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authorRobert Marko <robert.marko@sartura.hr>2020-05-12 22:18:33 +0200
committerJo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>2020-05-13 11:45:15 +0200
commit4cd9ae41c5f7fd4de6d9a2970f8243c9555428a7 (patch)
treeb82330da4afda8d08cb575f481b9144e7292dc99 /package/libs
parent6ffd4d8a4de2a7c35a841a21c4b4116dfe54b754 (diff)
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libjson-c: backport security fixes
This backports upstream fixes for the out of bounds write vulnerability in json-c. It was reported and patches in this upstream PR: https://github.com/json-c/json-c/pull/592 Addresses CVE-2020-12762 Signed-off-by: Robert Marko <robert.marko@sartura.hr> Signed-off-by: Luka Perkov <luka.perkov@sartura.hr> [bump PKG_RELEASE, rebase patches on top of json-c 0.12] Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io> (backported from commit bc0288b76816578f5aeccb2abd679f82bfc5738e)
Diffstat (limited to 'package/libs')
-rw-r--r--package/libs/libjson-c/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--package/libs/libjson-c/patches/000-libm.patch2
-rw-r--r--package/libs/libjson-c/patches/001-Prevent-division-by-zero-in-linkhash.patch32
-rw-r--r--package/libs/libjson-c/patches/002-Fix-integer-overflows.patch83
4 files changed, 117 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/package/libs/libjson-c/Makefile b/package/libs/libjson-c/Makefile
index 23cc7b5de4..522de06984 100644
--- a/package/libs/libjson-c/Makefile
+++ b/package/libs/libjson-c/Makefile
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=json-c
PKG_VERSION:=0.12.1
-PKG_RELEASE:=3
+PKG_RELEASE:=3.1
PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION)-nodoc.tar.gz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://s3.amazonaws.com/json-c_releases/releases/
diff --git a/package/libs/libjson-c/patches/000-libm.patch b/package/libs/libjson-c/patches/000-libm.patch
index 45adb0597f..e196b422fa 100644
--- a/package/libs/libjson-c/patches/000-libm.patch
+++ b/package/libs/libjson-c/patches/000-libm.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -43,12 +43,6 @@
+@@ -43,12 +43,6 @@ AC_FUNC_MEMCMP
AC_FUNC_MALLOC
AC_FUNC_REALLOC
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(strcasecmp strdup strerror snprintf vsnprintf vasprintf open vsyslog strncasecmp setlocale)
diff --git a/package/libs/libjson-c/patches/001-Prevent-division-by-zero-in-linkhash.patch b/package/libs/libjson-c/patches/001-Prevent-division-by-zero-in-linkhash.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5345328d7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/libs/libjson-c/patches/001-Prevent-division-by-zero-in-linkhash.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 77d935b7ae7871a1940cd827e850e6063044ec45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:46:45 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Prevent division by zero in linkhash.
+
+If a linkhash with a size of zero is created, then modulo operations
+are prone to division by zero operations.
+
+Purely protective measure against bad usage.
+---
+ linkhash.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/linkhash.c
++++ b/linkhash.c
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
+ *
+ */
+
++#include <assert.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+@@ -431,6 +432,8 @@ struct lh_table* lh_table_new(int size,
+ int i;
+ struct lh_table *t;
+
++ /* Allocate space for elements to avoid divisions by zero. */
++ assert(size > 0);
+ t = (struct lh_table*)calloc(1, sizeof(struct lh_table));
+ if(!t) lh_abort("lh_table_new: calloc failed\n");
+ t->count = 0;
diff --git a/package/libs/libjson-c/patches/002-Fix-integer-overflows.patch b/package/libs/libjson-c/patches/002-Fix-integer-overflows.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2298785b9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/libs/libjson-c/patches/002-Fix-integer-overflows.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+From d07b91014986900a3a75f306d302e13e005e9d67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:47:25 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix integer overflows.
+
+The data structures linkhash and printbuf are limited to 2 GB in size
+due to a signed integer being used to track their current size.
+
+If too much data is added, then size variable can overflow, which is
+an undefined behaviour in C programming language.
+
+Assuming that a signed int overflow just leads to a negative value,
+like it happens on many sytems (Linux i686/amd64 with gcc), then
+printbuf is vulnerable to an out of boundary write on 64 bit systems.
+---
+ linkhash.c | 7 +++++--
+ printbuf.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/linkhash.c
++++ b/linkhash.c
+@@ -498,7 +498,12 @@ int lh_table_insert(struct lh_table *t,
+ unsigned long h, n;
+
+ t->inserts++;
+- if(t->count >= t->size * LH_LOAD_FACTOR) lh_table_resize(t, t->size * 2);
++ if(t->count >= t->size * LH_LOAD_FACTOR) {
++ /* Avoid signed integer overflow with large tables. */
++ int new_size = (t->size > INT_MAX / 2) ? INT_MAX : (t->size * 2);
++ if (t->size != INT_MAX)
++ lh_table_resize(t, new_size);
++ }
+
+ h = t->hash_fn(k);
+ n = h % t->size;
+--- a/printbuf.c
++++ b/printbuf.c
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+
+ #include "config.h"
+
++#include <limits.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -63,7 +64,16 @@ static int printbuf_extend(struct printb
+ if (p->size >= min_size)
+ return 0;
+
+- new_size = json_max(p->size * 2, min_size + 8);
++ /* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */
++ if (min_size > INT_MAX - 8)
++ return -1;
++ if (p->size > INT_MAX / 2)
++ new_size = min_size + 8;
++ else {
++ new_size = p->size * 2;
++ if (new_size < min_size + 8)
++ new_size = min_size + 8;
++ }
+ #ifdef PRINTBUF_DEBUG
+ MC_DEBUG("printbuf_memappend: realloc "
+ "bpos=%d min_size=%d old_size=%d new_size=%d\n",
+@@ -78,6 +88,9 @@ static int printbuf_extend(struct printb
+
+ int printbuf_memappend(struct printbuf *p, const char *buf, int size)
+ {
++ /* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */
++ if (size > INT_MAX - p->bpos - 1)
++ return -1;
+ if (p->size <= p->bpos + size + 1) {
+ if (printbuf_extend(p, p->bpos + size + 1) < 0)
+ return -1;
+@@ -94,6 +107,9 @@ int printbuf_memset(struct printbuf *pb,
+
+ if (offset == -1)
+ offset = pb->bpos;
++ /* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */
++ if (len > INT_MAX - offset)
++ return -1;
+ size_needed = offset + len;
+ if (pb->size < size_needed)
+ {