unless overridden in build
++# configuration). To enable this, set the parameter to 1.
++#wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries=1
++
+ # Enable IEEE 802.11i/RSN/WPA2 pre-authentication. This is used to speed up
+ # roaming be pre-authenticating IEEE 802.1X/EAP part of the full RSN
+ # authentication and key handshake before actually associating with a new AP.
+--- a/src/ap/ap_config.c
++++ b/src/ap/ap_config.c
+@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ static void hostapd_config_free_vlan(str
+ }
+ 
+ 
++#ifndef DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES
++#define DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES 0
++#endif /* DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES */
++
+ void hostapd_config_defaults_bss(struct hostapd_bss_config *bss)
+ {
+ 	dl_list_init(&bss->anqp_elem);
+@@ -58,6 +62,8 @@ void hostapd_config_defaults_bss(struct
+ 	bss->wpa_gmk_rekey = 86400;
+ 	bss->wpa_group_update_count = 4;
+ 	bss->wpa_pairwise_update_count = 4;
++	bss->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries =
++		DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES;
+ 	bss->wpa_key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK;
+ 	bss->wpa_pairwise = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
+ 	bss->wpa_group = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
+--- a/src/ap/ap_config.h
++++ b/src/ap/ap_config.h
+@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ struct hostapd_bss_config {
+ 	int wpa_ptk_rekey;
+ 	u32 wpa_group_update_count;
+ 	u32 wpa_pairwise_update_count;
++	int wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries;
+ 	int rsn_pairwise;
+ 	int rsn_preauth;
+ 	char *rsn_preauth_interfaces;
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wp
+ static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first = 100; /* ms */
+ static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq = 1000; /* ms */
+ static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group = 500; /* ms */
++static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans = 4000; /* ms */
+ 
+ /* TODO: make these configurable */
+ static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime = 43200;
+@@ -1653,6 +1654,9 @@ static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_au
+ 			eapol_key_timeout_first_group;
+ 	else
+ 		timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_subseq;
++	if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
++	    (!pairwise || (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)))
++		timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans;
+ 	if (pairwise && ctr == 1 && !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC))
+ 		sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 1;
+ 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
+@@ -2882,6 +2886,11 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING)
+ 	sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
+ 
+ 	sm->TimeoutCtr++;
++	if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
++	    sm->TimeoutCtr > 1) {
++		/* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 */
++		return;
++	}
+ 	if (sm->TimeoutCtr > sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) {
+ 		/* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
+ 		 * immediately following this. */
+@@ -3220,7 +3229,9 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
+ 			 sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
+ 			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE);
+ 		else if (sm->TimeoutCtr >
+-			 sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) {
++			 sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count ||
++			 (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
++			  sm->TimeoutCtr > 1)) {
+ 			wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
+ 			wpa_auth_vlogger(
+ 				sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
+@@ -3260,6 +3271,11 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING
+ 	SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk_group);
+ 
+ 	sm->GTimeoutCtr++;
++	if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
++	    sm->GTimeoutCtr > 1) {
++		/* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key group msg 1/2 */
++		return;
++	}
+ 	if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count) {
+ 		/* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
+ 		 * immediately following this. */
+@@ -3363,7 +3379,9 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP)
+ 		    !sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
+ 			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED);
+ 		else if (sm->GTimeoutCtr >
+-			 sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count)
++			 sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count ||
++			 (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
++			  sm->GTimeoutCtr > 1))
+ 			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR);
+ 		else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
+ 			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING);
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ struct wpa_auth_config {
+ 	int wpa_ptk_rekey;
+ 	u32 wpa_group_update_count;
+ 	u32 wpa_pairwise_update_count;
++	int wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries;
+ 	int rsn_pairwise;
+ 	int rsn_preauth;
+ 	int eapol_version;
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c
+@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ static void hostapd_wpa_auth_conf(struct
+ 	wconf->wpa_gmk_rekey = conf->wpa_gmk_rekey;
+ 	wconf->wpa_ptk_rekey = conf->wpa_ptk_rekey;
+ 	wconf->wpa_group_update_count = conf->wpa_group_update_count;
++	wconf->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries =
++		conf->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries;
+ 	wconf->wpa_pairwise_update_count = conf->wpa_pairwise_update_count;
+ 	wconf->rsn_pairwise = conf->rsn_pairwise;
+ 	wconf->rsn_preauth = conf->rsn_preauth;
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/011-Additional-consistentcy-checks-for-PTK-component-len.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/011-Additional-consistentcy-checks-for-PTK-component-len.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5cc2f7b17d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/011-Additional-consistentcy-checks-for-PTK-component-len.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+From a6ea665300919d6a3af22b1f4237203647fda93a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 00:01:11 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Additional consistentcy checks for PTK component lengths
