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author | Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org> | 2015-04-23 08:01:51 +0000 |
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committer | Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org> | 2015-04-23 08:01:51 +0000 |
commit | eba659cbbac0bd31889eb7ca58bf9c86f7dd0feb (patch) | |
tree | 7ee84caef089d894ad22bb9ac4f36a3aa1cbe9c0 /package/network/services/hostapd/patches/001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch | |
parent | 7e3272f422526c7161c1bd8ae8755af1b12948bb (diff) | |
download | upstream-eba659cbbac0bd31889eb7ca58bf9c86f7dd0feb.tar.gz upstream-eba659cbbac0bd31889eb7ca58bf9c86f7dd0feb.tar.bz2 upstream-eba659cbbac0bd31889eb7ca58bf9c86f7dd0feb.zip |
hostapd: backport fix for CVE-2015-1863, refresh patches
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
SVN-Revision: 45567
Diffstat (limited to 'package/network/services/hostapd/patches/001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | package/network/services/hostapd/patches/001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch | 37 |
1 files changed, 37 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e408fbe383 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it + (CVE-2015-1863) + +This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in +p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes) +was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in +arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the +dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the +heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P +peer discovery purposes. + +This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program +behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service +due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation, +and potentially arbitrary code execution. + +Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart +hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +--- + src/p2p/p2p.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +--- a/src/p2p/p2p.c ++++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c +@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p, + if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0) + os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN); + if (msg.ssid && ++ msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) && + (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN || + os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN) + != 0)) { |