diff options
author | Eneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com> | 2023-04-04 15:39:56 -0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Christian Marangi <ansuelsmth@gmail.com> | 2023-04-07 11:26:26 +0200 |
commit | c3cb2d48da781f4e254ef526e1b44ae5a68248d7 (patch) | |
tree | 18f8d5526757abb2c11c5fa1bd0bc704ffa7fa9d /package/libs | |
parent | 036372c769eb9001d548e6b86ad8ebb97f27fa95 (diff) | |
download | upstream-c3cb2d48da781f4e254ef526e1b44ae5a68248d7.tar.gz upstream-c3cb2d48da781f4e254ef526e1b44ae5a68248d7.tar.bz2 upstream-c3cb2d48da781f4e254ef526e1b44ae5a68248d7.zip |
openssl: fix CVE-2023-464 and CVE-2023-465
Apply two patches fixing low-severity vulnerabilities related to
certificate policies validation:
- Excessive Resource Usage Verifying X.509 Policy Constraints
(CVE-2023-0464)
Severity: Low
A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions
of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains
that include policy constraints. Attackers may be able to exploit
this vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that
triggers exponential use of computational resources, leading to a
denial-of-service (DoS) attack on affected systems.
Policy processing is disabled by default but can be enabled by passing
the `-policy' argument to the command line utilities or by calling the
`X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies()' function.
- Invalid certificate policies in leaf certificates are silently ignored
(CVE-2023-0465)
Severity: Low
Applications that use a non-default option when verifying certificates
may be vulnerable to an attack from a malicious CA to circumvent
certain checks.
Invalid certificate policies in leaf certificates are silently ignored
by OpenSSL and other certificate policy checks are skipped for that
certificate. A malicious CA could use this to deliberately assert
invalid certificate policies in order to circumvent policy checking on
the certificate altogether.
Policy processing is disabled by default but can be enabled by passing
the `-policy' argument to the command line utilities or by calling the
`X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies()' function.
Note: OpenSSL also released a fix for low-severity security advisory
CVE-2023-466. It is not included here because the fix only changes the
documentation, which is not built nor included in any OpenWrt package.
Due to the low-severity of these issues, there will be not be an
immediate new release of OpenSSL.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'package/libs')
3 files changed, 252 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/package/libs/openssl/Makefile b/package/libs/openssl/Makefile index add3eb7db6..2abb348546 100644 --- a/package/libs/openssl/Makefile +++ b/package/libs/openssl/Makefile @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk PKG_NAME:=openssl PKG_VERSION:=3.0.8 -PKG_RELEASE:=7 +PKG_RELEASE:=8 PKG_BUILD_FLAGS:=no-mips16 gc-sections PKG_BUILD_PARALLEL:=1 diff --git a/package/libs/openssl/patches/200-x509-excessive-resource-use-verifying-policy-constra.patch b/package/libs/openssl/patches/200-x509-excessive-resource-use-verifying-policy-constra.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..927634c0a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/libs/openssl/patches/200-x509-excessive-resource-use-verifying-policy-constra.patch @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@ +From 959c59c7a0164117e7f8366466a32bb1f8d77ff1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Pauli <pauli@openssl.org> +Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2023 15:28:20 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] x509: excessive resource use verifying policy constraints + +A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions +of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains +that include policy constraints. Attackers may be able to exploit this +vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers +exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service +(DoS) attack on affected systems. + +Fixes CVE-2023-0464 + +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20568) + +--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h ++++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h +@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st { + }; + + struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st { ++ /* The number of nodes in the tree */ ++ size_t node_count; ++ /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */ ++ size_t node_maximum; ++ + /* This is the tree 'level' data */ + X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels; + int nlevel; +@@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_tree_find_ + X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, + X509_POLICY_DATA *data, + X509_POLICY_NODE *parent, +- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree); ++ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, ++ int extra_data); + void ossl_policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node); + int ossl_policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl, + const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid); +--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c ++++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c +@@ -59,10 +59,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_find + X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, + X509_POLICY_DATA *data, + X509_POLICY_NODE *parent, +- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) ++ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, ++ int extra_data) + { + X509_POLICY_NODE *node; + ++ /* Verify that the tree isn't too large. This mitigates CVE-2023-0464 */ ++ if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum) ++ return NULL; ++ + node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node)); + if (node == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); +@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_ + } + node->data = data; + node->parent = parent; +- if (level) { ++ if (level != NULL) { + if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) { + if (level->anyPolicy) + goto node_error; +@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_ + } + } + +- if (tree) { ++ if (extra_data) { + if (tree->extra_data == NULL) + tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null(); + if (tree->extra_data == NULL){ +@@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_ + } + } + ++ tree->node_count++; + if (parent) + parent->nchild++; + +--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c ++++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c +@@ -14,6 +14,17 @@ + + #include "pcy_local.h" + ++/* ++ * If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it to ++ * a generous default of 1000 nodes. ++ * ++ * Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens the ++ * door on CVE-2023-0464. ++ */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX ++# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000 ++#endif ++ + static void expected_print(BIO *channel, + X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, X509_POLICY_NODE *node, + int indent) +@@ -163,6 +174,9 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE ** + return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; + } + ++ /* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */ ++ tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX; ++ + /* + * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3. + * +@@ -180,7 +194,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE ** + if ((data = ossl_policy_data_new(NULL, + OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL) + goto bad_tree; +- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) { ++ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) { + ossl_policy_data_free(data); + goto bad_tree; + } +@@ -239,7 +253,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE ** + * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise + */ + static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, +- X509_POLICY_DATA *data) ++ X509_POLICY_DATA *data, ++ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) + { + X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; + int i, matched = 0; +@@ -249,13 +264,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509 + X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); + + if (ossl_policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) { +- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL) ++ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL) + return 0; + matched = 1; + } + } + if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) { +- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) ++ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL) + return 0; + } + return 1; +@@ -268,7 +283,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509 + * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. + */ + static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, +- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache) ++ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, ++ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) + { + int i; + +@@ -276,7 +292,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_L + X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i); + + /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */ +- if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data)) ++ if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree)) + return 0; + } + return 1; +@@ -307,7 +323,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLIC + /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ + data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; + data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; +- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) { ++ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) { + ossl_policy_data_free(data); + return 0; + } +@@ -370,7 +386,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEV + /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */ + if (last->anyPolicy && + ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, +- last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) ++ last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL) + return 0; + return 1; + } +@@ -553,7 +569,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_ + extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS + | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE; + node = ossl_policy_level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, +- tree); ++ tree, 1); + } + if (!tree->user_policies) { + tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null(); +@@ -580,7 +596,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TRE + + for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { + cache = ossl_policy_cache_set(curr->cert); +- if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache)) ++ if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree)) + return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; + + if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) diff --git a/package/libs/openssl/patches/210-Ensure-that-EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY-is-checked-even-in.patch b/package/libs/openssl/patches/210-Ensure-that-EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY-is-checked-even-in.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..01819c15a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/libs/openssl/patches/210-Ensure-that-EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY-is-checked-even-in.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From 1dd43e0709fece299b15208f36cc7c76209ba0bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> +Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 16:52:55 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY is checked even in leaf + certs + +Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we +later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf +cert was bad. + +Fixes: CVE-2023-0465 + +Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20587) + +--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c ++++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +@@ -1654,15 +1654,23 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * + goto memerr; + /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ + if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) { +- int i; ++ int i, cbcalled = 0; + + /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */ +- for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { ++ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { + X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); + ++ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0) ++ cbcalled = 1; + CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0, + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION); + } ++ if (!cbcalled) { ++ /* Should not be able to get here */ ++ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */ + return 1; + } + if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) { |