+
+Verify that TK, KCK, and KEK lengths are set to consistent values within
+struct wpa_ptk before using them in supplicant. This is an additional
+layer of protection against unexpected states.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.c |  6 ++++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c      | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.c
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.c
+@@ -100,6 +100,12 @@ int wpa_eapol_key_mic(const u8 *key, siz
+ {
+ 	u8 hash[SHA512_MAC_LEN];
+ 
++	if (key_len == 0) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "WPA: KCK not set - cannot calculate MIC");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
+ 	switch (ver) {
+ #ifndef CONFIG_FIPS
+ 	case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4:
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -725,6 +725,11 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(st
+ 
+ 	alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise_cipher);
+ 	keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
++	if (keylen <= 0 || (unsigned int) keylen != sm->ptk.tk_len) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: TK length mismatch: %d != %lu",
++			   keylen, (long unsigned int) sm->ptk.tk_len);
++		return -1;
++	}
+ 	rsclen = wpa_cipher_rsc_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
+ 
+ 	if (sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) {
+@@ -745,6 +750,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(st
+ 
+ 	/* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
+ 	os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
++	sm->ptk.tk_len = 0;
+ 	sm->ptk.installed = 1;
+ 
+ 	if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
+@@ -1717,9 +1723,10 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_verify_eapol_k
+ 	os_memcpy(mic, key + 1, mic_len);
+ 	if (sm->tptk_set) {
+ 		os_memset(key + 1, 0, mic_len);
+-		wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->tptk.kck, sm->tptk.kck_len, sm->key_mgmt,
+-				  ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1));
+-		if (os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
++		if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->tptk.kck, sm->tptk.kck_len,
++				      sm->key_mgmt,
++				      ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1)) < 0 ||
++		    os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
+ 			wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+ 				"WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key MIC "
+ 				"when using TPTK - ignoring TPTK");
+@@ -1742,9 +1749,10 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_verify_eapol_k
+ 
+ 	if (!ok && sm->ptk_set) {
+ 		os_memset(key + 1, 0, mic_len);
+-		wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->ptk.kck, sm->ptk.kck_len, sm->key_mgmt,
+-				  ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1));
+-		if (os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
++		if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->ptk.kck, sm->ptk.kck_len,
++				      sm->key_mgmt,
++				      ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1)) < 0 ||
++		    os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
+ 			wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+ 				"WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key MIC - "
+ 				"dropping packet");
+@@ -4167,6 +4175,11 @@ int fils_process_assoc_resp(struct wpa_s
+ 
+ 	alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise_cipher);
+ 	keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
++	if (keylen <= 0 || (unsigned int) keylen != sm->ptk.tk_len) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: TK length mismatch: %u != %lu",
++			   keylen, (long unsigned int) sm->ptk.tk_len);
++		goto fail;
++	}
+ 	rsclen = wpa_cipher_rsc_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
+ 	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Set TK to driver",
+ 			sm->ptk.tk, keylen);
+@@ -4183,6 +4196,7 @@ int fils_process_assoc_resp(struct wpa_s
+ 	 * takes care of association frame encryption/decryption. */
+ 	/* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
+ 	os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
++	sm->ptk.tk_len = 0;
+ 	sm->ptk.installed = 1;
+ 
+ 	/* FILS HLP Container */
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/012-Clear-BSSID-information-in-supplicant-state-machine-.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/012-Clear-BSSID-information-in-supplicant-state-machine-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..808d34586b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/012-Clear-BSSID-information-in-supplicant-state-machine-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From c0fe5f125a9d4a6564e1f4956ccc3809bf2fd69d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 01:15:24 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Clear BSSID information in supplicant state machine on
+ disconnection
+
+This fixes a corner case where RSN pre-authentication candidate from
+scan results was ignored if the station was associated with that BSS
+just before running the new scan for the connection.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -2662,6 +2662,7 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_s
+ 	wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
+ 
+ 	sm->msg_3_of_4_ok = 0;
++	os_memset(sm->bssid, 0, ETH_ALEN);
+ }
+ 
+ 
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/300-noscan.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/300-noscan.patch
index 6db16c9414..c8ca3694c0 100644
--- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/300-noscan.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/300-noscan.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 --- a/hostapd/config_file.c
 +++ b/hostapd/config_file.c
-@@ -3014,6 +3014,10 @@ static int hostapd_config_fill(struct ho
+@@ -3016,6 +3016,10 @@ static int hostapd_config_fill(struct ho
  		}
  #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
  #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  	} else if (os_strcmp(buf, "ht_capab") == 0) {
 --- a/src/ap/ap_config.h
 +++ b/src/ap/ap_config.h
-@@ -734,6 +734,8 @@ struct hostapd_config {
+@@ -735,6 +735,8 @@ struct hostapd_config {
  
