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authorEneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com>2019-08-05 14:45:41 -0300
committerHauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>2019-08-17 17:23:17 +0200
commit2df2b75208dce06dee02508c8d589fc5f540023d (patch)
tree6ffd3d40a1af5a5f4cd19e2d3b8dda5739714864 /package/libs/wolfssl/patches/020-Improve-nonce-use-in-ECC-mulmod.patch
parent09bdc144197fe656f16d691d649ae08b36b4b126 (diff)
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wolfssl: fixes for CVE-2018-16870 & CVE-2019-13628
CVE-2018-16870: medium-severity, new variant of the Bleichenbacher attack to perform downgrade attacks against TLS, which may lead to leakage of sensible data. Backported from 3.15.7. CVE-2019-13628 (currently assigned-only): potential leak of nonce sizes when performing ECDSA signing operations. The leak is considered to be difficult to exploit but it could potentially be used maliciously to perform a lattice based timing attack. Backported from 4.1.0. Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'package/libs/wolfssl/patches/020-Improve-nonce-use-in-ECC-mulmod.patch')
-rw-r--r--package/libs/wolfssl/patches/020-Improve-nonce-use-in-ECC-mulmod.patch98
1 files changed, 98 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/libs/wolfssl/patches/020-Improve-nonce-use-in-ECC-mulmod.patch b/package/libs/wolfssl/patches/020-Improve-nonce-use-in-ECC-mulmod.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..28ef4e48ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/libs/wolfssl/patches/020-Improve-nonce-use-in-ECC-mulmod.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+From ba4d612892bf6e3aae9cca7edce2a6d6b43e3e22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sean Parkinson <sean@wolfssl.com>
+Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2019 08:26:02 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Improve nonce use in ECC mulmod
+
+(cherry picked from commit 483f6a5acd9808b405306661c121aa6407464dc2)
+
+--- a/wolfcrypt/src/ecc.c
++++ b/wolfcrypt/src/ecc.c
+@@ -2039,7 +2039,7 @@ int wc_ecc_mulmod_ex(mp_int* k, ecc_poin
+ #define M_POINTS 8
+ int first = 1, bitbuf = 0, bitcpy = 0, j;
+ #else
+- #define M_POINTS 3
++ #define M_POINTS 4
+ #endif
+
+ ecc_point *tG, *M[M_POINTS];
+@@ -2253,7 +2253,9 @@ int wc_ecc_mulmod_ex(mp_int* k, ecc_poin
+ mode = 0;
+ bitcnt = 1;
+ buf = 0;
+- digidx = get_digit_count(k) - 1;
++ digidx = get_digit_count(modulus) - 1;
++ /* The order MAY be 1 bit longer than the modulus. */
++ digidx += (modulus->dp[digidx] >> (DIGIT_BIT-1));
+
+ /* perform ops */
+ if (err == MP_OKAY) {
+@@ -2272,25 +2274,53 @@ int wc_ecc_mulmod_ex(mp_int* k, ecc_poin
+ i = (buf >> (DIGIT_BIT - 1)) & 1;
+ buf <<= 1;
+
+- if (mode == 0 && i == 0) {
++ if (mode == 0) {
++ mode = i;
+ /* timing resistant - dummy operations */
+ if (err == MP_OKAY)
+- err = ecc_projective_add_point(M[0], M[1], M[2], a, modulus,
++ err = ecc_projective_add_point(M[1], M[2], M[2], a, modulus,
+ mp);
++#ifdef WC_NO_CACHE_RESISTANT
+ if (err == MP_OKAY)
+- err = ecc_projective_dbl_point(M[1], M[2], a, modulus, mp);
+- if (err == MP_OKAY)
+- continue;
+- }
+-
+- if (mode == 0 && i == 1) {
+- mode = 1;
+- /* timing resistant - dummy operations */
+- if (err == MP_OKAY)
+- err = ecc_projective_add_point(M[0], M[1], M[2], a, modulus,
+- mp);
+- if (err == MP_OKAY)
+- err = ecc_projective_dbl_point(M[1], M[2], a, modulus, mp);
++ err = ecc_projective_dbl_point(M[2], M[3], a, modulus, mp);
++#else
++ /* instead of using M[i] for double, which leaks key bit to cache
++ * monitor, use M[2] as temp, make sure address calc is constant,
++ * keep M[0] and M[1] in cache */
++ if (err == MP_OKAY)
++ err = mp_copy((mp_int*)
++ ( ((wolfssl_word)M[0]->x & wc_off_on_addr[i^1]) +
++ ((wolfssl_word)M[1]->x & wc_off_on_addr[i])),
++ M[2]->x);
++ if (err == MP_OKAY)
++ err = mp_copy((mp_int*)
++ ( ((wolfssl_word)M[0]->y & wc_off_on_addr[i^1]) +
++ ((wolfssl_word)M[1]->y & wc_off_on_addr[i])),
++ M[2]->y);
++ if (err == MP_OKAY)
++ err = mp_copy((mp_int*)
++ ( ((wolfssl_word)M[0]->z & wc_off_on_addr[i^1]) +
++ ((wolfssl_word)M[1]->z & wc_off_on_addr[i])),
++ M[2]->z);
++ if (err == MP_OKAY)
++ err = ecc_projective_dbl_point(M[2], M[3], a, modulus, mp);
++ /* copy M[2] back to M[i] */
++ if (err == MP_OKAY)
++ err = mp_copy(M[2]->x,
++ (mp_int*)
++ ( ((wolfssl_word)M[0]->x & wc_off_on_addr[i^1]) +
++ ((wolfssl_word)M[1]->x & wc_off_on_addr[i])) );
++ if (err == MP_OKAY)
++ err = mp_copy(M[2]->y,
++ (mp_int*)
++ ( ((wolfssl_word)M[0]->y & wc_off_on_addr[i^1]) +
++ ((wolfssl_word)M[1]->y & wc_off_on_addr[i])) );
++ if (err == MP_OKAY)
++ err = mp_copy(M[2]->z,
++ (mp_int*)
++ ( ((wolfssl_word)M[0]->z & wc_off_on_addr[i^1]) +
++ ((wolfssl_word)M[1]->z & wc_off_on_addr[i])) );
++#endif
+ if (err == MP_OKAY)
+ continue;
+ }