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author | Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de> | 2019-05-04 01:52:25 +0200 |
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committer | Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz> | 2019-11-14 20:59:58 +0100 |
commit | 80b58a9db6a514138e979ccf06d0fe4dc52f0907 (patch) | |
tree | 0658866191081fad509033aea534091df2299a27 /package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0006-SAE-Avoid-branches-in-is_quadratic_residue_blind.patch | |
parent | e1854815aa4e8d85cc7a831d665a8a43d00f41c0 (diff) | |
download | upstream-80b58a9db6a514138e979ccf06d0fe4dc52f0907.tar.gz upstream-80b58a9db6a514138e979ccf06d0fe4dc52f0907.tar.bz2 upstream-80b58a9db6a514138e979ccf06d0fe4dc52f0907.zip |
hostapd: Update to version 2.8 (2019-04-21)
This also syncs the configuration files with the default configuration
files, but no extra options are activated or deactivated.
The mesh patches were partially merged into hostapd 2.8, the remaining
patches were extracted from patchwork and are now applied by OpenWrt.
The patches still have open questions which are not fixed by the author.
They were taken from this page:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/hostap/list/?series=62725&state=*
The changes in 007-mesh-apply-channel-attributes-before-running-Mesh.patch
where first applied to hostapd, but later reverted in hostapd commit
3e949655ccc5 because they caused memory leaks.
The size of the ipkgs increase a bit (between 1.3% and 2.3%):
old 2018-12-02 (2.7):
283337 wpad-basic_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk
252857 wpad-mini_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk
417473 wpad-openssl_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk
415105 wpad-wolfssl_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk
new 2019-04-21 (2.8):
288264 wpad-basic_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
256188 wpad-mini_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
427475 wpad-openssl_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
423071 wpad-wolfssl_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Tested-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
(cherry picked from commit 8af79550e6c280717660f66032d89d21007b15d2)
Diffstat (limited to 'package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0006-SAE-Avoid-branches-in-is_quadratic_residue_blind.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0006-SAE-Avoid-branches-in-is_quadratic_residue_blind.patch | 139 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 139 deletions
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0006-SAE-Avoid-branches-in-is_quadratic_residue_blind.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0006-SAE-Avoid-branches-in-is_quadratic_residue_blind.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6d93cb2480..0000000000 --- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/061-0006-SAE-Avoid-branches-in-is_quadratic_residue_blind.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,139 +0,0 @@ -From 362704dda04507e7ebb8035122e83d9f0ae7c320 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> -Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 19:34:38 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 06/14] SAE: Avoid branches in is_quadratic_residue_blind() - -Make the non-failure path in the function proceed without branches based -on r_odd and in constant time to minimize risk of observable differences -in timing or cache use. (CVE-2019-9494) - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> ---- - src/common/sae.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------ - 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) - ---- a/src/common/sae.c -+++ b/src/common/sae.c -@@ -209,12 +209,14 @@ get_rand_1_to_p_1(const u8 *prime, size_ - - static int is_quadratic_residue_blind(struct sae_data *sae, - const u8 *prime, size_t bits, -- const struct crypto_bignum *qr, -- const struct crypto_bignum *qnr, -+ const u8 *qr, const u8 *qnr, - const struct crypto_bignum *y_sqr) - { -- struct crypto_bignum *r, *num; -+ struct crypto_bignum *r, *num, *qr_or_qnr = NULL; - int r_odd, check, res = -1; -+ u8 qr_or_qnr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; -+ size_t prime_len = sae->tmp->prime_len; -+ unsigned int mask; - - /* - * Use the blinding technique to mask y_sqr while determining -@@ -225,7 +227,7 @@ static int is_quadratic_residue_blind(st - * r = a random number between 1 and p-1, inclusive - * num = (v * r * r) modulo p - */ -- r = get_rand_1_to_p_1(prime, sae->tmp->prime_len, bits, &r_odd); -+ r = get_rand_1_to_p_1(prime, prime_len, bits, &r_odd); - if (!r) - return -1; - -@@ -235,41 +237,45 @@ static int is_quadratic_residue_blind(st - crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, r, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0) - goto fail; - -- if (r_odd) { -- /* -- * num = (num * qr) module p -- * LGR(num, p) = 1 ==> quadratic residue -- */ -- if (crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, qr, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0) -- goto fail; -- check = 1; -- } else { -- /* -- * num = (num * qnr) module p -- * LGR(num, p) = -1 ==> quadratic residue -- */ -- if (crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, qnr, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0) -- goto fail; -- check = -1; -- } -+ /* -+ * Need to minimize differences in handling different cases, so try to -+ * avoid branches and timing differences. -+ * -+ * If r_odd: -+ * num = (num * qr) module p -+ * LGR(num, p) = 1 ==> quadratic residue -+ * else: -+ * num = (num * qnr) module p -+ * LGR(num, p) = -1 ==> quadratic residue -+ */ -+ mask = const_time_is_zero(r_odd); -+ const_time_select_bin(mask, qnr, qr, prime_len, qr_or_qnr_bin); -+ qr_or_qnr = crypto_bignum_init_set(qr_or_qnr_bin, prime_len); -+ if (!qr_or_qnr || -+ crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, qr_or_qnr, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0) -+ goto fail; -+ /* r_odd is 0 or 1; branchless version of check = r_odd ? 1 : -1, */ -+ check = const_time_select_int(mask, -1, 1); - - res = crypto_bignum_legendre(num, sae->tmp->prime); - if (res == -2) { - res = -1; - goto fail; - } -- res = res == check; -+ /* branchless version of res = res == check -+ * (res is -1, 0, or 1; check is -1 or 1) */ -+ mask = const_time_eq(res, check); -+ res = const_time_select_int(mask, 1, 0); - fail: - crypto_bignum_deinit(num, 1); - crypto_bignum_deinit(r, 1); -+ crypto_bignum_deinit(qr_or_qnr, 1); - return res; - } - - - static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed, -- const u8 *prime, -- const struct crypto_bignum *qr, -- const struct crypto_bignum *qnr, -+ const u8 *prime, const u8 *qr, const u8 *qnr, - u8 *pwd_value) - { - struct crypto_bignum *y_sqr, *x_cand; -@@ -429,6 +435,8 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae - struct crypto_bignum *x = NULL, *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL; - u8 x_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; - u8 x_cand_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; -+ u8 qr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; -+ u8 qnr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; - size_t bits; - int res = -1; - u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_* -@@ -453,7 +461,9 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae - * (qnr) modulo p for blinding purposes during the loop. - */ - if (get_random_qr_qnr(prime, prime_len, sae->tmp->prime, bits, -- &qr, &qnr) < 0) -+ &qr, &qnr) < 0 || -+ crypto_bignum_to_bin(qr, qr_bin, sizeof(qr_bin), prime_len) < 0 || -+ crypto_bignum_to_bin(qnr, qnr_bin, sizeof(qnr_bin), prime_len) < 0) - goto fail; - - wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password", -@@ -504,7 +514,7 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae - break; - - res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(sae, pwd_seed, -- prime, qr, qnr, x_cand_bin); -+ prime, qr_bin, qnr_bin, x_cand_bin); - const_time_select_bin(found, x_bin, x_cand_bin, prime_len, - x_bin); - pwd_seed_odd = const_time_select_u8( |