  	int ht_op_mode_fixed;
  	u16 ht_capab;
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/380-disable_ctrl_iface_mib.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/380-disable_ctrl_iface_mib.patch
index 908641f638..e977f00a25 100644
--- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/380-disable_ctrl_iface_mib.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/380-disable_ctrl_iface_mib.patch
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@
  static void ieee802_1x_wnm_notif_send(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
 --- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
 +++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-@@ -3762,6 +3762,7 @@ static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int val
+@@ -3780,6 +3780,7 @@ static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int val
  	return val ? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
  }
  
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@
  
  #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
  #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
-@@ -3906,7 +3907,7 @@ int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_mac
+@@ -3924,7 +3925,7 @@ int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_mac
  
  	return len;
  }
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@
  {
 --- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
 +++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-@@ -2339,6 +2339,8 @@ static u32 wpa_key_mgmt_suite(struct wpa
+@@ -2356,6 +2356,8 @@ static u32 wpa_key_mgmt_suite(struct wpa
  }
  
  
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@
  #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
  #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
  ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
-@@ -2422,6 +2424,7 @@ int wpa_sm_get_mib(struct wpa_sm *sm, ch
+@@ -2439,6 +2441,7 @@ int wpa_sm_get_mib(struct wpa_sm *sm, ch
  
  	return (int) len;
  }
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/390-wpa_ie_cap_workaround.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/390-wpa_ie_cap_workaround.patch
index bdbae9b48e..8f7a6879ca 100644
--- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/390-wpa_ie_cap_workaround.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/390-wpa_ie_cap_workaround.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 --- a/src/common/wpa_common.c
 +++ b/src/common/wpa_common.c
-@@ -1664,6 +1664,31 @@ u32 wpa_akm_to_suite(int akm)
+@@ -1675,6 +1675,31 @@ u32 wpa_akm_to_suite(int akm)
  }
  
  
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
  int wpa_compare_rsn_ie(int ft_initial_assoc,
  		       const u8 *ie1, size_t ie1len,
  		       const u8 *ie2, size_t ie2len)
-@@ -1671,8 +1696,19 @@ int wpa_compare_rsn_ie(int ft_initial_as
+@@ -1682,8 +1707,19 @@ int wpa_compare_rsn_ie(int ft_initial_as
  	if (ie1 == NULL || ie2 == NULL)
  		return -1;
  
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/600-ubus_support.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/600-ubus_support.patch
index 0c85a27ca5..31e3e79995 100644
--- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/600-ubus_support.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/600-ubus_support.patch
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@
  }
 --- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c
 +++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c
-@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ static void hostapd_wpa_auth_psk_failure
+@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ static void hostapd_wpa_auth_psk_failure
  	struct hostapd_data *hapd = ctx;
  	wpa_msg(hapd->msg_ctx, MSG_INFO, AP_STA_POSSIBLE_PSK_MISMATCH MACSTR,
  		MAC2STR(addr));